This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
ocean-going capability, and this is decreasing each year. Nigeria intends to expand its naval horizons through contacts with Brazil, but the Nigerian Navy’s deep-water effectiveness will be very limited, regardless. Few sub-Saharan navies are capable of defending their maritime economic zones and fishery interests because their patrol boats are too small for continuous operations in heavy seas. Chances of improvement during the next decade are remote. Economic problems in most countries are serious, internal security uncertain, and perceived maritime threats do not warrant the diversion of funds from armies and air forces.
The Soviet Union will probably continue to supply African clients with naval vessels. The Soviet Osas are nearly obsolete; their larger Tarantul-class successors are probably too sophisticated and expensive for most African countries.
In the improbable event of an all-out East-West conflagration, virtually any port in central and southern Africa could be captured easily except, possibly, those in South Africa. To hold them without local support might be more difficult.
Colonel Dodd is the British or European correspon ent for magazines in Australia, Malaysia, Germany, and Spain, and writes for magazines in 12 countries-
Generally, 1985 was a quiet year for the Asian region, with some substantial programs coming to fruition among the navies of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet there has been a darker side. The continuing war in Kampuchea is proving to be an expense of spirit for Thailand, which anxiously awaits the outcome, and a waste of shame for Vietnam, its reconstruction programs
now gravely dislocated. Despite an aborted coup, Thailand seems to be coping well with the threat to its security and is receiving support from its ASEAN partners and the United States.
Outside the continent, Japan has found the busy program and burgeoning strength of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet causes for concern. The Soviets appear to be dividing their attention between the
North Pacific and the Indian Ocean, using Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as a staging point and lookout on China, but ASEAN is acutely aware of the strength of the Soviet Union’s position.
The future of Taiwan is unresolved. B is possible that mainland China may not be as patient as some observers imaging Meanwhile, the two Chinas eye eac other warily. .
The Philippines continues to worry its neighbors; the political situation in Ma' nila is bloody and uncertain, and insur gents defy government efforts to erad’ cate them. The rest of ASEAN relatively prosperous, although the rap1 decline in Singapore’s economy is caUS ing alarm. The region’s economic strength is growing, and the developi11® Southeast Asian nations are determine to make the most of their opportunities- Japan: In late 1985, Japanese p'alis for the new Five Year Defense Progra were settled. Although funds are scarce- the 1% of gross national product limit o defense expenditures, which became shrined in Japanese financial policy- certain to be breached by 1987. Marit'1^ operations will be emphasized, with 1 procurement of P-3C Orions a high Prl°eI ity. The recent activities of the Sovl Pacific Fleet and the continuing depld^ ment of major new Soviet units to region have given an edge to the butl? ary demands of the Japanese Marih Self Defense Force (JMSDF). ^
Plans are now in place for a force o diesel-electric submarines by 1988, P sibly with more to follow. Yushio-e a^ subs are produced at a rate of one per H and the older but very capable Uzus^ class submarines have many years o fective life left. afe
Developments in the surface force more uncertain. The Japanese contm _ display considerable interest in the ^ ish Invincible-class carriers, as we ^ the Sea King airborne early warning P ^ ect. It is likely that this interest cen
enou;
s surface-to-surface missile in bat
m°re on concepts than particular equipment. There is no doubt that the JMSDF Sees a requirement for multiple helicop- ui~~anC* Per^aPs V/STOL (vertical/short aKeoff and landing) aircraft—carrying Units in the 20,000-ton range. Indications m"e that ships would not be ordered until e next five-year program.
Meanwhile, there are plans for an improved and enlarged (6,500-ton) version me Shirane-class destroyer which is to Carry the Aegis ship combat and weapon ^sterns and long-range surface-to- surface missiles, possibly vertically „aunched Standard SM-2 missiles. The lfst ship is programmed for 1988 and _ elivery in 1992, with the others follow- ‘n8 at two-year intervals. The ship’s mi-load size is only slightly smaller than ‘he U. S. Navy’s 8,300-ton Arleigh °Urke class.
The pace of the improved Hatsuyuki- ass Program has been stepped up. Three more of this antisubmarine warfare de- r°yer type were ordered in 1985 and more orders will follow for a planned ml of ten. This rate is necessary to at- a,n the force level of 60 escorts planned y the JMSDF and to replace units com- ^ eted in the 1960s which will be obsolete r 1990. Little progress has been made a . the small frigate program, although , 'mproved design was foreshadowed in last defense budget. Two 5,400 atakaze-class guided missile destroyers inere authorized (the first to be delivered 1986), but a request for a third was ^nied in the 1985 budget. With the cur- g 1 hiatus in the frigate program, the 'Ship goai vvin be difficult to reach, let ^ maintain.
l Phe small flotilla of torpedo boats is to . replaced by six or more 250-ton to'k m‘ss'le crafL the first of which is Ca °e completed by 1989. These will . y a 76-mm. gun and four Harpoon Ssiles. In other coastal defense devel- Pments, Japan plans to deploy an indig- teries on the coast of Hokkaido. With a range of 55 miles, the ASM-1 will be a powerful deterrent to enemy amphibious assaults.
Both oceanic and coastal mine countermeasures forces are receiving attention. The first 1,000-ton deep sea minesweeper should be ordered in 1987 and followed by five sister ships. Production of a glass-reinforced plastic version of the coastal Hatsushima class continues at two per year.
The JMSDF displays a moderate and sensible approach to the problems of Japanese defense, particularly in long-range protection of seaborne trade and the ability to react rapidly to a surprise attack on the homeland.
China: By 1990, the emergence of a modem Chinese Navy (People’s Liberation Army Navy—PLAN) will attract considerable interest and shift the regional balance of naval power. Despite across-the-board cuts in defense spending by the Beijing government, the PLAN is managing a small number of new building programs, using imported defense technology and equipment. While France and Britain are prominent, the United States is emerging as China’s prime supplier. The question remains, however, whether a modem PLAN is in the best interests of the United States, for while such a force will greatly complicate the strategic picture for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, it will similarly affect the U. S. Pacific Fleet—particularly if the Soviet Navy further builds force levels in the region as a counter. The specific equipment the United States will sell China is critical to the PLAN’S development. Beijing can be expected to press very hard, now that the door is open, for more sophisticated weapons and systems.
The Chinese submarine program has a high priority. The first Y/a-class nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine became operational in 1985 (although her missiles are probably not ready) and oth-
Japan’s Yushio-cldss submarines are hitting the water at the rate of one per year. The Nadashio (left) and all subsequent units will be configured to five U. S. Sub-Harpoons.
ers will follow. Slow construction of these subs suggests that technical problems still exist. The third Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarine was commissioned in September 1984, and more are expected. China’s conventional submarine strength includes about 90 Romeo-class submarines and 21 elderly Whiskeys. In 1985, the first Wuhan-class sub entered trials. The Wuhans are cruise missile-armed versions of the Romeo class and represent a sensible extension of the design, particularly if they are armed with the new SY-2 sea-skimming antiship missile.
Last year, it was reported that China and Argentina held negotiations for the sale of Argentina's British-built, Type-42 destroyers, the Hercules and Santisima Trinidad. These ships are almost useless to Argentina without British spares; China has long been interested in acquiring the Sea Dart missile for its ships. Such a bargain, while unusual, would be in the interest of all parties since the British prefer the Type-42s to be in other hands and would like access to the Chinese naval equipment market. The failure of the Luda-class guided missile destroyer modernization package some years ago was a disappointment that British Aerospace has yet to accept.
The 4,000-ton Luda-class destroyer replacement will have combined diesel or gas propulsion, employing General Electric LM2500 gas turbines. Armament may include the new Chinese CSA-NX-1 surface-to-air missiles, SY-2 antiship missiles, French Creusot-Loire 100-mm. Compact guns, and a Dauphin-2 helicopter. In line with this project, a new frigate class will commence delivery this year. The first six ships’ systems will be compatible with the new destroyer class. These ships are likely to carry the U. S. 20-mm. Mark-15 Gatling antiaircraft gun (Phalanx) and U. S. Mark-46 antisubmarine torpedoes.
The large patrol boat force will be updated with the new Haiju-class patrol boats, which are successors to the Hainan class. The long-awaited replacement of the Huangfeng (Soviet Osa-I)-class missile boats may soon begin with the construction of the H-3-class lead boat. Designed by a U. S. firm, H-3 Research and Development Group, it incorporates U. S., European, and Chinese weapons and sensors.
Three developments in the air arm in-
implications for South Korea. Vietnam: The war with Kampui
The increased transfer of U. S. military hardware to China is evidenced by the construction of up to 15 U. S.-designed, H-3-class aluminum patrol boats to replace China’s Soviet-supplied Osa-Is.
elude the refurbishment of several Super Frelon helicopters with French antisubmarine warfare sensors; the introduction of a four-engined antisubmarine warfare seaplane; and the introduction of a Soviet Styx-derived air-to-surface missile for the Tu-16 Badger aircraft. These new systems will strengthen a traditionally weak area of the PLAN. However, the absence of modem long-range maritime patrol aircraft is a serious deficiency.
China’s navy demonstrated its growing competence by making its first foreign port visits in late 1985. A Luda destroyer and Fuqing-class oiler made a tour of the Indian Ocean, visiting Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. This was a marked departure for Chinese foreign policy, as well as for a navy that rarely departs coastal waters.
Taiwan: Alarmed by a recent hardening of mainland China’s attitude toward Taiwan, the Taiwanese Government has become more generous to its navy: extra munitions are promised and additional missile craft are ordered. Work continues on the very impressive package of weapons and electronics being fitted to Taiwan’s ex-U. S. destroyers. The program includes new fire control systems, a 76-mm. OTO-Melara gun, up to five Hsiung Feng (modified Gabriel) surface- to-surface missiles, Sea Chapparal point defense missiles, chaff, and facilities for a light helicopter. Commitment of so much money to the old ships suggests that they also must be undergoing work on their hulls, machinery, and electronics—at least equivalent to their U. S. fleet rehabilitation and modernization program of the 1960s. The process has reached the early design stage; options include a modified USS Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class ship and an innovative design based on the USS
Fletcher (DD-445) hull. It is likely, however, that units of the destroyer force will see 50 years of active service.
Up to ten of the small but successful Hai Ou-class missile craft are commissioned each year. Production of the Chinese-built modification of the Korean PSMM Mark-5 has resumed; up to eight of these 50-meter craft should be in service by 1989.
Taiwan’s navy exhibits a curious lack of emphasis on mine warfare. It has only 13 elderly coastal minesweepers with no replacements in sight. Although Taiwan could call on large numbers of fishing craft for conversion, the island is vulnerable to mine blockade.
More encouraging is the expected delivery of two Dutch-built, Zwaardvis- class submarines in late 1986. Acquisition of additional submarines must be a high priority for Taiwan, but there are formidable political and economic hurdles to overcome.
South Korea: After the completion of a third Ulsan-class frigate in 1984, and with two more under construction, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is at least able to begin replacing the oldest and least modified of the American-built Fletcher-, Allen M. Sumner (DD-692)-, and Gearing (DD-710)-class destroyers. The unusual and innovative Ulsans appear to have good weapons and sensors: two of the now almost universal OTO- Melara 76-mm. guns, Harpoons, and Mark-32 torpedo tubes. The number of Ulsans to be completed is unknown, although one-for-one replacement of the destroyers and smaller destroyer escorts is unnecessary in light of the introduction of the Ma San-Ho-class corvettes, 11 of which should be completed in the next year. Although lightly armed, the Ma San-Hos appear seaworthy, equipped with reasonably sophisticated weapon systems, and well suited for surveillance and patrol.
Although the light craft in the ROKN’s attack and patrol forces are generally modem, including several wholly South Korean designs such as the Wild Cat and the Sea Hawk, the ROKN’s mine warfare capability is not much better than Taiwan’s. Two of the eight U. S.-built coastal minesweepers are only ten years old, but all are of Korean War-vintage design and ill-equipped by modern standards. The first indigenously designed- glass-reinforced plastic-hulled mine- hunter began construction in 1985 W South Korea’s Kangnam Shipyard, f°r delivery in 1986. The craft will carry a Plessy minehunting sonar and the
Gay marine Pluto remote-controlled
minehunting submersible. Up to ten ot these Lerici-sized craft will be built if the prototype is a success.
There has been little sign of progress with a submarine project; no announced
agreement for the construction of Type- 209s; and it is possible that the ROKN lS laboring under tighter financial restrictions than South Korea would like to admit.
North Korea: Information about the North Korean Navy remains sketchy- outside of the reported loss of a Rome0' class submarine off North Korea’s east coast in February 1985. The country * apparent emphasis is on the production o numerous small fast attack craft, including the enlarged So Ju (Soviet Osa-1 missile patrol boats, up to eight of whic are in service. These craft will give Nod Korea a considerable capability for clad destine operations, including mine war fare, but there are obvious inherent hm1 tations in command and control. On ” two of the primitive Najin-class friga*eS are in service, with no sign of more to come. Completion of a catamaran-hum frigate has been reported, although no details of her design are available. Othe new types appear conservative in desifc and relatively cheap. North Korea ap pears to have only older variants of ■ SS-N-2 missile, while guns and fire trol systems are years behind any 01,1 country in the region.
Much attention has been devoted small submersibles, while the RorP program continues at a steady pace spite the design’s obsolescence. Sin larly, amphibious construction, aP from a trickle of Hantae-class land'd^ craft, is centered on small assault cr^ and mechanized landing craft, suit3 for raids or the rapid deployment of lar- numbers of troops over very small tances. This suggests that North Rot®3 navy is concentrating on develop forces that will directly support an in sion of South Korea, but that long-radj^ long-term problems are being left to . country’s allies. This may have awk"
cite3
as been difficult for the Vietnamese Nayy- The need to sustain large-scale nverine operations drained the navy of ships and men, and retarded expansion. ^ Vietnamese Government is not well-endowed; further expansion must c°me from direct Soviet aid. Personnel Problems could be critical if additional ngates or other, morp sophisticated, Units are obtained. Five Petya-Il-class rigates and 22 Osa- and Shershen-class attack craft are operational, while several Urya-class. semi-hydrofoils were delivered from the Soviets—no doubt as part o the “rent” for the Soviet Navy’s major base at Cam Ranh Bay.
Thailand: Despite political and finan- C|al difficulties, the Royal Thai Navy Continues its modernization program, he navy is awaiting delivery of two new ■ S.-built, PFMM Mark-16-class cor- 'juttes, although they may be delayed by eir builder’s bankruptcy, to supplement ® modernized frigates Tapi and hiribat. The navy’s flagship, the frigate akut Rajakumarn, recently completed a niaJ°r refit. The large patrol craft program is nearing completion and, with this e*Perience, the country’s shipbuilders , ould be ready to begin construction of a *rd Tacoma-designed corvette, with Perhaps even more sophisticated ships to
No announcement has been made con- mmg the submarine program, perhaps wing to budgetary constraints. Thai in- erest centers on the German Type-209 ar,d a Swedish Kockums design; China
j^ac*e a financially attractive offer of l^fneos. An order has been placed for six CQrssens-designed, general purpose mine hi J'termeasures vessels. The older Blue- Th C*ass ships are to be modernized.
, e amphibious force will receive a big 7qqSI when six French-designed, PS- Th l^e Ending ships enter service. ese 2,800-ton ships will replace World
War II tonnage. A similar program for the navy’s utility landing craft flotilla should be next.
The continuing problem of logistics support has received attention, and a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in October 1985 ensures that the Thais will have rapid access to spares and munitions in an emergency. The high proportion of U. S. equipment, particularly weapon systems, in the Thai inventory indicates that the U. S. link will always be important. Despite attempts to avoid complications, multiple orders for new construction mean that the Thais again have several disparate sources for stores and equipment. This will not make further improvements easy.
Burma: While Burma’s small navy ages, no substantial replacement, beyond the construction of a small number of 33-meter patrol craft, has taken place. Unless this program is accelerated markedly, the navy will soon lose whatever seagoing and coastal patrol capability it has, reducing it to a purely riverine force. The Pearl and Fisheries Department is no substitute.
Malaysia: The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) had a busy 1985: The new frigates Kasturi and Lekir, four modified Italian Lerici-class mine countermeasures ships, and a third logistics support ship, sister to the Mahawangsa, all entered service. These units double the effective strength of the RMN, which now has a balanced fleet and a sound basis for expansion. However, the acquisition of so many sophisticated craft will prove a considerable challenge for the RMN. Mine warfare may be a particular difficulty: There will always be the temptation to employ the craft on the patrol duties for which they were partially justified in the Malaysian budget, rather than on the mine countermeasures duties for
which they are intended.
More frigates are planned, but it is likely that other priorities will delay orders for additional Kasturis, particularly as the Royal Malaysian Police is acquiring at least two large and helicopter- capable cutters for coast guard work. The RMN is more likely to concentrate on additional fast missile craft, such as the four, long planned but still unordered, Spica-M-class craft from Sweden, and finding replacements for the score of British-designed patrol vessels. The fleet air arm is growing slowly, but little has been said about submarines, probably because of demands for new surface ship construction.
The RMN is likely to spend the next few years concentrating on consolidating its gains. The blossoming defense relationships among ASEAN partners will mean more joint exercises, particularly for Thailand and Singapore, and the exchange of information on mine countermeasures and surveillance matters. It is quite probable that Malaysia will accept mine warfare responsibilities for Singapore’s waters, while Singapore’s E-2C Hawkeyes will provide airborne early warning for both nations.
Singapore: Six TNC-45-class missile boats are the backbone of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). The second-line Independence and Sovereignty classes will eventually be replaced by a locally built Lurssens 57-meter design. Considering the RSN’s congested and confined operating environment, a Harpoon/
Thailand’s extensive naval modernization program includes a contract for Marconi’s Sting Ray light antisubmarine torpedo. Replacing South Korea’s ex-U. S. destroyers will be Ulsan-class frigates and the capable Ma San Ho-class corvettes (above).
L & L VAN GINOEREN
The frigates Kasturi (above) and Lekir were among seven major Malaysian ships commissioned in 1985. The 1,690-ton ships have decks for, as yet, unacquired helicopters. The Zakarias (ex-Gurkha), below, is one of three ex-British Tribal-class frigates refitted for Indonesia in 1985. The Tribals were stricken by Britain in 1984 after being recommissioned for the Falklands Conflict.
Gabriel antiship missile mix would offer significant tactical advantages.
Singapore’s air force has taken delivery of the first of the E-2Cs on order. For the next few years, Singapore will be working hard at coordinating operations between the airborne early warning units and the missile boat force. A coordinated defense system with Malaysia would ease mutual security problems.
The Philippines: The Republic of the Philippines Navy (RPN) has been doing what it can to modernize and replace its fleet. A limited modernization program is under way for the former Barnegat-class seaplane tenders, now used as patrol frigates: They are being refitted and will receive helicopter facilities and Harpoons. It is unlikely that modernization will be extended to the smaller and equally elderly destroyer escorts. Construction of two new frigates, foreshadowed in recent defense budgets, is now urgent.
The light craft situation is more encouraging, with four of the modem Katapangan-dass patrol vessels in service and six more under construction. The acquisition of missile craft—a logical move, owing to the planned acquisitions of Harpoon missiles from the United States for the larger units— appears to have started, but few details are available and the crafts’ sophistication is questionable.
The U. S.-built tank landing ships are receiving extensive modernization, including new machinery and renewed plating—very much like that undertaken by Singapore on its landing ships some years ago. This scheme should allow the LST-542 type to serve well into the next decade.
Despite these recent efforts, the RPN
will soon require substantially rn°re money if it hopes to sustain the fore® levels needed to patrol the islands an deal with antigovemment insurgents- Indonesia: 1985 was truly a year o steady progress for Indonesia. The three former British Tribal-class frigates coin pleted their refits in Southampton, Eng land, and returned to Indonesian waters- They replaced the Riga-class ships bn will be employed principally as training vessels. There are suggestions that Ind° nesia is interested in acquiring addition frigates. Considering Indonesia’s
Wlth the Netherlands, it is possible that some of the still-capable, modified eander/Van Speijk-dass ships, which Were offered to Indonesia in 1985, will be required. Indonesia, with four ex-U. S. la“d Jones-class frigates and the three nbals approaching the end of their ser- Vlce lives in 1990, may be interested in all four surplus Van Speijks.
Indonesia ordered two Tripartite-type j^'nehunters from the Dutch production ltle (hulls 14 and 15). These will be Modified to give them a general mine countermeasures capability; they will be a le to sweep as well as hunt all types of m'nes, giving the Indonesians a long- needed capability.
Attack and patrol forces continue to expand, including up to 50 Boeing jet °ils to be produced locally over the next ecade (although the program is already ^ behind schedule).
. With the progress made in reorganiz- lng the Indonesian command and mod- sizing base facilities, Indonesia is bet- er able to deal with the problems of SUrveillance and security.
Australia: 1985 was a year of mixed Attunes for Australia’s maritime forces.
though some provision was made for hcreases in the defense budget, the re- aUced value of the Australian dollar gainst American currency caused con- '.enable strain in the F-18 and guided •ssile frigate programs. The most visi- Ne effect was the Royal Australian avy’s decision to disband the amphibi- s squadron, placing some units in PCS’ and the rest in surveying duties. Nevertheless, there were some encour- ging developments. The first of the Aus- a 'an-built FFG-7 class is under con- ^htction at Williamstown Naval are^yard and her four U. S.-built sisters s: °Perational. The government empha- ^ es the need to obtain airborne early •j^hng coverage of northern Australia. a 's would vastly improve surveillance p I aH°w full exploitation of the first tin ° S(lUadron when it becomes Opera'S3* at Tindal Air Base in the Northern th it0r^' The most attractive option is ® Lockheed P-3 with E-2C electronics. roew submarine options have been nar- Ko t to two designs: one from Sweden’s Ckutna, the other from West Ger- ^ny s HDW/IKL. Six submarines will ord U''t locally. and competition for the sta(er Is fierce among the Australian surfS ^tudies continue for a follow-on Ihe |3Ce combatant. With the memory of tj,j °st carrier project fresh in the navy’s Ihis ’ cons'derable effort is going into c0urfr°~'eCt t0 Prevent d lro,T1 going off
eSuccess replaced the Supply as the
navy’s replenishment ship, but no order— suggested as a possibility last year—has been placed for a follow-on unit. Given the navy’s close links with the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), the latter’s decision to purchase a replenishment ship is very welcome.
New Zealand: The continuing controversy over the Labour Government’s refusal to admit nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships to New Zealand ports has brought modest dividends to the RNZN: an increased budget with more funds available for fuel and stores, and approval to investigate the purchase of a merchant tanker for replenishment ship conversion. The RNZN has long desired to extend the range of the navy’s four frigates. Reports indicate that the tanker, which will carry about 7,000 tons of fuel, limited stores, and a helicopter platform, should be operational by 1987, though no order has been placed.
Proposals in 1984 to obtain submarines are dead. It appears that the original suggestions were overly optimistic as to the cost of necessary support facilities and training, let alone the submarines. Although submarines would provide an effective deterrent force, they could not patrol New Zealand’s extensive waters or deal with low-level contingencies.
With only four aging modified Leander-class frigates, the RNZN must develop proposals for replacements in the next two years or face a repetition of the difficulties with the now-deleted Otago and Taranaki. The cost of frigates is likely to force New Zealand to select an economic exclusion zone patrol type like the ships in service with the coast guards of nations such as Norway.
The RNZN frigates’ Wasp helicopters, although refurbished, also require replacement in the near future. The RNZN has made preparations for the Lynx, but
no funds have been forthcoming.
The Royal New Zealand Air Force received funding to purchase and modernize a sixth P-3B. With a modernization planned for its A-4 Skyhawks, the air force is in reasonable shape, although it too must look for replacements for its front-line aircraft in the next"few years.
Oceania: The future shape of the fledgling naval forces in the island states of the southwest Pacific became clear in 1985. The Australian-sponsored Pacific island patrol boat project was finalized: 1131 -meter patrol boats will be built for Fiji, Papua-New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. Most of these nations’ boats, with a range of 2,500 miles, will be adequate for economic exclusion zone patrols. Later in the decade, Fiji must replace its three ex-U. S. Redwing-class
Joining the Solomon Islands’ Tulagi and Savo (above) in 1986 will be one 165-ton ASI-315, the winner of the Pacific Island patrol boat design contest.
minesweepers, two of which can support helicopters. For Papua-New Guinea, accepting the Australian patrol boat offer came only after an up-gunned version was offered and it was understood that the four boats would not replace the larger Arrack-class boats. Papua-New Guinea would like to deploy missile boats for a viable coastal defense, but the tight economic situation makes this unlikely for years.
Lieutenant Goldrick is serving as a principal warfare officer (PWO) on exchanged service with the Royal Navy in the Type-42 guided missile destroyer HMS Liverpool. Lieutenant Jones is serving as a PWO in the guided missile frigate HMAS Canberra. Both officers have previously written for Proceedings and other journals.