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The late arrival of journalists in Grenada—one of whom sports a cap and T-shirt which, like a serviceman’s ribbons, proclaim his most recent campaigns—did not help their
The Reagan administration’s decision to restrict the press from the first few days of the Grenada rescue operation caused an uproar throughout the news rciedia. Reporters appealed to the American public to join them in their protest of the “unwarranted and unprecedented” infringement upon their constitutional rights. But their answer was not what they expected. Telephone calls, Otters, and interviews revealed that up to 99% of those Persons contacted not only agreed with the administration’s decision, but felt distaste for the press in general. The reaction by the American public should not have been a surprise to the media. In 1969, the International Press Bulletin reported:
“In the United States, where journalists have long enjoyed a special position compared with colleagues elsewhere, a disquieting development has been noted. . . . Newspapers, it appeared in surveys, were no longer trusted by their readers, who felt that they lie, manufacture news and sensationalize what they do report.”
Nevertheless, the reaction from the American public, that the press is arrogant, biased, undisciplined, and irresPonsible, has been hard to swallow by an institution that insiders itself investigative, courageous, professional, ar>d the protector of American democratic values. The difference between how the news media view themselves and how they are viewed by the public should be disturbing to k°th. Because advances in technology have made the I^odia an influential institution in American society, it is lniPortant that they use that power responsibly and wisely. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case.
Prior to World War II, press accounts of military bat- lfes, policies, and leadership were limited by technology, government censorship, and propaganda, and ranged from ahsurd mythical fabrications to detailed and accurate narrations. World War II, however, was a unique experience f°r the United States. It was a patriotic war, and patriotism Was reflected in the reporting of its events. Admittedly, lhe loyal conduct of the press was not without a certain aniount of duress. Censorship was practiced in all theaters. Even so, correspondents were more inclined to cooperate with than fight the authorities when stories were un- c°vered that would have a detrimental effect on morale at front or at home. For example, when General Dwight • Eisenhower was briefing a group of reporters after the 0rth Africa campaign, he was asked again and again ^here the Allies would strike next. Ike looked them straight in the eye and told them he was confident in their aoility to keep a secret—in two days, they would invade icily. He had excellent rapport with the press as well as jteir unwavering respect. Not one reporter hinted about e upcoming operation to his editor.
The press corps acted as a booster club that promoted e valiant effort of the team and reluctantly overlooked . e occasional errors and less-than-honorable actions of '^dividual players. Although the degree of press censor- *P varied, there was little enmity between the military ^ media because reporters identified with the troops. °mbat reporters commonly trained, marched, and went 0 battle with the same unit. As a result their stories about
the soldiers, sailors, or marines were quite personal and even compassionate. The correspondents were aware of the importance of morale back home. They knew that the American people did not need reminders that war is horrible. The thousands of gold stars displayed in windows across the country was evidence enough.
With the Korean War emerged a transition in the style of reporting. Human interest specialists such as Ernie Pyle and Bill Mauldin who boosted morale on the home front with articles and cartoons depicting the day-to-day struggle of G. I. Joe became obsolete. The correspondent in the Korean War was a news reporter, and in that capacity struggled to justify—or impugn—the U. S. effort to repel the North Korean invasion from a seemingly insignificant piece of Asian territory 10,000 miles from the United States. The mismanagement, cowardice, corruption, and atrocities that plagued a fledgling South Korean nation struggling for survival received an inordinate amount of attention from idealistic correspondents. They eagerly concentrated on the political arena rather than the events on the battlefield, which was the purpose for which they originally came.
The horde of reporters that descended upon the Korean peninsula was a preview of the media mania that was to infect Southeast Asia 15 years later. Quantity, however, did not mean quality. In the words of Reginald Thompson, a respected British journalist who covered the Korean War, “With American correspondents the quality is so uneven. At the top you get the very best. Below you get virtual illiterates.” Many reporters were intimidated by the majestic authority of General Douglas MacArthur and the implied threats by senior combat-experienced officers. Yet, courageous actions by journalists were not uncommon. Many stood beside the riflemen and shared the terror of combat. The Korean War correspondents represented the various degrees of physical courage shared by the soldiers about whom they reported. Some were brave, some were cowards, and most were cautious yet daring as they carried out their respective missions.
The Korean War was a traumatic period for Americans. The public, as well as the press and the military, had difficulty understanding why U. S. servicemen were dying strictly for the sake of political maneuvering or why unprecedented limitations were placed on the field commanders. The reporting reflected this frustration and eventually focused on the human cost of the stalemate, the lack of clear war objectives, and the prolonged negotiations at Panmunjom. Yet, when the truce was finally signed in June 1953, the public had been given, on the whole, a fairly accurate report of their men in uniform.
The responsible reporting known to World War II sharply declined during the Vietnam War. The miracle of television that brought the Dallas Cowboys into American living rooms also placed the stench, gore, and tragedy of the Vietnam War right in the laps of the American people. Members of the news media seemed convinced that they alone had discovered that war is ugly and felt compelled to share their discovery with every American citizen. While U. S. servicemen battled the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the countless networks and syndicated and free-
The responsibility of the press has declined during the past 40 years. During World War II, commanders like Admiral Chester W. Nimitz could hold press conferences and be confident that stories would be straightforward and, if need be, confidential. By the Vietnam War, however, sensational reporting and breaches of trust and security were not uncommon.
lance reporters roaming Southeast Asia battled each other for one-upmanship. Sensational reporting became the avenue for recognition. That the Ernie Pyle-image of G. I. Joe was not going to boost TV ratings or sell papers became obvious to the TV networks and newspaper editors. Certainly, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were not going to invite the American press on forays where they performed some atrocious tortures on their prisoners. Therefore, such horror on the part of the enemy rarely appeared in the press. If vivid evidence of such rumored atrocities was not available to the media, then any unexplained violence by U. S. servicemen would suffice as an attention-getter. The uncommon valor of G. I. Joe still occurred, but it was overshadowed by repeated allegations of uncommon atrocities. The killing of guerrillas of varied sex, dress, and age (rather than of uniformed enemy soldiers) and the burning of thatched huts (regardless of the reason) were alien to the American ethic and therefore were graphically photographed for U. S. and foreign editors. To meet deadlines, factual explanations for the events photographed were not always pursued. Instead, misleading captions often accompanied the photos. In addition, explicit photos of body bags and mutilated corpses of U. S. servicemen were rushed home to be viewed on the evening news. This type of reporting began to arouse the public desire to end the war quickly, regardless of the consequences. An antiwar movement erupted and spread across the country. Antiwar activists and the news media eventually began to feed on the fruits of each other’s labor.
Although the news media have never accepted any responsibility for the Vietnam debacle, their unprecedented unrestrained coverage of the war would have had adverse impact on the military effort regardless of how clear, noble, and feasible the political objectives of the war were. Unfortunately, the nature of the conflict precluded press censorship, and, if any self-restraint existed, it did not prevent breaches of trust and security. An example of the news media’s nonconcem for the release of sensitive and classified information was the publication of the Pentagon Papers (“The Defense Department History of U. S. Decisionmaking on Vietnam”) in 1971 while U. S. servicemen were still in Vietnam and while the United States was still negotiating for an end to the war. Some reporters’ claims that “the public had the right to know” sounded somewhat pontifical to a negotiator at the Paris conference table or to a commander trying to do his job in combat.
When the Vietnam War ended for the United States in 1973, the news media were already engrossed in the Watergate scandal. President Richard Nixon, who thought the press would not see him as an item to “kick around anymore,” found himself once again the target of opportunity and more the recipient of the news media’s wrath than he could have ever envisioned when he made that statement in 1962. The news media had revitalized their self-aP' pointed role as society’s sentinel, a fourth check and balance on all branches of government.
Another disturbing trend also began to appear in regular news reporting. Although commentary or editorial remarks are best labeled as such and reserved for a speeh* segment of the TV news program or newspaper, they began to appear in regular newscasts. Currently, they are interjected wherever and whenever the reporter feels so inclined. For example, in his 5 December 1983 report oo the deaths of eight marines in Beirut and the loss of tsV° aircraft that were attacking Syrian antiaircraft sites, To111 Brokaw of the NBC Nightly News stated, “How long cafl this go on?”—a statement obviously intended to stir pu^' lie emotion.
News media reporting hit a low in 1980 during the Ira' nian hostage rescue attempt. The operation’s failure vva^ painfully displayed by closeup photos of burned aircra and corpses of U. S. servicemen. The news media’s aP parent disdain for U. S. military capabilities provided the Ayatollah Khomeini with an opportunity to propagan^12 against the United States. The circumstances surround^ the events at Desert One certainly deserved close exarni|i;l tion by military analysts, but airing as many facts, rumor5’ and allegations as the news media could unearth was not >n the best interests of anyone but our adversaries—a regfe' table consequence that the news media unashamedly aC*nl1 is not their concern.
Although many news media representatives have eX pressed a personal liking for President Ronald ReagalV they still appear somewhat uncomfortable with his unra fled and refreshing manner when interviewed. Critic1^ has been inconsistent and often self-contradictory- example, the President’s attempts to stop leaks fr°n within his administration have been the subject of rr>aj^ caustic editorials and commentaries. The voices of 1 news media have repeatedly stated that it is the goverl1
Kent’s job to guard matters of national security, not theirs. But they also called the the President’s concern about leaks an “obsession with secrecy” that inhibits the essen- l>al flow of information in a free society. This uneasy rela- tlQnship between the administration and media was exacerbated by the military presence in Lebanon and Grenada.
Following the 23 October 1983 bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, members of the news media dem- °nstrated probably the most deplorable behavior to date. "1^ cameras invaded the homes of bereaved parents and sPouses of the dead and wounded marines; reporters ig- n<)red their need for privacy and badgered the families for statements. Repeated questions directed at the families during interviews appeared to be intended to encourage negative comments about the Marine Corps or the policies °f the Reagan administration. The behavior of some TV Cfews was nothing less than repulsive. As one badly Burned marine was being unloaded from an ambulance at 'he Brooks Army Medical Center, San Antonio, Texas, pendants were hampered in their efforts to move the man lnto the hospital by an undisciplined gang of TV reporters and cameramen seemingly more concerned with showing V|ewers a critically injured marine.
, In the Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, area, representa- hves of the media paid children to go door-to-door in areas cl°sed to the press to discover which families were await- 'ttg word of a family member’s possible death in the Beirut
explosion. The 12 December 1983 issue of Time quoted an outraged Marine officer who stated, “You people will stop at nothing. Everywhere you go, you leave a smell.”
The invasion of Grenada and the media’s exclusion from the island stimulated a considerable amount of biased journalism. Many newscasts, commentaries, and newspaper stories were so obviously antiadministration and antimilitary that they lacked credibility. Page one reporting on 8 November 1983 in The Washington Post contained scorn for President Reagan’s declared motives for placing troops on the island of Grenada. Reporters were obviously disappointed when returning medical students continued to express relief and gratitude for their rescue, despite the reporters’ repeated attempts to ferret out doubt or displeasure. Such attempts to distort the facts flagrantly inhibit the guarantees of the First Amendment. Herbert J. Gans, in his book Deciding What’s News, states that some charges of news distortion are justified, but “absolute objectivity or nondistortion is impossible.” Perhaps, but there must be limits. Editorializing in news reporting is surely a lack of professionalism. It is particularly disturbing when it appears in prominent news media.
Many reporters are convinced they were barred from Grenada primarily to prevent the American public from seeing the human price of combat, even in a very limited operation. They have not accepted the fact that their presence could have adversely affected the commander’s options, decisions, or degree of success, especially when surprise, speed of maneuver, and limited intelligence data were significant factors.
When the press did arrive on the scene, the criticism and negative attitude projected throughout their reporting convinced the public as well as the military that, for morale purposes alone, the decision to exclude them earlier was valid. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, Commander of the Second Fleet and of the Amphibious Task Force for the Grenada operation, makes no apologies for his decision to leave the press at home, but is concerned about the serious “anti-press sentiments” within the military. He strongly urges both parties to end this adversary relationship. But to reverse the military’s and the public’s “anti-press sentiments,” reporters must better understand the mood of their countrymen.
The news media’s misconception of the values of American society was apparent during a panel discussion of reporters on ABC’s Good Morning America show airing 27 December 1983. The panel discussed the positive public response to the barring of the press from the Grenada rescue mission. One reporter brought up the negative reader reaction to the picture of a dead marine pilot on a Grenada beach published in the 7 November 1983 issue of Time. The panel member stated the picture was not particularly “gory or gruesome,” but Americans simply did not want to be reminded of the horrible price of war. Letters to the Time editor, however, did not convey the reporter’s message. The letter writers considered the picture disrespectful of the pilot’s dignity, honor, and family. (The pilot was one of three airmen in a total of 18 servicemen killed in the Grenada operation and therefore easily identifiable by his family and friends.) Yet, even
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the
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country’s defense. Apparently, however, the military
Most commanders like to talk, and some can be a'
ddle'
with this evidence, the reporter could not accept that the public had any cause for protest other than a “subconscious rejection of the ugly side of war.” This inability to accept reality is strong evidence that the news media are losing touch with the public they are pledged to serve.
In 1977, Alan Barth, former editorial writer for The Washington Post, advised the public that although an objective and fair press is frequently linked to the bond between responsibility and freedom, the citizenry should not expect a “responsible press” in a free society—they are essentially “incompatible.” Americans must “become accustomed to its [the press’s] abuses” and consider the press their ‘ ‘watchdog of society. ’ ’ For the press to remain effective in this role, society “must put up with a certain amount of mistaken barking.” Barth’s journalistic philosophy is worthy of reflection, but it cannot excuse total irresponsibility. There must be an honest and visible effort for objectivity. For instance, reporters can insert a caveat when an opposing viewpoint is not obtainable, thereby at least showing their intent for responsibility. If the press is responsible to no one, it can be irresponsible to everyone. An irresponsible press contributes to anarchy just as much as an irresponsible government.
Walter Lippman, often called the greatest journalist of his time, also had some ideas about responsibility in his trade. He advocated a high level of professionalism demonstrated by “competence, responsibility, fairness, objectivity, disinterestedness, 'and indeed of charity, chivalry and good humor.”
Even after the biased reporting of the Grenada operation and the reprehensible behavior of TV crews following the Beirut bombing, the “big voices” were quick to defend the record of their profession and uphold their right to irresponsibility. On the NSC Today show (26 October 1983), James Michener considered the record of military reporting “impeccable.” This respected author must have been so deeply engrossed in his writing that he failed to note the reporting that came out of the Vietnam War. Ben Bradlee, The Washington Post editor, stated in the 12 November 1983 Time that reporting is “better than ever,” a puzzling comment considering the current public criticism of his profession.
Journalists’ indifferent attitude regarding national security was exemplified during the ABC evening program. Viewpoint (19 January 1984). Mediator Ted Koppel re" sponded to a query as to whether he would have aired the imminent invasion of Grenada if he had known about it beforehand. He answered that he did have a tip beforehand, and if he could have confirmed the information he would have “used” it. What he meant by “used” is unclear. One can only assume that he would have felt obligated to air whatever information he held. Also on Viewpoint, Jack Nelson, The Los Angeles Times Washingt°n bureau chief, stated that, if newsworthy, he would pnnt whatever information he received—that although he would not do anything to endanger national security, he would not “go around trying to find out whether or not the information ... is something that involves a national security operation . . . .”
Other reporters, preferring to remain anonymous, have apologetically stated that the fierce competition within the media industry prohibits them from sitting on informati°n about upcoming military operations, regardless of the p°" tential for compromise. They believe that if they do not print the story, someone else will.
CBS anchorman Dan Rather stated on Columbia University’s “National Security and Freedom of the Press” show airing 5 January 1983, “My job is to get news and report it. If I determine the information is newsworthy I’ll run it.” Such statements confirm my thesis tha there is a standard of journalism today that disregards prl vacy, national security, and dignity. “News,” by whatever definition, is the ultimate qualifier. Perhaps, if Amef icans, particularly reporters, used the terms oU* government, our public, and our military, rather than t'u government, the public, and the military, they might bet ter recognize their responsibilities as U. S. citizens.
The historical idiosyncrasies of the news media and th media’s recent trend toward sensational reporting have significant implications for a military commander. Al°n^ with the demands of combat, the commander must con front the demands of a press whose objectives are diver gent from those associated with the success of the opera tion. In the past, the military’s policy has generally be to cooperate with reporters whenever possible and use 1 media to educate the public about what the Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps are prepared to do if not always succeeded in this effort. Thus, the must either change its policy of accommodation or ,,ri prove its means to conduct it. The latter can be accofo plished through a program of training and education _ Public affairs officers (PAOs) at the headquarters ot the services run interference for general officers and slne^ the subordinate commands from the majority of high'^g news media inquiries. They cannot, however, protect field commander who must deal with the isolated on-t spot interviews and the masses of reporters that conve t at the scenes of unusual military maneuvers, tragic aC^r dents, and combat operations. Commanders come un ^ an attack dissimilar to any they have been trained to |a ^
I
bY the barrage of reporters’ questions and field of microphones put before them. In spite of persistent probing, the c°mmanders generally trust that the press will be fair and honest. The unit commander’s only help may be a local c°nimand PAO who, regardless of how dedicated he or she may be, is probably not prepared to deal with swarms professional (or nonprofessional) reporters and TV CreWs. The command’s capability to deal with the news ttledia must extend beyond the local PAO. A modest in- Vestrnent in realistic training for commanders would mini- ,1'lze the potential for the negative image of the military hat can result from short-notice press interviews.
Commanders are currently schooled to the point where hey develop a false sense of confidence in their ability to eal with news media representatives. If they have at- ehded an upper-level course of professional military education (PME), the curriculum probably contained about .IVe to ten hours of lecture, seminar, and reading explain- ln§ how to deal with the news media. This is similar to ^lv'ng a marine five to ten hours of boxing lessons and Patting him in the ring with a professional fighter.
^ media course or seminar should be included in the CUricula at all levels of PME, especially at the command ahd staff colleges. This course should not be the short case ^tudy or lecture-discussion period familiar to many PME °raduates. It should be a formal full-length course or semi- .ar that is part of the core curriculum, similar to the train- that has been made available for high-level officials in , e Pentagon. If possible, the course should be taught by jl! experienced media representative. An experienced ^0 would also be acceptable, but a media representative *)uld be available as a resource person.
PME directors or commandants could argue that their core curricula are already saturated with high-priority courses of study. Quite a bit of time is now allotted for independent study, lectures of opportunity, athletics, and “director’s time.” Perhaps some of this time could be used for a laboratory-oriented media seminar. As a minimum, a media elective should be available for officers anticipating a command position soon after graduation. Granted, elective courses are now available in most war colleges, but they are general in content and do not adequately focus on the unique problems of the commander in the field.
The syllabus for a media seminar should be designed to extensively train future commanders how to confront the news media. The course must emphasize practical experience with news media representatives, including a series of challenging no-notice interviews. (The Armed Forces Staff College now has such exercises in its curriculum.) Sessions actually on camera would be essential. The training must challenge students to maintain a presence of mind while under the pressure of rapid-fire inquiries by persistent reporters. The commanders must be trained to emphasize the positive, clarify or correct the negative, and direct their answers through the reporter and out to their real target—the public. They must be trained to suppress hostility and still project authority and self-confidence.
The syllabus for a military media course should include practice of no-notice interviews on camera, so that future commanders could be trained how to respond to news media when under pressure.
They must be aware that whatever the position taken or statement made, the result will depend on the perceptions of the interviewer. In addition, they must be aware that what is presented before the public will be influenced by the profit motive, that is, it will be presented to sell papers and not necessarily to provide an objective (and “dull”) story.
Commanders must be taught to be realists, rather than idealists. A well-meaning attempt by a trusting commander to reverse the news media’s opinion of the military will most likely be viewed as an exploitable weakness or a temporary relaxation of the guard.
Padding the syllabus with discussions of such topics as “The Role of the News Media in Society” or “The Theory of Broadcast Journalism” could provide some interesting background, but it would have little value for a future commander. This type of information could be obtained from elective reading. Whatever the syllabus content, the goal should be to produce an officer who is cool, cordial, and confident, but prudently cautious when meeting the press.
The relationship between the military and the news media has been inconsistent during the past 40 years, and it has definitely deteriorated since the 1960s. Although I agree with Vice Admiral Metcalf’s assessment of the sentiments of the military, I am pessimistic as to the eventuality of a meeting of the minds in the near future. I do not view the recent meetings of the Department of Defense with representatives of the news media as a reconciliation, but only as an opportunity for both groups to lay some ground rules. Unfortunately, I foresee no significant changes in the laws that control media behavior. Rather - what’s most likely in store for the future is a disciplined military establishment permanently at variance with a free but unrestrained, undisciplined press.
Regardless of the efforts by the local PAO and the good intentions of a commander, in all probability the unbiased report will turn out to be an Arcadian fantasy that was lost in the scraps on the newsroom or cutting room floor. Alas- the commander may not be pleased, proud, or promoted when his story unfolds. The best insurance agair>st “media-related injury” is to provide commanders with body armor composed of extensive media-oriented train' ing and education.
Colonel Upchurch is currently the Air University Marine Corps RePre' sentative and a faculty seminar leader at the Air War College. He re' ceived a bachelor’s degree in biology from Central Michigan Universe and a master of art’s degree in science education and an education*1 specialist degree in administration and supervision from Wayne State University. He has graduated from the Naval War College, and his Pa5‘ assignments include Commander, Marine Wing Support Group 27, ^ sistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and Chief of Staff, Second Marine Aircra* Wing.
Wi
anted: A
Professional Press
By Captain Brent Baker, U. S. Nav)
Walter Cronkite recently stated in Parade Magazine that there was a “cockeyed system” for news programming in which standards were constantly being lowered without any realization by management that it was happening—something Cronkite blamed on the fact that both management, in general, and people getting into TV news, in particular, were no longer being “journalistically trained.” When asked why he stopped such criticism of his profession, Cronkite said, “. . . my colleagues were unhappy. So I stopped.”1
As a military officer who has dealt daily with news media representatives for more than 20 years, 1 am concerned with the erosion of “objective” journalism today. Fortunately, my experience with the Pentagon correspondents has been superb. I wish those reporters who arrive at overseas combat or crisis areas were as professional as the Pentagon press corps. A major obstacle to a better military-media relationship is this lack of professionalism elsewhere in the news media.
Since it is natural for those in any profession to miss some of the trouble signals of the business because of daily deadlines, the following journalism trends are provided:
► In the 1980s, new journalistic busP ^ ness opportunities and technology- sU as Cable TV, have caused an expl°sl° of news and information outlets. Thus- more reporters are covering military combat or crisis operations. For exam pie, in Grenada, up to 400 reporters ^ were at Barbados on the second day the military operation—all demanding immediate access to the battlefield- range of journalistic experience in sU a growing group is declining. Of the ^ 400 international reporters at Barbad0* less than a third could be considere professionals. Many were part-time