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Most likely, this pair of press people, who found their own passage from Barbados to Grenada, hoped they would be reporting the news rather than listening to it. Members of the press believe they Preserve the liberties of the Constitution by reporting what they learn. They believe the people have a right to know. And they do. But how absolute is this right?
r,ght to know.”
The media furor continued long after the Grenada oper- ai,on was successfully completed. In November, General °hn W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
In October 1983, U. S. military forces—along with forces from six neighboring Caribbean countries— landed on the island of Grenada. These military forces ere not accompanied by representatives of the U. S. j!e'Vs media. In fact, newsmen were officially barred from e island until the third day of the operation, when a pool *5 reporters was allowed to cover what was taking Place.
The news media were indignant. Their outcry was loud a,1(i strong. However, a large number of polls, scientific and otherwise, showed what appeared to be strong public SuPport for keeping the media off the island for the first 'Wo days.
The members of the press, in their outrage, stressed Several points. Two of the major ones were that the government's action was in violation of the First Amendment o the Constitution, and it denied the American public its
Staff, asked me to convene a panel of experts from the media and the military to examine the question, “How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of a military operation while keeping the American public informed through the news media?”
The Military-Media Relations Panel met from 6 through 10 February 1984. It was composed of four former newsmen with television, radio, newspaper, news magazine, and wire service experience in wartime. Three had been bureau chiefs in Vietnam, and one had headed a major network’s television news operation. Also included were the former dean of a major school of journalism, who had more than 40 years’ experience in military-media relations, and a former high-ranking news magazine executive, who had also served as Chief of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon. On the military side were representatives of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and all four of the Department of Defense military services. I served as chairman.
of the
The public’s right to know and the media’s First Amendment rights were discussed by the panel. These issues were addressed also by many of the 25 senior media representatives from 18 major news organizations and the top public affairs officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force who appeared before the panel.
However, the final report of the panel did not include any specific discussion of either subject. We thought that both areas were extremely gray, and judgments would be difficult. Fortunately, we also believed that we did not need to make a judgment on either issue. We felt justified in this position because we unanimously agreed at the outset of our deliberations that the U. S. media should cover U. S. military operations but with two provisos. The statement of principle on which we based our recommendations explains our position. It said:
“The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U. S. news media cover U. S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U. S. forces.”
This statement supports the First Amendment and certainly implies that the American people have a right to know about U. S. military operations, but it also indicates that this right is not absolute; the people do not have a right to know everything. It also states that the news media should be one of two sources of information for the public, the other one being the government.
Historically, the principle of freedom of the press, to include the “right to know” aspect, is quite new and is an American concept. For example, the press in England remained under government control until 1837. Prior to our First Amendment, it was quite normal in all major nations to deny considerable information to the press (when it existed) and to the people. A few samples follow:
- In about 450 B.C., the Athenian dramatist/philosopher Sophocles said, “It is the merit of a general to impart good news and to conceal the bad.”
- In Napoleon’s era, there was a proverb that said, “False as a (press) bulletin.”
- More recently, when asked to state a press relations policy for the Navy in 1942, Admiral Ernest J. King, then- Chief of Naval Operations for the U. S. Navy, said, “Don’t tell them anything. When it’s over, tell them who won.”
Today, the principle has made much progress despite temporary setbacks and many growing pains. To analyze the current status of the public’s right to know, we need to
Five months after the operation on the sunny tropical island of Grenada, a panel of military and media experts headed by General Sidle, fourth from left (front row), met in wintry Washington to discuss how better to handle reporting in combat situations.
What do we mean by the people’s right to know. What are the legal/constitutional aspects involved? What are the logical/common sense aspects involve • What is the impact of the principle on public decisions- Does right to know affect the volume of press coverage ■ Can the principle be misapplied? If so, what is the nn
result? ,
What is the people’s right to know? Are we speaking 0 an individual’s right to know? Obviously, some of oU citizens have considerable right and even need to knoW> depending on their jobs. The President and many ot e officials in our government certainly have the right a need to know almost anything.
However, I think most people agree that the phrase does not refer to individuals but to the American people as whole. This is certainly what the press means when claims the people have a right to know. The press a infers, of course, that it has a corresponding right to 111 form the people.
In layman’s terms, what are the legal aspects
?ent> “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the reedom of speech or of the press . . . that press free- t°rn should be maintained so that it can inform the people.
Inf;
havi
act, I believe my panel would agree that the people do e a right to have information on matters of public con-
Cern gathered and disseminated through the medium of a Pr^ss free from legislated control or restraint.
,. Supreme Court of the United States has supported „.ls interpretation by ruling that the First Amendment was .'ntended to give to liberty of the press, as to other liber- es> the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an tderly society.” Note, however, that this ruling does not trant absolute freedom of the press; the freedom is quali- 'e(l- In addition, neither the Constitution nor the Bill of >ghts says anything barring the President of the United ates from abridging the freedom of the press.
Of course, we need to consider what the writers of the |Klrst Amendment had in mind in 1791. Did they intend for Press to have a free rein at all times, or did they intend establish freedom of the press as they knew it in the late
the
l700s?
^hat
The latter interpretation seems logical to me. But,
was the status of the press at that time? From a mili-
ta - “—“ .........
O' standpoint, there is very little evidence of much repor-
•oriai
coverage of battles in the Revolutionary War. In
act> some, perhaps many, battles were not covered at all, though we do not know whether this was by media °'ce or by direction of the commanders concerned. We 0 know that there was no problem with a commander Ting the press from coverage during the Civil War. °th Generals William Sherman and Henry Halleck kept e Press from covering certain operations.
C ^ut it is obvious that the press situation confronting our Unding fathers was a far cry from what it is today. How °uld they have worded the First Amendment if they were r,ting it in 1985? An interesting speculation.
Since we do not know the answer to this question, we jhust draw the current legal status of freedom of the press °ni how the courts have interpreted the problem. My Punel requested and received an evaluation from the p.Tierican Legal Foundation of court cases involving the lrst Amendment. The analysis by the foundation made ^ 0 points that are germane to this discussion:
The preponderance of court cases has upheld the right ^ the press to publish information it has obtained. However, the preponderance of cases has not upheld the solute right of the media to have access to the news. n(l, if the press cannot have access in some cases, the Pe°ple logically do not have the right to know about these cases.
Thus, although the matter is hazy from a legal/constitu- |.°nal standpoint, a case can be made that the courts be- eve the people’s right to know is not absolute. Now, let’s °°k at the matter from the standpoint of logic and com- rn°n sense.
, Ho the people themselves believe they have a right to n°w? There is undoubtedly much general support for the H'Uciple, but it seems equally clear that the people do not eheve that this right is all-encompassing.
Several examples illustrate this point. As already noted, apparently a majority of the American public supported
the barring of the media from Grenada for the first two days of the operation. Apparently, these Americans were agreeable to a delay in being fully informed about the operation and presumably agreed that the government had sufficient good reason to override their right to know, at least temporarily.
Similarly, there was considerable public antagonism to the press breaking the story last December about the classified payload scheduled to be on board the first 1985 Space Shuttle launch. In central Florida where I live, a poll by the major newspaper in the area showed public disagreement with The Washington Post (and the other media that quickly followed suit) for revealing some of the details about the classified payload that the government did not wish released. I also listened to several radio talk shows on the subject, and many of those people who called in castigated The Washington Post for breaking the story. Several callers said that they not only had no right or need to know, but did not even want to know.
There are many more examples, such as the release by the press of The Pentagon Papers. Many members of the public initially decried this unauthorized release of classified information by the press. With respect to classified military information, at least some of the public do not believe the principle of the people’s right to know applies.
But the classified material must be genuinely classified before an exception to the principle would be supported. For instance, when it developed that there was doubt about whether the information contained in The Pentagon Papers was classified, public disapproval of the unauthorized publication waned considerably.
In the 1960s, Arthur Sylvester, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), was accused by the press of advocating the government’s “right to lie.” I worked for Secretary Sylvester at the time these accusations were made, and, although I cannot prove that he ever made such a statement publicly, I know he did believe it. His point was that if material became available to the press that would seriously endanger the security of the United States and it was published, the government had the right to deny its accuracy even if the denial was a lie.
I surmise that the American public would agree that if publication of material would present a clear and present danger to the United States, it not only should not be published but the people would have no right to know about it. I think the people would also agree that the U. S. media should not put their own government in a position where it had to lie to help preserve national security.
At a seminar conducted by Columbia University in December 1984, attended by a large number of well-known journalists and high-ranking present and former government officials, hypothetical U. S. military operations were presented. The media representatives were given the opportunity to voice their opinions on publishing stories that gave aid and comfort to the enemy. I was delighted that the majority of the reporters and editors present agreed that stories that would impair the security of a military operation and/or jeopardize the safety of U. S. forces should not be published or put on the air. Unfortunately, these positions were not always unanimous.
However, it was clear that the greater the danger to the success of the operation/troop safety a published story would be, the smaller the group of reporters that wanted to publish. In fact, on the final day of the seminar when it was obvious that clear and present danger to an operation would result from publication of a story, no reporter or editor wanted to release the story.
Also, when my panel questioned the news officials who appeared before us, it was equally apparent that they agreed they should not publish information that would clearly impair military security or the safety of U. S. forces.
Another indication of press support for not publishing information considered classified by the government occurred during the December commotion about the Space Shuttle classified Department of Defense payload. As reported in Editor and Publisher, the Associated Press did not break the story although it had it. As Associated Press’s president explained the reason for this, “ . . . basically we came down on the side of saying we can’t define national security.”
Thus, with respect to logic and the people’s right to know classified information about military operations, I am convinced that most people, especially if they have taken the time to think about it, believe they have no right to know. I am also convinced that most reporters and editors, at least those from major news organizations, share this belief, provided they are convinced that the information concerned is genuinely classified.
But, from a common sense standpoint, there is more 1 the matter of the people’s right to know than purely 1111 * tary national security concerns. For example, what shou be the position of the public and the press regarding 1 early release by television networks of their accurate tion predictions? Do the people on the West Coast have t right to know election results elsewhere in the country before they have had the opportunity to vote? Public op"1 ion has apparently not been solidified on this problem, an I suspect those who have already voted when the pre<alC tions are made are less concerned about the problem tha those who have not.
But what would our founding fathers have ruled on thij situation? One would have to assume that, in view of conviction that voting should be by secret written bal 0 (or its equivalent), they would be against the early rdeaSi of the predictions. The networks can counter that they nj. reporting predictions, not results. Our forefathers mig well have sidestepped the issue by withholding all electio returns until all polls are closed rather than abridge 1c freedom of the press to publish its own estimates of 1 results. ,
Another example that has no connection with classif>e information was the bombing of the U. S. Marine Corp^ Headquarters in Beirut in 1983. Shortly thereafter, °n• could hardly turn on his television set without seeing close-up coverage of bereaved parents of dead MarineS' Did the American people have a ‘‘need to know” Although it did not appear in the panel’s report, the m&ie was discussed several times during the course of our mee ings. The panel was unanimous in thinking that this covef age was overdone and not necessary under any possm context of the “need-to-know” principle.
A somewhat similar example is the now famous ph°
0 a dead U. S. pilot on the beach at Grenada that appeared jn a major news magazine and perhaps elsewhere. Most of ^ panel thought this photo was in poor taste, and its Publication was not necessary from a need to know standpoint. The press representatives with whom we discussed ls point seemed to have mixed reactions but believed ^the news organization involved had to make the call.
I he American people have no need to know the specific j entity of a dead soldier on the battlefield. This is also rue of the wounded, unless they have agreed to be photographed. It is hard to find a tenable need-to-know argu- jJMit in favor of such photos. Combat photos, yes; identi- lahle dead and wounded, no. I should add that the press generally has been very cooperative in this matter, apparently agreeing that there is no public need to know.
It is clear, then, that logic and common sense indicate at there must be some exceptions made to the people’s need-to-know principle both in classified information Cases und in others.
J^hat is the impact of the people’s right to know on Public decisions? History strongly indicates that the AmerICan People, when given the facts, almost always tend to JUake the right decisions, even on complicated matters.
0re than 200 years of our country’s successful growth au.d relative prosperity seem to bear out this premise. If *s true, the American people have reason to have the rjght to know” the majority of the time, out suppose the media do not present the facts accu- ■ately? What happens to the American people’s decisionmaking process when they receive non-facts, misleading Pmss statements, or personal opinions of reporters and e dors disguised as news? What happens when they encounter reporting from advocacy reporters who believe at Americans cannot make proper deductions from the acts and therefore try to interpret the facts in news stories ° help” the public draw the “correct” conclusions? ny of these inaccuracies or types of slanting could cause a Serious problem.
Of course, the people’s right to know certainly includes av*ng the opinions of reporters and editors. But they s °uld be so labeled. There is much evidence that the Public welcomes press opinions so long as they know that "mat they are reading, viewing, or hearing are opinions.
One of the major press criticisms that has come to the Orefront since the Grenada operation is that the press is °° negative. Since it was publicized that I was the chairman of General Vessey’s Military-Media Relations Panel, nave received numerous comments, not only from the mditary, but from businessmen, doctors, educators, administrators of various types, and others saying that the media treat their groups unfairly and that the coverage eems to be too often limited to bad news.
Some newsmen who appeared before the panel told me Pr'Vately that they agree, at least somewhat, with this criti- msm. if the press has become too negative, and it would a*e an in-depth study to prove it, there is a possible im- Paut on the right-to-know question. That is, a steady diet ^ negative news might influence the public when relayed y the media as part of the right-to-know doctrine. Fortunately, some examples tend to prove that the pub- lie is too smart to be influenced too much by negative, nonobjective, or inaccurate reporting. One example is the Grenada operation itself. Since the public seemed to support barring the press, perhaps it recognized that today’s reporting has become too negative, too biased, and/or too often inaccurate or misleading.
It certainly indicated that the trust in the press by the public has decreased. This was confirmed by the annual poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, which seeks to discover how much confidence the public has in various U. S. institutions. In 1983, this poll showed that only 13.7% of the public had great confidence in the print media and 12.7% had great confidence in television. This was opposed to confidence figures of 52.3% in medicine and 44.4% in the scientific community.
This lack of confidence seemed to continue in 1984. A Harris Poll released in mid-December showed that the press ranked third from the bottom of 14 U. S. institutions about which respondents were asked if they had “a great deal of confidence.”
If the public does not trust the media, what does this do to the people’s right to know? I suspect that it does little since the media remain the principal means by which the public obtains its information. But, it should make the press sit up and take notice. At least a few of the major news organizations are engaging in some self-appraisal. In addition, last fall, the American Society of Newspaper Editors commissioned a study designed to find some practical ways editors can deal with the problem of “eroding press credibility with the public.” This should be good news for the public.
Still another matter that bears directly on the people’s right to know is the proliferation of media and individuals
seeking to cover the news. During the Grenada operation, about 700 individuals who called themselves reporters gathered on Barbados. According to a Department of Defense examination of these 700, about 400 actually represented legitimate news media.
Imagine the confusion if the Department of Defense or the on-scene Grenada commander had accredited these
400 reporters and permitted them immediate access to Grenada. There would have been almost as many news men as there were Cubans on the island. This would have been an intolerable situation for the on-scene commande ■ Our founding fathers probably did not foresee such a situation, but, if they had, would they have insisted that a ^ 400 reporters be allowed to come ashore on the first day 0
First Press Pool Fails; What Now?
At 1800 on Saturday, 20 April, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, called ten prearranged news media contacts, alerting them that a pool was being formed to cover a military operation, that secrecy was absolutely necessary, and that their representative should report to Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D. C., at 0400 on Sunday prepared to go to a hot and rainy place.
Actually, the operation was a joint training exercise in Honduras, and the pool being formed was a test of the pool plan the Pentagon had worked out as the result of Sidle Panel recommendations. It was well- known that this plan was going to be tested, but the pool alert message made no mention of a test as this would have destroyed its value.
A little more than six hours later, at about 2420 on Sunday, the Department of Defense began receiving calls from various media not included in the pool. The callers wanted to know what was going on. Many calls later and after some callers seemed to believe that the exercise was a genuine wartime operation, the Pentagon issued word that the pool was only a test.
In other words, the story had leaked, and the test was a failure as far as the operation’s secrecy was concerned.
Reports indicate that the major leak, although not intended as such, came from one of the pooling organizations that believed it must notify a number of client news media so that they could make the necessary arrangements to carry reports from its pool representative. The news organization made these calls despite the fact that the message read to its representative by the Pentagon made it clear that secrecy was vital.
What does this failure mean?
Is the press not to be trusted by the military? Was the Grenada solution—keeping the press off the island for the first two days— the only way to handle a military operation with the news media today?
Although it was most disappointing to me that the press failed this test, I strongly concur with the Department of Defense’s announced decision that the solution is to restudy the pool plan and attempt to fix the problems the test developed. Then, try again.
This restudy will examine both the media’s and the Department of Defense’s roles as there are undoubtedly problems on both sides. For example, it appears that too many Pentagon officials were aware of the plan so that at least one news organization found out about it before the Saturday evening pool alert was distributed. Laudably, this agency kept the secret, and no harm was done.
In any case, the restudy and a new test after the plan is tightened is mandatory. As my panel stated in our report, “The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the government.”
I believe that this matter can and will be worked out. After all, the purpose of a test is to find out if any problems remain so that they can be fixed. This is especially true of any newly designed system, be it a test of a weapon, a procedure, or whatever the case.
Obviously, the press should not have leaked. But my prediction is that the next test will work much better, perhaps perfectly. Let us all hope so because the American people will be the winners.
know
without interfering with the operation.
Unfortunately, censorship is difficult to establish unless ' ls total as in World Wars I and II. Some consideration as given during the Vietnam War to applying what the Military calls field press censorship, that is, censoring all edia output from the combat zone. However, it would ave been simple enough for a reporter to fly to Bangkok °r Hong Kong to file the story, uncensored. He or she °uld not have been able to get back into Vietnam as a Ault, but the news organization might consider this pena ty worthwhile if the story was “big enough.” Also, field PjAs censorship would not cover stories prepared in ashington or elsewhere. It was not adopted.
The Vietnam solution in lieu of censorship and the one recommended by the panel is to rely on the press to censor '[self via agreement on a set of ground rules which specify e types of information that may not be reported or, in s°nte cases, may not be reported without previous ap- Pr°val from the senior on-scene headquarters. This 0rked well in Vietnam and seems to be agreeable today 0 both the military and the media. It may not be the best s°lution, however; in 1968, a group of Saigon media bu
e operation? I think not. The sheer volume of reporters inning free in such a small operation could well have had negative impact on operational security and quite possi- y °n troop safety as well.
To solve this problem, a small pool of reporters could ,ave been allowed ashore as soon as feasible on the first aV> followed by larger and larger pools as the operation regressed. This would have satisfied the people’s right to
The government, the press, and the public should all insider this problem of the volume of press coverage. ePorts vary, but all agree that less than 100 newsmen ,ere put to sea to cover the massive Normandy invasion in 44- And there were certainly less than 400 U. S. report- rs covering World War II on the ground in Europe at any 640 t*me' Vietnam where, in March 1968, there were ° U. S. reporters accredited, numerous checks showed ,at there were less than 100 in the field on any one day. If . e CUrrent trend continues, some control will have to be shtuted over the numbers of news agencies, organiza- °ns> and reporters actually covering a Grenada-type or eycn much larger military operation in the future.
What can the government do when a news organization P Wishes information that presents a clear and present anger to national security? This question was introduced ring our panel meetings. Some panel members sug- §ested that perhaps an effort should be made to have Con- §ress pass a law similar to the British Official Secrets Act. uis law would put some real teeth into punishment for Authorized media release of classified information. °ugress would probably not pass such a law, but it may e Worth considering.
A related point, at least as far as military operations are 0r>cerned, is censorship. Censorship places the executive . ranch of the government in a position to determine what formation the media should relay to the public. This gically is anathema to the press, but it does provide a a°dy solution for maintaining the security of classified c°mbat information.
reau chiefs visited my office to ask that I take steps to institute field press censorship. Their point was that the press should not have to censor itself; the government should do it. The group backed off when it realized that South Vietnam, as the sovereign nation, might well also have censorship rights should the United States initiate field press censorship.
Where does all of this leave us with respect to the people’s right to know?
First, the public does have a right to know, but not an absolute right. There are some things that the public does not have a right to know and probably does not want to know for the most part. This would apply especially to information that would be against the people’s own interests if it were known. This would include genuine national security matters and possibly such information as early release of accurate election predictions and matters of good taste.
Second, the executive branch of the government is not barred from abridging the freedom of the press by denying access to news organizations in cases where information, if published, would present a clear and present danger to the nation or its military operations. Denying such access seems to be supported by the courts, and it is certainly logical from the public’s standpoint.
Third, the public has the right to know accurate, nonbiased information. Reportorial opinion or advocacy report- ins should be kept out of news stories.
Fourth, the people’s right to know does not require that an unlimited number of newspersons be permitted to cover a military operation. If coverage must be limited, the public can be very well informed by permitting access to the news by media with the widest American audiences.
Fifth, should the media publicize information that is not in the best interests of the government and the public, such as genuine national security information that should remain classified, adequate remedies—legal or otherwise— are generally not available to the government or the public. This means that the press must serve as its own watchdog in such matters. Fortunately, despite some of the examples cited above, there is a preponderance within the press of professional, objective, and patriotic reporters and editors.
My conclusion is that the public, the government, and the press should accept the fact that the public does have a right to know, but it is not an absolute right. The principle must be followed in the great majority of cases for the continuing good of our country. But exceptions, especially those involving national security, must also be made when they apply.
General Sidle received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Wisconsin. He has had numerous billets in the U. S. Army, including Chief of Information, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Commander, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery; Chief of Information, Commander of Army Readiness Region VII with concurrent duty as Deputy Commanding General, Fifth U. S. Army; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. After his retirement from the Army in 1975, he joined Martin Marietta Orlando Aerospace. In 1983, he was promoted to Director, Public Relations for Martin Marietta Aerospace in Orlando.