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The United States has lagged behind the technical and strategic innovators of 20th century warfare, making up with industrial might for deficiencies in imagination. We can no longer afford such complacency.
Occasionally, technological invention and creative 1 ltarY thinking have combined to bring about Precipita(V0 Ut'°nary changes 'n the conduct of warfare, ^PPened'11^ ^Uantum 'eaPs *n military strategy. This has given more and more frequently in the 20th century, e accelerated pace of scientific and technical ad-
van
the Nevertheless the United States has not been in
air p0ty r°nt these changes. Giulio Douhet, the Italian e*e . Cr a^vocate. wrote: “To prepare for war demands strateISe °l imagination.” The record indicates that U. S.
^§'c thinking has lacked such imagination. tions3 ru'e’ the United States has not appreciated innova- clriVe^n strategy unt'' t*ie ut'hty °f a new concept has been carrj home. Recall such dramatic examples as Japan’s er air attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957. Once the feasibility of a new strategy has been demonstrated, we have energized and focused our vast scientific, engineering, and economic capability in a frenzy of activity, and usually have surpassed the country that originated the concept. In contrast, the Soviet Union has shown a willingness to adopt innovations in warfare, and has often preceded the West in developing new strategies. Only their limited technological and economic bases have kept the Soviets from exploiting such doctrinal advantages.
The United States’s relative geographic invulnerability and the fact that many strategic innovations are not absolutely decisive have permitted us the luxury of waiting for new modes of warfare to be proved before adopting them. This may not be possible in the future. The Soviet Union’s
increasing ability to exploit advances in technology, coupled with the range and destructiveness of modern weaponry, has placed a premium on seizing the strategic initiative. It is unlikely that we will be able to recover from any blow invited by deficient strategies. Our national security now depends on our ability to grasp the significance of new strategic concepts.
The Record
The development of strategic air power, carrier air power, mechanized warfare, and strategic nuclear warfare graphically illustrates our inability to exploit doctrinal advances. There are other examples of this tendency— airborne forces, submarine employment, and strategic defense—as well as a few exceptions—amphibious warfare and space systems. Nevertheless, the four selected cases cover the entire spectrum of warfare, demonstrating that the lack of strategic perception is common to our overall defense structure.
These four warfare areas represent the core of our present military capability. Despite the rapid pace of technology over the past 30 years, the doctrinal basis of our current force structure was developed by other nations in the 1930s and 1940s. Further, in three of the four examples, the Soviet Union was one of the leading innovators.
Strategic Air Power: Giulio Douhet and British air power advocates first articulated offensive air power strategy in the early 1920s. They claimed that the airplane could break the deadlock in ground combat that characterized World War I—by concentrating offensive striking power against an enemy’s homeland. While the Italians and British did not fully evolve the concept owing to economic and technical constraints, the Soviets and the Germans began developing a strategic air force. In 1934, the German Luftwaffe had more bomber than fighter squadrons, most of the former intended for deep (beyond the immediate battlefield) strikes. In the Soviet Union, A. N.
• The
Lapchinsky strongly advocated strategic bombing^.^ Soviets built the first mass-produced, foure bomber—the TB-3. More than 800 were built in 37, and even larger aircraft were experimented wt • jng the Soviets and Germans conducted independent operations in the Spanish Civil War, and the ® pj„ were the first to attempt large-scale strategic bom their air assaults on Britain.1 . , the'
U. S. Army General Billy Mitchell popularize ^Qs. ories of Douhet in the United States during the Proponents of air power supported Mitchell. althoug ^ marily as an argument for an independent air ^ Douhet’s theories were taught at the U. S. A aS Corps Tactical School in the 1930s. The B-17 ^>onlpeSpite designed in 1934 and a prototype flew in 1935. ,js. these developments, the U. S. military establishme ^ missed the concept of strategic air power. George . Secretary of War in the first Franklin D. Rooseve t a^ 3 istration, regarded mass bombing “the fantasy^ ^ dreamer.” The Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff wr 1938: “The military superiority of ... a two or three smaller planes that could be procured ^ same funds remains to be established.” That san^reCted funds for other long-range bomber designs were re ^ by the Army-Navy joint board, which decided iSVbe or longer-ranged aircraft than the B-17 would needed. Few B-17s were produced until 1940. ^
After 1939, the situation changed dramatics >■ power advocates in the Army Air Corps used 1
. .. . C0iiil
Prodded by British claims that prolonged bombing^.^ break down Germany without an invasion, the 0f States built a massive strategic air force.3 The con and
offensive air power was embraced wholehearte remains the core of Air Force capability today, ern. (0fs in the Strategic Air Command. Ironically, the orig 0f of the strategic bombing concept realized the limit3 1
64
Proceedings / No'el
niber
1
to
•fleet p ■ ioiiuic vji Mimcgic uomuing
have vpt xPectations in World War II and Vietnam, we /vJQ/ *° learn these limitations, carrier in iQr7°”’ British launched the first aircraft
to project power also grasped the po-
*aunched Carr'ers *or Pacific operations, and
the Japane V*rSt CaiTier’ theHosho, in 1922. By 1941, had more ^ £et ^ac* as many carriers as battleships, and
had in bothT 1CaS 'n the Pacific (ten) than the U. S. Beet deship stii, ,£ Atla"t.c and Pacific (six). Though the bat- d°ctrine w-S 'nBuenced Japanese naval thinking, a
dent carric>aS eve'°Pecl to support the potential of indepen- garner oj*rations.- p P
1520s “ ’
-1 offpn --------------- o ------ - J
carrier.L se and defense of flying boats as compared with N- Se Dlanp« ” Initial 1939 appropriations called
for
ls not
strik,
OVPr n ^
ar8ek u a vast range and at the most swiftly moving
Cb^l
gun. ,,at The
Pacific rCayzatr°n that a naval war would be fought in the Italy, jn fbe success of aircraft against ships at Taranto, I941 j , TO, and in the sinking of the Bismarck in May
^as
m°veditn*n? and a^ant*f,nec^ even as the United States a opt it. Despite the failure of strategic bombing
the British n Adm‘ral J°hn R- Jellicoe, commander of h°tce of p. ■ £et’ advocated the construction of a large across ih 3ITlers f°r the Far Eastern Fleet 'entia nfVaStPacific-The JaPanese
-> alth .aV-^ a*so adopted the aircraft carrier in the Mitchell’s °hU^ ** W3S as much in response to General hy air p0wC ar^es *Hat the battleship was made obsolete carrier wae[j,as was because the Navy believed that the remained f1 Wave °f the future. In fact, the battleship UP to pea ',rSAln fhe minds of most naval strategists right Carriers ^ > dr^or- all fleet exercises in the 1930s, opment 0frC tlec*to lhe battleships, restricting the devel- 1938-39 h 1IJ^CPendent operating doctrine. The Navy’s n° carrier Ur’v!n^ Pro8rarn included four battleships and B. Lea.S *1'e^ Naval Operations Admiral William hr\«L . * instead Pnrlnrco^ in in S'!)-af'ng tW<) battleships in that year and two more hfavgj a ’ w'*h only one carrier authorized, in 1940.5 ic „a ^st Bernard Brodie wrote in 1941: “The carrier rkdy to replace the battleship. The carrier can
• cannot strike with the accuracy and force- 1S characteristic of the large naval
-not t0 a 8reater emphasis on naval aviation. But it ackgroUnbl Pearl Harbor that the battleship faded into the UeshipsUn<^ Navy was forced to operate without bat- Uiat be' UI1(P as a resuB> created the carrier task forces ^°rld M/1116 t*1C scour8e °f lbe Pacific. By the end of aircraft ar TJ- S. shipyards had produced more than 30 group bCarr'ers’ and the doctrine of the fast carrier strike carrier tCcarne cornerstone of U. S. naval strategy. The ^Val ,ask force remains the principal instrument of U. S.
Tfe .°ctr'ne today and into the 21st century.
Phases Warfare: In the first of two developmental
Hap a’ ritish strategists J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell break., v°cated using tanks and motorized vehicles to f^ancg e stalemate of trench warfare. Though Britain and eXperj reJected these concepts, the Germans and Soviets Chief niCntecl extensively during the 1920s and 1930s. hache °V- S°v>et General Staff Marshal M. Tuk- skiy envisioned a new form of warfare predicated on mobility and maneuver, and by 1936 had formed a mechanized corps of tanks and motorized infantry. However, the Germans brought the initial phase of mechanized warfare to its fulfillment. General Heinz Guderian’s Panzer divisions combined concentrations of tank formations with mobile infantry and support troops to create a formidable striking force. Guderian’s blitzkrieg rolled across Europe in 1939-41.7
Meanwhile, the U. S. Army remained convinced of the utility of horse cavalry through the 1930s. While some army officers saw potential in tanks and motorized vehicles, the Army had only one mechanized cavalry brigade in 1939, and it was manned at half-strength. Witnessing the stunning effectiveness of the blitzkrieg in France, the U. S. Army quickly moved to catch up. The Armor Corps was created in July 1940 and a number of studies on tanks and armored vehicles were hurriedly prepared. By the end of the war, the Army had 16 armored divisions and 62 tank battalions supporting infantry units. Yet, despite the exploits of General George S. Patton and others, the tank remained a supporting arm in the U. S. Army.8
Drawing on lessons learned from fighting the Germans and analysis of the implications of nuclear weapons, the Soviets amplified the blitzkrieg concept in the late 1950s to create a doctrine and force structure for decisive mobile warfare. The doctrine emphasized surprise, rapid offensive action, and maneuver. Today, all Red Army infantry units are mechanized. The Soviets pioneered the development of infantry fighting vehicles, a mobile air defense umbrella, and other mechanized support units, all of which enhance the capability to engage in maneuver warfare.
For many years, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps failed to recognize the changing nature of land warfare. The 1975 edition of FM 100-5, the Army field operations manual, was described by one strategist as “. . .a doctrine of pure attrition. . . . The invading enemy is treated as a mass of individual targets, to be destroyed one by one with the strength of the defense in fire-power being ranged against hard armor.”9
U. S. equipment and force structure have likewise lagged behind the times. In 1975, more than one-third of the active Army divisions and most reserve units depended upon foot mobility. Marine Corps mechanized capability was minimal. Faced with growing criticism of its inability to confront the Soviet threat in Europe, the Army finally adopted some mechanized warfare concepts. The 1983 edition of FM 100-5 endorsed the principles of maneuver and deep operations, and the Marine Corps has tested a doctrine for mechanized operations. Programs for the mass procurement of new tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and air defense weapons have begun. The evolution of U. S. mechanized warfare is progressing, but only by following the German and Soviet examples.
Strategic Nuclear Warfare: While the United States integrated nuclear weapons into the force structure with minor modifications to doctrine and strategy, Soviet doctrine and force structure underwent significant transitions in the 1950s in response to what they termed “the revolution in military affairs”:
within the defense bureaucracy often have con
must
survive struggles among branches within a service,.^ service rivalries, interagency disputes within the eX branch, and conflicts between Congress and the presi
ment did not progress until it was removed t'rorn^^ cre.
cannot
om>c
and institutional constraints alone
account for our lack of strategic perception. . fre constraints were lifted before World War II and duri ^ Korean War, yet the Navy and Air Force continu ^ build battleships and bombers instead of carriers a js siles. Once the strategic significance of an innoVii,aV or
grasped, institutional resistance is usually swept awu>
conflicts, there has been little incentive to innovate- when we have been surprised by a new strategy, 'v£s<, always adapted with striking resiliency. This l0S uno- sense of security based upon assumptions of U. S- t. logical and economic superiority, which allows usto pone doctrinal revision. „oVjet
The Soviet Union: Under totalitarianism, the ^rec- leadership has a great deal more freedom to shift the t tion of its military policies. There are limitations °nafy the Kremlin can spend on defense, but the Soviet m ^ is relatively free of economic constraints. AlthoU-5 jc
Soviet Union has institutions and a bureaucracy, ^r‘lte,rest
f inte:
decisions are not inhibited by a wide range oi 1 . j|.
groups, the need for a consensus, or political accou ity. The Soviets are driven by a well-defined ide° ~r Unlike the pragmatic U. S. approach to policy, ^lS jng. vides long-range goals that foster long-range P*an„c0f
enceS
un
de'''
onr
j con;
cepts to ensure their security and attain their desired '■$
wof“ trateg1^
status
in the 1920s and 1930s
-strategic bombers,
Proceedings / Novenil>e
“The development and introduction of nuclear and rocket weapons, as well as of radio electronic equipment, has led to fundamental changes in almost all other means of armed combat. As a result, the importance and strategic significance of the services of the armed forces, as well as the methods of using them in war, have changed profoundly, thus imparting an entirely new nature to war.”10
The Soviets began a vigorous nuclear weapon development program. By 1950, design bureaus were at work on crash programs to perfect ballistic missiles. Two new military services were created: the Strategic Rocket Forces for strategic offense and the Air Defense Forces of the Homeland (PVO Strany) for strategic defense. The army, navy, and air forces were all restructured to incorporate nuclear warfare.
Meanwhile, the United States continued with the strategy that prevailed in World War II. Nuclear weapons assumed the primary role, but within the existing force structure. The long-range bomber became the principal strategic weapon. The Navy’s carrier forces also got a piece of the nuclear action, being tasked to deliver strikes in support of the nuclear war plan. The significance of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was overlooked. After World War II, an Air Force scientific study concluded that ballistic missiles would not be available until the distant future. Missile research was cancelled in 1947, and received minimal support in 1951-54.
The United States was jolted in 1957: ICBM feasibility was demonstrated by a Soviet test in August and Sputnik was launched in October. U. S. planners had assumed that the Soviets would follow the U. S. lead in developing aircraft as nuclear delivery platforms. This led to the infamous “bomber gap” prediction of the mid-1950s. When the scope of the Soviet missile program was discovered, however, President Dwight D. Eisenhower made ICBM development “the highest priority in the nation.” The Atlas and Minuteman missiles were developed in five years. President John F. Kennedy accelerated U. S. programs dramatically; the “strategic triad” clearly outdistanced all Soviet deployments for almost a decade.11
The Reasons
The United States: There is no simple explanation for the U. S. lack of strategic perception. The democratic system inherently imposes economic and institutional constraints that prevent prompt assimilation of potential advances in warfare. J. F. C. Fuller doubted that a liberal democratic state could muster the resources necessary to exploit new strategies in any situation short of total war. Limited resources and strict political accountability for the use of those resources creates an almost irresistible pressure to choose proven systems rather than innovations.
Two institutional factors inhibit the exploitation of strategic advances. First, the U. S. approach to policy is pragmatic and crisis-oriented. Until something happens that exposes a problem with the current strategy, there is little long-range evaluation and planning, without which it is
66
impossible to anticipate and prepare for advances in1 ^ ts fare. Second, the various organizations and in .c(jn2 ideas of what is best for the nation. A new strategy all responding to different interest groups and percep ^ of public Opinion. Rarely can an innovative cone P
these bureaucratic battles. For example, missile e
' " i trie 11
mal bureaucratic process and a special agency _ -c ated. Similarly, the President’s Commission on x ^ Forces was established to break the deadlock on 1 issue.
Economic
c?-- 1--- 7 ------------------------------ — -------- j nfCV^^”
bypassed. Doctrinal objections are the key factors" ^e\\ ing the rapid assimilation of new strategies. As .je3 Hart put it, “The only thing harder than getting apoC. into the military mind is to get an old one out. trine is derived largely from perceived lessons of Pa- y flicts. Because of this tendency, U. S. military st.^tofy. suffers from what might be termed the paradox ofvl ^ Defense analyst Richard Betts wrote: “Victors ten ^ less adventurous than losers, since having won t*lStTjeS of ous war they see more virtue in the dominant strategy ^ that war.” 13 Generally having been the big winner i
Zel*
The most important distinction lies in the expert the two countries. The United States was relative y scathed by two world wars, but the Soviet Union was astated. People’s perspectives change when they hve ~ j former battlefield. Emerging from World War I a l°se^ from World War II as a weak runner-up to an atom perpower, the Soviets were forced to seek innovative .
They experimented with a variety of new stra o 1920s and 1930s—strategic bombers, mechan
l9«7
fo •
s'dered 3ntl airborne troops—to prepare for what they con- World W° j6 an 'nev*ta^e conflict with the West. After to attain 3r • ’ a8gressively pursued atomic advances ingness tPanty Wkh the United States. The Soviets’ will-
fear the wnn?Vate 'S likely t0 cont'nue as long as they est s industrial and technological capability.
H^/uture
The
S°vie^s°Ceans are not the barriers they once were. The bate extf.rniSSI*eS’ a'rcrab’ and naval forces can concen- minutgs rie destruct've force upon U. S. territory in they can .n C Past^ years, the Soviets have shown that laiproy311 W'^ exP^od advances in warfare.
°f our def'n^ strate8lc perception strikes at the foundation initiative ense establishment. There are six areas in which MilitaC°, nurture strategic thinking, not onlv i?i et uca,'on: The study of history and strategy °f current ljStrates tbe evolution of warfare and the origins the direct' °Ctr'ne’ but identifies trends that can indicate the servil0n °^uture developments. Recent initiatives by SessrnentC6S rev’ved tbe study of history and strategic as- and case ^ ,°Ur Professi°nal military schools. Seminars 'Var and a Uff CS kave been added to the curriculum of the gic perCg 3 c®deges, providing a basis for better strate- •he fU|j P.tlon- However, it will be a few years before While w C^tS these improvements can be felt. Mean-
preco^n?- Skou!d expand this program into entry-level and ^ 'ssioning training, to introduce all officers to the
Wean “*V1US* With the ever-increasing sophistication of tiCu, nry. we need to emphasize technical training, par- expe y *n entry-level courses. At the same time, we can ticesCt a Cah for increased emphasis on managerial prac- iw/^d to controlling the complex administrative, eff0r,enance> and procurement systems. We must resist s to trim history and strategy from our programs.
Personnel Management: There is no system to identify individuals who demonstrate a talent for innovative strategic thought and to place them in positions where they can influence the formulation of doctrine and strategy. The lion’s share of professional school graduates are funneled into the operating forces. It is unclear whether our best and brightest officers are being assigned to the doctrine and development centers where the future course of the services is being charted.15 There is no question that commanders need to have a foundation in strategic thought and that strategic thinkers should have operational experience, but the skills required for long-range planning and development of strategy are not the same as those required for command. That many of the most innovative strategic ideas are being advanced by civilians with limited military experience supports this. The German General Staff identified individuals with strategic talent early in their careers and retained them in positions where their talents could be used. Though they served limited tours in the operating forces, they were not field commanders, and were not discriminated against because of it.16 Today’s Soviet General Staff operates in much the same way.17 We should identify our best and brightest early in their careers and develop a career pattern that will enable them to help formulate doctrine and strategy.
Organization: Once we have identified these individuals, we must provide an environment in which they can exercise their talent. Though each service has its development departments and war colleges, assignments for ac
tive-duty officers are transitory and not always considered career-enhancing. There is no Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)- or Defense Department-level organization to consider overall national strategy. Creating a professional joint staff of strategists from all services would improve our ability to analyze key issues objectively. Each of the services could also develop its own strategy department, which would produce neutral assessments of existing doctrine and explore alternatives. Retaining talented person-
*Ve
will provide clearer and more timely identification o tegic deficiencies, which in turn will permit the exP tion of new methods of correcting these shortconn Then these assessments can be used as the founda ■
future strategies. Communication
denioc'
Some of the disadvantages a
lasers-
nel in these positions is essential for developing the continuity and expertise needed for effective long-term planning.
Research and development (R&D): Most research responds to specific requirements developed by the services. Naturally, these requirements are based primarily on identified deficiencies in existing equipment. While this method ensures continuity of basic capabilities, it stifles truly innovative concepts. Research becomes evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and progresses by increments rather than by leaps and bounds. The tendency toward conservative research strategies is reinforced by unrealistic expectations of success. The purpose of R&D is to explore a variety of alternatives and arrive at the best through testing, analysis, and evaluation.
Throughout the process, shortcomings will be found in one or more of the potential options, prompting modifications or deletions. However, rather than recognize the natural progression of the development cycle and that several concepts must be explored to find the best solution, the military establishment is often cited for mismanagement when experimental programs fail to yield a viable system. This creates further pressure to invest only in sure things. We must be willing to pursue a broader R&D program, one that strives for new concepts as well as improving old ones. Because of our current strategic and economic circumstances, this program may adversely affect some current capabilities. There will be dead ends in the exploration of revolutionary concepts, but only by tracing these concepts can the truly innovative strategies needed to enhance our future security be brought to fruition. Conservative research strategies guarantee only that we will continue to invest in sure things, the effectiveness of which may have long since passed.
Strategic Assessment: Improvements in education, personnel management, and strategic thinking will provide the means for improving strategic assessment, but unless we insist on accurate assessments, these improvements
will serve no purpose. Our method of measuring ■ strategy against the strategies of potential adversaries^ proved to be inadequate for long-range planning an <_ vation. We must demand that our personnel examine • capabilities critically. Objective, long-range assessm
racy has facing a totalitarian state in the strategic aren be overcome by using the strengths of democratic 1 ■ tions. Open forums and publications can educate the P ^ lie and help influence the legislative process. In the P such efforts have been limited and somewhat c u Monographs like the Soviet Military Power series in a growing recognition of the need to present the P ^ with the facts directly, rather than through secoa_ sources such as the media or civilian analysts. The- ^ forts should be expanded to increase public awaren ^ strategic circumstances and the need to seek mno solutions. je$
There are indications that our current military stra are rapidly becoming obsolete. The vulnerability 00f based ICBMs is acknowledged, and the effectivene ^ our other strategic forces has become increasingly tionable. The introduction of cruise missiles and an ^ rier tactics by the Soviets has initiated debate abou future utility of carrier battle groups. Similarly, the as of mechanized warfare and precision-guided mum has threatened the doctrinal basis of amphibious war Potential solutions to these challenges are, as in the P generally ignored. Though space-based defense s gained favor recently, it appears to have emerged £>nj ^ less-innovative alternatives were exhausted, rather tn ^ the result of a bold stroke. Meanwhile, developme11 concepts with great strategic potential, such as
, . ePQrations y0| M. S. Watson, The Chiefs of Staff: Prewar Plans and
- P- 69* ' ’ 1 of the U. S. Army in World War II (Washington: GPO,
Vork; Ballantin 5^*1973 a Humble, The Japanese High Seas Fleet
225.
*-Re.
"Ranted.! /„ p ’■
240 -46 eace an^ (Westport, CT: Greenwood
ion vehicl CmiSe m'ss>les» surface-effect ships, air cush- tilt-rotor' ^ vertical/short takeoff and landing and pace. a'rCraft’ Progresses at an excruciatingly slow
ing and^ aber'n8 ^ns situation are innovative think- straints on ° act|on- Economic and institutional con- inertia is , lnnovat*on W>11 continue; overcoming doctrinal s'gnifjCanCp C?tlcaj requirement. If the ability to grasp the cates that ° ■ f” innovative concept exists, history indi- n°mic ban-3'1 ' ,3 Can hurdle the bureaucratic and ecoAir Force 'fprs . 'eutenant General Daniel Graham, U. S. gence A,v„ et'rCd)’ former head of the Defense Intelli- States forcy’wrote: “The only real hope for the United
safety ;naC lev'ng confident security—a margin of
habits of ;n6 Perdous decades ahead is to discard the hamewoi-L- Crenienta' thinking and to opt for the strategic 0Ur suk °f the bold aPProach.’’19 n'h°n an(JVIVa! ma^ Web dePend upon our prompt recog- he prenama^*3 OItat'on °f radical new concepts. We must o make the quantum leap.
'The ■■
Q*t0ry (New York°^f°N*r*ne 1S covered in R. Higham, Air Power: A Concise ntian Air porc ' * s Press> 1972), pp. 68-71. For early structure of
Jnecy Co., 1971 \CC ’ Schliephake, The Birth of the Luftwaffe (Chicago: Henry h s-)» Soviet Avian ^ j ^or ^ov*et Air Force see Higham and J. Kipp ^ 1976), pp 5°n ™ Air power: A Historical View (Boulder, CO: Westview
pCr 1958 PD oP/’ 7he Army and the Strategic Bomber,” Military Affairs, Sum- reParm: and M S
STS**'4-*-' Of the I
Press, 1978), pp.
1968) nflt ^ast Carriers: the Forging of an Air Navy (New York: McGraw-
l' M rv ’H I/.
MapH 8orkiewic7 tu r\ •
Qor>ald & \ q ne L)esiSn and Development of Fighting Vehicles (London:
• ’ 68), pp. 30 _35; ancj k Macksey, Tank Warfare: a History of
Tanks in Battle (New York: Stein and Day, 1972), p. 90.
8On the Army and horse cavalry see, “The Horse Cavalry in the 20th Century: a study in policy response,” in Readings in American Foreign Policy, M. H. Hal- perin and A. Kanter (eds.), (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1973), p. 185. For Army mechanized units in World War II see Watson, pp. 52, 148; Ogorkiewicz, p. 40; and K. R. Greenfield, et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 of the U. S. Army in World War II (Washington: GPO, 1947), p. 211. 9E. N. Luttwak, ‘‘The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance,” Survival, March-April 1979, p. 58.
10V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, trans. H. F. Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1968), p. 198.
“For the evolution of Soviet missile programs see R. P. Berman and J. C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982); for US ICBM development see E. Beard, Developing the 1CBM (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).
,2J. M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 223.
I3R. K. Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 116. 14A battle studies and strategy program was added to the curriculum of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and Amphibious Warfare School in 1982-83. See R. A. Emerson, “Command and Staff College: Prospectus for the 1980s,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1982, pp. 62-67; and J. J. Holly, “Amphibious Warfare School: A Warrior’s Shield,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1982, pp. 67-69. Policy and Strategy forms a core of the Naval War College program. In addition, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies and the Strategic Studies Group was established at the college in 1981-82. See J. E. Jackson, “Naval War College: The Right Stuff?” Proceedings, April 1983, pp. 71-77, and “A War-Fighting Perspective,” Proceedings, October 1983, pp. 66-81.
,5P. D. David, “Fewer Promotions at Development Center,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1985, pp. 22-23; C. O. Skipper, “Development Center Assignment Policies,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1985, pp. 62-63; and T. B. Buell, “The Education of a Warrior,” Proceedings, January 1981, pp. 40-45.
16T. Ropp, War in the Modern World (N.Y.: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 155-58; and C. A. Leader III, “Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries,” Proceedings, November 1984, pp. 94-95.
i7H. F. Scott and W. F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 102-113.
,8D. O. Graham, “Toward a New US Strategy: Bold Strokes Rather than Increments,” Strategic Review, Spring 1981, p. 12.
Captain Williams is an intelligence instructor at the Fleet Intelligence Training Center Pacific. He has served as an intelligence officer in the 1st and 3d Marine divisions, as a recruit training officer at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, and most recently as a Soviet intelligence analyst at Headquarters, U. S. European Command. He received a B.A. degree in history from Cornell University in 1978 and an M.S. in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College in 1985.
Spit It Out
Each week during the academic year at Annapolis, plebes must research and familiarize themselves with a given professional topic. This particular week, the topic was U. S. Navy ship types. One day at noon meal, I, an upperclassman, was questioning a nervous young plebe.
“Mr. Jones, what is the name of the lead ship in the Spruance class?”
“I-um-I’m not sure . . . I . . . I’ll find out, Sir!”
“Aw, c’mon Jones. You should know that—it’s obvious.” I paused. “Then tell me, Jones, who is buried in Grant’s tomb?”
“Grant, Sir!”
“Very good Jones. Now that you’re on the right track, tell me the name of the lead ship in the S-P-R-U-A-N-C-E class.”
“The Grant, Sir!”
Lieutenant (junior grade) Mike Yandell, U. S. Navy
■------------------------------------------------- Superpower Staredown________________________________
In the 1960s, one of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s newest ships boldly steamed through a U. S. naval formation in the Atlantic and then, without provocation, suddenly and rashly pointed her guns at Admiral Isaac Kidd’s flagship.
Kidd immediately ordered battle stations and had every gun trained on the Soviet ship. The startled Soviet captain quickly signaled, “Do you want to start World War III?”
Admiral Kidd signaled back, “If I do, you will be the first to know.”
Wayne A. Silkett
Vdin