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Respite their relatively limited utility, the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG- ty-class frigates are hooking up with battle groups in a new form of shotgun wedding, with the budget cutters holding the double-barreled enforeer. Can the FFG-7s bring enough to the marriage to make it succeed? V
Since its inception in the early 19-7()s us a f low-cost expedient for convoy escort duty, 1 the Navy’s Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) ; Gass of frigates has been the subject of contro- 1 versy. In a service predominantly focused on car- gl r'cr battle-group operations, the FFG-7 has often ''51 been criticized because it is not the advanced^ « technology, multipurpose destroyer the fleet opera- J tors really wanted. Force-structure documents jM tagged it with the daunting sobriquet Non-Battle- -m Group-Capable Ship to help ensure that Defense V Department analysts and congressional staffers 1 Understood its limited utility. But now. with till' a budgetary meat cleaver chopping surface-combat-' unt strength from more than 220 ships to fewer than 'SO. it is certain that the 51 FFG-7s will be increas- 4| uigly required to fill front-line battle-group slots. Since these ships will form one-third of the escort <• lorce during the next decade, a reassessment of their' capabilities and performance is clearly in order.
The FFG-7 class has undergone an evolutionary odyssey in the two decades since its birth as the patrol frigate of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s 1070 Project 60. As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt asserted the concept of a fleet balanced between highly capable, multirole battle-group ships, such as Aegis-equipped cruisers, and specialized, affordable ships useful for sea control. The Knox (FF-1052)-class frigate, optimized for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), can be considered the model of the latter. Under this “high mix/low mix" plan, the FFG-7 class was conceived as the Knox's air- defense complement in protection of convoys, replenishment groups, and amphibious forces. Accordingly, the FFG-7 was designed around a Mk-13 missile launcher and a Mk-92 fire-control system to provide a measure of antiair warfare (AAW)
, capability, particularly against pop-up missiles k front Soviet Charlie-class cruise missile submarines. The FFG-7's main contribution to the ASW ’ side of escort was a pair of LAMPS helicopters, intended to support long-range prosecutions.
To ensure that the FFG-7 remained truly a , low-mix ship, development was managed under the concept of "design to price”: only systems essential to the postulated convoy AAW mission were installed. This precluded many of the weapons and sensors that most naval officers considered fundamental to the combat suite of a 1 proper fleet escort. Omissions included five; inch guns, a long-range SQS-26 sonar, and an
f AS ROC launcher. In addition, because the submarine-launched missiles the FFG-7 was intended to counter had low- or medium-alti-
Marriage of________
—Necessity_______
By Captain Robert J. Shade, U.S. Navy
tude flight profiles, the sensor suite did not contain the height-finding radar that had heretofore been a distinguishing feature of U.S. AAW ships. In other cost-saving moves, displacement was restricted to 3,400 tons, the engineering plant was limited to a single propulsion shaft, and personnel strength was reduced well below what it was in ships of comparable size. All in all, the austere FFG-7, with its boxy superstructure, was hardly the ship to warm the hearts of officers nurtured on the likes of the sleek, weapons-intensive, twin-screwed Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) class or the even more capable Coontz (DDG-40), Leahy (CG-16), or Belknap (CG-26)-class guided-missile ships.
Criticism was not long in coming; the FFG-7 class was soon panned. Representatives of interested professions— politicians, analysts, naval officers, pundits—attacked it for every conceivable shortcoming.
Favorite axes to grind have included:
- It is not a good ASW ship because it lacks propulsion quieting, low-frequency sonar, and ASROC.
- The United States should not spend its resources on convoy escorts; NATO allies should handle that mission.
- The ship’s weapons are not capable enough even for the limited mission assigned.
- Its principal weapons (Standard and Harpoon missiles) would be useless if the single Mk-13 launcher became inoperable.
- The propulsion plant lacks the redundancy necessary for fleet operations.
- The aluminum superstructure would be a fire hazard in battle.
Fueled by the controversy, proposals for trading off FFG-7 funding to pay for more cherished programs became a growth industry for naval writers. While the ships were still being ordered, contemporary issues of maritime periodicals fielded a multitude of elegantly crafted articles suggesting termination of the frigate in favor of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) carriers, submarines, or missile destroyers, such as the Kidd (DDG-993) class.
And efforts to truncate the class were not limited to the naval press. Following Admiral Zumwalt’s departure as CNO, reduction or elimination of the annual FFG-7 procurement became a perennial budget issue within the Navy. Despite all this debate, the class remained in production until the mid-1980s—in part because of the politically sound motivation of some congressional members to provide work for private shipbuilders. And although the United States finally stopped procurement at 51 (as opposed to early proposals for 70-odd ships), that number qualified the class as the largest built for a Western-bloc navy since World War II, even without counting the II built or under construction for Australia and Spain.
Even before the first production units were commissioned, the Navy was making plans to improve class capabilities. This entailed division of the production run into four “flights” based on the sequence of ship construction, with equipment and system enhancements in each flight. Earlier units were to be retrofitted through progressive maintenance availabilities. Initial improvements focused on better self-defense capabilities, such as installation of the SLQ-32 electronic support measures system, Vulcan- Phalanx close-in weapon system, super rapid blooming offboard chaff (SRBOC) launchers, and Kevlar lightweight armor. Other modifications provided increased crew accommodations, stabilizers, and an austere Navy tactical data system (NTDS) link. But the most sweeping modification was intended to reorient the FFG-7 from a limited-capability AAW platform into a viable long-range ASW ship. This involved redesign of the stem and flight deck to enable support of new SH-60B LAMPS-III helicopters, the SQR-19 passive tactical towed-array sonar system (TacTAS), and, eventually, the computer-based SQQ-89 integration system. Then, in the mid-1980s, congressional initiatives led to a new twist in class configuration—procurement of the air-launched version of the Norwegian Penguin antiship missile for use by LAMPS-III-capable units.
The lengthy phased update process, combined with increasing budgetary constraints throughout the 1980s, led to wide variations among ships of the class, particularly regarding LAMPS and towed-array capability. Early units retain the SH-2F LAMPS-I system and are not programmed for SQR-19. The latest units were commissioned with the full LAMPS-III and TacTAS modifications (or they received them in post-shakedown availability). The middle flights received LAMPS-III through retrofit or while under construction and are being fitted with SQR-19.
Many of the FFG-7s joined the fleet in the early 1980s and earned their spurs in a decade that saw extensive use of naval forces in trouble spots throughout the world. FFG-7s performing combat search-and-rescue operations were among the closest ships to the coastline during the April 1986 Navy-Air Force strike on Libya. While patrolling the Persian Gulf in 1987, the USS Stark (FFG-31) was struck by two Iraqi Exocet missiles that severely damaged the ship and killed 37 crewmen. This incident reignited controversy over the class’s combat capabilities but provided evidence that the ships had better resistance to battle damage than had been anticipated. The event also contributed to increased U.S. presence in the Gulf, a role largely filled by the FFG-7s because they had the price of admission to that theater: a medium-range AAW system, a close-in weapon system, and good helicopter capability. In April 1988, while engaged in Gulf operations, the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) struck an Iranian mine that exploded under her keel, breaking the ship’s back. Similar detonations have sunk larger combatants than the Samuel B. Roberts, but this tough ship and heroic crew won a desperate battle to stay afloat. In reprisal, the United States launched a strike by surface action groups against Iranian military sea platforms. When this action, termed Operation Praying Mantis, drew elements of Iran’s naval and air forces into action against the U.S. forces, several FFG-7s were effective participants in the ensuing surface and air combat.
The class has also proved effective in the normal duties allocated to surface ships—support roles in battle-group operations, drug interdiction in the Caribbean, intelligence-gathering, and participation in NATO exercises.
h4QALLS SHIPBUILDING
during the early part of the 1980s, plans were initiated to Put 18 FFG-7s into the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) by *990, an action that was seen as consistent with their intended role as wartime convoy escorts.
Now, with many battle-group combatants about to de- c°mmission and the long-awaited Arleigh Burke (DDG- ^1) class facing renewed debate in Congress and potential Production slowdown, the FFG-7, by default, will be a fixture of battle-group deployments for the foreseeable future. Reportedly, the Navy may be considering return- fug the NRF FFG-7s to active-fleet status to compensate for the impending reductions. So the problem is how best f° integrate this hard-working ship of somewhat discredited lineage into the Navy’s battle-fleet organization.
Because of design characteristics and the upgrade program, the FFG-7 class is superbly placed to fill several roles in the battle-group environment. Most naval officers recognize that the ships with LAMPS-III and SQR-19 are almost as capable as a Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer 'n ASW. However, there are two other missions for which the FFG-7 is an ideal tactical choice: interior defense zone BDZ) escort and, to use a somewhat archaic term, fleet scout.
Interior Defense Zone Escort
The concept of IDZ escort—close-in A AW and ASW defense of a carrier or other high-value unit—is well known to those familiar with battle-group operations. The colloquial term for the role is riding shotgun, and it has long been the bread and butter of the Charles F. Adams class, scheduled to leave the fleet during the next two Vears. Specific tasks involve acting as a pouncer (ambush- tog unit) against submarines that penetrate the outer defense zone, and as a last-ditch missile defense against air targets. These duties can be performed with different (and sometimes less complex and expensive) combat systems than those required for outer-zone ships. The IDZ combatant needs medium-range AAW weapons, with fire control systems capable of handling closing, sequential targets, whereas outer-zone ships must carry longer-ranged missiles and a capability such as Aegis to take on multiple targets simultaneously. In the IDZ ASW arena, which features high levels of turbulence and noise in the water— combined with the need to quickly classify and attack sub-
Thc combination of tough ship and heroic crew won new respect for the combat capabilities of the Oliver Hazard Perry class after the Stark (FFG-31)—here, leaving the Pascagoula, Mississippi, shipyard alter repairs—and the Samuel B. Roberts (FFGt58) weathered major damage in Persian Gulf operations.
merged targets—the system of choice is a medium- frequency active sonar, which provides better target- discrimination capability than the more powerful low- frequency sonars that earn their keep in the quieter outer zone. All duties require the speed and acceleration to stay with a carrier.
The early production FFG-7s now assigned to (or earmarked for) the NRF clearly could assume this function more capably than the steam-driven DDGs. Their Mk-92 fire control system and SM-1MR missiles are an effective combination for engaging missile or aircraft “leakers” not stopped in the outer zone. In addition, the FFG-7’s automated, integrated combat system and NTDS Link 11 greatly improve response time to threats. The Vulcan- Phalanx close-in system and 76-millimeter gun enhance close-in self-defense capability. The medium-frequency, direct-path SQS-56 sonar meets the criteria for a viable inner-zone sonar. The gas turbine power plant is unquestionably a more responsive installation than that of the DDGs, providing similar top speed, faster acceleration, and the ability to go from economical one-engine cruising to maximum speed on two engines in a few minutes.
The early flight FFG-7 helicopter capabilities add a dimension to IDZ operations not offered by the DDG-2 class. Embarked SH-2F LAMPS-I helicopters, equipped with sonobuoys, magnetic anomaly detectors, and Mk-46 torpedoes, enable quick-response localization and attack on submarines detected by the frigate or other units. The FFG-7 itself can extend the endurance of the carrier’s SH-3H or SH-60F ASW helicopters during contact prosecution some distance from the carrier, by using the helicopter in-flight refueling system.
The IDZ frigate can also be a strong junior partner for cruisers and destroyers operating on AAW or ASW stations in the outer defense zone. For example, an FFG-7 could provide air defense and augmenting helicopters for a Spruance-dass destroyer prosecuting submarine contacts. Or, with its long-range Standard SM-2 missiles, it could act as a mobile AAW/ASW point defense unit for an AAW ship focused on combating a high-density aircraft/missile raid. And, as became clear in the USS Vincennes (CG-49) shoot-down of an Iranian airliner, during the heat of battle even an Aegis-equipped ship can benefit from a second set of eyes and ears.
The IDZ mission may take on added importance for much of the 1990s. Logically, the requirement for inner- zone defense has an inverse relationship with the number ol fully capable ASW/AAW ships in the battle group’s outer picket stations. Given the accelerated retirement of older battle-group combatants, the perimeter defense will be considerably thinner than planned. Therefore, IDZ frigates may become a key factor in hardening the close-in “shell” around the carrier, at least until several Arleigh
Burke-class Aegis-equipped destroyers join the fleet to strengthen the outer defense layers.
Fleet Scout
The FFG-7’s second battle-group role is the historic function of fleet tactical scout. Tactical (as opposed to strategic) scouting can be defined as early warning and monitoring of the enemy’s presence in proximity to one’s own main force. This type of reconnaissance was carried out by frigates in the days of sail and by cruisers in the late 1800s and early part of this century. Several classes of small, fast, lightly armed combatants in the World War I-era were designated scout cruisers. Their role was to patrol on the advance fringes of the battle force and establish first contact with the enemy’s fleet, and then, as the battle developed, fall back and operate with the destroyer squadrons. Later, the scouting function was almost totally taken over by aircraft; first by seaplanes embarked in cruisers and later by carrier aircraft.
Surface ships again took over part of the tactical scouting job late in World War II. Specially configured destroyers became radar picket ships (DDRs) that operated on advanced stations to warn the fleet of approaching aircraft raids and coordinate fighter interceptions of the enemy formations. In the early 1960s, these specialized DDRs were replaced by airborne early warning aircraft, but modem cruisers and destroyers continue to carry out this role on a collateral basis.
Long-range and tactical reconnaissance are now functions of an integrated network of many platforms, including satellites, aircraft, submarines, and ships. Scouting now encompasses finding the enemy’s subsurface units, as well as his surface and aircraft forces. As discussed earlier, the view that a ship classified as a frigate should be an ASW platform has led to FFG-7s of the later flights receiving LAMPS-III helicopters, towed arrays (either during construction or through ongoing retrofits), and the SQQ-89 coordination system. These enhancements, combined with the ship’s search radars and other sensors, pro-
L VAN GINDEREN
vide a superb capability to act as a three-dimensional surveillance unit. In addition to its submarine-detection capability, the towed passive array is excellent for surface detection and classification. A pair of FFG-7s with four SH-60Bs embarked can keep aircraft aloft virtually indefinitely (personnel fatigue and safety considerations notwithstanding) to provide a battle group or surface action group with accurate, real-time surface and underwater contact information via secure data link. The helicopters also can provide relay capability for other NTDS information. The towed array/helo/directional data link combination is an exceptional tool for providing contact data when the battle group operates in electromagnetic radiation control. Scouting FFG-7s, “seeing” through their sensors and those of their airborne LAMPS, provide an effective means for feeding target data to aircraft and surface ships for a coordinated Harpoon or Tomahawk attack.
Of all the ship classes in the battle group, the FFG-7 is the most practical tactical choice for this mission. Since it features extended, often isolated operations on the periphery of the battle group, where fighter protection is thin, the Standard SM-lMR-equipped FFG-7 makes more sense than a Spruance with a point defense missile. Additionally, though the Spruance class is also being equipped with TacTAS, it normally carries only a single LAMPS- III, which limits helicopter availability for surveillance tasking. The USS California (CGN-36), Virginia (CGN- 38), Leahy, and Belknap-c\ass cruisers lack both a passive towed array and LAMPS-III capability. The Kidd-class DDGs and early Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis CGs have LAMPS-III facilities but lack TacTAS. Only the latest Aegis cruisers carry the full LAMPS-III/TacTAS combination. But regardless of how well equipped these battle-group stalwarts are for reconnaissance, they can only be in one place at a time. Using FFG-7s as dedicated scouts permits tactical commanders to station the major surface combatants for their primary AAW/ASW functions in the best possible location. Thus the FFG-7, which will never be a big player in the weapons delivery game, has the right stuff to become a cornerstone of the battle group commander’s information-gathering network and prevent mission conflicts for the cruisers and destroyers.
Moreover, the FFG-7/LAMPS-III/SQR-19 system has repeatedly demonstrated its value in fleet scout scenarios during deployments and “hostile-peace” episodes. As part of the Sixth Fleet’s Gulf of Sidra action against Libyan forces in April 1986, the frigates Halyburton (FFG-
40) and Dewert (FFG-45) provided valuable surveillance information for the battle group through their SH-60Bs. The system again demonstrated its versatility in locating and tracking Iranian small combatants and boats during the patrols and spasmodic “hot” actions throughout the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf mission.
Because of budgetary trends and proposed carrier force reductions, it is likely that a larger proportion of operations will be undertaken with only a single carrier present. That means that air assets embarked on board FFG-7s will increasingly be used for warning and surveillance missions, easing the load on carrier aircraft and ensuring continued information flow when the carrier stands down from air operations.
Conclusions
The FFG-7 will never take the place of the Aegis- quipped Arleigh Burke, which shoots the guts out of a massive air attack; nor of the Tomahawk platform, which suppresses air-defense sites with TLAM-Cs to smooth the Way for carrier attack aircraft; nor of the spacious Spru- ance, with its balanced, integrated sensors and weapons, which functions so well as a flagship. But it could be the Charles F. Adams-class successor in shortstopping targets that squeeze past the Aegis combat air patrol defense; it could play the role of a nimble goalie against submarines approaching the heavies. It is a worthy descendant of the lithe scout cruisers and rugged radar pickets in supplying vital detection, surveillance, and targeting on the far teaches of the battle group. It can also expand the capabilities of a detached surface action group with its two embarked LAMPS helicopters and its Standard, Harpoon, and Penguin missiles.
And, as an increasing number of officers operate with FFG-7s and gain an appreciation of the flexibility inherent *n their various systems, the stigma that resulted from the earlier high/low debate is perceptibly diminishing. Tactical commanders find that in routine operations, at least one multifaceted FFG-7 in the group is of more immediate Value to them than another battle-group escort with high AAW firepower but no embarked aviation or passive- sonar capability.
It is therefore in the best interest of the Navy to reshape the image of the FFG-7, in the uniformed naval community and the sectors of government that have a role in the budgetary decision process. The first step should be to formally recognize the value of the ship in battle group operations and redefine its missions.
A visible, effective initiative would be to segment the class along the lines of the two functions discussed in this article. Early units would become IDZ frigates, with the classification FFI. LAMPS-II1 units would be classified to reflect the multipurpose reconnaissance role they are already performing and thus gain the title Scout Frigate, or FFS. Changing designations may seem theatrical, but it is a valid device to clarify understanding of roles. Reclassification would also help to reinforce the tactical reality that the ship is not an AAW surrogate for Aegis and SM-2/ NTU combatants. Upon reclassifications (and retirement of older missile destroyers), the G designation would apply exclusively to ships that were fully capable of holding down an outer-zone air-defense station.
Once legitimacy in battle-group operations had been acknowledged, modernization could be analyzed from the proper mission perspective. Hardware upgrades for an IDZ frigate or fleet scout vary in important detail from those of a ship perceived to be a convoy escort. The continued vitality of the ship’s medium-range antiair capability would demand early attention. In the middle 1980s, short-sighted Department of Defense budgetary decisions terminated production of the SM-1MR missile. Although a considerable inventory of these weapons exists, they must eventually be replaced because of age and increasingly capable threats. However, the logical action— modifying the FFG-7 to use Standard SM-2MR in some configuration—necessitates expensive fire control and hardware changes. That has reportedly led to consideration of eliminating the FFG-7 Mk-13 launcher/Standard missile system in favor of a short-range point defense or close-in weapon. There was some rationale for the latter action in the context of a 600-ship fleet with a projected abundance of Aegis and SM-2/NTU combatants to cover frigates intended only for escort missions. But a medium- range missile is essential if the FFG-7 is to carry out the battle-group IDZ role and defend itself on scouting missions remote from the carrier. Logic suggests finding an affordable fix for this problem, such as a combined remanufacturing and updating of the SM-1MR to keep it useful over the life span of the frigates.
Considering the FFG-7’s credible performance during its ten years of fleet duty, it is a good bet its shotgun union with the battle group will succeed, in a state of mutual respect, if not passion.
Captain Shade is Comptroller, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. His sea duty includes serving as commanding officer of an ATF, MSO, and DDG; and executive officer of the Julius A. Furer (FFG-6).