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The Marines got high-quality bomb damage assessment—here, evidence of direct hits on hangars at Kuwait’s A1 Jaber airfield— from Navy F-14s equipped with the Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) during Operation Desert Storm, after waiting in vain for an F/A-18D with a more advanced recce system. They may still be waiting when the next conflict breaks out, and will have to work more closely with the Navy (and Army, and Air Force) until the Marines grow their own eyes back.
The Beginning
The lack of organic aerial reconnaissance (recce) in the Marine Corps is a problem that is well identified but not well understood. Intelligence specialists, commanders, operators, and communicators need both to understand this problem and to realize that intelligence issues do not belong exclusively to the intelligence community. A healthy aerial recce program is in everyone’s best interest if tanks, planes, ships, and Marines are to know where to scoot and shoot. All those who depend upon recce must support and fight for it—if necessary, giving up some missiles, tanks, or planes as budget offsets.
The Marine Corps, faced with the aging of the venerated RF-4B, began serious debate over its aerial recce alternatives around 1980. Within a few years, the apparent decision was to postpone the inevitable through RF-4B service life extension programs (SLEPs), on the reasonable assumption that the introduction of the F/A-18 in 1982 would lead to an RF-18 variant (manifested now in the F/A-18D). Calls for alternative aerial recce systems to the RF-4B were evidently set aside or muted by assurances that the F/A-18D variant and the then-nascent electro-optical (EO) systems would be on line as the last RF-4B was retired. But confusion, indecision, and lack of direction took hold as the Corps struggled to define the F/A-18D aerial recce system.1 As a result, we Marines now find ourselves lacking a dedicated organic reconnaissance capability. Prudent acquisition of AV-8B or F/A-18 tactical aerial recce pods—a system already fielded for Royal Air Force (RAF) Harriers—as insurance against F/A-18D production delays, called for hard budgetary decisions, to cut other acquisition to maintain Marine “eyes.”
But making such hard decisions would have meant coH" tinuity in Marine organic aerial recce capabilities; preservation of air/ground crew and imagery-analyst proficiency tactical doctrine development as electro-optical, data downlink and real/near real-time (R/NRT) systems came ofl line; and unbroken contingency support for Marines.
By the mid-1980s, it became apparent the F/A-l^ would not be delivered as promised. Sage advice to fie^ an interim aerial recce system fell on ears deafened W sirens’ songs of contractor assurances, dazzling technological wizardry, and shortsighted procurement only equipment that would enhance combat firepower and maneuverability. Most recce projects turned to stone und# a congressionally mandated amalgamation of aerial recce programs, consolidated under the Office of the Assistan1 Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance. Hopes that the F/A-18D would arrive on schedule as part of the Follow-On Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (FOTARS) fell throughout the late 1980s as design changes, costs, and delays multiplied.
At decade’s end, motivation and urgency in the program declined further, as complacent assumptions took root. One assumption was that the United States would not soon become involved in a war or major contingency, and thus could live with a five- to seven-year gap in tactical aerial recce capabilities. Particular to this assumption was the notion that FOTARS’ elements, the Advanced Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ATARS). the Joint Services Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), the F/A-18D, and the Medium Range-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MR-UAV), would arrive in time for the next war. By 10 August 1990, however—as Iraq consolidated its invasion of Kuwait—elements of FOTARS were still seven years away from initial operational capability (IOC) and the last Marine RF-4Bs had retired with the disbanding of VMFP-3.2 ATARS has since been canceled.
Further Deterioration
The Corps’ vision continues to wane with the 1993 retirement of the last vestige of dedicated, organic aerial reconnaissance, the OV-IOA/D Bronco—another victim of budgetary expedients that leaves no adequate successor. This reduces Marine aerial imagery assets to hand-held photography and Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) units. Also, loss of the OV-IOD means loss of its forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) system, resulting in a commensurate decrease in the night-operations capability of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). As for
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F/A-18 FLIR cockpit video recorders and AV-8B night- attack Harriers providing some capability—such systems are inadequate because they are not designed for tactical aerial recce. At best F/A-18 and AV-8B night-attack systems may offer marginal imagery intelligence (IMINT), but are poor substitutes for a dedicated aerial imagery reconnaissance system.
The only dedicated, organic aerial reconnaissance asset in the Corps today is the Pioneer RPV. These RPVs, though excellent aerial recce systems, have extremely limited Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)-level experience (introduction of Exdrone very low cost (or VLC)-UAV will alleviate some immediate MEU shortfalls). As part of the surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence (SRI) group, the RPV company is a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) asset, tasked according to MEF or higher echelon requirements. In addition, Pioneer has limitations that go beyond its negligible adverse-weather performance—it is not standardized within the military-procurement system.
All is not well with the Pioneer RPV in Marine Corps, Navy, or Army service because it is a developmental system with limited logistic support, airframes, and funding for replacements—unless authorized by Congress through the Joint Project Office for UAVs (JPO-UAV). All aspects of RPV/UAVs come under the JPO-UAV and must meet joint-service criteria. The situation is a smaller rendition of what befell the RF-4B and FOTARS—i.e., will fielding of the Hunter short-range UAV (SR-UAV) be on time to replace Pioneer?3
There is a near-desperate need to solve the Corps’ aerial recce dilemma, but there are no quick fixes beyond its current limited, human-vision assets. Here is a brief
The U.S. Air Force relinquished its tactic31 aerial recce capabilities in anticipation of RF-16 (another element of. FOTARS) and up coming electro-optical sensors when its RF-4C* began transferring to Air National Guard an Reserve service at the end of 1990. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and side-looking airborn3 radar (SLAR) systems are no longer active at Air Force tactical levels unless theater assets^ such as U-2/TR-1 Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar Sys' tern (ASARS II) become tactical assets during war. SLAR exists in Guard or Reserve RF-4Cs since remov3 of their AN/UPD-10 SLARs in favor of U-2/TR-1 ASARS II. Consequently SAR and SLAR, the only true all-weathet systems available to tactical commanders, are now rest' dent in only a few platforms.
Despite some perceptions that the Marine Corps has rC' linquished its aerial recce role to the Air Force, naval avi' ation retains an organic, albeit dispersed asset in its nil' merous F-14 TARPS-capable aircraft.4 The Navy' exercising better foresight in replacing its venerabR RF-8 Crusaders and ancient RA-5C Vigilantes with TARPS, is not totally blind, thanks to some unsung pr°" ponents of Navy aerial recce (although disbanding the Navy’s photo recce squadrons scattered outstanding, expert air/ground crews and diluted its collective aerial recce knowledge). F-14 squadrons deploying on board carriers commonly have three or four TARPS-capable F-14s that respond to Navy, Marine, and joint/combined taskings such as those recently levied on the Independence (CV- 62) and the Ranger (CV-61) in Operation Southern Watch- Navy plans are to adapt most, if not all, F-14Ds (and D upgraded F-14 As) for TARPS, and possibly to execute an unexercised line option in FOTARS, adapting TARPS to ATARS (some ATARS will be retained).
The U.S. Army retains a limited-capability platform in the OV-1 Mohawk, which loosely parallels the OV-lO Bronco. At least the Mohawk has stand-off SLAR moving target indicator (MTI) and 70-mm. film cameras that the Army is quite unwilling to relinquish, despite their cost. However, Mohawk carries no self-defense means and is
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recce capability. VMFP-3 RF-4B aircrews still on active duty should retrain and then train Marine aircrews m aerial recce with the F-14 TARPS as preparation for ATARS Such a nucleus of trained Marine aviators and imagery'interpreters should ensure effective and efficient activation of the first F/A-18D recce squadrons.
Joint Use of Assets______________________________
All service branches have shortfalls in aerial recce assets, and Marines should push for joint use of what remains. The Air Force should deploy Reserve and National Guard RF-4C units to joint exercises such as Team bp in Korea. Moreover, failure to establish Joint Initial tm agery Interpretation Centers (JDICs) with SIDS capabib ity and task Air Force and Navy assets to fulfill MAG IF requirements or assign them in direct and general support of the MAGTF will severely hinder amphibious and expeditionary exercises and operations. Interoperability, t e evaluation and testing of joint/combined doctrine, and intelligence communications requirements are issues neea- ing immediate attention and resolution before we next sail into harm’s way again.
Overlooked sources of aerial recce are host-country or allied aerial-recce units in combined operations. Combined doctrine for aerial-recce-imagery intelligence (IMIN1) exists and MAGTFs should exploit any opportunity to exercise that doctrine.6 Combined JIIICs could be a reality, offering expanded capability and redundancy of sources
The downside to Reserve and Guard RF-4C deployments is the cost of moving aircraft, support equipment, personnel, and photo film processing and exploitation facilities from stateside. Even if forward-deployed processing facilities are in place, total deployment costs may be severely prohibitive.
Some services may not deploy their Reserve or Guard assets. Finally, additional language interpreters must be assigned to help coordination of combined JIIIC operations, and that may place too great a burden on the interpreter assets of the armed forces. Yet, budgeting for such costs must be made if commanders want trained and responsive, joint or combined tactical aerial recce assets providing timely IMINT reports and products to the MAG IF.
extremely vulnerable to ground fire and antiair missiles.
These tactical, manned, aerial-recce systems are all that are currently available for use by Marine tactical units Pioneer RPVs are the only active, established RPV/UAV Units in military service with one company in the Army, three companies in the Marine Corps, and two units in the Navy.
h New Navy-Marine Emphasis
With emphasis upon limited conflicts and the Navy s r°le in supporting amphibious expeditionary operations in Such conflicts, one can expect and demand more integrated carrier battle group support of the MAGTF and its avialion combat element (ACE).5 Such support and integrated operations will no doubt include carrier-based P-14 TARPS, which will become an essential and intimate part of the Navy-Marine team and ACE operations.
On the other hand, more integrated operations means more demands upon the Navy’s limited aerial recce assets, particularly when only three to four F-14 1 AKr a deploy on board carriers. Humanitarian operations, such as Sea Angel in Bangladesh, will need aerial recce support as much as potential conflicts in littoral countries. Multiple disasters and hotspots (Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Spratly Islands, Somalia, and Mt. Pinatubo, to name a few) will stretch naval aerial recce resources severely if they are called upon to support MAGTF operations.
With greater requirements for aerial recce in the new Navy-Marine view of future expeditionary operations, there will be a commensurate increase in the demands Upon Navy F-14 TARPS—an increase the Navy may not he capable of meeting. Integrated RPV and TARPS operations from ships at sea may become essential to alleviating such increased demand, and thus require further development. , ,
Rather then reestablish old assets and expend scarce
resources, effective use must be made ot F-14 lAKFts. Recently III MEF, the 3rd Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group and the 1st Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (FIIU) coordinated with the Seventh Fleet and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to assign two Marine imagery interpreters to the Independence (CV-62). These interpreters worked and operated within the carrier s intelligence section, exploiting TARPS imagery and disseminating the products to the U.S. Central Comman and other agencies during Operation Southern Watch This highly successful six-month assignment rewarded both sailors and Marines with invaluable experience and training. If a MAGTF deployed as part of Southern Watch then the carrier’s communications, and secondary imagery dissemination system (SIDS) would provide timely information and imagery products. Assigning MAGTF aviation elements to carriers would further enhance coordination and utilization of F-14 TARPS assets by the MAGTF.
In addition, aggressive use of Marine exchange phots, aerial observers, and Marine imagery interpreters in F- 14 TARPS squadrons is essential to ensure availability ot an experienced cadre when the F/A-18D achieves some
Acquiring an Interim Aerial Recce System____________
The commitment to electro-optical systems has been made and in anticipation of the MR-UAV and ATARS, the Marine Corps and Navy should seriously look at reviving combat-proven, off-the-shelf technology that would:
> Offer an interim high-performance manned and unmanned aerial vehicle electro-optical aerial recce capability in the near future (less than a year?)
>• Create a foundation of trained air/ground crews and sott- copy exploitation-experienced imagery interpreters (a necessity if the Corps expects rapid exploitation of real- or
near-real-time imagery) . . , .
> Allow system-specific communications development
> Help establish MAGTF operational doctrine for ettec-
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tive use of such systems.
Specifically: dust off the BQM-34 Firebee RPVs (used so successfully in Vietnam) and excess TARPS pods; outfit and modify them with current electro-optical, navigational, and real-time data-link communications technology; and deploy them to all three MEFs for use.7 Acquisition costs would be limited to modified BQM-34 airframes and TARPS pods, EO systems, IMINT data-link systems, training, and to the mod-
est expansion of the Navy’s BQM-34 target drone program (at present, ground and DC-130 Hercules air-launch platforms and the support structure for BQM-34s are in the Navy’s inventory).
This idea is almost reality in a cur- * rent U.S. Air Force UAV test system, | which successfully provided pre- \ strike/attack imagery targeting data only 1 moments after overflying selected target' This system, called ARGUS, is a strike fe" connaissance demonstration concept incorporating the ubiquitous BQM-34 Fire- bee and color EO technology connected via data-link to a ground exploitation center, an airborne command, control, ant* communications platform, and then to a® , on-call or en-route flight of attack aircraft' | These UAVs “successfully proved the real" I time intelligence concept” during a Green Flag electronic warfare exercise where the target images were recorded as the 300- knot UAVs flew at 5,000 feet. The ARGUS UAVs were able to transmit these images through a multiplexed video data link to a ground station 150 miles away^ The video was then retransmitted to an EC" 130 another 150 miles from the ground station.9 Still, the Air Force (not unlike the Marines with the RF-4B in 1980) was at an impasse over full development of ARGUS as an interim system, particularly as it weighed the odds of another war before ATAR$ came on line in 1997. But FO- TARS’ past development performance, with its canceled ATARS and slipped JSIPS schedules, should be enough to justify ARGUS as an interim system.
We are not 100% blind in our self-inflicted glaucoma because TARPS—though showing signs of age—is available and requires only some creative cooperation and cost sharing within the naval service. Newer commitments to amphibious expeditionary op-
Nations will increase demands on limited assets and will Squire ingenuity to provide the support required. Inter- tervice cooperation and joint use of current aerial recce assets in exercises should be the norm, not the exception. Exploration of all available means is central to acquiring an immediate aerial recce capability that, with a Wary eye to the future, will be a truly effective interim terial system that dovetails into FOTARS and its sub-systems. (JPO-UAV and OASD should devote serious consideration to ARGUS, as just such an interim system to Provide a transitional tactical capability between conVentional” and advanced systems—or as a replacement
Tatars.) , ,
Concurrently, Marines now commanding the battalions, tegiments, squadrons, and groups of the Corps must continuously and studiously follow the trends and developments in intelligence. It is imperative that these now-and- future leaders of the Marine Corps understand and Participate in intelligence matters and, above all else, give voice to their concerns. Our top leaders will need foresight, tenacity, and courage in making hard budget decisions that result in a sound fighting force, capable of seeking out the enemy and destroying his ability to fight. It current leaders hear not a whisper of protest or concern, 'hen such omissions condemn the Corps to perpetual blindness. To command the divisions, aircraft wings, and Marine expeditionary forces of the future, these leaders will need the “eyes of the Corps” to survive and succeed on tomorrow's battlefields.
‘At the lime RF-18 or F/A-18D requirements
RF-18 aircraft to a pallettzed sensor suite® t“^18A to an aerial recce pod able with the 20-mm. gun system in the: single-sea WA ns*
system and then back to the “palletize *f“°rw • Patched-Together Air ’Master Sergeant Douglas G. Armstrong The Gulf War s Indulgence U S Naval Institute Proceedings, November IV , p during October 1992 the Defense Appropriations Board awarded toe SR-UAV Low Rate Production contract to Israel Aircraft In us e® iU be soughl dur-
However, the decision to enter Full 7ful completion of
ing the fourth quarter of fiscal year 19 ( , User Testing commencing the third quarter of FY93. Full^accepmn ^ ^ either iate FY95
of Hunter into the Fleet Manne Force (FMF) , . of jpo-UAV projects
or early FY96. For further information on the development of P
see the Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Master Plan 199. pub
*LtCol BmceE-Brann, USMC, “Maneuvering Blind,” Marine Corps Gazette, Oc-
tS- scan C. O’Keefe. Admiral Frank
eral Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, “ . . - From the Sea A. New Due
Naval Services,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992 pp. 8 22, Bam
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the tactical level for operations with Japan, South Koreay^M 34 Firebee dur- 7For further information on the tactical reconnaissance RPV BQM-34 F.reWie an ine the Vietnam era see: William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnais slice Drones, (Fallbrook, CA: Armed Forces Journal Internationa! in coope
I*.llig.no, Concept,"
Week & Space Technology, 2 November, 1992, p. 48.
’Fulghum, p. 49.
Gunnery Sergeant Tang is the Exploitation and Collections Chief of the 1st Force Imagery Interpretation Unit, in the 3d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group, on Okinawa.
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