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Two fundamental dilemmas confront New Zealand. First, what ships should it select to replace its four aging frigates—three of which led two Australian warships into Wellington in Tasmanex 84? Second, what does the future hold for this long-time friend and ally whose banning of certain ollied warships has caused the United States |o regard it still as a friend, while question- ,n8 its status as an ally.
Postwar defense policy in New Zealand has been founded on the principle of collective security via security ties with Australia (ANZAC) and with the United States and Australia (ANZUS). Unlike other Cold War alliances,” which became irrelevant not long after their establishment, the ANZUS alliance will be 34 years old this year.
Effective deterrence provided by collective security has flowed New Zealand governments to capitalize on these Eternal ties to keep defense expenditures to a minimum. °nly in financial year 1981-82 did defense expenditures exceed two percent of gross domestic product, for the first t'nie since financial year 1970-71.1 Consequently, the New Zealand Defence Force is a small establishment of Professionals. Until recently, force development principles have dictated that the defense force would maintain a Srnall core of professionals, which would be increased with reserves in times of need. This doctrine is most apParent in the present formation of the New Zealand Army. Its regular forces consist of two regular infantry battalions ar>d small associate units, such as artillery, armor, etc.
This principle has less relevance in the case of the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal New Zealand Air Force. Capital equipment orders have long lead times and training is both expensive and technical, thus these forces must ^e prepared to go to war as is. Since New Zealand’s environment is maritime, successive New Zealand governments have recognized the need to emphasize the acquisi
tion of ships and long-range maritime patrol aircraft. New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone is 1.4 million square nautical miles, and New Zealand is also responsible for the defense and policing of the waters around Niue, the Tokelaus, and Cook Islands.
Historically, because of financial limitations, the defense force maritime units have chosen to maintain the capability to operate with allied formations even at the expense of home requirements. The consequences of this policy have inadvertently left the Royal New Zealand Navy’s structure uneven. Its first modem patrol boats were not introduced until 1975, and their operating capabilities have proven disappointing.2 It currently "has no mine countermeasure vessels, even though mines were successfully used against New Zealand shipping in both world wars.3 There are no logistic support vessels in its inventory.
Despite the willingness of past New Zealand governments to purchase and maintain expensive equipment in the area of maritime defense, the navy is fast approaching a major problem of replacing its strike force, currently composed of frigates. The air force’s maritime element of five P-3B long-range maritime patrol aircraft fortunately does not face the same problem. All five aircraft have recently undergone an extensive and successful updating of their sensor systems and will shortly begin a program to improve their weapon systems.4 The 1983 “Defence Review” identified the need for an additional P-3B. and in April 1985, the government gave its approval for the purchase of a part-life P-3B aircraft from Lockheed Corporation.5 Air force officers whom I interviewed, however, believed that additional aircrews should be formed First as, at present, there are not enough to fully man five aircraft, let alone an additional one.
What makes the reequipment program for the navy special is that the eventual decisions by the New Zealand Government will have important implications not only on the structure of the navy, but it could also produce fundamental changes in New Zealand’s defense arrangements with its allies. What is at issue is the replacement of the navy’s 11th Frigate Squadron, which consists of four British-built Leander-dass antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigates. These vessels will likely end their usefulness in the early 1990s.
A similar crisis of block obsolescence was avoided in 1981 when the navy was forced to begin paying off its two
British-built Rothesay-class frigates (Taranaki and Otago), which required replacement. The New Zealand Government was committed to maintaining a combat force of three vessels, so at least one new vessel was required. Faced with replacement costs of 300 million U. S. dollars for a suitable ship, the financially strapped government accepted the British offer of two half-life Royal Navy Leander-class frigates (Dido and Bacchante, later named Southland and Wellington, respectively), for the price of approximately 90 million New Zealand dollars, which included Wasp helicopters and associated stores.
The conservative National Party government was able to ensure that the navy would be able to maintain three combat-capable frigates, Canterbury, Wellington, and Southland (the latter of which is armed with the Ikara ASW system), while relegating Waikato to training and exclusive economic zone surveillance roles. The negative long-term implications of this purchase is that the navy, as
mentioned, must replace all four of its frigates at appr°xl" mately the same time. .
Not surprisingly, the cost of simultaneously replacing the entire combat fleet of any nation would be considere a nightmare of huge proportions for politicians of any country, let alone New Zealand. The small size of the country and its unique domestic economy compounds tni already unenviable position. The New Zealand economy is based on the production of agricultural, particularly PaS" toral, products. Until the early 1970s, most of ^evV Zealand’s exports went to the United Kingdom. Since that country’s entry into the European Economic Community- New Zealand had to diversify its export markets.
Unfortunately for New Zealand, this policy of diversification has coincided with a global trend to restrict imports of agricultural goods, especially dairy products. The im plications of this situation have not been lightly felt by th defense force. With a gross domestic product of 21 -6° billion U. S. dollars in financial year 1983-84 and a sma industrial sector, capital equipment procurements have been kept to a minimum.6
Defense must compete with all other sectors of th economy and government services for scarce foreign eX' change. With a budget of 773.055 million New Zealan dollars for financial year 1984-85, of which appr°x1'
B°£ir'iG AEROSPACE
capital expenditures for all three services.7
In 1983, the National Party recognized the implications °f this problem concerning the replacement of the navy’s frigates. It was evident that New Zealand could not afford to purchase four modem surface combatants that would be °perationally compatible with its allies. With a price tag of more than one billion U. S. dollars for new frigates, alteratives had to be found.
The “Defence Review” of 1983 issued by the National Party government proposed the novel idea of considering diesel-electric submarines as a replacement for its frigates.8 The lessons of the Falklands War demonstrated the Royal Navy’s difficulty in dealing with the Argentine submarine force of two German-built “Type 209s.” Despite dteir limitations, submarines appear to offer a cost-effec- frve alternative to frigates. With the addition of two logis- dc support vessels, one of which is ice-strengthened for Antarctic operation, the “Review” outlined a financially Possible future force development policy for the navy.
There are many attractions in the procurement of submarines. They would be cheaper in initial outlay, and operating costs would be lower since the crew complement is considerably smaller than the Leander-class frigates.9 The Royal Australian Navy is currently funding a project to find a replacement for its Oberon-class submarines, and the Royal New Zealand Navy had an officer on secondment to the Royal Australian Navy’s study program. For logistic support reasons, the Royal Australian Navy’s choice would dictate the Royal New Zealand Navy’s decision, although a cheaper, scaled-down version of the Royal Australian Navy’s submarine would probably be considered by New Zealand because of financial consider- afions. The “Defence Review” states that six boats would he required for New Zealand, but it proposed acquiring only four.
Operationally, diesel-electric submarines would be an effective deterrent to a surface threat and, in conjunction with the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s P-3B aircraft, they would be capable of countering hostile submarines. Moreover, the boats could fit operationally into a larger allied task force and contribute to allied efforts. In short, given the financial considerations prevailing in New Zealand, the “Defence Review” concluded that submarines offered a viable option, despite their limitations, for the continuation of the strike element of the navy.
The “Defence Review’s” proposal to study the option of submarines is a result of the phenomenal increase in the cost of modem surface combatants. As guided-missile frigates have become increasingly more sophisticated, the price tag has risen dramatically. Moreover, for such vessels to be of use in an allied formation, certain capabilities, especially combat data communications, must be able to interface. The Royal New Zealand Navy has had considerable problems in maintaining this capability because of cost constraints. Already, there are problems where data links between the Royal New Zealand Navy frigates and some of the units of the Royal Australian Navy do not interface.10
The experience of the past decade has shown New Zealand defense officials that simply maintaining the capability of being able to operate with allied vessels after initial procurement has become financially prohibitive for New Zealand’s slender defense resources. Submarines, because they are difficult to detect and a disproportionate response is required to effectively counter them, offer the unique opportunity for a country to maintain a maritime deterrent, but on the cheap. Since air defense is not a priority in the New Zealand environment, submarines offer a relatively inexpensive option.
What is of interest in the “Defence Review’s” rationale for submarines, and subsequent statements by New Zealand defense officials, is the need for the navy to maintain a capability to integrate into allied formations. Corvettes for the Royal New Zealand Navy, simply do not meet the country’s requirements. The reason normally given for this is that a vessel of 2,500 tons is the absolute minimum needed for New Zealand’s maritime environment. The navy must have vessels that can operate in the lower “roaring 40s.” Thus, smaller combatants would be prone to frequent operational limitations. Yet, this is only one aspect of the decision of the New Zealand Ministry of Defence’s desire to maintain a blue water capability.
The experience of both world wars demonstrated to New Zealand defense officials how vulnerable their shipping was to surface raiders and mine warfare. During the Korean War, naval authorities from Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand met in Hawaii to establish an arrangement whereby the four countries would cooperate in the control of merchant shipping and ASW in a wartime situation. The arrangement also divided the Pacific and Indian oceans into “areas of maritime responsibility.”11 A subsequent arrangement, ANZUS MARSAR, effected in 1977 between the ANZUS nations further delineated areas of maritime surveillance.
These arrangements fall within the title of the Radford- Collins Agreement, named after then-U. S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur Radford, and the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Sir John Collins. Because of its modest maritime forces, New Zealand’s responsibilities within the arrangement appear to be centered on providing operational control, not complete command. Allied forces, in conjunction with New Zealand’s maritime forces, would operate together to provide for the safe passage of merchant shipping.12
The establishment of the Radford-Collins Agreement in 1951 had an important impact on New Zealand defense planning. Besides for the first time establishing an operational agreement during peacetime with a country outside of the British commonwealth structure, it has also required New Zealand to maintain a certain level of forces in peacetime to be able to carry out its responsibilities and obligations. Although the agreement has only recently been acknowledged to exist, New Zealand defense officials have long referred to that country’s area of maritime responsibility.13 A review of the annual “Notes to the Estimates,” or the proposed budget, which is submitted to Parliament, clearly states New Zealand’s defense orientation. The “Programme Statement” for defense reads:
“New Zealand’s armed services will maintain the capability:
- To conduct surveillance and reconnaissance in order to detect, identify, and monitor any activities within the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone and in the South Pacific and the southern oceans
- To offer a deterrent to threats to New Zealand and its interests”14
Note that the defense of New Zealand proper and its interests are placed secondary to its international obligations to its allies. This priority of commitments is echoed in the statement of the navy and the air force concerning their respective operational roles.
The navy is to “contribute to the wider strategic interests shared in the Pacific region with Australia and the United States.”15 The “Programme Statement” on air forces mandates that the air force is to be capable of contributing “to the effective maritime control over New Zealand territorial waters, the EEZ [exclusive economic zone] and the South Pacific.”16 The New Zealand Government maintains an organization for defense-related research, the Defence Scientific Establishment. Although small, the establishment’s orientation also follows that of the defense force. Its first priority is to “study sea environment conditions in areas of operational significance.”17 Following this directive, much of the establishment’s efforts go into oceanographic research, which is directly applicable to ASW.
It must be concluded that the Radford-Collins Agreement has had a fundamental impact on the entire structure of the New Zealand Defence Force, probably more so than any other agreement. Even the New Zealand Army has been affected indirectly because scarce defense resources have been directed toward maintaining the Defence Force’s maritime capability vis-a-vis a modern land warfare capability. The “Defence Review” has made an effort to remedy the deficiencies in the New Zealand Army with the establishment of the Ready Reaction Force for possible operations in the South Pacific region.18
Since the early 1950s, New Zealand governments of both political parties have continued to adhere to the Radford-Collins Agreement. New Zealand’s heavy reliance on surface shipping for the transportation of its exports and the need to import industrial products, especially petroleum, necessitate continuation of this agreement. However, this “membership” has its price. Unlike the other members, New Zealand, because of its small size, is not required to independently provide for the security of its area of responsibility.19 However, New Zealand defend officials must feel the pressure to maintain its bonafides to the agreement by doing what is politically possible. F°r this reason, they emphasize the importance of maintaining a sophisticated, though small, force of long-range maritime patrol aircraft and frigates that can operate with their allies.
This is also the reason for the 1983 proposal to explore the possibility of acquiring submarines. In light of this proposal, it must be recognized that Wellington has expressed its desire to maintain these collective defense arrangements with its allies, despite the financial cost involved. Thj^ in turn, leads to two fundamental dilemmas, which will u/quire attention by the present and future New Zealand governments. The first is the question of the value of submarines for New Zealand’s requirements. The second is directly related to the present policy of the current New Zealand Labour Party government, which bans any nuclear-propelled and/or nuclear-armed vessels from New Zealand ports.
Regarding the former point, in recent years, New Zealand governments have begun to direct attention to New Zealand’s region: particularly the Polynesian archipelago and its increasing number of independent micro-island states. Traditionally, Wellington has oriented its defense and foreign policies to Western Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The Kirk-Rowling Labour Party g°v' emments of 1972-75 started the process of directing emphasis in external policy to the South Pacific. The “De' fence Review” of 1978 stated that the South Pacific would become New Zealand’s primary region of emphasis- Moreover, in a wider sense, New Zealand is well placed to represent Western interests in the region.20 A military assistance program has been established to aid countries in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia to develop their own defense forces. Tonga and Fiji have been the principal recipients of this program, particularly in the area of training-
In light of this change in New Zealand’s defense and foreign policies, it is questionable whether the acquisition of submarines for the navy will be able to take the place ot frigates in providing the government with a useful politic3 instrument. A New Zealand-based defense analyst has criticized the “Defence Review” of 1983 for automatically assuming that submarines can perform the same tasks as frigates.21
Should the navy acquire the two logistic-support vessels outlined in the “Defence Review,” then this deficiency would be mitigated. These vessels would be well-suited for disaster relief and development projects. Yet, the navy still would not have any surface combat vessels that could be used to exert pressure in a crisis situation that required a Western military presence. The existing patrol boat squadron is too small to be effective in this role.
Moreover, should the New Zealand Army’s Ready Re' action Force need to be deployed to a South Pacific island, submarines would be unable to assist if an amphibious landing was required. Surface combatants are designed f°r such purposes; submarines are not. Nor should one think that allied vessels would be automatically available. New Zealand is a small Western nation with no pretensions to
great power status. The defense force could be deployed in )huations in the South Pacific where Australian or U. S. mtervention would result in negative extraregional implications. Indeed, the Ready Reaction Force has been based 0n this premise.
Prom the tenor of the “Defence Review,’’ it is apparent •hat the then-National Party government, despite its commitment to maintaining its interest and physical presence 'n the South Pacific, believed greater issues of security had a priority over scarce defense funds. According to recent statements by Labour Party government officials, subs are no longer being considered as replacements for •he frigates. However, it is not clear what com Taints have been placed on the navy’s range of options.22^ it chooses surface combatants instead, it will be faced with the necessity of further deciding between small coastal vessels an<J transforming the Royal New Zealand Navy into a •mast guard (a view which has support with many in the Labour Party government), or attempting to purchase and maintain a blue water force. The former would seriously reduce New Zealand’s already small contribution to the Ladford-Collins Agreement, yet the latter is improbable.
This difficult decision has been compounded and obScured by the election of the Labour Party and its policies regarding the “nuclear” issue. Fringes of the Labour Party have long called for New Zealand’s withdrawal from military alliance with nuclear powers, that is, ANZUS. It is not unusual for nonbinding resolutions to be passed at •he annual Labour Party conferences demanding such withdrawals. The implications of a nuclear war on New Zealand have become a burning political issue in the past few years. Since the ANZUS alliance ties New Zealand to •he United States, the treaty has become a focal point for Peace, antinuclear, and anti-American groups. Official Labour Party policy calls for a review of ANZUS, with the aim of expanding the treaty to include nondefense matters *L-g., trade and environment) and to remove the alliance’s nuclear aspects.
One of the first actions of the Labour Party government, Ld by David Lange, was to declare that all nuclear-propel- *ed vessels and nuclear-capable vessels and aircraft would he excluded from New Zealand territory and waters. As •he United States refuses to acknowledge (even to allies) which of its ships or aircraft are carrying nuclear weapons, •his policy has, in effect, made New Zealand the only Lb S. ally to forbid U. S. military forces from its ports and airfields. Parenthetically, as the Royal Navy also adheres
the same policy of nondisclosure, the New Zealand policy has resulted in a ban against British vessels and aircraft as well. The long-awaited “ANZUS collision” predicted hy the New Zealand Herald23 occurred on 31 January •985 when the Lange government refused to allow a U. S. hfavy conventionally powered destroyer to visit New Zealand ports after completing the ANZUS maritime exercise called Sea Eagle 1-85.24
The New Zealand initiative has placed the Reagan administration in a difficult position. Washington is adamantly opposed to the establishment of a precedent whereby other treaty-allies could also refuse U. S. forces access to their territory. There are also fears of the encour
aging effect the Labour Party policy will have on the peace movements of other U. S. allies, particularly Canada, Australia, and Spain.25 However, the most difficult aspect of the policy is that it has taken the form of a fait accompli and has left the United States with no apparent latitude for compromise.
Consequently, the Reagan administration has reacted by downgrading the ANZUS relationship with New Zealand. The annual ANZUS Council of Foreign Ministers has been postponed and, according to a Department of Defense official, New Zealand is still considered a “friendly government,” but no longer an ally in intelligence and supply matters.26 Defense meetings, the flow of military intelligence to New Zealand, and joint exercises have been severed or downgraded. Probably the strongest signal yet sent to Wellington was the U. S. withdrawal from the biennial Roll Call exercise scheduled to have taken place in February.27 This command post exercise tests common procedures for the naval control and protection of shipping established under the Radford-Collins Agreement.
Regrettably for both parties and the Western security community in general, the rationale for nuclear ship visits is not widely understood in New Zealand. Compared to visits to other allies, port calls to New Zealand by U. S. Navy vessels are few and infrequent.28 Furthermore, the U. S. Navy units that periodically operate in New Zealand waters with New Zealand Defence Force maritime units do so to improve joint operational capabilities.
Effective ASW operations require familiarity with the maritime environment. Hence, if New Zealand wishes to maintain a high level of expertise in ASW, exercising with allied units in New Zealand’s area of maritime responsibility is required. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the United States will not send vessels and aircraft to operate in an ally’s environment where they would be unable to use the local logistic support facilities.
These exercises and defense contacts benefit all Western nations. In a conflict where Western shipping would be threatened. New Zealand’s contribution of forces and command and communications facilities to the security of shipping would relieve allied resources for deployments elsewhere. Any action by the New Zealand Government that would impede cooperation between its maritime forces and those of its allies could harm greater Western security interests in the Pacific.
Although these dilemmas have been developing over the past decade, New Zealand's maritime environment itself has undergone changes. Besides the emergence of the large number of independent island-states to New Zealand’s north, the Soviet Union’s dramatic increase in its Far East Fleet in the past 15 years has resulted in a permanent Soviet military presence in the South Pacific.29 It is an open question whether the Soviet naval presence and its attempts at establishing a diplomatic presence in Melanesia and Polynesia constitute a direct threat to New Zealand and/or its interests. However, the presence does require monitoring since it is the first entrance into the region by a potentially hostile power since the end of the Pacific war.
An additional development may occur should the Antarctic Treaty, which is to expire in 1991, not be extended. If the territory is opened to unrestricted resource exploration, outside nations could possibly manifest their interests in the region in order to protect their claims. Besides being called on to support its claims in the Antarctic, New Zealand may have the additional task early in the next decade of monitoring an increase in civilian and naval activity in its southern oceans.
Altogether, the replacement of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s strike force, the ban against U. S. Navy and Royal Navy vessels, and the changes in New Zealand’s maritime environment produce an array of difficult political choices for New Zealand officials. In essence, at the heart of New Zealand’s maritime dilemma is the issue of the continuation of a defense policy based on collective security. The costs for this continuation are indeed high. Should the navy be reequipped with oceangoing combatants (either subs or surface vessels), the cost will be difficult to meet by the New Zealand defense vote.
What should be of concern to the Western alliance is the difficult position New Zealand has found itself in because of the high costs of modern surface warships. Although these vessels may be optimal for developed countries which are located in high-threat environments, their relevance for countries like New Zealand is questionable. North American and Western European defense officials may have to start considering the implications of their desire for more sophisticated and expensive surface warships for wider Western security interests if smaller Western and
Western-oriented countries are unable to acquire, let alone maintain, these vessels. The New Zealand situation may well be a harbinger of things to come.
In the final analysis, the viable choices open to the New Zealand Government are limited. Whether the government will be able to balance successfully domestic, regional and alliance considerations in its decision-making process is difficult to say. What is certain, however, is the necessity to resolve the issue of port visits by allied vessels. The outcome of this issue alone may very well dictate changes in the basic assumptions upon which New Zealand maritime security has traditionally been founded.
'Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR). 1984. G "*■ Defence, p. 44, and 1975, G. 4, Defence, p. 30. .
2Grant Howard, The Navy in New Zealand (Wellington: A. H. and A. W. RlC ’ Ltd., 1981), p. 93. „
3N. F. Jury, “Mine Countermeasures—A Necessary Strategy for New Zealand- The Balmoral Papers 1982 (The Journal of the Royal Australian Navy Staff L° lege, Balmoral, New South Wales, Australia).
4For further details of this “unconventional” updating, see Benjamin M- E*s°n' “New Zealand Updates P-3B Electronics,” Aviation Week and Space Technolog)1 9 January 1984, p. 75. .
5AJHR, 1983, G. 4a, Defence Review 1983, pp. 31-32; New Zealand Herat • April 1985.
6The Military Balance, 1984-1985 (London: IISS, 1984), p. 106. . jj
1 Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand for year ending March 1985, “Ministry of Defence,” pp. 66-74.
8Defence Review 1983, pp. 23-24. .
9The complement of the Leander-class frigates in the Royal New Zealand Navy ^ approximately 250 officers and men. The submarines the Royal Australian Navy 1 currently considering have crew sizes that range from 41 to 63 officers and ‘“Testimony by Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, RAN, Chief of Defence Force Stay 18 March 1981, Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and DefcnC ^ Subcommittee on Defence Matters, Official Hansard Transcript of Evidence, Apr 1980-March 1981, Vol. II (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service- 1981), p. 1,793. . .
11National Times, 8 July 1978; David Filer, The New Zealand Armed ServjZe* Their Development in Relation to Defence Policy, 1946-1972 (University of terbury, Christchurch, 1972), p. 62.
12Filer, p. 142.
I3Ibid., p. 62.
14Estimates of Expenditures, p. 75.
15Ibid.
,6Ibid., p. 76.
17lbid. d
18Defence Review 1983, p. 28. The force consists of an infantry battalion an associated combat and support units—all of which are regulars. Provisions hold the expansion of the force up to brigade level with the introduction of reserve a territorial forces.
19Filer, p. 142.
20AJHR, 1978, Defence Review 1978, p. 11. ,
2lDalton West, “The 1983 Defence Review: Prospects and Implications. ^ey Zealand International Review, May-June 1984, pp. 2-6. . f
22A Labour Government review of the 1983 “Defence Review” is currently nn way and should provide a new development proposal.
23Lead editorial. New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 26 December 1984.
24The Washington Post, 1 February 1985. _ f
25See Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle’s remarks in a television m c view in The Washington Post, 15 February 1985.
26The Washington Post, 21 February 1985.
27Ibid., 20 February 1985.
28Desmond Ball, “The ANZUS Connection: The Security Relationship betvvcy Australia, New Zealand and the United States,” Arms, Disarmament and N* Zealand, ed., T. J. Hearn (Dunedin: Department of University Extension, Um'e sity of Otago, 1983), p. 65.
29John C. Dorrance, United States Security Interests in the Pacific Islands presented for the Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the Pacific, Suva, 'J ’ January 1983), pp. 1-3.
Mr. Young is a PhD candidate in international relations at The Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva. He has an MA 111 international relations from The Johns Hopkins University and a BA ,n political science from the California State University. Mr. Young is cUf rently a research assistant for the Programme for Strategic and Interna tional Security Studies, University of Geneva.