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Captain William T. R. Bogle, U.S. Navy, and ;ain Gerald G. O’Rourke, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Despite the U.S. Navy’s historic dependence upon naval aviation in general, and carrier aviation in particular, to rule the seas and to deter potential international troublemakers, hard times lie ahead in the 1990s. Current plans forecast a reduction from 14 to 12 carriers in the near future. Worse yet, under the funding estimates now anticipated, maintaining even a 12-carrier Navy does not appear likely. The reasons for this are many and varied, but one important aspect of maintaining a viable carrier fleet is reducing escalating costs for the carriers’ aircraft and escorts.
Threats to carriers from potentially hostile submarines, aircraft, surface warships, and missiles have increased enormously. Such threats have caused many defensive needs to be “off-loaded” onto the escorting warships, forcing their costs markedly upward.
One result is that the Navy’s operational strength can now be realistically measured only in terms of deployable carrier battle groups (CVBGs), rather than individual carriers. Throughout the lifetime of any given ship, roughly three “suits” of aircraft, each matching or exceeding the original cost of the ship, will operate from her flight deck. Overall costs, then, tend to dwarf even those of the multi- billion-dollar carrier.
These costs, in addition to the initial price tags of carriers and aircraft, have escalated for several reasons. Supporting ships in each CVBG have themselves become increasingly sophisticated and costly. Second, a salty environment and the constant wear and tear from catapult shots and arrested landings drastically reduce the length of airframes’ lives. Finally, carriers will not be capable of going in harm’s way without the most modern, high- performance aircraft, and the industrial base for constructing rugged, specialized, tailhook aircraft has been withering during the past decade.
Consequently, the numbers of affordable aircraft are eroding. Both the glamorous “Topgun” interceptors and the less glamorous, but critically essential, combat support aircraft are aging, and with them, the overall offensive punch of the air wing—its traditional forte—is decaying. Like an old trusty-but-rusty family sedan, passing each safety inspection becomes increasingly expensive, eventu- z ally forcing a visit to the dealer’s showroom and threaten- | ing sticker-shock.
| Long-range naval aviation planners are already near | total paralysis. Only one new replacement aircraft pro- i gram will start within this decade when at least two, possi-
As we reflect this year upon what the Japanese taught us about the importance of naval aviation at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. carrier fleet shrinks and its aircraft deteriorate before our eyes. What is the answer to the aircraft shortage? Shuffleboard.
bly three, others are desperately needed. Although the number of operating carriers is supposed to be reduced, °ld-time cynics simply don’t believe it will happen. When the chips are down, and trouble is brewing for U.S. troops overseas, even the meanest of budget-cutters will be asking “Where are the carriers?”
In any event, reducing the number of carriers would provide only a temporary solution to the problem of too few carrier aircraft. It would provide no relief whatsoever for aging aircraft and changing operational requirements. At the apex of this seemingly intractable cost/numbers Pyramid is the specter, in the not-too-distant future, ot a single naval aircraft on board a single nuclear-powered carrier, with 1,000 tailhookers standing by for their turn to % it.
At first blush, the solution to what the average taxpayer views as a simple matter of Navy priorities is to slash the Navy’s strategic weaponry, such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and spend the money on carrier battle groups. Unfortunately, and totally aside from the merits of the countless strategic force/counterforce arguments involved, the pragmatic facts are that the strategic forces Present few realistic savings opportunities. And even those savings would not come for many years. Besides, the money saved probably would show up on U.S. Air force, not Navy, ledgers.
Looking elsewhere within the conventional Navy and Marine Corps for sacrificial lambs is an equally unproductive exercise in futility. The expensive and sophisticated Aegis ships, which could be offered up, are the very same expensive and sophisticated escorts that carriers themselves must have in company for their survival. Reducing the Marine Corps, our acknowledged small-war experts, in preparation for a future marked by small wars, is manifestly illogical. While we may have more nuclear attack submarines than we need, it just isn’t smart to start mothballing many of them before the Soviets do the same.
Something has to give within naval aviation itself. The challenge is to effect extensive redesign, while keeping a Wary eye on the old threats, handling whatever new ones appear, living within a tightening budget, and doing it all without destroying the combat credibility of our military edifice in the process.
The starting point should be a hard look at what tasks appear most likely in the future for naval aviation. The next step would be to get some impartial estimates of how those jobs might be done effectively in different ways—
ways that cost less money and/or are more easily done. Finally, some sort of rational transition plan would have to get from today to a pre-selected “tomorrow,” sometime about 2020 or so, when the carrier Navy of today will be manifestly outdated.
The most likely tasks are not very hard to imagine. With the Soviet conversion from resolute enemy to dubious ally, they should be “small-war” and “crisis-intervention” operations, not the old “global maritime threat” that has dominated naval thinking for the last half-century. Historically, one or more all-purpose CVBGs have been dispatched to handle such threats. Their outcomes usually included a high-priority “naval presence” mission that persisted for long periods thereafter, and for which full CVBGs came into play. We hope that Vietnam-type, long- endurance small wars are not on the agenda, but plenty of pre- and post-hostility presence and other posturing deployments probably are.
These scenarios imply no end to the need for both quick reaction and long duration overseas deployments. Whether CVBG-sized forces or some lesser forces are committed for short or long periods of time, chances are good that smaller-size forces will be adequate for handling many, possibly most, commitments.
Some of the new technologies seem to promise some relief in this regard. On the offensive side of naval warfare, for missions in strike warfare and antisurface warfare (ASUW), cruise missiles are rapidly moving into direct competition with manned attack aircraft, particularly those that boast stealthy and accurate long-range performance against well-defended point targets. On the defensive side, manned aircraft are probably not going to provide the total answer to the antiship missile threat, although their contributions to the overall air defense system will remain critical. In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), manned aircraft will also remain important, but more as a part of a large, ship-directed system than as traditional, independent submarine hunter-killers.
Amphibious invasions will still need many aircraft with better speeds and longer legs. Modern space sensors, communications, and navigational systems won’t necessarily outmode all command, control, communication, and intelligence, surveillance, and electronic warfare manned aircraft tomorrow, but they are already leading to rather different applications of such craft. A trend common to all warfare areas is the use of manned aircraft as sensor carriers and communication platforms, as opposed to weapon delivery vehicles.
Estimating future manned aircraft needs requires that they be placed in three categories: low-, medium-, and high-performance types. Helicopters are typical of the low; the medium comprises conventional subsonic aircraft; and the high performers are made up of the first-line supersonic fighters and sophisticated, but probably still subsonic, all-weather attack aircraft. In most cases, the purchase prices and the operating expenses of individual aircraft types will follow the same pattern over the long term, thereby offering at least rough relative cost cuts.
Using these categories in assessing needs across all the warfare areas yields estimates that the Navy will need more low- and medium-performance types than it is using now. Fewer high performers may be needed. This is significant. Ships much smaller (and less expensive to operate) than 100,000-ton nuclear-powered carriers could handle the lower-performance aircraft. By far the most apparent controversial issue is the need for the high performers that cost the most and that presently demand the big carrier basing. Naval aviators state quite accurately that any fighting force going in harm’s way must be capable of matching world-class fighter opposition aloft and world-class strike defenses on the ground.
It is hard to conjure up many situations in which Air Force fighter, attack, and airborne early warning elements will not be able to contribute. The recent situation in the Persian Gulf, which we hope will be the most demanding one to be faced for some time, is probably typical. Plenty of land bases were available, and the Air Force’s outstanding tanking capabilities moved forces quickly. High- performance elements, the Air Force claims, arrived earlier last August than those of the carrier air wings. It should be noted, however, despite that land-oriented scenario, three CVBGs were initially deployed, and an additional three made up part of the November 1990 augmentation.
At sea, however, far from the handy airfields of friendly nations, the Navy will be forced to go it alone. Luckily, the air threat out there is minimal, but big troubles could come from small numbers of missiles and submarines. This translates into decreasing needs for high-performance birds and increasing needs for the medium and low performers. While it will always be prudent to have at least a modicum of hot-shot fighters available, they will probably represent more of a security blanket than a military requirement in most deep blue-water scenarios. Doing without a full complement of fighters and complex attack aircraft becomes an unpleasant, but realistic option for many future naval scenarios.
What about these low- and medium-performance categories? The future Navy will need greater numbers of such aircraft than it now fields within most deployed groups.
ASW alone will demand more to be used in tying together a tightly coordinated, multisensor, multistrata network of sensors, and aircraft will remain the ideal ASW weapon delivery vehicle for a long time to come. Surveillance needs are constantly growing, both in range and in the detail and flexibility of the coverages. ASUW, even with ship-launched missilery, will still need aircraft for coordi-
nation, possibly even for direct control of the weaponry. Electronic warfare needs, on both the offense and the defense, are growing similarly over time.
Simply doubling the complement of helicopters on destroyers won’t even begin to solve this problem, nor will expansion of the small flight decks of the logistic ships be able to help much, either. A workable solution, however, does begin to appear when the larger ships of the amphibious force, the 40,000-ton general-purpose and multipurpose amphibious assault ships (LHAs and LHDs), are factored into the equation. Apart from the organizational and emotional issues involved in transferring “ownership of these ships from the amphibs to the battle group, it becomes obvious that they could provide sea bases for helicopters and Harriers performing “purely naval missions. Within a decade or less, tiltrotor aircraft could provide more relief, particularly in tasks where long-endurance, multi-place, manned aircraft are ideal.
The concept of converting LHAs and LHDs into medium-sized aircraft carriers (CVMs) is nothing new. In one form or another, it has been around since World War II. Its major weakness, then and now, has been the lack of high-performance aircraft. When used in applications where world-class fighters were not essential, such as the World War II Atlantic, it worked beautifully. The key to its potential success in the future Navy is technological. What is needed is implementation of a suitable high- performing member of the vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) family of aircraft.
The first of this family was the successful vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) helicopter, which got its baptism of fire during the Korean War in the form of shaky, rattly, little search-and-rescue (SAR) choppers. Helicopters are now salty and sophisticated old-timers, having proved themselves in a wide variety of demanding roles. Their utilization in naval warfare has grown well beyond the SAR tasks into highly specialized, complicated duties such as airborne mine countermeasures, ASW, and under
way vertical replenishment.
The second successful V/STOL sibling was the small AV-8 Harrier jet, which has been around for almost two decades in a variety of steadily improving modes. The Harrier looks like a high performer and actually is, in its light-attack, close-air-support role. It is not supersonic, however, and it carries a fairly simple weapon delivery system. But it is remarkably useful in many potential small-war roles.
The third family member, just recently arrived, is the dramatically different, large, strictly medium-performance tiltrotor V-22 Osprey, now flying in preproduction form. Its initial assignment will be to transport combat Marines ashore, but it promises dozens of other applications for Navy, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, and commercial duties. With the (questionable) exception of airborne early warning, V-22 variants appear extremely capable of handling almost every conceivable future medium-performance naval mission and may even supplant helicopters in a number of the low-performance tasks.
Thus far, the Navy has been reluctant to pursue vigorously either the AV-8 or the V-22 opportunities for use in purely Navy, as opposed to Marine Corps, roles. Probably the most realistic sources of this problem lie in technology and economics. A costly developmental path toward a high-performance, short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) has—at least thus far—been considered too risky. And without the high performer, “going V/STOL” in a big way offered few, if any, advantages over the tail- hook concept.
A STOL high performer, however, is now being seriously considered as achievable within perhaps a decade, which could put it into widespread Air Force service by roughly 2010 to 2015. Add another five years or so, and the availability of the high-performance STOVL needed for naval use appears reasonable.
This cautious new enthusiasm for STOL and STOVL comes largely from the progress in jet engine development and from some thrust-deflecting schemes that have recently been Hying in experimental form. The new engines boast fantastic thrust-to-weight ratios. These alone do not promise good high-performance STOVL, but the ideal engine generation appears to be close at hand. Although the thruster schemes are pointed toward better agility in dogfighting, they are equally applicable to landing and take-off flight dynamics. Implied for designers of future fighters and attack aircraft is a wealth of new possibilities and for designers of massive transports a hope for great leaps forward in commercial air travel. Implied for designers of future aircraft carriers is a loosening of the present “chains of specialization” that have constrained ship as well as aircraft designs over the past several decades.
The carrier Navy, whose catapult technologies and installation size are approaching practical operational limits, is already discussing a STOVL design as a logical follow- on to the present first-line, high-performance F/A-18 Hornet. Its estimated production date is probably more dependent upon the funding allocated lor its development than upon any dramatic new discovery. Because the resultant design could move easily between both small and large shore and sea bases, it will have profound implications on the design of both naval aviation and the rest of the Navy and will surely serve to lower, perhaps even shatter, the operational barriers for using land-based and sea-based tactical aircraft interchangeably. Because many foreign services stand to benefit as well, high-performance STOL and STOVL aircraft could come much sooner than anticipated.
Early experimentation within what might aptly be called a “Langley 11” evaluation could expedite their arrival and subsequent lessons learned. The extensive pioneering tests of aircraft, ships, and weaponry conducted throughout the 1920s on board the converted collier USS Langley (CV-1) formulated the operational concepts that have been used in carrier aviation ever since. The goal of Langley II would be to formulate the operational concepts for seagoing aviation in the future.
Assets needed for such an effort would include periodic dedication of a big-deck carrier, a medium carrier, several smaller air-capable ships and craft, a few shore sites, a wide variety of helicopters, some Harriers, several V-22 naval variants, and much ingenuity, innovation, and imagination. During the trial period, which could span five years or more, the aircraft would be operated and supported in unusual new ways, and the variety of new sensors, weapons, and tactics made possible by the availability of V/STOL aircraft could be evaluated in a realistic, seagoing environment. “Shuffleboarding” aircraft among all the air-capable ships and shore sites would be one of the many games evaluators could play in search of a suitable operational concept for V/STOL as a possible solution to naval aviation’s cost/numbers spiral.
In its early stages, the big-deck and the medium carriers would undoubtedly operate together, rather than apart, and support, but not duplicate, each other. The large carrier could then concentrate more of her efforts on what she does best, supporting missions of high-performance offensive aircraft, and the medium carrier could support most, if not all, of the medium- and low-performance, largely defensive tasks. As more varieties of tiltrotors become available, the medium carrier’s role would expand to include acting as a sea staging site for aircraft based ashore or aboard other distant ships, as well as a base for numerous short-legged helicopters.
Coordination, control, and communication needs for playing shuffleboard would be demanding, but not overwhelming, even by today’s standards. Providing the levels of aircraft maintenance and services to preclude bottlenecks and overcrowded flight decks is another matter altogether. Thousands of operational considerations will have to be worked out. And here is where the imagination, ingenuity, and innovation of the operators will be critical, just as they were in the pioneering days of Langley I.
In its final stages, the aircraft operated from (or through) both large and medium carriers would include aircraft (or combinations thereof) that could simulate the performance of potential STOVL designs and the new sensors, systems, and tactics made possible by V/STOL. Eventually, independent medium-carrier operations could be full-fledged substitutes for the big-deck carriers.
All this demands some basic and wholesale breaks with both the aircraft operating and aircraft maintenance support philosophies now in use. Every air-capable ship going to sea today carries the “whole enchilada” for supporting its own aircraft, from screwdrivers to pilots. The theory here is that each ship must be capable of fully independent operations. Its virtue is that the combat loss, or the tactical redeployment of any single ship is tolerable, while the remainder of the force fights on. Its weaknesses include both monetary and operational costs, and they might be overcome by some form of shuffleboarding, which offers the potential for putting more aircraft to work at sea at less cost. The other side of this coin is that, with shuffleboarding, the loss of a larger ship, the sudden redeployment of the force beyond the range of a shore site, or unexpected breakdowns in some critical but common aircraft system could wreak havoc with the entire effort. With shuffleboarding, things probably will be moving too fast to rely upon operational “fixits.” Instead, success may lie in more operational forethought and preplanning.
For Desert Storm, in the depths of the Persian Gulf, LHAs operated whole potsful of Harriers and helos in something akin to shuffleboard. There is plenty of precedent for doing aircraft maintenance off-board, from the experiences with the USS Corpus Christi Bay (TARVH-1) in Vietnam to the hub-and-spoke operations of the commercial airlines today.
At any rate, during the years of Langley II, while shuf- fleboarders might be struggling with problems of this sort, the traditional carriers in the traditional CVBGs would be policing the world and performing all the day-to-day duties of the U.S. Navy much as they are today. However, they would do this using a constantly dwindling, steadily aging, and increasingly patchwork assortment of today’s carrier aircraft.
Obviously, many hopes for naval aviation’s future would be resting on Langley II’s results. And therein lies a major risk. Some very hard decisions would have to be made over what probably will be a decade of tight budgets, unanticipated demands on naval forces, and uncertain congressional support. That is not an inviting prospect for naval aviation’s leaders. All the alternatives, however, seem to include that far more uninviting spectre of that line of aviators waiting for a turn at that single airplane.
Having less does not imply that naval aviation can’t do more. It just means that naval aviation must be smarter to keep pace. Playing shuffleboard within a Langley II effort might be one of the smartest future games in town.
Captain Bogle is currently serving as the V-22 Requirements Officer in OP-5. A Helicopter Support pilot, he flew H-46s and commanded HC-5 and HC-3. He served as XO of the USS Okinawa (LPH-3) prior to assuming his present duties in OpNav.
Captain O’Rourke has been a frequent contributor to Proceedings for many years and is a former member of its Board of Control. During his active duty, he was a carrier fighter pilot and commanded several squadrons and the USS Independence (CVA-62).