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Table 1: U.S. Strategic Force Structure
| 1 Jan 1992 | FY 1992 Base Force* | New Base Force" | Nuclear Posture Review |
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles | ||||
Trident D5 | 120 | 240 | 240 | 336 |
Trident C4 | 384 | 192 | 192 | 0 |
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles | ||||
MX Peacekeeper | 50 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
Minuteman III | 500 | 500 (300 to 1 Warhead) | 500 (all downloaded to 1 warhead) | 450-500 (all downloaded to 1 warhead) |
Minuteman II (being deactivated) | 450 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Strategic Bomber Aircraft | ||||
B-2 | 0 | 75 | 20 | 20 |
B-1B Lancer | 97 | 96 | 96 | (96) |
B-52H Stratofortress | 95 | 95 | 95 | 66 |
B-52G Stratofortress | 44 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notes: * The U.S. strategic force planned in FY 1992 for the late 1990s based on the implementation of
START agreements.
** A “substantial” portion of the bomber force was to be oriented primarily to the conventional role under this proposal.
A Decreasing Strategic Force
The long-awaited, comprehensive review of U.S. strategic forces—as expected—will further reduce U.S. nuclear strike forces. The Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missile force, which will provide most of the U.S. strategic offensive capability in the post-Cold War era, will be cut to 14 submarines with 336 missiles. Navy planners and others had anticipated a force of 18 Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarines with 432 missiles being in service for the next two decades. However, the Department of Defense-sponsored Nuclear Posture Review, completed in September 1994, calls for disposal of the four earliest Trident submarines, completed from 1981-1984.
The Nuclear Posture Review was undertaken because “Now it’s time to change the way we think about nuclear weapons . . according to Secretary of Defense William J. Perry.1 He said that the review dealt with a balance between the “two great issues”: how to achieve the proper balance of nuclear weapons, while at the same time having a hedge against the reversal of reform in Russia. The review was conducted by a joint civilian-military team headed by Dr. Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Programs), and then-Vice Admiral William A. Owens, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments).2
Beyond the cutback to 14 submarines, the Trident force will be placed on "modified-alert" rather than full-alert status. However, no action has been taken on some proposals that the Trident force shift from the historic two-crew operating concept to a single crew. While this could result in considerable savings, it would severely reduce Trident submarine time at sea and flexibility in scheduling.
Not mentioned in Pentagon briefings and speeches about the nuclear review is the possibility of employing Trident submarines in a conventional strike role. The Navy has been reported to have proposed a demonstration of a conventional Trident missile. The tests have been suggested by the Strategic Systems Project Office as a means of striking time-sensitive, heavily defended, high-value targets.3 Such a weapon could enable the Navy to retain the four non-strategic submarines for a conventional role. However, there could be significant problems in the concept, such as a nation’s early warning system indicating that ballistic missiles were being fired with no way of knowing the intended target or whether they were nuclear or conventional weapons. Modification of existing agreements would be required, but that is feasible, as evidenced by changing the status of the B-1B bomber from a nuclear to a conventional strike aircraft.
In addition to 14 Trident submarines, U.S. strategic offensive forces after the turn of the century will consist of B-2 and B-52H manned bombers, and single-warhead Minuteman ill intercontinental ballistic missiles. The forces that will be maintained under the Nuclear Posture Review and the earlier plans for the post-Cold War strategic forces are shown in Table 1.
While the Department of Defense calls the Nuclear Posture Review the “first such review of U.S. nuclear policy in 15 years and the first study ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety and security, and arms control in a single review,” there have been other major strategic reviews in the past few years.[1] For example, President George Bush announced major changes in the U.S. nuclear forces—strategic as well as tactical—on 27 September 1991.
In addition, the “Fiscal Year 1992 Base Force” for strategic forces was announced in 1990 and the “New Base Force” was revealed in 1992. Major changes proposed by the latest strategic review is the reduction of Trident submarines, and the reduction in the number of older B-52H bombers. The B-52s, delivered in 1961-1962 but greatly updated, will have both a conventional and nuclear strike role, the former with “iron bombs” and stand-off missiles, the latter with cruise missiles. The review confirmed the earlier Air Force decision to shift all 96 B-1B bombers to the conventional bombing role.
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Proceedings/January 1995
| Table 2: |
|
|
Weapon Loadouts/Launch Capabilities | |||
Ship-Class | Weapons | Torpedo | VLS |
|
| Tubes | Cells |
SSN-688 Los Angeles ISSN-688 Los Angeles | 25 | 4 | 0 |
(Improved) | 37 | 4 | 12 |
SSN-21 Seawolf | 50 | 8 | 0 |
DD-963 Spruance | 61 | — | 61 |
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke | 90 | — | 90 |
CG-47 Ticonderoga | 122 |
| 122 |
These reductions in strategic nuclear weapons will be compatible with the START II agreement with Russia, which has not yet been ratified or entered into force. By the year 2003, the end of the time period considered by the Nuclear Posture Review, it is expected that START II would be in effect with a limit of 3,500 weapons: up to 1,750 on Trident submarines (with four or five warheads per Trident missile), 450 to 500 on Minuteman III missiles, and the remainder on manned bombers.
Also significant, the Nuclear Posture Review states that there is “No requirement for any additional B-2 bombers in a nuclear role” beyond the 20 aircraft now being produced. The continued production of the B-2, a stealthy flying-wing aircraft, had been urged by both the Air Force’s leadership and by the Northrop Corporation, initially rationalizing the manufacture of more aircraft for the conventional role and then for keeping the nation’s bomber- producing industrial base in being. (No strategic bombers were produced in the United States from 1962, when the last Boeing B-52H was delivered, until 1974, when the first Rockwell B-1A was completed, except for two prototype B-70 Valkyrie aircraft.)
While the number of Trident submarines is being reduced by four units (i.e., 29% less than previous planning), all of the submarines are to be armed with the more-capable D5 variant of the Trident. The first eight Ohio-class submarines were built to carry the C4 missile. An upgrade to the D5 variant was planned for those units, but with the end of the Cold War, the availability of funds for that update (to be accomplished during overhaul) was highly questionable. Now the four oldest C4-armed submarines will be discarded, and the next four units will be upgraded to the D5 missile, thus providing a force of 14 submarines, all carrying D5 missiles.
The Trident D5 is a longer-range and more-accurate weapon compared to the C4. Also, the D5 can deliver 75% more payload than the C4, carrying eight of the Mark 5 re-entry bodies, each fitted with a W88 nuclear warhead having an explosive force of about 300-475 kilotons. However, in the future, the D5 missiles will be downloaded to only four or five warheads. The production of W88 warheads stopped after some 400 were produced; hence, most Trident missiles will carry the W76 with a yield of some 100 kilotons.
The first test flight of the Lockheed-developed D5 missile from Cape Canaveral occurred on 17 January 1987. The first submarine launch occurred on 21 March 1989 from the Tennessee (SSBN-734); that test launch failed, as did the third submarine launch. Following a series of successful test launches, the missile became operational, and the Tennessee began the first Trident D5 patrol in March 1990. (The failures were due to a design flaw caused by the water pressure on the missiles' nozzles, which caused the missiles to tumble after leaving the water.)
The backfitting of four submarines to the D5 missile will also preserve an industrial base for strategic missiles, following the cancellation of further MX Peacekeeper production and the mobile, small, intercontinental-ballistic-missile program (called Midgetman).
At this writing, 15 of the Ohio-class submarines are in service, completed since 1981. Three additional units are under construction at the General Dynamics/Electric Boat yard in Groton, Connecticut: the Maine (SSBN-741), to complete in 1995; the Wyoming (SSBN-742), in 1996; and the Louisiana (SSBN-743), in 1997.
The last of the 41 earlier strategic missile submarines—completed from 1959 to 1967 and armed with a successionof Polaris missiles (41 units), Poseidon missiles (31 units), and Trident C4 missiles (12 units)—have been withdrawn from the strategic role. Of those, 39 submarines are being partially dismantled and stored at Bremerton, Washington; two others, the Kamehameha (ex-SSBN-642) and the James K. Polk (ex-SSBN- 645), are in active service as special-operations submarines (nowdesignated SSNs).
The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review also addressed non-strategic nuclear forces with significant implications for the Navy.
Of the five remaining types of non-strategic nuclear forces, two are to be eliminated entirely. These non-strategic nuclear forces are:
► Air Force dual-capable tactical aircraft in Western Europe and deployed nuclear weapons: to be retained at current levels (which are less than 10% of Cold War force levels).
► Air Force dual-capable tactical aircraft, B-1B, and B-52H aircraft based in the United States: retain, with a reduction in the B- 52 numbers.
► Navy and Marine Corps dualcapable, carrier-based aircraft: eliminate nuclear option.
► Navy nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles for surface ships: eliminate nuclear option.
► Navy nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles for attack submarines: retain nuclear option.
In addition, the Navy will be affected by the decision to fit all nuclear weapon systems—including submarines—with coded control devices, called “permissive action links,” by 1977.
Previous decisions caused the removal of all nuclear weapons from Navy surface ships except for those with a Tomahawk capability. Nuclear weapons also have been eliminated from the Marine Corps as well as the Army.
In some respects, the most surprising decision of the Nuclear Posture Review has been the elimination of nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAM-N) from surface ships while retaining them in submarines. Submarine weapon loadouts and launch capabilities are limited compared to surface ships with vertical-launch systems, as shown in Table 2.
Both submarines and surface ships would carry other weapons in addition to TLAM-N missiles. The submarines would use weapon spaces for torpedoes. Harpoon antiship missiles. Tomahawk antiship missiles, various types of conventional TLAMs, and possibly mines; the surface ships would have Standard surface-to-air missiles and conventional Tomahawks. Still, the larger numbers of weapons available to the surface ships compared to the submarines, and the small number of Seawolf-class units that will be in the force (only two or three), will impose a severe limitation on the number of TLAM-N missiles that could be available in the fleet. [2] 4
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Proceedings / January 1995
[1]“DoD Review Recommends Reduction in Nuclear Force,” Department of Defense News Release, 22 September 1994, p. 1.
'Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Press Conference, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 22 September 1994.
:Adm. Owens is now Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
‘Barbara Starr, “Conventional Trident Tests Planned by USN,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 August 1994, p. 1.