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Why not? The Standing Naval Force Atlantic has proved so successful that a Standing Naval Force Pacific seems like the next logical step to counter the growing Soviet threat in the Pacific. Five nations promise to be the permanent members of such a force—two of which are represented here by the Canadian Aurora (CP-140) antisubmarine aircraft overflying the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70).
An internationally significant naval event took place in Portsmouth, England, in 1968. The first perma' nent international naval force in modern history was established—the Standing Naval Force Atlanta (StaNavForLant).
The squadron originally consisted of one frigate eac from the United Kingdom, the United States, the Nethej- lands, and Norway. Formed to counter the Soviet Navy rapid expansion in the mid-to-late 1960s, it was assigned four-fold mission:
► To provide a continuous NATO maritime presence ^ ► To provide an immediately available deterrent na force that would be operational during peacetime
econ
omic growth are ensured for all Pacific rim nations.
^ To form a nucleus around which a more powerful international naval force could be built * To improve NATO capabilities through multinational °perations
StaNavForLant is an unqualified success story. Since its ormation, more than 85,000 officers and men have been Part of this force, which steams about 55,000 miles each year in a display of international solidarity. Could this concept work equally well in the Pacific Ocean?
The Pacific, the world’s largest ocean, is bounded on the west by the Asian landmass and islands dominated by jne Soviet Union and China and—further to the south— y Australia and New Zealand. North and South America orm the eastern limits, dominated by the United States. Uuring the past two decades, an increasing amount of rade has flowed between North America and the western abons of the Pacific rim, most notably Japan. Japan is jltlc °f the largest trading partners the United States has day, while trade links between almost all Pacific rim entries have increased dramatically in the past ten years, eddition, although it is too early yet to make confident edictions, China’s emergence upon the Pacific trading ene—especially with its very recent apparent turn to odified capitalism—would portend significant future °wth in trading activity among Asian nations, as well as 1 h China’s North American and European partners. This a*n of events can occur only if continued stability and
Since the departure of U. S. forces from Southeast Asia more than ten years ago, the Soviet Union has rapidly extended its sphere of influence in the region. Using Vietnam as its largest staging area, the Soviet Union is now comfortably ensconced across Japan’s vital links with its Persian Gulf oil supplies. Yet there is little reason to believe that the Soviets’ desire for further expansion in the area has abated. The United States has long recognized this trend, and, lately, so have realists in Japan and Australia. This belief has breathed new life into the treaties and agreements the United States has with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and, until recently, New Zealand. The United States has other, less-defined interests in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, including the abilities of these states and economic areas to maintain their industrial viability and friendly relations with the Western democracies.
A Standing Naval Force Pacific would represent a significant move by the United States and its Pacific rim allies, demonstrating their opposition to additional Soviet influence in the region. It could also provide an overdue sense of common purpose among the contributing nations.
In order for the Standing Naval Force Pacific to be fully credible, Japan would have to participate. A means would have to be found to circumvent the 1,000-mile “limit” on operations currently imposed on ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force—one of the world’s more capable blue-water navies. Given the importance of Persian Gulf oil to Japan and the current pragmatic Japanese leadership, the Japanese would probably participate in the Standing Naval Force Pacific, although its two largest trading partners, the United States and Canada, would need to apply discreet pressure.
Korea would also have to be involved in such a force. The animosity between Japan and Korea, which, until a few years ago, would have prevented joint participation, has now receded considerably and, with U. S. urging, could well be reduced enough to prevent any perceived loss of face by either side. Since Korea’s destroyer and frigate force is small, it probably would not wish to participate full-time unless the U. S. Navy could provide a relief ship to operate under South Korean control. Such an agreement between the South Korean and U. S. governments would be necessary in order for South Korea not to lose its ability to defend itself against its northern neighbor.
Canadian involvement would also be important. Canada carries out increasingly significant amounts of trade with most Pacific rim nations, notably Japan, and enjoys a generally untarnished image in the Far East. Though small, the Canadian Navy should be able to contribute a destroyer full-time. The current Canadian Government would probably consider this proposal favorably because it is steadily becoming more aware of the Pacific rim countries’ importance.
The final country, other than the United States, which has a navy large enough to permit permanent membership in the Standing Naval Force Pacific is Australia. Its ties with the United States have grown as its involvement with Britain and the Commonwealth have diminished. Australia is clearly a leader in its part of the Pacific and would further strengthen this perception by participating in the squadron.
New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand have smaller navies and, therefore, would probably not be able to contribute naval forces on a continuous basis. Instead, they would be asked to take part when forces could be spared and when the squadron was scheduled for training exercises and port visits to those countries. Thailand would likely view an invitation to join the group as a further sign of U. S. willingness to guarantee its territorial integrity, especially in view of the unrest along its eastern border. The Philippine Government could use such membership as the reason for modernizing the largely obsolescent Philippine Navy—with U. S. help. In the case of New Zealand, an active role in the Standing Naval Force Pacific could be seen as a natural and significant strengthening of the troubled Australia-New Zealand-U. S. Pact, with the welcome addition of more powerful allies.
Three other countries should also be considered for
Commonwealth ties with Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as its continuing commitment to Hong Kong. These Western countries’ participation, however, might not be politically acceptable to some of the other contributors, in view of the colonial past of both nations.
China presents another problem. The most populous land in the world, China has begun to look beyond its borders in many areas, especially in acquiring technology and, more recently, in limited military exchanges with the United States. In addition, the navies of Great Britain. Australia, and Canada have recently paid official visits to Shanghai, China’s largest seaport. Although it is unlikely that China would initially wish to become a contributor to the Standing Naval Force Pacific, little would be lost by extending the invitation and opening the door for full par" ticipation in the future. China’s recent “awakening” t0 the attractions of capitalism may well provide the impetus for greater military and naval cooperation between China and its Pacific rim neighbors.
membership in the Standing Naval Force Pacific— France, the United Kingdom, and China. France and Great Britain may very well be interested in at least parttime membership—France because of its remaining responsibilities in French Polynesia, and Britain via its
Command of the Standing Naval Force Pacific squad ron would rotate among the five main contributors f°r period of not less than nine months and ideally for a tu year, as is the case in StaNavForLant. The operating area of Standing Naval Force Pacific would include the weS and southwest Pacific from Japan to Australia. The ma|n concentration of effort would, however, most likely be the Sea of Japan, the China Seas, the Philippine Sea, 1 ® Strait of Malacca and its approaches, and the eastern 1 ^ dian Ocean, with further expansion into the central a ^ western Indian Ocean should the Middle East situation • warrant.
Justification for establishing this force would be sim1 to that for StaNavForLant, including the following:
► To provide a continuous maritime presence in the We
Pacific by a naval squadron composed of allied and “• S. vessels
£ To provide an immediately available deterrent naval °rce that would be operational during peacetime
- To provide the core around which a more powerful international naval force could be built
- To demonstrate Japanese and North American commitment to the continued freedom and prosperity of Pacific
nations
- To improve the Pacific rim allies’ naval capabilities nrough multinational operations
This squadron would signal the welcome reemergence °f Japan as a major power, willing to assume its share of ,e cost of defending the world’s industrialized democrats; China’s participation, if only initially as an observer, c°uld be a significant step toward involving it more fully °n the West’s side.
In addition to these political benefits, there would be ^tractive spinoffs for the navies involved, including: Improved interoperability in most forms of naval warfare
^ Improved levels of training for the smaller navies’ oper- atl°nal units resulting from in-company steaming and Tnlti-national exercises
. Greater public awareness of the importance of the na- Vles of the smaller countries with a concomitant rise in ^e’r funding
The initial costs of establishing the force need not be e*cessive, for the necessary ships and infrastructures are mady operational national assets. The major exception °uld be the increased cost of the fuel necessary to sustain mtiadron operations at the same level as StaNavForLant’s;
ch costs would presumably come out of national bud- I m The United States and Japan could bear most of the direct costs, including occasional provision of replenish- ent vessels and naval aid for the Philippines and Thai- nd- Also, the United States would likely be required to Provide the Republic of Korea’s navy with a frigate or estroyer to relieve the Korean vessel operating with
StaNavForPac. The costs are small, however, when compared with the potential benefits.
The concept of a Standing Naval Force Pacific is one whose time has come. The leaders, policymakers, and planners of the countries concerned need to consider such a move seriously.
Captain lessen received a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Victoria in 1965 and attended the Royal Naval Staff College Greenwich in 1975. His assignments have included command of the destroyers HMCS Kootenay and Restigouche, Queen’s Harbor Master Esquimalt, exchange duty with the Royal Navy in HMS Dryad, and command of the training vessels HMCS Fundy and Chaleur. Captain Jessen attended the U. S. Naval War College as a member of the Naval Command College, Class of 1985. He is currently the Director of Maritime Studies at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto, Ontario.