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The Naval War College has contributed more to the Navy than annual classes of graduating officers; it has stimulated and inspired the writing of a body of strategic doctrine. And the thoughts of two of the college’s presidents, the incumbent Stansfield Turner, at rostrum, and John T. Hayward, have not passed unnoticed in the Soviet Union.
American and Soviet naval strategies stand at a turning point during the present interval between ratification of the SALT I agreement and the anticipated negotiation of SALT II. It is one of those relatively rare times when major political realignments coincide with significant advances in science and industry. This convergence demands a careful assessment of the probable impact of these changes on both countries. Too often such examinations are made unilaterally, that is, without giving full consideration to the opinions and ideas of the leading thinkers in both the United States and the Soviet Union. American naval literature, of course, is more accessible, and even a cursory examination of it reveals a preoccupation with two overriding questions. First, to what extent has American naval strategy evolved in response to technological change during the last quarter century? Second, to what extent is the strategy of the U. S. Navy credible?
What has rarely been attempted is an examination of the Soviet perception of the American answers to these questions. That perception to a large degree shapes Soviet naval strategy, which in turn should determine the evolution of American naval strategy. Thus, by examining the Soviet interpretation of the American answers to the twin problems of strategic response to technological change and strategic credi
bility, we may hope to increase the American naval officers’ understanding of Soviet naval policy and thereby contribute to refinement of American naval strategy.
For this purpose, three works have been selected because of the prestige of their authors and the representative nature of their conclusions. The studies to be analyzed and compared are: "The Impact of Technology on Strategy,” by Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired), U. S. Naval Institute P& ceedings, September 1972; "The United States At a Strategic Crossroads,” by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U. S. Navy, in the October 1972 issue of th« same periodical; and "Zigzags of American 'Grand Strategy,’” by Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo, Soviet Navy, which appeared in the August 1971 issue of Morsko' Sbomik, the leading Soviet naval journal.
The two articles by Vice Admirals Hayward and Turner must be interpreted as especially important indices of the state of American naval theory because Hayward is a past president of the Naval War College and Turner is the incumbent. Since its foundation Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884, the Naval War College has symbolized the latest strategic thinking within the U. S. Navy. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sefflin3^ book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, was3 distillation of the lectures he delivered as a membet of the first faculty at Newport. From its beginning5’ then, the Naval War College has contributed more to the Navy than annual classes of graduating officers 1[ has directly stimulated and inspired the writing body of strategic doctrine. The articles by Vice Ad1"1 rals Hayward and Turner are part of that corpus.
It is likewise significant that the two admirals ha'c published in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Thc inaugural issue of this journal appeared in 1874 3° ' since that time, its pages have conveyed the opin'0 of some of the Navy’s most distinguished theofis^ Mahan was one of these and, like all the office15 ^ his generation, he was committed to creating a
of new, steam-powered, steel-hulled ships mounting rifled cannon to replace the squadrons of obsolescent wooden sailing ships that showed the American flag on "distant stations.” These technological innovations had been pioneered by European nations, and the American naval reformers of the 1880s were crying for their adoption by the U. S. Navy.
By 1890, in part because of articles in the Proceedings, the United States had the beginnings of a modern battleship navy and American naval officers had begun to formulate a strategy for its employment. Since then, the Proceedings has continued to serve as a forum for those who advocate particular weapons systems and complementary strategies. The articles by Hayward and Turner are of this genre.
An index of the importance of Admiral Hayward’s views is his present position as Vice President for International Operations of the General Dynamics Corporation. A hostile critic has labeled that company "our number one defense conglomerate.” Regardless of one’s personal viewpoint, it is true that there has been a close relationship between General Dynamics, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the shaping of U. S. national strategy. To cite but one example, in the mid-1950s a panel composed of military and corporate leaders discussed U. S. foreign policy for some months in New York under the auspices of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. Among those present was Gordon Dean, who was soon to leave the chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission to become a senior vice president at General Dynamics. The research secretary of the group was a young instructor in the Department of Government at Harvard, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger who, in 1957, summarized the panel’s deliberations under the title Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Gordon Dean wrote the book’s foreword, wherein he pointed out: "Dr. Kissinger argues for much more communication of our intentions to the enemy. He believes that it must know that our strength is great or we have lost the asset of a deterrent.”
During the latter part of his naval career Admiral Hayward moved in this milieu. He served as Head of Weapons Research for the Military Applications Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, and he was the first Deputy Director of Naval Operations for Development. It is perhaps owing to this background that Admiral Hayward concentrates on the element of deterrence, which he describes as "the product of technology . . . aimed at achieving our national objective of no nuclear exchange between the Soviet and ourselves.” In words that virtually echo those of Gordon Dean, the Admiral contends, "We must have a reliable weapons system. We must have the will to use it. The
enemy must know that we have it, that it does work, and that we will use it.”
It is perhaps because of his participation in the post-World War II technological revolution that Admiral Hayward argues in behalf of the submarine as the best deterrent and ideal weapons system of today and tomorrow. In all its forms, from transport to nuclear missile platform, the submarine is the veritable embodiment of this technological revolution. Admiral Hayward notes that nuclear propulsion wedded to an armament of missiles constitutes the very essence of the latest technology. As the range of the missiles carried on board submarines is extended, the area of possible deployment is commensurately enlarged, making the task of countering this strategic naval system much more difficult.
As we shall see shortly, Soviet naval theorists have addressed themselves to precisely the strategy that Admiral Hayward advocates. But before discussing the Soviet response, it is important to describe the very different strategic alternative of Vice Admiral Turner. The two systems he most favors are the attack aircraft carrier and the amphibious assault force. He believes these offer the best method of deterring an attack upon the United States, but should they fail to do so, they will provide the means to retain or regain command of the seas as well as reinforce and resupply the allies of the United States. Short of an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers, Admiral Turner envisions two lesser categories of armed conflict involving the United States, namely, sub-theater or limited war and "unilateral involvement.” The latter is a species of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union which is limited in geographic extent. Soviet strategists have most explicitly rejected this concept.
The student of American naval history will observe that there is very little new in Admiral Turner’s surface- oriented "maritime option.” If we turn to the pages of the Naval Institute Proceedings for the months immediately after World War II, we find many articles in which the CVA and the amphibious assault force are depicted as the peculiarly American contribution to weapons system technology. Marines, such as Colonel R. D. Heinl, contended that the "United States has emerged as the dominant amphibious power among the contestants.” Naval officers, such as Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stressed that Japan had been defeated by an American "sea power spearheaded by our carrier-borne air raids and by the excellent work of our submarines.” The carriers and the submarines "made possible the bringing forward of troops—soldiers an marines .... It was that sea power that made possible the use of the atomic bomb by seizing bases frorn
U. S. and U.S.S.R. Naval Strategy 41
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which the planes could carry it.” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal added his imprimatur in favor of carrier task forces, which he described as "a unique creation of the United States.” He considered them "one of the most powerful forces in existence in the world today,” and believed their potency enhanced when backed by amphibious assault forces.
It thus becomes apparent that a maritime strategy resting on command of the seas achieved through use of CVAs and amphibious forces is at least a quarter of a century old and a product of the experience of World War II. Indeed, to the extent that the objective of command of the seas is emphasized rather than the means, the strategy is as old as the British Empire, whence Mahan drew his inspiration.
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History aside, the most direct way to estimate the credibility of American naval strategy, be it submarine or surface, is to analyze Soviet naval theory. Unfortunately, neither Hayward nor Turner discusses Soviet intentions extensively. Instead, both officers somewhat vaguely posit a "Soviet threat” as the ultimate rationale for the specific U. S. naval strategy and force they favor.
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A partial explanation for virtually disregarding Soviet naval theory is the "common sense” approach which assumes that the U.S.S.R. is a closed society and therefore does not have forums for openly debating strategic issues. Indeed, many American Sovietologists formerly believed that any Soviet discussion of strategy must inherently be a form of psychological warfare aimed at bluffing or intimidating the West. Whatever the validity of this interpretation in the past, it has lately lost acceptance with the growing recognition of the pluralistic tendencies at work in the Soviet system and especially within the armed forces. For example, Commander Robert W. Herrick, U. S. Navy (Retired), in his book Soviet Naval Strategy, published by the U. S. Naval Institute in 1968, laid the groundwork for comprehending the diversity of opinion in the Soviet Navy.
In the 19th century, a similar conviction that tsarist society was closed permeated naval circles in England, France, and later Germany, making them deaf to the dialogues on strategy by which Russian naval theorists were articulating the Russian Navy’s program for modernization. Tsarist naval officers, like their Soviet successors, knew full-well that they were in the junior service and that neither the Ministry of War nor Russian public opinion would support expansion and modernization of the fleet unless justified by naval developments outside of Russia. Thus, in 1848, they founded the journal Morskoi Sbomik (Naval Digest), which ever since has been the anvil upon which Russian and Soviet naval strategy has been hammered out.
It was in Morskoi Sbomik that 19th century Russian naval officers discussed each new technological develop
ment of the leading naval powers and its implications for the Russian Navy. Here, Admiral G. I. Butakov presented the case for the screw-propelled fleet after the disastrous Crimean War. Since Butakov’s generation, tsarist and Soviet naval officers have consistently used Morskoi Sbomik as their platform for airing the strategic problems confronting the navy as a result of technological advances by the navies of the great maritime powers—Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
Unable by themselves to exercise sufficient political leverage to bring about a reallocation of defense spending, tsarist and Soviet naval officers from Stepan O. Makarov* at the beginning of the 20th century to S. G. Gorshkov, the present commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, have pointed to the modernization of Western European and American navies to justify the improvement of Russian naval forces. This political pragmatism is implicitly demonstrated in Commander Herrick’s study of the evolution of Soviet naval strategy. Unfortunately, Herrick did not explicitly examine the relationship between recent shifts in Soviet naval doctrine and the changing nature of the threat posed to the U.S.S.R. by the seaborne weapons systems of the United States and NATO countries. While admitting that the United States and its allies possess a strategic superiority over the Soviet naval forces, Herrick did not analyze the use made of this pressure by Soviet naval officers in their attempts to persuade the more traditional party and military elites of the need to transform radically the Soviet defense posture by developing and deploying a Russian maritime deterrent.
Since the appearance of Herrick’s work in 1968, these efforts have become more and more pronounced. Each issue of Morskoi Sbomik contains articles devoted to the strategic consequences of the Western revolution in weapons technology. Soviet naval officers have followed very closely the discussions of American theorists, especially those appearing in the Naval Institute Proceedings. A pertinent example of Soviet commentary is the criticism of American "grand strategy” by Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo in the August 1971 issue of Morskoi Sbomik.
Rear Admiral Stalbo is a doctor of naval sciences and a professor at one of the Soviet Higher Naval Institutes, a position analogous to that of Vice Admirals Hayward and Turner at the Naval War College. He must be considered the outstanding Soviet authority on naval developments in the post-World War II period. He authored the two chapters covering these events in the West and in the Soviet bloc for the
* See D. W. Mitchell, "Attack! Attack! Attack!" July 1965 Proceedings, pp. 57-67.
textbook currently used to train Soviet naval officers, History of the Naval Art, published in 1969. In that book Stalbo showed that he shared the preoccupation of his American counterparts with the impact of technological change on naval doctrine, strategy, and tactics:
"The relatively short postwar period has been saturated with the most important events in the development of navies and the naval art of the leading maritime powers. Major achievements in science and technology have determined this development, making it possible to carry out radical changes in the material basis of war in general and of armed struggle at sea in particular.”
Rear Admiral Stalbo’s article on the "Zigzags of American 'Grand Strategy’” in the August 1971 issue of Morskoi Sbomik demonstrates his familiarity with the American literature on national strategy and naval doctrine. Despite the usual references to Leninist dogma about the nature of imperialism, capitalism, and American militarism as dangers to world peace, the article provides a rather sophisticated analysis of the interrelationship between technological change and the evolution of postwar American strategy. In Stalbo’s opinion, the various American doctrines—containment, massive retaliation, flexible response—represent attempts to escape from the dilemma that nuclear weapons systems pose to traditional military thinking. The development of a Soviet "nuclear shield” made suicidal an American attack upon the U.S.S.R. and the Socialist camp. According to Stalbo, the United States thus has been "deterred” from attack by the threat of Soviet nuclear counterattack.
To demonstrate that the Soviet Navy has had a major role in preventing nuclear war, Stalbo relies on the following statement by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy:
"The relationship of the latest advances of science and industry and the creation on the basis of these of fundamentally new means of armed struggle have permitted in a short time radical changes in the technological foundation and made possible the creation of an essentially new qualitative kind of armed force—our ocean fleet, in which submarines, aviation, surface ships, and other types of forces have been harmoniously developed.
"In cooperation with the Strategic Rocket Forces it [the ocean fleet] has become the most important instrument of the High Command, capable of having a decisive effect on the outcome of armed combat in vast theaters of military action.”
In view of the very minor and secondary role assigned to the Soviet Navy for most of the 50-odd years of its existence, the shift in Soviet defense policy implied in Admiral Gorshkov’s assertion of the partnership between the Navy and Soviet land-based ICBMS controlled by the Strategic Rocket Forces is fundamental.
Rear Admiral Stalbo does not elaborate upon the rationale for this transformation, but his comments about America’s "sharp turn toward including in the strategic nuclear forces the submarine nuclear missilefiring system 'Polaris’ and later 'Poseidon’ ” suggest that this American decision had a critical impact on Soviet defense policy. Stalbo curtly dismisses the polemics between the American armed services regarding the relative advantages of bombers, attack carriers, Polaris submarines, and land-based ICBMs as so much interservice rivalry among the "emissaries in uniform acting on the instructions of certain circles that direct this or that sector of the military-industrial complex.” True to Russian tradition, however, he puts the words of these "emissaries” to his own use in justifying expansion of the Soviet Navy.
Stalbo focuses on statements by American naval officers to illustrate the threat an American "ocean strategy” poses to the Soviet Union. American comments concerning a "reasonable minimum” of 10 t° 20 million dead in a nuclear war with the U.S.S.R- serve his purpose very well since the figure corresponds to Soviet casualties during World War II. From the perspective of an American strategist, megadeaths mav seem a rational intellectual exercise. From the Russian viewpoint, they serve to reinforce the image of Amen- can military adventurism. In a basic sense they facilitate the symbiosis that exists between the development o* Soviet naval power and the evolution of American naval doctrine, a central theme of this essay. For example, Stalbo attributes the following statement regarding expansion of the Polaris program to the former Chid of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke:
"I don’t think that I can give you an exact figurC You could start with the number of Russian citic5, the number of megatons necessary for the destmc_ tion of each city, the reliability and accurateness0 the missile, and then determine for yourself d* number of submarines. After that you double number you get to guarantee certainty.”
Obviously, the deployment of large numbers of Pcdjri5 submarines with the express mission of destroying I*lC urban population of the Soviet Union makes bod'1 countervalue and an ASW capacity vital to the secu'1-' of the U.S.S.R. Such a point could not very well es^f*
U. S. and U.S.S.R. Naval Strategy 43
the attention of Stalbo’s audience.
Discussions in the Naval Institute Proceedings of an "ocean strategy” also provide Stalbo with a device for justifying expansion of the Soviet Navy. He understands that the maneuverability and invulnerability of sea-borne nuclear weapons systems make it logical for the United States to give primacy to its naval forces. Tougher to destroy, such systems can launch attacks from all directions upon the U.S.S.R. and its allies. While ICBMs deployed in the continental United States can reach the U.S.S.R. only through a relatively narrow flight corridor and thus can be countered by a moderately effective ABM system, Stalbo worries that ballistic missiles deployed on or below the oceans make adequate defense almost impossible. Further, by moving strategic weapons systems to sea, American strategists reduce the number of targets of strategic worth within the continental United States. In addition, Stalbo cites discussions by American naval experts of the development of a seaborne ABM system as a potential threat to the viability of Soviet "deterrence:”
"These systems, deployed in sufficient quantity and possessing greater endurance than land-based [systems], could permit the U. S. to escape from the 'dead end’ created by the nuclear balance. They could put into the hands of the Pentagon that nuclear superiority that has persistently escaped it during the entire postwar period.”
Stalbo asserts that even an incremental transition to an "ocean strategy” by the United States demands a similar shift on the Soviet side. When the primary threat to Soviet security was land-based ICBMs the ingredients of the deterrence equation were easily determinable: the number of missiles, their range, the number of warheads or megatons carried. An American "ocean strategy” introduces certain imponderables into the Soviet calculation: the mobility, secrecy, potential area of deployment, endurance and invulnerability of the ocean-deployed strategic nuclear missiles. Stalbo condescendingly observes the disquieting effect that such an "ocean strategy” must have on the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and argues that this U. S. strategy necessitates an expanded strategic role for the Soviet Navy. Here are evident the pluralistic tendencies within the Soviet defense community and the Navy’s traditional use of foreign naval developments as lever- age for its own claims within the Russian military establishment.
Writing before the SALT I agreement, Stalbo presents the Soviet Navy’s views on strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. He is extremely skeptical about American goodwill, believing that while they
negotiate and make "statements concerning the limiting of strategic arms, American leaders have simultaneously worked out plans for a cardinal modernization of those arms and [planned] new means of war.” He warns that the American defense community is "fooling itself with illusions” if it thinks that it can strive for strategic superiority without a concomitant Soviet response. With some rhetorical exaggeration Stalbo admonishes his readers that the:
". . . mighty ocean navy of our Fatherland has forced the Americans to speak only about the return to a condition of superiority. Unquestionably the Soviet Navy, advancing on the basis of the latest achievements of science, technology, and industry, will maintain its strategic capacities in the quantity necessary for a reliable defense of our Fatherland and of the countries of Socialist cooperation.”
Certain broad conclusions can be reached from studying Rear Admiral Stalbo’s article, as well as others appearing in Morskoi Sbomik. For one thing, it is clear that the Soviets have no intention of challenging American naval power in all its forms and in all places. On the other hand, insofar as American naval power presents a strategic threat to the U.S.S.R., Soviet doctrine demands a countervailing force. Therefore, with the negotiations of SALT I completed, the Soviet naval establishment will push for and, in all probability, achieve modernization of its own strategic nuclear systems. It will also expand its ASW capacity to deal with the American nuclear missile submarine threat.
Regarding the composition of American naval power, Stalbo’s article makes it apparent that given the continuing revolution in weapons technology the Soviets do not find a "maritime option” based upon CVAs and amphibious assault forces viable. Such a naval force may protect American access to raw materials and markets. It may also permit U. S. intervention in local wars. But the Soviets feel confident they have the means with which to destroy any American surface fleet in the event of a Soviet-American conflict.
In one respect, Admiral Turner’s formulation of a "maritime option” represents a very misleading foundation for American strategy. Stalbo and other Soviet writers admit the existence of only two types of local wars: those which are part of an American effort to gain strategic positions for launching surprise attacks on the Soviet bloc, and those which are bound up with the "anti-imperialist” struggles of the Third World. Stalbo and his associates do not conceive of anything like Turner’s "unilateral involvement.” They have no intention of fighting a limited nuclear war with the
United States. Their response to destruction of Soviet naval units, whether submarine or surface, by American carrier strike forces would be to destroy what they regard as the inherent strategic potential of such carriers and the missile-firing American submarines operating in the same theater. In their view, rapid and total escalation would quickly ensue.
Thus, from the Soviet viewpoint, American carrier strike forces are a destabilizing element in the deterrence equation. To such American theorists as Vice Admiral Turner they represent the means by which to maintain command of the seas; to Soviet writers such as Rear Admiral Stalbo, the dual role of the carriers as launching platforms for conventional and nuclear strikes makes them a continuing strategic threat to the Soviet Union.
It is extremely hazardous to accept without close scrutiny Admiral Turner’s scenario of "unilateral war” in the crucial area of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turner argues that the Soviets conceivably could "expand an Arab-Israeli war to an attack on the U. S. Sixth Fleet.” He believes there still "would be limitations or inhibitions on how extensive a force the Soviets would commit.” Most unhappily, there is no evidence in Morskoi Sbomik to sustain the American admiral’s thesis of Soviet restraint.
On the world scene, the Eastern Mediterranean is already at flash point because of the grave risks involved in renewed fighting between the client states of both powers. It is also considered by the Soviets as an American launching point for strategic attacks upon the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union, the Donets basin, and the Black Sea littoral in general. When the United States armed Sixth Fleet CVAs with both conventional and nuclear weapons the Soviets responded by working out a series of coordinated countermeasures to the strategic threat that such ships and aircraft pose. These defensive measures include close electronic surveillance, in-depth air defense, and combined naval operations. The fighters and SAMs of the Soviet Air Defense Forces have primary responsibility for intercepting the attacking aircraft. Naval units—land-based naval aviation, nuclear rocket-firing submarines and surface ships—are assigned the task of destroying or crippling the American CVAs so that they can neither recover aircraft nor launch further strikes against the U.S.S.R. In the 1969 edition of History of the Naval Art, Stalbo labeled this a prime mission of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean.
A British observer, L. W. Martin, in The Sea tn Modem Strategy (The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967) cites the effectiveness of Soviet naval and air defense as well as certain operational limitations of carriers. He concludes that the CVA now has "only a declining residual stake in the strategic role.” Furthermore, the destruction of any nuclear delivery system, be it a U. S. CVA or Soviet Kresta-class cruiser, would greatly destabilize an already critical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. General nuclear war would very probably result. The conclusion must be that in this vital respect Vice Admiral Turner’s "maritime option’’ lacks credibility.
By contrast, as the summary of Rear Admiral K- A. Stalbo’s article demonstrates, Vice Admiral Hayward’s emphasis on submarines, especially those with nuclear power and ballistic missiles, is frighteningly credible to the Soviets. But Stalbo also shows very definitely that the Soviets intend to meet the challenge- Thus, if the U. S. Navy wins congressional authorization for full development and deployment of the Trident system, the Soviet Union undoubtedly will expand and enlarge its naval forces "in the quantity necessary’ to blunt the new menace. The American naval dilemma here is how to retain credibility without stimulating an ever-expanding and exorbitantly costly arms race The dilemma is made especially frustrating because both Vice Admirals Hayward and Turner have formulated their strategies in part out of realization that domestic political considerations preclude indefinite continuation of American defense expenditures at present levels.
A graduate of the University of California at Berkeley (A.B. 1958; MA 1964), Dr. Kenneth Hagan served on active duty as a naval air intclligencC officer from 1958 to 1963. He earned his Ph D. from Claremont Graduate School in 1970. The author of American Gunboat Diplomacy and th Navy, 1877-1889 (Greenwood Press, 1973), he wrote an article publish in America Spreads Her Sails (Naval Institute Press, 1973). While an Ass*1' ant Professor of History at Kansas State University, he served as Joint Review Editor of Military Affairs with Dr. Kipp. Dr. Hagan is n°* Assistant Professor of History at the U. S. Naval Academy.
Dr. Jacob Kipp is an Assistant Professor of Russian and East Europe'5 History at Kansas State University. He received his Ph.D. from PennsylvJ1"1 State University in 1970. His publications include, "Consequences of D^1 Modernizing the Russian Navy, 1856-1863," (Jabrbucher fur Gesd>d‘ Osteuropas, 1972) and a bibliographical article on the Russian navy in 19th century for Military Affairs (1972). Dr. Kipp has held a Fulbright-Hn1 Fellowship for study in Poland and a Fellowship for study in the S‘"'ct Union. He has been designated a Kosciusko Fellow for 1973-74.