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Located on the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman shares with Iran the guardianship of the vital stretch of water known as the Strait of Hormuz, through which passes approximately one-half of the Western world’s oil supply. On an average of every 18 minutes, a commercial oil tanker passes through the narrow strait. With the fall of the Shah in Iran, Oman’s role in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open has become critical.
Dominating the southern side of Hormuz, the staggering mountains of the Musandam Peninsula are sheer and barren and drop straight to the sea, forming isolated fjords where families of fishermen live. In fact, the Musandam very closely resembles a subtropical Norway with its myriad fjords and inlets. Although the Musandam Peninsula is topographically connected to a 400-mile-long massif of jagged, waterless mountains extending nearly to the "Ras al-Hadd” (Oman’s easternmost protrusion into the Arabian Sea), it is disconnected from the remainder of the country by a corridor some 60 miles
Emirate (U. A. E.) states.
Since Oman proper was adequately discussed in Captain Richard Stewart's excellent professional note entitled “Oman: The Next Crisis,” (Proceedings April 1980, pp. 97-102), the theme of this follow- on effort will concentrate on the world’s most vital waterway, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oman’s Musandam finger which remains on the Western world’s oil lifeline.
If the Strait of Hormuz were not curved it would be a waterway 26 to 35 nautical miles wide and about 150 nautical miles long. Oman has about 100 nautical miles of coastline on the strait; Iran controls the entire other coastline. The sea bottom drops off very steeply, and the water is deeper along the Musandam than along the Iranian shoreline. Sand shallows and low dunes are the features of the Iranian coastline with a plainlike area extending into the interior for some distance before entering the Zagros mountain chain of southern Iran. On the other side, the Musandam shoreline is mostly escarpment with occasional sand pockets between ridges.
Because of its fjordlike features, the Musandam provides many deeply indented and small protected harbors. Small watercraft and dissidents, whose operations in the area can create at least a nuisance threat to the constant flow of oil tankers, can hide there and use the deep waters close to the shoreline to mask their movements from radars. Part of this potential advantage, however, is offset by the difficulty in communications the terrain along the coast creates. Communication between units is prevented or limited unless they resort to easily detectable high-frequency radio transmissions.
The Quoin Islands in Oman's waters consist of Big and Little Quoin and Gap Island. Little Quoin lies about 9 nautical miles from Musandam proper and stands 168 feet high in almost 50 fathoms of water—similar to a miniature Gibraltar without the Spanish causeway. The island has a marker light, generators, and a stationkeeper building used as the primary channel marker in the strait. The traffic separation lanes in the Persian Gulf were drawn largely between the Quoins and the Musandam. In November 1979, the Omani Government moved the lanes outside of the Quoins to provide further clearance from the peninsula. Several small islands lie just off the Musandam headland, the most important of which is Ghanam or Goat Island.
Goat Island is becoming the hub of Omani naval activity. The anchorage (Khawr al Quway) has deep clear water with a minimum depth in the center of about 78 feet. The area is surrounded by 40- to 70- foot cliffs on the island and the cliffs of the Musandam, which quickly rise to 300- to 900-foot crests within half a nautical mile of the shoreline. During World War II, British submarines used the anchorage for resupply from support ships. The island has a small jetty and airstrip with construction well along in upgrading the facility for use as a forward operations and support base.
Besides keeping the strait open from external threat, the Sultan of Oman’s Navy has many other roles. The tanker traffic in the area must be patrolled in order to ensure lane separation and monitor pollution. Tankers frequently unload ballast as they approach the safer waters of the Gulf. The oil res-
idues that are mixed with the ballast can harm the sea life and the limited village beach areas. Because of the size of many tankers and the time they require to turn or stop, traffic control is necessary to prevent a major catastrophe. The Omani Government s adjustment of the traffic lanes to outside the Quoin Islands makes the monitoring task easier. The longer “turn of the corner” still keeps most traffic inside Oman’s territorial waters.
The high-wage scales in many of the Gulf sheikdoms create a large illegal immigrant traffic between the Gulf and the poorer parts of India, Pakistan, and Iran. Many illegals pay the transport fee, are landed ashore, and told that the U. A. E. is just over the hill. In fact, they are stranded in Oman without water, food, or any idea of where to get help. The Omani Navy attempts to intercept this traffic and rescue the stranded illegals for repatriation. Smuggling people is but one form of contraband exchange. Since Oman imposes very few import duties, the country itself has very little black market activity. However, many items, ranging from rice to small arms, are smuggled into Iran and further east via Oman's waters. To discourage this use of Oman’s waters, the Omani Navy routinely searches the many dhows that transit the area.
The water and supply problems of the area are most difficult. A large portion of the Omani Navy effort is expended in ensuring the villages are contacted regularly by medical personnel and that enough water is brought to outlast the long dry periods. The terrain limits the movement of supplies to the sea or air. Omani Air Force helicopters often work with the navy to resupply areas as well as to patrol the strait.
Alternating winds along the African and Arabian coasts help explain the maritime nature of the area and Oman. Omani sailors, pushed by the seasonal wind pattern into an annual cycle of travel, sailed their dhows across the Arabian Sea to Indonesia, and the Omani reputedly brought Islam to Indonesia. Recently, Zanzibar was part of the Omani realm—the sultan of one country often being a vassal of the other. Baluchistan, prior to the 1947 partition of India, was an independent British colony and also part of the Omani empire. Many Baluchis still serve in the Sultan of Oman’s military. Items brought to the Muscat National Museum are items handed down from generation to generation and show that the Omanis traded with China centuries ago. The maritime tradition continues today and is reflected in the Sultan of Oman’s Navy.
The Omani Navy is a tribute to simplicity. Its small fleet consists of six Brooke Marine patrol boats. Two of the warships are armed with Exocet antiship missiles. A third patrol craft had completed conversion when it was lost at sea as cargo on board a larger vessel returning it to Oman. The Omani Navy is acquiring larger vessels of similar design to replace the lost vessel and eventually the craft it
now has. The patrol craft are suitable for the more sheltered part of the Omani coast but make for a rough ride along the southern coast, especially during the northern wind flows and the accompanying swells.
The Omani Navy also has a special amphibious command craft that can accommodate helicopters. Considering the length of coastline, the scattered population, and a population of less than a million, the difficulties with which Oman must cope and its need for specialization become clear. Amphibious craft allow the movement of supplies to scattered villages where harbor facilities are lacking. Helicopters can reach coastal areas that are inaccessible by road and separated by mountains from the coast.
The Omani vessels are manned by a mixture of British, Pakistani, and Omani personnel. Although Omanis take naturally to the sea, the educational system in Oman prior to 1971 did not provide a sufficient technical pool of manpower for the expanding military and industrial sectors. Hence, the need for foreign personnel arose. The education system will eventually provide a suitable pool of personnel; however, the demands on the population will also increase (similar to South Dakota developing its own navy). An Omanization program to bring more Omanis into the service to replace foreigners is well under way, but competing industrial sector demands will act to limit the pace.
Oman has only limited oil resources, yet the social demands on oil revenue are almost staggering. A few years ago, the country had but one doctor and no real hospital. There were 18 miles of paved roadway in a country the size of Kansas. The military, though small, must compete in the “guns or butter” environment of an emerging nation.
Because of the Hormuz Strait, our interest in the Omani Navy tends to be focused on that northern extremity of Oman. The Omani Navy, however, has more than 1,040 nautical miles of coastline to patrol. The southern extremity of this coastline is anchored on the border by South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen), a Soviet bloc-aligned Socialist country (not friendly with Oman). This border area is almost due north of Socotra Island off the Horn of Africa, which is used by the Soviet Union and possessed by South Yemen. This makes the demands on the Omani Navy here different from those in the Hormuz. The area is open to the Indian Ocean and has fewer natural indentations suitable for safe havens. The effect is a call for open ocean patrols that provide stand-off protection of the supply line represented by Raysut Harbor. The small patrol crafts difficulty in the seasonal swells that accompany the monsoon season created the need for larger craft, the first of which is now being built. The 287-foot craft will be equipped with the Exocet missile and provide the Omani Navy with true allseason capability. This sort of incremental expansion can be expected to continue in pace with the growth of indigenous skills and capabilities.
The monies issue along with population and the education base form the constraints that shape the navy. The naval craft are largely tailored for the situation. For instance, the craft have diesel engines instead of gas turbines. Costs, plus available maintenance skills, make the less capable diesel more acceptable. The manpower and overhead costs of shore support bases have acted to limit the number of available naval bases. Amphibious craft provide mobile support to compensate for the long stretches of empty coastline. Training craft are in short supply because the navy’s limited manpower facilities and money cannot support what does not directly contribute to defense. Training is done with the Royal Navy or on board operating vessels.
Although the psychological threat stemming from mine warfare cannot be underestimated, review of the threat in Hormuz shows the real dangers tend to be overstated, as are the difficulties in countering mines. Yet, Oman still does not have any mine countermeasure vessels; this critical gap of capability, of which the Omani Navy is well aware, is the most serious Omani naval weakness.1
While numbers do, of course, make a difference, the Omani Navy is demonstrating how a professional, well-trained force with commonsense support can make up for numbers. Considering many larger but similarly new navies have a hard time getting what vessels they do possess to sea, this is an important difference and a high compliment in-
‘See T. M. Johnson and R. T. Barrett, “Mining the Strait of Hormuz,” Proceedings, December 1981, pp. 83-85.
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THOMAS J. ABERCROMBIE. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY
deed. With the continuation of incremental growth, we can expect the Omani Navy to expand its mine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. The latter is necessary because of the length of the coastline and the establishment of the 200-mile economic zone. Economic constraints preclude the development of a separate naval air arm and marine corps. This will act to increase the burden on the well- established base of interservice cooperation as each service, including the army and air force, adjusts to improve its support to the others and accepts the growing pains.
Oman’s shores were back in the news during December 1981 when more than 1,000 U. S. Marines stormed ashore on the deserted coastline northeast of Salalah during Operation “Bright Star,’ a 45-day series of complex exercises involving approximately 6,000 U. S. military personnel who worked with the armed forces of Oman, Egypt, Somalia, and the Sudan. The amphibious landing in Oman and the other exercises in neighboring countries were designed to demonstrate U. S. intention to help safeguard the security of the nations of the region and to test the evolving ability of the U. S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)2 in accomplishing its global missions. The Marines who landed on 7 and 8 December in Oman were supported by Marine tactical aircraft flying off a nearby carrier in the :See T. M. Johnson and R. T. Barrett, "The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force." Proceedings, November 1980. pp. 95-98.
Arabian Sea and a small RDJTF headquarters detachment on Masirah Island.
With its rich maritime tradition, friendliness, and responsible outlook, Oman is emerging from its long centuries of unchanging life into the modern world on sound footing. The Omanis are an energetic people who are doing well in dealing with the harsh limits nature has placed on their country. The challenges of the Hormuz and the Musandam should be Western challenges, too. This is not solely because of oil and strategic location, but also because Oman can be a model of a stable nation developing and advancing in a very troubled region of the world.
Editor’s Note: The authors were members of the U. S. Department of Defense!Department of State Defense Requirements Surrey Team dispatched to the Sultanate of Oman in September 1979. l.TC Johnson returned in September-Octoher 1981 as a member of the U. S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Bright Star-82 Predeployment Team.
Colonel Johnson is a U. S. Army infantry officer presently assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a frequent contributor to military periodicals and the author of 7 books and more than 40 articles on military weaponry.
Commander Barrett is a 1965 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy and is now assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has authored several articles for the Naval Aviation Safety Magazine Mech.