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When the Going Gets Tough . -------- ----------------
By Captain Charles W. Koburger. Jr.. U. S. Coast Guard Reserve (Retired)
J'Ps simply planati0n.
Merchant ships become more vulnerable to terrorism with each passing ,ay. So, too, do fishing vessels, oil r'gs, and oceanographic research vesSels- But, of all the civilians who go ,° sea in ships, the merchant mariner ls among those best able to take care jn himself. It is about time he started °‘ng more to defend himself because e cannot and should not count on the ?'*itary sea services to fight his battles f°r him.
If the merchant ship crews aren’t atlgry enough to get up in arms, one °nders what it will take to get them ad. Three to four merchantmen (or least their entire cargoes) disappear Very month, worldwide. Masters are unned down in their own ships, in
h M°rs at anchor-
Merchantmen on innocent passage l e Se'zed and sunk or held hostage aH kinds of belligerents, some in ne name of recognized causes, some ■ SnmA ■■►’jps are blown up. Some disappear without ex- quent attacks by unidentified aircraft and mysterious submarines, and in any case, the ever-present danger of a missile attack and mines.
Along with this and just as likely are scattered attacks by terrorists, directed against merchant ships, on their lawful occasions to gain concessions for some cause or other, to protest an act, to dramatize a claim, or simply to acquire operating funds. The possibilities are many. Legitimate trade and research could come rapidly to a halt. At best, costs would soar; at worst, people would die.
Attack by surface ships and craft using guns, missiles, or boarders poses the most likely threat to merchant shipping. Surface vessels are the most ubiquitous; they run the gamut of technical complexity from decrepit native coasters to ultra-modern air-cushion vehicles to the full range of major naval vessels. Surface vessels can operate effectively in day or night, in almost any weather, and their base facilities already exist or can be established almost anywhere.
Attack from the air, on the other hand, is in many ways the easiest threat to carry out. Military aircraft are plentiful. Once the tasks of location and identification have been accomplished, the aircraft swoops down out of the sun. executes its pass, and disappears into the distant haze. Only the sophisticated aircraft with well- trained pilots, however, are able to operate effectively in conditions of poor visibility.
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shi *0West 'eveI threat to merchant j( PP'ng is piracy, or whatever title S°es by. Port congestion is endemic Cor°u8hout the developing world. Port for 85st'on means vessels have to wait ro Berths for long periods in the tye- 1’ pro,ected areas in terms of frci er ^ut n°t in regard to safety ber?? .Bnman threats. Unfortunately, vehlng pierside seldom improves subS? safety’ since police are scarce, of,Ject to bribery, and in any case, n underarmed for their task. iper,f overall basic naval threat to Hi b nt shipping resembles that °f th materialized at different stages and C Spanish Civil War (1936-39). In are. ar°Untl one or more troubled ThgS ^ere would be blockades. and ^ WouM Be illegal attempts at visit ioteSearch. As larger (outside) states
’here Cnet* on one s'c*e or ^ other, would be more and more fre
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Then there is the threat from underwater. The hapless mariner would probably never see a submarine. Recognizing that such a capability is beyond the reach of many, and cannot be improvised, only logistics and related technical requirements really place any restrictions on this kind of
We ought to be planning now to avoid being embarrassed or worse by third- party hostilities such as the 1967 Arab- Israeli War which trapped neutral merchantmen in the Suez Canal, right. Why in the risky world in which we live don't we arm our merchant ships with, for example, the Phalanx close- in weapon system seen below?
operation for those already possessing the basic tools.
Attack by scuba-equipped frogmen (or other swimmers)—in a harbor or at an oil-loading terminal—is another underwater threat. To train, equip, and infiltrate a small team of such men is relatively easy.
Limpet mines, the archetypal weapon of unconventional warfare, present a special threat. Limpets are relatively small and extremely simple, making them the perfect weapon for frogmen. They can be set to explode either at a set time after placement against a hull, or after the ship has traveled a certain distance. Just one or two limpets properly placed would be enough to create chaos in the shipping community.
The actions necessary to neutralize the kinds of threats outlined here will have to take place at many levels. The master will have to reexamine the internal workings of his ship and be sensitive to what goes on outside her in light of these threats. He will have to consider countermeasures in port (and roadstead) as well as on the high seas. The following is a catalog of possible relevant steps. The necessity to be alert runs through all the steps and applies every day.
First, as always, the safety of a ship, her crew, cargo, and passengers, if any. depends on the master. If trouble threatens, his first task is to find out exactly what is happening. At all stages, he should pay especially close attention to Notices to Mariners, keeping alert for applicable warnings. He should listen to his radio regularly. He should consult his local agents, always conscious that local politics may strongly color their advice. If there is a consul, the master should check with him. The master should call the company, too. but the final responsibility remains the master’s.
The merchantman's countereffort begins on the individual vessel in port. It includes such items as a bridge manned at all times, an alert gangway watch, and strong deck patrols. (These are just as important at anchor in a roadstead as tied up to a berth.) Walkie-talkies can be used to ensure communication as the patrols move about. Patrols can be equipped with night sticks if the threat warrants it. The ship should ordinarily be kept well lighted.
One elementary precaution the master should take under almost any set of circumstances is to seal off all points giving unauthorized access to his vessel. Especially, he should not allow gangways and ladders out over the side either unnecessarily or unattended. They are open invitations to unwanted visitors.
Fire hoses can be laid out and alarms tested—ready, among other things, to repel boarders. Officers can be armed. Fuel and water tanks should be kept topped off. The engine room should be prepared to provide steam on short notice. The mooring lines/anchor(ifout) can be kept ready for slipping. (Buoy the anchor if you think you might want it back.)
Local port authorities can contribute to the merchant ship's defense in many ways. Police can secure the landward side of the port, strictly limiting pier and quay access. As trouble mounts, police can institute strengthened security watches and conduct extensive harbor patrols. The hull can be scraped clean of limpets by passing a chain or cable under and along 11 frequently. Divers can check the hull- Random detonations in the water of small (half-pound) explosive charged serve to discourage frogmen hv threatening to break their backs. Radar and other shipboard electronic surveillance devices can be sited to improve the ship's monitoring effort- An effective riot-control and fire" fighting capability could also he handy.
Masters should make every effort to avoid being trapped in ports or uP rivers by third-party hostilities. The 70 or so neutral merchantmen tha were caught in the Shatt al ArabJaV the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran Wa (1980-81) illustrate the point. Th same thing happened in 1967 in * Suez Canal.
Survival for the unarmed and unes corted mariner under way rests Pn marily on the observance of the tra ditional seamanlike virtues: an ale watch, a good lookout (radar and vl* ual), and careful navigation. In Pra^ tice, this can mean keeping clear danger areas, suspicious headlan • and unknown vessels. It can me steering a mid-channel course 3 steaming at full speed in the vie'01, of harbors and other traffic cho ^ points. It can mean maintaining proper communications schedu • And it can mean obeying instructs ^ if any are received, to the letter- ^ specific submarine threat exists. >■ even mean zigzagging. Under so ^ circumstances, it might be usC uan make smoke. At night, it can m darkening the ship. ti,e
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Under way, if there exists eve? ,ep slightest hint of trouble. ^ strangers off the bridge and out 0 engine room. Such practice is m j mental to effective security. Loc ' u bar the entrances. Require the * ^ reliefs to identify themselves be letting them enter secure areas-
In high-intensity threat areas (war or near-war), merchant ship crews can sandbag their bridges (wheelhouses) and radio rooms. They can organize damage control and firefighting teams and drill them. They can organize first a'd and stretcher teams. They can check their lifeboats for stores, provisions, fuel, and fresh water. They can swing out the boats, lower them 'o deck level, and be ready to use mem. They can practice abandon ship drills. They can strictly regulate the Movement of passengers, if any.
What else can be done?
. First, it would be most desirable to Institute naval control of shipping NCS) just as soon as this would be- corne politically feasible. This would aJlow the Navy to locate and track shipping of interest, to determine the status of cargo at sea, and as necesSary. to route these ships, form con- v°ys, and provide escorts, j. Activating NCS would also provide °r the early institution of a number immediate preventive measures, Eluding the placing of naval armed 8Uards aboard where it was consid- th^ apProPr'ate. It would facilitate e location and alerting of standby Hicham crews, or the earmarking of e,r naval replacements/substitutes.
Steps to arm selected vessels could be taken. It may even be a prerequisite to adequate and secure communications, as the Mayaguez incident (1975) showed.
Second, it would be desirable to have an operational plan to arm merchant vessels. This author made a case for such action in the March 1981 Proceedings professional note entitled “What If They ‘Pearl Harbor’ Our Merchantmen?” The approaches to this option are many and include putting the Vulcan-Phalanx close-in defense system on merchant ships and pushing forward with the Arapaho concept which would provide merchant shipping with individual naval helicopter and V/STOL capabilities. This concept consists physically of prepackaged and modularized sets of containers (quarters, messing, fuel, munitions, maintenance, operations) which can be mounted in various combinations immediately on container ships and, with modifications, tankers. With Vulcan-Phalanx and Arapaho on board, the merchant ship would have a most credible offensive/ defensive antisubmarine and antisurface ship potential, even steaming alone, especially in low-threat areas.
It would also help if all masters carried a set of sealed orders in their safes, ready to be opened in case of emergency or upon receipt of a special signal, telling them just what to do. Whether or not this is the case, the existence of MARISAT (or INMARI- SAT) makes rapid and reliable communication with properly equipped ships anywhere a present reality. Telephone, telex, facsimile, and data transmission services are all available and can be used to pass instructions and/or gather information worldwide. But, if effective communications are to be established and maintained, radio discipline must be exercised.
As the world becomes increasingly unglued, the protection of those who pass on the seas on their lawful occasions has become an immediate problem. This is not a task that can be left entirely to navies. They will, of course, do what they can, but they have troubles of their own. The nonmilitary maritime community must be ready itself to do what it can to minimize its own losses, more so today than ever.
Captain Koburger, a frequent contributor to the Proceedings, has been an independent consultant on maritime affairs since retiring from the Coast Guard in 1978.
^°al Burning
By John Bunker
If
Co frecent maritime-focused energy nJ1 erences are any indication, coal as j|/e the fuel of the future for ships
Up_ ye Price of oil continues to go
n, 0Ver the long term—and as the cerl,lrne industry becomes more con- about the quality and availa- ^ of oil for ships, are esp'te *he current oil glut, there shonred'Ctions lhat fuel °il wiH be in
Co |UPr,ly in the l980s- abiv>a Is 'n ample supply, is reason-
equ Priced compared with oil, and of s, .y lmPortant from the viewpoint not IP °Wners and engineers, does <leve|e9U're exPensive technological Tbe °prTlent to use it aboard ship, at Se^ ate of the art for coal burning and fi IS’ 'I1 °tber words, technically conVenancially attractive, for either In ,rs'°ns or new construction, htarioe rCra* conferences dealing with ticjpaUe*’ the consensus of the par- hot be !S *?as hteen that the Navy will as interested in coal as will operators of merchant ships because the Navy's consumption of fuel, while it may be a large portion of the naval budget, is still a very small percentage of our refinery production; and because the Navy, through one means or another, will be able to obtain all the good quality oil it needs. But, if saving money on its fuel bill becomes of greater importance than it seems to be today, many Navy ships, especially those in the fleet supply train, could also convert to coal.
In a coal technology conference sponsored by Babcock and Wilcox and several other equipment makers, the issue was put into these words:
"The hard facts of life are that good quality oil may not be available for maritime use. We believe that progress in coal firing will result from building on what we know with hard work and good management. . . . Coal-fired steam plants are available now for whatever application [is needed] .... and the hardware and the systems are proven.”
These assurances are based on the fact that coal-fired ships, using mechanical stokers, comprised a substantial part of the U. S. Great Lakes fleet until recent years and that some coal-fired ships for that fleet were built as recently as the 1950s. Besides this, of course, automatic stokers are in general use in many types of shore- side power plants and factories.
In the past several years, considerable attention has been focused on the diesel engine as a fuel saver for the predominantly steam-powered U. S. ships. Sea-Land Service, the largest U. S. flag operator, has led the way in the switchover from steam to diesel to cut fuel costs, ordering 12 diesel ships from Japanese and Korean shipyards at a cost of close to $600 million. These 745-foot contain- erships are powered with Sulzer engines.
r<c
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