ties in more pragmatic terms. At the same time, nearly tLl years of international wrangling over an acceptable IaW1 the sea regime has helped sensitize less developed coast' states to both the value and fragility of their maritime re
By David E. Simcox
Less developed countries need each other’s help in pulling together and developing regional coast guards for their security and other common interests. They also need U. S. and other allies’ help in acquiring ships, equipment, and training. For example, in 1984, three patrol boats were delivered to Antigua, Dominica, and St. Lucia from the United States under the Security Assistance Program.
Regional cooperation has long been a key feature 1 the U. S. strategy for aiding less developed coui' tries. One form of regional cooperation now 1,1 creasingly attractive to some Third World coastal states ^ cooperation among their coast guards or equivalent mafl time services to promote and protect their common inters* in the safety, security, cleanliness, and productivity 0 their littoral seas.
After two decades or more of independence, small coastal nations that emerged in the 1950s and It^1*' have begun to view their basic security needs and capab*
sources. Hard pressed to pay for the development of the"
Proceedings / July
in Maritime forces, these countries are mindful of the need to
i- Stiard against the erosion of revenues through smuggling
i- atld the often hidden high costs to their societies of drug
is 'sticking.
i' Many small Third World nations inherited with indest I^ndence small navies created for them on the European
)t fttodel. Now, these countries are more concerned with de
ling an achievable, cost-effective mission for those na- iy v>es that contributes to overall nation-building. Their post-
)s "dependence notions of using navies to project their na-
i' '*°nal power, win regional influence, or affirm the
n n^tional prestige are giving way to more pragmatic views
it 'hat in today’s high-cost, high-tech world their modest
al ""vies are best used as coastal forces.
v Along with this new pragmatism has come the recogni-
ir 'ion that the vastness and complexity ot the task of polic-
ro<*edings / July 1985
in" their adjoining exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the transnational character of maritime problems, and the scantiness of their own resources all make regional cooperation an appealing option.
The evolution of international law and practice in recent years has also lent encouragement to cooperative, multistate approaches to regional maritime problems. The 1979 Hamburg Convention on Search and Rescue calls for a sharing of responsibilities by regional or subregional groups. Article 63 of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea calls for regional or subregional organizations to agree on measures for the conservation and development of fisheries stocks occurring in the EEZs of two or more coastal states. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization promotes fisheries management through regional fisheries commissions, grouping coun-
tries whose seas lie within a common fisheries ecosystem. Recognizing that pollution does not respect imaginary maritime frontiers, the United Nations Environmental Program, through its “regional seas” program, strongly encourages multistate efforts toward pollution prevention and abatement.
The idea that neighboring less developed countries might pool their limited maritime forces appeals to policymakers and planners in the West concerned with the security and development of the Third World. By encouraging regionalization of coast guards, the United States or its allies can open a new mode of military-to-military cooperation that can significantly advance concrete security interests while being politically less compromising in the eyes of the receiving states. U. S. training and support for coast guard functions can help emphasize the humanitarian, nonlethal, and developmental role of the receiving nations’ naval forces. At the same time, it can instill in those maritime forces multipurpose skills that are as useful in conflicts as in peacetime law enforcement.
For those countries opting for a regional coast guard, the potential advantages are clear. They get better law enforcement at less cost; their enforcement capabilities become more credible; they can put their navies to work with a morale-building mission; and their sharing of maritime law enforcement responsibilities can serve as a confidence-building step toward greater political harmony.
The preservation of the regional military balance—a complicating requirement of U. S. security assistance policy in many areas—is not threatened by development of regional coastal forces. Combined action against the common foes of pollution, dangers to shipping, and fish poaching may help ease latent mutual suspicions. Each country can enhance its own security without alarming its neighbors, thus curbing what often becomes a costly spiral of reactive arms acquisitions.
The potential for regional coast guard cooperation in a given area and the degree of integration that cooperation would seek depend on a variety of circumstances. Obviously, the concept has little relevance for the superpowers, landlocked states, and major maritime powers with unique security needs.
But the concept could have applicability in areas with the following political and geographical circumstances:
- Among closely adjoining island, archipelagic, and coastal states sharing the use of and responsibility for control of heavily transitted international sea-lanes, e.g., the Caribbean Islands and Southeast Asia
- Among clusters of homogeneous smaller island states distributed over a large expanse of ocean that is beyond their individual competence to police effectively, e.g., the South Pacific island states
- Among culturally and politically similar, contiguous states fronting on a common sea, e.g., West Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Central America
Although the concept has most appeal for less developed countries, it need not be limited to them. The regional coast guard concept could be beneficial to developed countries abutting a maritime area of high traffic volume, numerous active ports, and a high concentration
of coastal industry, with the attendant transnational pro lems of pollution, vessel traffic safety, and port security Examples would be the states of the Mediterranean an Baltic basins or of the European Economic Community- (A regional coast guard could provide uniform standar of maritime law enforcement that would discourage any tendency among member states to lower their safety an pollution standards in the hope of competitive advantage for their ports or flag merchant vessels.)
The actual degree of regional integration could vary from total integration of forces and functions under a su pranational command to a loose association of national y directed coast guards sharing training, doctrine, and some intelligence, with compatible equipment and commumca tions. Between these two extremes, there is a range ° possibilities. One might be regional cooperation for se lected functions only, such as fisheries and pollution en forcement, thus leaving some sensitive national security functions, such as contraband, immigration, and security surveillance, to strictly national control. Once begum loose regional arrangements might evolve toward closer forms of regionalization as each country’s confidence grows.
But the road to regional cooperation in the Third Wot has never been smooth; maritime cooperation is likely t0 be no exception. National leaders of the cooperating states, policymakers of donor countries, and internationa civil servants must expect to face daunting obstacles, be ginning with the endemic political distrust prevalent even among the most culturally similar Third World nations-
Nourishing this distrust is an unspoken fear amonf those states and their leaders of further loss of the I'd e control they feel over their national destinies. They a*s° fear that there will be too much professionalism in theJ own military forces, which are the ultimate lever of p0*'11 cal control.
Rivalries within many Third World regions are such fbat even benign cooperation among two neighbors can be seen as a threat by a third. Even small poor states may ba'x predatory impulses. Some would fear the loss of a Pre sumed advantage in their neighbor’s waters if serious en forcement were to occur. For example, they may lose ac cess to fishing grounds or profits from smuggling- number of less developed littoral states would be bur pressed to agree precisely on areas of enforcement since their maritime boundaries frequently remain unresolved-
An examination of five areas of the world where rC gional coast guard cooperation either already exists in naS cent form or where conditions are particularly prornis'11- for coast guard cooperation may be useful.
The Eastern Caribbean Regional Coast Guard: where has the concept of a regional coast guard been m°r<^ refined or progressed more toward realization than amonf the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean. Co" ceived in the late 1970s, the regional coast guard was en visaged as the maritime expression of an overall integra tion of the defense forces of the weak and new; independent Eastern Caribbean islands. Regionalization 0 maritime security and law enforcement would give tm
* £3
^St. Kitts
0Nevis Oantigua
Montserrat
DOMINICA
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sea
SAINT
LUCIA
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BARBADOS
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^GRENADA
ing, maintenance, and repair remains an important obstacle to centralization. Perhaps the greatest obstacle toward progress toward unified command, control, communications, and intelligence is fear among the smaller islands of being dominated by Barbados, the largest state.
These small states remain dependent on the United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and Canada, for boats, training, and nearly all other forms of support. Initial training progress of the newly recruited coast guard forces on all the islands has been promising. In Grenada, the United States and the United Kingdom have developed a novel sharing arrangement. The United Kingdom provides the law enforcement segments of the coast guard training that U. S. personnel are prevented by security assistance laws from offering. With U. S. Coast Guard help, the still green units of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and Barbados performed respectably in joint exercises in November 1984 with U. S. Navy units detailed to UNITAS ’84.
Despite a good start in maritime cooperation, cultural homogeneity, and a tradition of political cooperation, the Eastern Caribbean’s prospects for a self-sustaining and cohesive regional maritime force is far from assured. A major obstacle to the force is the area’s weak economic base. The minute size and population of the area’s states— even combined—may fall short of the minimum “critical mass” for supporting even the most modest armed forces. Virtually all the cost of vessel acquisition, maintenance, and training are funded under U. S. Security Assistance, which may be required to continue at high levels far into the future. The burden will be even greater if the Eastern Caribbean states acquire the aircraft they ultimately must have for effective patrolling.
MAPPING ASSOCIATES. NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA
islands a collective maritime shield that each would
be
unable to sustain alone; it would provide economies of
tjCva*e *n dealing with what for them were the near prohibi- e costs of maintaining even modest maritime patrol
fo.
wrces; it would be another confidence-building step to- a^d greater political unity.
q ,^e six small nations of the Organization of Eastern injt'bbean states and Barbados are now working toward as C^rat'on °f a broad range of maritime responsibilities: SgSl§nment of geographical areas of responsibility for arcb and rescue; upgrading communications and devel- j la8 uniform operations centers; and creation of central- S(e repair and training facilities—all the while stressing jU.udardization and interoperability. With its return to sta- ’ Grenada is also expected to become a member. .Although the individual island states have, or will soon inn e’- ni()dern patrol vessels and trained personnel for their ■vidual coast guards, the ultimate direction and degree f lntcgration remains undecided, awaiting further signals C'|IT1 the area’s political leaders. The same narrow politi- j concerns that worked to prevent the islands from unit- § into a single nation at independence now cloud the l ^sphere in which regional maritime cooperation must
e developed.
Q ^ith the shortages of jobs on these islands, concern Ver losing the commercial advantages of ship provision-
With U. S. Coast Guard help, the units of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and Barbados—Barbados’ only patrol boat is seen, above—performed respectably in joint exercises with U. S. Navy units detailed to UNITAS ’84.
naval and coast guard forces, and to a unified command^
leave
the present diverse structures of the naval, coastal,
are arms of the national police or of the ministry
Accordingly, the United States, as the underwriter of the Eastern Caribbean coast guard, has enormous leverage to determine whether it emerges as a regionalized, integrated, efficient force, or remains a loose coalition of small nationally directed maritime wings.
The Persian Gulf: Halfway around the world in the Persian Gulf, the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are also moving toward an integrated regional maritime force. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are joining together their coastal defense forces as part of an integration of military forces.
A summit of GCC leaders met in late November 19 ^
review a regional defense treaty defining command s ture roles and responsibilities for the six countries, extent of ultimate unification of forces has seemingly be one of the issues delaying final agreement on the dete treaty. Reportedly, GCC foreign and defense miwste^ have approved in principle the establishment of a J° GCC naval command with headquarters in Saudi Ara ■ Plans call for a joint operations center with rapid com nication links to the operations centers of GCC forces coordination of the air and sea forces that patrol the coa sea-lanes of the six countries. ^
Although gulf leaders have committed themselves to principles of interoperability and standardized training
other maritime security forces of the six countries unanswered questions as to how this unification is t° P ceed. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the major partners or GCC, both have separate navies and coast guards. Saudi 5,000-member coast guard includes a large con11 gent devoted to land-border surveillance. The Coa Guard-equivalents of U.A.E., Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahra
J . g
interior. To further complicate matters, some U.A, coast guard forces are under separate commands 01
Unlike some other regional coast guards, the six nations of the GCC are endowed with the one resource most important to making regional force a success—money. An Omani guided-missile patrol craft steams above.
country’s major political subdivisions, the Emirates Abu Dahbi and Dubai. Reaching a working understand' of the respective roles, missions, and command and c trol linkages among such a mixture of ministries and in tutions will require careful planning. i£j
Development of a regional outlook is expected to to more professionalism in maritime surveillance, sear and rescue, and the fight against seaborne pollution"^ major threat in a region that depends heavily on coas
19#5
esalinization plants for its water.
espite common language, similar culture, and shared j lstory > the six countries of the GCC find the road to real egration is beset by rivalries and suspicions, just as in ..e Caribbean. For the smaller states, fear of Saudi inten- '°ns» or of ultimate Saudi hegemony, remains an impedi- arent- Unlike the Caribbean model, however, the six states re well endowed with the one resource most important to Access.—money. All GCC members except Bahrain are ea-i°r °>1 exporters. Bahrain, the only non-oil producer, xPects to receive nearly two billion dollars during the UuUdtCn ^ears ^rom *ts richer partners to help with its
a Although the immediate goal of the GCC is to establish ^ solid front against a militant Shiite Iran across the Per- ^lan Gulf (and beyond that the possibility of an aggressive cn ambitious Iraq), an effective regional maritime force ^°uld pay off in nonmilitary dividends for the littoral aa*es themselves, for the Gulf’s maritime environment, eff ^°r other major maritime powers. It could provide an ective action arm for the Regional Organization for Pro- ctl0n of the Marine Environment, formed by the GCC tra£s and Iraq in 1978, and it could enforce better vessel a tic safety in the congested sea-lanes of the gulf. The aritime forces of the GCC have made frequent use of aa'ning at Coast Guard installations in the United States n of visiting U. S. Coast Guard technical experts.
i ,^ePacific Islands: For the small, newly independent and states of the Southwest Pacific, maritime enforce- i(ent cooperation now has a strong juridical base, though •j.lS Egging in implementation because of a lack of means, tr f..^ac*fic island nations face immense problems of pa- as° ,'ng and protecting the resources of their EEZs as well asSlZable expanses of inter-island waters already defined slnternal waters or to become archipelagic seas when of these states adopt archipelagic regimes. Even ru- clltlentary surveillance will be unattainable without close ^operation. Then, success may depend for years to come the willingness of the larger South Pacific powers, such viri^UStra*'a’ New Zealand, and France, to continue pro- lng training and resources under favorable terms. .Understandings already reached by the South Pacific and states on cooperation in managing and protecting vsheries could be an appropriate model for other less de- (,e oped countries. Fourteen South Pacific states formed ae South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency in 1979. The ^gency’s convention calls for cooperation in fisheries sur. a,llance and enforcement and coordinated action in deal- 8 with distant waterfishing countries.
^ The secretariat of the agency gives priority to steps lch harmonize the fisheries regimes of member states a which promote regional approaches to surveillance vaa enforcement, including regional registration of fishing thessels. Member states have already begun to standardize I eir requirements on fishing vessel identification, licens- § Procedures, use of observers, reporting by vessels of . °shions and catches, and vessel reports on entry and exit r the fishing zones. They have also standardized their Sional fisheries log sheet.
The patrol assets available to the small island states range from none at all to highly limited. Australia, through its technical and military assistance programs, plans to continue providing a limited number of patrol boats to the island states under concessional terms along with necessary training. Australia also plans to make available relevant information from its own air surveillance of the area.
The island states show a healthy, though at times contentious, spirit of regional cooperation in maritime environmental protection. The South Pacific regional environmental program has emphasized programs to combat pollution by oil and hazardous materials. But continued efforts to get a fully agreed regional seas convention, similar to the Cartagena Convention covering the Caribbean, have been delayed because of resistance by large Pacific states, including the United States, to proposals that have included a total ban on nuclear waste dumping. Negotiations are continuing.
Member states recognize that enforcement of high pollution standards, detection of violators, and emergency cleanup of spills will require considerable cooperation among themselves and with the region’s large partners. Although Australia and New Zealand remain the region’s principal donors and purveyors of training, some of the small states have made use of specialized Coast Guard courses in the United States.
West Africa: In assessing the prospects for regional maritime cooperation in West Africa, two contradictory trends are apparent. On the one hand, there is a strong commitment in principle to regionalism manifested by a proliferation of regional and subregional institutions; on the other hand, there is a chronic inability to make existing regional organizations work well.
West African coastal states, which include some of the world’s poorest nations, confront maritime problems that each of them, with the possible exception of Nigeria, is incapable of dealing with alone. They are protein-poor countries, nominally sharing control of some of the world’s richest fishing grounds. Acting separately, they have proven themselves unable to protect these fish stocks, whose migrations ignore national maritime boundaries. Modem fishing fleets from Europe, Warsaw Pact states, and Korea regularly exploit and at times abuse these fish stocks with impunity.
The EEZs of some West African coastal states touch a major sea route for supertanker traffic between the Persian
West African coastal states, which include some of the world’s poorest nations, confront maritime problems that each, with the possible exception of Nigeria, is incapable of handling alone. Two Nigerian Coast Guard patrol craft are seen in port, right.
Gulf and Western Europe. The prevailing direction of ocean currents makes this traffic a major pollution threat, which none of the coastal states is equipped to handle alone. The Abidjan Convention, with 21 West African signatories, provides the framework for regional pollution control cooperation, but the maritime muscle for its implementation is absent.
Lacking the necessary ships, planes, and training, West African coastal nations have delayed the creation of the regional search and rescue facilities encouraged by the 1979 Hamburg Convention. But the need for some regional response to these problems is generally recognized among West African states. The Abidjan Convention itself is at least an expression of good intentions. West Africa’s leading regional body, the Economic Community of West African States, a group of 21 West African states, has begun to turn its attention to the great economic potential of West Africa’s fisheries and the need to manage this treasure. Supporting a similar objective is the Commission for East Central Atlantic Fisheries (CECAF) in Senegal, an arm of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. CECAF concentrates on the management, exploitation, and commercialization of fish stocks, but has no program for enhancing surveillance.
At this time, the West African institution having the greatest potential to promote a regional approach to maritime law enforcement is the Regional Maritime Academy at Abidjan, jointly sponsored by the francophone West African states and assisted by international donors such as the United Nations Development Program, International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the European Economic Community. The Academy has already begun to give instruction in basic maritime and port management subjects. At the initiative of the Government of Ivory Coast, the Academy’s chief national backer, a Regional Coast Guard School will soon be added, using the U. S. Coast Guard as its instructional model. The Coast Guard School is open to students from all West and Central African countries, giving classes in both French and Enghs ■ The school could become a key institution for the harnion ization of doctrine and training among West An* coastal forces, while nurturing personal contacts and tr among the region’s future maritime leaders.
Three other West African subregional groups sn some promise to become nucleii around which transna tional Coast Guards might coalesce. Since 1983, Cong > Zaire, Gabon, Sao Tome, and Equatorial Guinea ha ^ cooperated through a Regional Consultative Commiss1 for the Gulf of Guinea to manage their fisheries and Pr° tect their EEZs. The five must deal with a common pr° lem of very limited surveillance forces. >
In late 1984, Nigeria, the region’s dominant nava power, joined with its neighbors, Benin, Togo, atl Ghana, in the Gulf of Benin group—a series of agre ments to work together in criminal investigation, extra tion, customs and immigration, and other cooperate among national law enforcement agencies. .
The Mano River Union, which groups Liberia, Guine' Conakry, and Sierra Leone—countries with close ethjb and historical ties—has a long record of at least ver ' commitment to maritime cooperation. The Mano R*v Maritime Academy trains aspiring seamen from the thr countries in basic maritime skills. The Liberian Cj,a^ Guard, which models itself on the U. S. Coast Guard.1 West Africa’s most professional.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEA^ Nowhere else in the less developed world are the con ^ tions more propitious or circumstances more inviting 1 the creation of a regional coast guard than among the si member states of ASEAN. The ASEAN states, Indones^- Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and, as 1984, Brunei, have achieved a degree of political and ec nomic unity and a record of successful practical cooper, tion since ASEAN’s creation in 1967 that is the envy many Third World blocs. ,
The leaders of those states have demonstrated awar ness of their shared responsibility for the safety, °r®e’ and cleanliness of the heavily transited sea routes n® them, which link the Pacific with Europe, the Midjj East, and Africa. All the states possess some servicea ^ naval coastal forces and/or marine police and manti customs forces that, by less developed countries’ stan ards, are fairly well-equipped and crewed.
Regional coast guard cooperation is also seen as an tion that may offer the ASEAN states an alternative troublesome security dilemma. Since its creati° ' ASEAN, partly as an alternative to the Southeast As
Treaty Organization (SEATO), has spurned an overt sec
licy
l
rity role for itself and stressed the collective foreign p01
and
m some cases, multilateral cooperation among
Pn.nciple of the ASEAN area as a “zone of peace, friends 'P. and neutrality.” The desires of member states to lncrease their cooperation for their own mutual security mns counter to their perceived need to avoid militant ac- y°ns °r arms buildups that the great powers, neighboring letnam, or possibly even each other would see as probative or threatening.
^ regional coast guard, with its emphasis on anti-pi- acy, search and rescue, commercial vessel safety, and enforcement, could give muscle to ASEAN’s asser- '°n of peace, friendship, and neutrality, while serving as e region’s maritime eyes and ears and as an important aiding block for follow-on security cooperation as cir- curnstances warrant.
Respite the logic of the circumstances and occasional ^commendations by some Japanese and Australian au- °rities involved in assisting the region, the ASEAN , ates have been slow to consider institutionalized multi- ateral maritime cooperation. Even so, the idea seems to
e Progressing from the bottom up rather than the top °Wn. With the area becoming a theater for big power aval rivalries, security is very much on ASEAN’s mind. Meeting this concern is the growing program of bilateral
SeAN forces.
A regional search and rescue seminar in Jakarta, Indo- j.es'a, in 1984 sponsored by IMO revealed the determina- l0n among area states to develop and organize their search rescue capabilities for the region. Malaysian and Indo- esian units have conducted joint patrols in the Malaccan traits. Singapore conducts patrol boat exercises with both ndonesia and Malaysia, while Indonesia and the Philip- P’aes conduct joint patrols to curb smuggling off Minda- (a°- More recently, Malaysia and Thailand have moved |0vvard more cooperation to combat the continuing prob- of piracy against Vietnamese refugee vessels in the alf of Siam and the South China Sea. There is some diligence exchange among ASEAN members, more c*changes of officers among national staff colleges, and a p°wing interest in a regional transnational staff college for the area.
Central America: At first glance, all the conditions are present for close maritime cooperation among the six isthmian countries. All are bicoastal (except El Salvador) and have heavy maritime responsibilities relative to their size and resources. All have close ties of language, culture, and history. Five of the states at one time formed a single nation and, in the 1950s and 1960s, made considerable progress toward integration, including creation of a regional Central American Defense Organization. All have modest but workable maritime patrol assets and basic technical skills gained from a long security assistance association with the United States.
The area has maritime threats and interests for which the regional coast guard would be a highly appropriate response: drug smuggling, vessel traffic safety for the approaches to the Panama Canal and the transisthmian pipeline, protection of local fisheries, and regional monitoring of the exploitation of highly migratory species.
Although Central America seems to be a laboratory for regional cooperation, actually, regional rivalries and suspicions, unresolved border claims, ideological tensions, and intrusions by external powers rule out any movement toward area-wide collaboration in the maritime field at this time.
In the future, however, when a post-Sandinista Nicaragua may be more prepared to resume its place in a community of cooperating Central American states, movement toward a regional coast guard would be the most practical confidence-building step toward establishing the overall security cooperation that could ensure long-term peace for the region.
The U. S. Contribution: What’s In It For Us? Although these case studies underscore the diversity of circumstances and the unevenness of progress so far, the advantages to the overseas economic development and security goals of the United States in fostering regional coast
The leaders of the ASEAN states have demonstrated awareness of their shared responsibility for the safety, order, and cleanliness of the heavily transited seas near them. For example, Singapore—one of its patrol craft, above—conducts patrol boat exercises with both Indonesia and Malaysia.
guards are clear. A U. S. commitment can be a cost-effective way to enhance the security of friendly coastal nations, open new channels to their military establishments, and enhance their ability to contribute to the overall safety and environmental health of the oceans. Politically, progress toward regional coast guards can be an important building block in the larger edifice of regional cooperation, enhancing trust and mutual confidence through shared efforts in dealing with problems in an area of national security that is politically not very sensitive. Finally, any effort that helps the receiving states to husband and protect the resources of the sea is a significant contribution to their national wealth.
What can the United States do in its own security and economic development policies to encourage states to share their experiences, their resources, and their knowledge in protecting the ocean and its resources? The United States should revise its security assistance legislation and practices to eliminate restrictions against aiding maritime law enforcement or channeling security aid through entities other than individual recipient governments. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act remains a legal bar to the provision of much needed Coast Guard or Navy assistance to foreign maritime law enforcement. U. S. legislation now limits channeling aid through multistate regional organizations. But there are few better ways of enhancing the credibility and authority of an organization than by making it a conduit for the flow of vital outside resources.
Similarly, the United States, as a major donor, should make more of its aid in maritime matters contingent on the development of healthy regional approaches. But often the heavy emphasis in the foreign policy bureaucracy on bilateral channels—‘ ‘clientitis” in State Department parlance— remains a natural point of resistance to a broad regional approach. Not surprisingly, this preference for the bilateral is too often mirrored in the policies of the individual aid-receiving states themselves.
Other benefits besides aid can be channeled through t e regional entities. The United States possesses a vast array of experience, information, and technology of imine potential value to other Third World maritime states. These are nonmonetary resources, which could be chan neled through a multilateral maritime organization ra than to individual states, providing the organization w valuable information on ship sightings, oil slick trajectory projections, migration of fish and other marine life* a data on piracy and smuggling in the region. .
Evidence shows that other major Western aid donors the Third World find the regional approach no less coin pelling, given their even greater need to optimize their ai • As the experience in the Eastern Caribbean shows, United States is often in a position to take the lead arnon donors in a genuine multilateral promotion of a regi°n ' rather than bilateral, approach to maritime law enforce ment and security.
Multilateral encouragement for the development of rc gional coast guards may well have a less troubling po11 cal coloration for the receiving states than would a pr0 gram conducted and financed by the United States alone- In West Africa, where ties to the British and Fre£c_ former colonial powers remain strong, and where the E ropean Economic Community is a major donor, Britts French-U. S. cooperation would blunt suspicions of U- ; objectives while helping to overcome the natural susp1 cions between anglophone and francophone Afr>c;1 states.
In Southeast Asia or the South Pacific, Japan is a natu ral source of resources and expertise in the movement tn ward regionalization. But suspicions of the Japanese re main strong among the area’s states. A partnership am°d the United States, Australia, and Japan, three states w1 ^ genuine maritime interest in the region, would be m°r acceptable politically.
There are many opportunities for the United Statestl
Caribbean Coast Guard
Prior to October 1983, the Caribbean was undergoing another of its historical periods of benign neglect by the United States. Even though the Reagan administration’s Caribbean Basin Initiative was an effort to stimulate business and thus friends in the Caribbean, political- strategic considerations were largely being ignored.
Despite Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s leftist leanings and coup in 1979 in Grenada, the United States seemed unwilling or unable to exert positive influence over the Eastern Caribbean.
With Bishop’s death in 1983 and the subsequent U. S.-led multinational military intervention, the United States was forced to make some decisions about what it wanted to do, in both the short and long term, in the Caribbean.
Thus, the catalyst for the transformation of the “good idea” of a regional coast guard into a fait accompli was the U. S. involvement in Grenada in October 1983. As has been the case in the past, it took a crisis in the region to direct U. S. interest in an area that is justifiably of great national concern.
Nonetheless, once the national attention was focused on the East' ern Caribbean, things began to hap pen quickly. Within six months, ten U. S. Coast Guard personnel had been given permanent change of station orders to various Easter11 Caribbean islands. Construction on three patrol boats for Eastern Caribbean nations was nearly completed, and tentative plans for ad tional vessels had begun.
By the first anniversary of the military intervention in Grenada, the first three vessels had been delivered to Antigua, Dominica, an
i#
PUsh for regionalization in those United Nations specially agencies, such as IMO, and commissions that have eavy maritime or coastal developmental agenda. In many ays, these United Nations organizations are more adVanced in promoting the architecture of regionalism than the United States itself. The United States should iden- 1y and adapt what is good for the benefit of its own Sccurity and economic development interest.
As the Eastern Caribbean experiment shows, if the n*ted States is to succeed in helping to establish regional ?ar'time forces, it will have to rely on the U. S. Coast (Uard to provide much of the training, technical assis- atlce, and general guidance to fledgling regional coast shards. But the Coast Guard, small by the standards of its lster armed services and heavily committed to domestic Passions, even now in an era of no-growth budgets, is . ard pressed to provide the experienced trainers, slots at .s Schools, and administrative support for the security askance program. The national security importance of its
U. S. and allied aid to less developed countries for the building of regional coast guards benefits both the receivers and the givers. A member of the Jamaican Defense Force takes part in training in the wheelhouse of the USCGC Sagebrush (WLB-399).
role must be recognized, and funding and billets must be found to ensure that the Coast Guard can meet the rising international demand for its training.
Finally, there has been a consistent potential for conflict between the U. S. willingness on one hand to help small coastal nations enhance their own surveillance abilities, and the U. S. concern on the other over the risk of giving small coastal nations the means to interfere with the asserted right of U. S.-flag vessels to take tuna and other highly migratory species in those nations’ EEZs. For many Third World nations, the right to control all forms of fishing within their 200-mile EEZs is a key symbol of national sovereignty, which is not easily waived whatever the inducements.
By supporting the surveillance capability of coastal nations, the United States at least may gain some leverage in pressing its position on highly migratory species. The United States has paid a high political price to maintain the right of its vessels to take migratory species anywhere beyond the territorial seas of neighboring nations. At some point a choice of basic national interests will have to be made.
Mr. Simcox is the foreign affairs advisor to the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard. Before this appointment, he worked in the Department of State, as Director of the Office of Mexican Affairs, as Deputy Director of Management Operations, and finally in the HI Salvador Working Group. Previous to this, he worked in the Foreign Service for more than 20 years. Mr. Simcox is a 1972 graduate of the National War College.
By Lieutenant Commander Michael R. Adams, U. S. Coast Guard
■
j. ' Lucia, another new patrol boat r Grenada was nearly complete,
1^ ore U. S. Coast Guard personnel ad been ordered to the Eastern
anbbean, and an agreement for still
Und
communication and natural re
another patrol boat for the is-
nation of St. Vincent had been ('§ned. Throughout all this flurry activity was the unstated comeltlT|ent of the United States to ^sure that a regional coast guard ecame a viable entity.
Given the heavy maritime impli- ^at>ons of global strategy in the aribbean (for example, sea lines sources, including oil), it was nearly inevitable that the United States consider establishing a regional naval presence there. That presence, however, had to come from the countries themselves.
By November 1984, little more than one year after the Grenada invasion, five Caribbean nations (Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) sent their coast guards/police marine wings to participate in UNITAS XXV (the annual U. S. Navy-Latin American exercise). This unprecedented demonstration of cooperation among the new independent nations (most have been independent for only a few years) of the Eastern Caribbean bodes well for the future of a regional coast guard.
True blue-water navies, however, are beyond both the need and financial capabilities of the small nations of the Eastern Caribbean. Instead, what these countries need and want is equivalent to the U. S. Coast Guard: armed seagoing forces that have the ability to conduct search and rescue, law enforcement, boating and merchant marine safety, environmental pro-