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he Navy-Marine Corps White Paper . . From the Sea” lays the foundation for restructuring our naval forces. As the United States withdraws from over-
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Landing Marines is the strongest signal can send in the new era of littoral war Lire. A combined-arms team—the naval ®xpeditionary force—is the most effective way to accomplish this. How many and 'vhat kind of “arms” should make up this force?
?eas bases, naval forces will become even more relevant ln meeting U.S. forward presence requirements. Planners Anticipate that this power projection will occur in littoral j^vironments. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps Live introduced the concept of the naval expeditionary force (NEF) as a means of dominating littoral areas.
Although “. . . From the Sea” discusses the capabilities °f a naval expeditionary force, it does not describe the units that should comprise it. One of our immediate tasks should be to define the naval expeditionary force. For ex- jj'nple, what are the command relationships within a NEF? what units should we retain or discard in resizing °Ur naval forces for littoral warfare?
The most distinctive characteristic of the NEF is its j;°mbined-arms personality; it is created for littoral war- are- Designed as a combined-arms team to project naval P°Wer, it is flexible and self sustaining. Using the war- 'Shting philosophy of maneuver warfare, the NEF produces decisive results with a relatively small force.
As a littoral combined-arms team, the NEF puts into Practice the fundamental tenet of maneuver warfare: pattering the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, V|°lent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot c°Pe.”‘ Combined arms create a dilemma for the enemy;
step he takes to counteract one threat makes him vul- 1'erable to another.
Admittedly, the “arms” used to create the combined- artHs effect vary greatly. A NEF could be structured “sing an aircraft carrier and her embarked aircraft wing, j^Phibious ships with embarked Marines, surface com- ;itants, Navy special forces, submarines, maritime pa- tr°l aircraft, and mine warfare forces. The answer to every S|tUation may not be all these “arms.” For example, for a nortcombatant evacuation operation, we may need only an ^phibious ready group with its embarked Marine air- ®r°und task force (MAGTF) and a surface action group 'v'th Tomahawk missiles. Another crisis may call only for ? carrier battle group. Thus, what is the minimum number of “arms” that have to be present for a naval force to e called a naval expeditionary force?
The answer lies in “. . . From the Sea.” It indicates that (|Ur national strategy envisions naval forces that can act , ecisively on short notice in order to dominate littoral j!reas. This decisive action ranges from a benign show of 0fce offshore to the strongest signal we can send: landing Marines. The key operational capabilities required to execute this decisive action successfully are:
► Command, control, and surveillance >• Battlespace dominance
► Power projection
► Force sustainment
Arguably, battlespace dominance and power projection are the two most important operational capabilities in determining the minimum arms level to be present in the NEF. These two capabilities overlap. After analyzing these capabilities, we will link them to the tools needed to create a NEF.
Battlespace Dominance
Battlespace dominance has two aims—to enhance friendly freedom of action, especially in projecting power ashore, and to deny the enemy freedom of action, particularly as he attempts to interfere with our amphibious power projection. Tactically, battlespace is the three-dimensional space—both at sea and in littoral areas—in which the NEF commander executes the maneuver of his forces. Because the sea, the air, and the land are viewed as one maneuver space for a single, seamless operation, the battlespace must encompass the entire area of maneuver and influence of the NEF, plus its larger area of interest.
Naval expeditionary forces must consider all aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The size and shape of the battlespace will vary greatly. The longer the range of friendly and enemy weapons and sensors employed, the larger the battlespace. Conversely, the shorter the reach of the forces involved, the smaller the battlespace. It is not a fixed area in space, time, or responsibility. As the force moves and conditions change, so does the battlespace.2
In a worst-case scenario or nonpermissive environment, two “arms” are required to achieve battlespace dominance: first is a carrier with her massive strike potential and surface combatant escorts heavily armed with tactical cruise missiles, antiair missiles, and antisubmarine torpedoes; less obvious, but equally critical, is an amphibious ready group with an embarked MAGTF.
The carrier’s most important function in littoral warfare is to establish air supremacy in the objective area in order to ensure that the NEF can effectively transition its control from open ocean to littoral areas. Fixed-wing aircraft—F-14s and F/A-18s—provide antiair warfare support to destroy or reduce enemy air and missile threats. Inherent also in the carrier wing is the EA-6B Prowler, fulfdling the primary role in antiship missile defense. Similarly, surface combatant escorts will continue to provide air, surface, and subsurface protection for carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups.
A MAGTF is required to dominate battlespace on land. Clearly, landing Marines is critical to our ability to project power. In a sense, battlespace dominance is a precursor or precondition to power projection. But a NEF also achieves battlespace dominance over land through the power projection of the MAGTF from the sea to the shore. Unquestionably, land is the most difficult dimen-
aircraft are necessary to provide them with sustain^
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sion to dominate. Thus, to achieve land dominance, we should be prepared to project power ashore via an amphibious operation. Yet, we need some battlespace dominance before we can project power ashore. Therefore, if our goal is to dominate the land portion of our battlespace then we will need power projection in the form of landing Marines ashore.
The Marine Corps is organized into fighting units called Marine air-ground task forces. The MAGTF employs a building-block concept. The naval expeditionary force operational requirement or task is analyzed, and the right types of units are drawn from a Marine division, aircraft wing, and force service support group into an air-ground- logistics team—under a single commander—to meet the task. The resulting MAGTF could be any size, and the composition of its component elements may vary, depending on the mission and enemy situation. In each case, however, it will contain a MAGTF command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element.3 This uniquely capable organization—the MAGTF—always will be an integral part of a NEF.
Once battlespace dominance is established, the need for both a carrier battle group and a MAGTF continues throughout the campaign, because dominance is fleeting. At any given time, the battlespace will be subject to a certain degree of control by forces of one or both sides of a conflict. The greater degree of battlespace dominance, the easier it is to conduct friendly operations. On the other hand, the fact that an operation is needed is evidence that dominance is less than complete.
Shaping the Battlefield
Inherent in battlespace dominance is the concept of “shaping” the battlefield. Shaping the battlespace sets up conditions for decisive action. The NEF commander shapes the battlespace primarily with fires, although he may use other means, e.g., electronic warfare (EA-6B). Shaping attempts to destroy, disperse, or fragment the enemy’s main combat power. It also seeks to dismantle his command-and-control structure. It keeps the enem) from massing his forces or maneuvering them effectively' thereby creating a window of opportunity during which he is most vulnerable to the firepower and mobility of the naval combined arms team.4
Within a NEF, carrier aviation and its surface combatants armed with Tomahawk missiles are the commander's primary tools. Naval aviation uses its massive firepowet and exceptional speed to shape the battlespace. Shaping may take the form of deep air strikes on critical enemy command-and-control nodes. Tomahawk missiles also can strike against critical nodes. After the NEF commandef prepares and shapes the battlespace, he creates the deci sive action—in the form of naval power projection—at the best time and place to win.
Power Projection
Naval power projection is decisive. A NEF uses its dominance of littoral areas to project intense, precise offensive power ashore at the time and location of its choosing. The three types of power-projection tools available are cruise missiles and naval gunfire, naval strike operations, and amphibious operations. They may be combined in an overwhelming combined-arms onslaught, or they may be judiciously measured. A belligerent commandef may back down upon the arrival of a NEF in his neigh' borhood. It might take missile strikes in his backyard to convince a more persistent enemy. Bombing may be re' quired to break an even more stubborn commander’s will' The most implacable of foes may realize his defeat only when his infrastructure is in disarray, his fighting forces are in retreat, and Marines are inside his house.5
The most decisive tool of naval power projection is a11 amphibious operation. The results of strikes are always fleeting—for permanent results, troops must occupy the enemy’s turf. Operational maneuver from the sea alio"15 a NEF to build up power ashore rapidly—deep in hostile territory. An amphibious operation can be used as the crowning blow of an effective campaign, or it can e*1' able or enhance the introduction of heavier follow-011 forces.6
When Marines go ashore, naval aviation on board a>r' craft carriers and—if required—land-based expeditionary
high-volume tactical air support. “.. . From the Sea” states that the capability to generate high-intensity power pr°'
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The MAGTF must be large enough to conduct a forcible entry from the sea. Forcible entry, while not the only mission for the MAGTF, is the one that demands the most of lts unique capabilities. When we organize a NEF, it posSesses an inherent amphibious capability. The minimumsized MAGTF required for these amphibious operations ls a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).
A MEU is normally composed of a battalion landing team, a reinforced helicopter squadron, and a MEU ser- v*ce support group. Because it is seabased, the MEU is c°nsidered the most responsive MAGTF. The MEU is capable of deploying ashore with 15 days of sustainment. It Is normally embarked on amphibious ships that constitute amphibious ready group (ARG). Using the Belleau Wood (LHA-3) ARG as an example, a normal size ARG "'uuld consist of an amphibious assault ship (LHA), an ‘'niphibious transport dock (LPD), a landing ship dock (LSD), and a landing ship tank (LST).
This is an important point. For example, when the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) recently deployed with 600 Marines embarked, the battle group did not qualify as a naval expeditionary force. The embarked Marine unit was Waller than the smallest normal MAGTF—the MEU. Al- 'hough the embarked Marines were called a special-pur- P°se MAGTF, they were primarily a reinforced company- s>Zed ground combat element and an aviation combat e*enient consisting of six Marine Corps CH-53D heli- c°Pters. This small group of Marines was better suited for evacuations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, maritime interdiction operations than for forcible entry derations.
, A NEF always will be organized around at least a MEU- S(Zed MAGTF embarked on amphibious ships and a car- r'2r battle group. Obviously, we may wish to add other elements to this structure, e.g., minesweepers or perhaps 3 submarine operating in direct support.
Given the foregoing points and our analysis of the in- ent of . . From the Sea,” we have arrived at our definition of the NEF:
A cohesive, integrated Navy and Marine force consisting of an embarked MAGTF of MEU size or greater, derating with a carrier battle group task organized to dominate a designated sea-air-land battlespace, to de- c>sively project power ashore from the sea, and to sustain continuous operations.
Although all NEFs have the same minimal elements— 5 MAGTF and a carrier battle group—no two are identi- The forcible-entry capability of the NEF is actually t,nly a small part of the force’s entire capability. Using ® Navy ships as sea bases, the Marines can conduct many ^her operations such as humanitarian assistance or non- ^batant evacuation operations. One mission might de- and more attack helicopters and Tomahawk-capable s-*Ps; therefore, the NEF with that mission will be as- ^'SUed a preponderance of those kinds of assets. We should 1?'e and shape our naval forces not only for armed Can’Ve
flict but also for a myriad of other important tasks. No matter what, however—if we are missing either the MAGTF or the carrier battle group, we do not have a NEF.
For example, if we have organized forces without a carrier then our capability for battlespace dominance is limited for local air superiority and suppression of enemy air defenses. Also, our ability to shape the battle decreases and our capability for power projection is limited for close- air support and manned strikes. Similarly, if we leave out a MAGTF, then our capability for land battlespace dominance is nonexistent—and we lack a capability for power projection in the form of forcible entry, noncombat evacuation operations, and in extremis hostage rescue.
Accordingly, if we have ships without a MAGTF embarked, or if a MAGTF is embarked, but we do not have a carrier, then we have naval task forces, task units, and task elements. This might appear to be an academic argument. After all, isn’t an ARG consisting of an LHD, LHA, LPD, and LSD with an embarked MAGTF capable of amphibious operations? Of course—within certain permissive environments. This force is well-suited for operations short of war, such as humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation operations, and amphibious raids.
But, just like the Roosevelt carrier experiment, this force is not a NEF because it lacks the capability to conduct amphibious operations in a nonpermissive environment. A NEF is a force that can deliver the knockout punch.
Nevertheless, when we do have a NEF we are not necessarily going to use the amphibious option. We will use a graduated response with our other power-projection tools. Our hope should be that, through the use of these other tools, we will not need to conduct an amphibious landing. But if that is necessary, then the NEF must possess all the necessary assets to conduct it.
The naval expeditionary force is a capability, not a structure. Thus, any size naval force can be referred to as an expeditionary force as long as it possesses the units that can meet all the operational capabilities expected of a NEF. The centerpiece, however, for high-intensity power from the sea always will be a carrier battle group and a MAGTF.
Now that we have defined the naval expeditionary force, we can begin resolving other issues such as command relationships, conduct of workups and deployments, and NEF staff structure.
'FMFM Warfighting, p. 59.
;FMFM 2 The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 12 April 1993 Draft, p. 37. 3FMFM 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, p. 4-8. 4FMFM 2, p. 42.
’Ibid., p. 48.
‘Ibid., p. 51.
7S. O’Keefe, Adm. F. B. Kelso II, USN, and Gen. C. E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, “. . . From the Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1992, p. 95.
Commander Pierce is currently assigned to the Marine Corps Amphibious Doctrine Command, Quantico, Virginia. He has a master’s degree in National Security Affairs, Strategic Planning from the Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He recently completed his executive officer tour on the USS Dubuque (LPD-8).