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In a world increasingly hungry for energy, attention must be focused on the Persian Gulf, a distant and little- known area of the globe that contains two-thirds of the earth’s proven oil reserves. There, in tiny nations and sheikdoms with names such as Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Bahrain, oil rivalries are growing as hot as the desert sands, and the matter is shaping up as the latest East-West confrontation.*
While Leonid Brezhnev, chief of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, prepares to head for Washington to praise the new East-West detente, Moscow is making a long-awaited grab for a beachhead on the Persian Gulf. Oil is the reason. Beneath the 97,000 square miles of the Gulf, and along its shores, comes a third of the earth’s total oil production, and the potential amount is staggering.
American oil companies earn some Jl.5 billion a year in the region, and some economists predict that by 1980 the United States may be importing as much as 5096 of its oil from the Mideast. Europe already gets 6096 of its oil from the Persian Gulf area, Japan 90%.
With such riches at stake, international rivalries are inevitable. Two large countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, dominate the Gulf, and both are pro- Western. In the smaller countries and islands of the Gulf, instability is evident.
*&e V. J. Croizat, "Stability in the Persian Gulf,” Proceedings, this issue, pp. 48-59.
But it is Iraq where the Soviet Union is making its biggest bid. The Iraqi government leans toward Moscow, and although the big Mideast nation has a relatively short Gulf shoreline, it is enough to give the Soviets a small port, a beachhead.
For years, Iraq and Iran have been skirmishing. The United States has responded by agreeing to sell a couple of billion dollars worth of sophisticated weapons to Iran over the next two years, and by sending Richard Helms, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, to Teheran as ambassador.
Iraq, on the other hand, has been under the Soviet thumb at least since 1970, and is rapidly acquiring the characteristics of a classic people’s democracy. For a year, the Soviet fleet has been using the small Iraqi port of Umm Kasr, although this is too tiny and isolated to serve as a major naval base.
A recent Iraqi army attack on the Kuwait border station at Samta, not far from Umm Kasr, is generally regarded as a test-thrust at Kuwait to see how Iran and the Western powers would react. Kuwait, though smaller than New Jersey, with a population of only 830,000, contains a fifth of the world’s known oil reserves. Some three-million barrels a day are shipped to Western Europe, the country’s biggest customer.
The Soviet Union already is exploiting one of the world’s greatest oil fields, the Rumeila district of Iraq. What Moscow needs now is a hunk of secure Persian Gulf coast, where a major port and refinery can be built, such as exists in Kuwait.
Besides Gulf sea lanes, the only alternative oil route for the Soviets would
be a pipeline through Iran, and that’s not in the cards. This, then, explains Iraqi thrusts at Kuwait, and, economically, at Lebanon. Iraq recently announced a boycott of agricultural products and consumer goods from Lebanon because that country refused to accept Iraqi orders to nationalize its oil-transit facilities.
The world-wide energy crisis is behind an agreement concluded on 1 January 1973 by the United States with Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi—one of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait. The "general agreement” coordinates production from these oil-rich countries, and serves to bar nationalization, such as Iraq carried through a year ago.
That agreement, a recent meeting in Vienna of oil-producing countries, and a coming meeting of oil nations in Beirut, all have served to step up the Soviet’s Persian Gulf timetable.
Soviets Building Naval Base In Iraq On The Persian Gulf
(Joseph Alsop in The Washington Post, 25 April 1973)
Because of the energy crisis—which is really a strategic crisis—the jugulars of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan now run through the Persian Gulf* So it is deathly important news that the Soviet Union is now thoughtfully building its own naval base at the head of the Persian Gulf, where all these oil-jugulars can be cut.
*See V. J. Croizat, "Stability in the Persian Gulf,” Proceedings, this issue, pp. 48-59.
The new Soviet naval base will be at Um Qasr, on the Iraqi shore of the Gulf. The story for publication is that the Soviets are generously helping Iraq to build an additional port. The actual fact is that the Soviets will have a fully operational naval base at Um Qasr in about one year.
Significantly, the construction at Um Qasr has already caused trouble at the head of the Persian Gulf, plus an obvious Soviet exercise in the old art of gunboat diplomacy. The trouble arose from an attempt by Iraq to infringe on the established border of the small but immensely rich neighboring oil- sheikdom of Kuwait.
While the row between Iraq and Kuwait was at its worst, between 3 and 11 April of this year, the Soviets sent the cruiser Sinyavin and lesser fighting ships to the head of the Persian Gulf,
to give "moral” support to Iraq. The trouble has now simmered down into negotiations. But Iraq continues to lay claim to two islands belonging to Kuwait. These little islands simultaneously mask the approaches to Um Qasr, and would also put Kuwait in pawn, if controlled by a hostile power.
Behind all this, there has been a long, expensive, and successful Soviet effort to buy up all the more important vipers in the viper-pit of Iraqi politics. The Soviet effort in Iraq has attracted far less attention than the much less adroit Soviet effort in Egypt. But the effort in Iraq is vastly more important, at least from the standpoint of Western interests and Soviet gains.
Nor is this the end of the story, by any means. Simply for want of feasible competition, the Soviets now enjoy effective naval predominance in the
Air Cushion Landing Gear—A Navy A-4 model is shown in a wind tunnel with an air cushion landing system. The concept of the Surface Effects Take-Off and Landing System (SETOLS) program consists of a cushion of air maintained in a housing or trunk beneath the aircraft fuselage. During take-off or landing, the "bubble" supports the weight of the aircraft and replaces the conventional landing gear. A SETOLS would give tactical aircraft increased operational flexibility, by allowing the plane to operate from water or unprepared terrain, without depending on aircraft carriers or airfields.
Indian Ocean, at the Persian Gulf’s other end. As yet, they have not begun to keep a large force in the crucial western basin of the Indian Ocean—through which all oil tankers from the Persian Gulf must pass. It is a costly thing to do, since the nearest naval base on Soviet territory is Vladivostok, halfway around the world.
Yet what the U. S. Navy calls ship- days (meaning number of days combat ships are at sea) were increased by the Soviets by a factor of eight in the Indian Ocean’s western basin between 1968 and 1972. The Soviets have further built another important naval base at Berbera in Somaliland, on the Red Sea; and they effectively control the Somali snake-pit, too. They also have fuel and water facilities in the Indian Ocean itself, on the island of Mauritius.
In contrast, the United States has nothing at all in the Indian Ocean beyond a communications set-up on the little island of Diego Garcia. After Diego Garcia, we have nothing else in range except another communications facility on the northern shore of Australia. This year, for the first time, the Soviets have also passed the U. S. in ship-days of their navy at sea all over the world.
If there is ever a crunch in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, in sum, the present outlook is that American naval power on the scene will necessarily be inferior to Soviet naval power. In such a crunch, our only base in the whole area would be the tiny, politically insecure facility we are now allowed to use on the island of Bahrain, in the Gulf itself. But this could never sustain a U. S. force comparable to the much larger naval power their new bases will allow the Soviets to deploy in the area if they sec a need for it.
It is easy to understand, then, why President Nixon chose the very able former CIA Director, Richard Helms, as his Ambassador to Iran. In Iran, Helms has two jobs. The first job is to assure the U. S. of an adequate supply of Iranian oil—and therefore non-Arab oil- in case of political difficulties with the Arab oil-producers. The second job is to give added toughness, direction and support to the Shah of Iran’s effort to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.
121
Notebook
Operations Cut By 50 Per Cent For All Atlantic Fleet Ships
(Orr Kelly in the Washington Star & News, 19 April 1973)
Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, has ordered a 50% cut in Fleet operations for the rest of the fiscal year to help make up for the cost of operations in Southeast Asia last year.
"I have budgeted steaming money for only 20 days in the final quarter of the year,” Cousins said.
The Atlantic Fleet has been the hardest hit by the severe demands imposed on the Navy by the surge in American air and sea activity that followed the Communist Easter offensive last year.
Two of the Fleet’s seven carriers and 38 other ships were rushed to the Pacific last year. The carriers have now returned, and Cousins said he expects all the ships back in the next six weeks. But he predicted it would take two years to get the Fleet back into the shape he would like to see it in. In the meantime, he said, there may be times when he will simply be unable to provide ships where and when they are needed,
The problems with the Atlantic Fleet were spotlighted by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, when he told Congress the Fleet was "experiencing widespread degradation of Fleet readiness.” While there are severe problems throughout the Navy, he said, they are most severe in the Atlantic Fleet.
The major exception to the problems afflicting the Navy is the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, to which Cousins supplies ships and men. His order to cut back on steaming days, for example, does not apply to the Sixth Fleet, because of its political importance as a symbol of the American commitment to the defense of Europe.
Thus, while the ships of the Atlantic Fleet, except for those on trial runs after shipyard work, will be cut to an average of about 20 days sailing in this quarter, the ships of the Sixth Fleet will put in a normal 37 to 40 days at sea.
The sharp drop in readiness of the Atlantic Fleet—the force that would have to keep open the sea routes to Europe and protect oil supplies coming to this country in the event of war—is
similar to the problems faced by the Army in 1970.
At the time of the Jordanian crisis involving fighting between troops and Palestinian guerrillas, the 82nd Airborne Division was alerted for possible use. But the division had enough properly trained men to field only one of its three brigades.
Cousins said the Atlantic Fleet had been hit by a shortage of key noncommissioned officers and a heavy maintenance backlog. "Our backlog of essential maintenance is $76 million,” Cousins said.
The problem is at least as bad in personnel, Cousins said. "Boilermakers and machinist mates are not re-enlisting,” he said. "The number of first and second class petty officers is far below allowances. The chiefs and the few ratings we have spend much of their time checking out new men so they can be trusted to stand watch alone at sea—or standing watch-on-watch-off themselves.”
The Navy’s recruiters are now bringing in the new men the Navy needs, Cousins said, but it will take time to train them. "What this means is that we are going to have to focus on fundamentals at the expense of task force and task group exercises,” he said.
Lessons Learned From Military On The Closing Of Many Bases
(The Wall Street Journal,
20 April 1973)
It can’t be emphasized enough that the greatest pressures that led to the Pentagon’s announced plan to close and consolidate military bases throughout the United States came from the military professionals themselves. The great resistance to these long-delayed economy moves has come from the civilian politicians—in the administration and on Capitol Hill—whose reasons have had absolutely nothing to do with national security.
The military brass, of course, has only been pointing out the obvious, that 479 principal installations are too many, especially after the substantial cutbacks in strength in recent years. The professionals have been eager to modernize and are well aware that the dollars they
have been throwing into obsolete or unneeded bases were coming out of their modernization plans. The Navy has been the most persistent of the Services in calling for consolidation and cutbacks, and of the 40 major installations to be drastically curtailed or closed outright, 29 belong to the Navy.
It was apparent to Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, when he left the Pentagon 18 months ago, that the military was carrying a burden of wastefulness imposed upon it by the politicians. He then estimated the government could save $1 billion annually by closing unneeded bases, a program of consolidation much more ambitious than the current one, estimated to save $3.5 billion over ten years. Defense Secretary Richardson, though, does more or less promise further "realignments” down the road.
But despite the clamor in Congress for defense cuts, and the eagerness of the military to jettison obsolescent bases, there is no political benefit to anyone in taking military payrolls out of local communities. We’re grateful the administration has acted, but it’s hard to cheer President Nixon for what he should have done years ago, before he had his re-election behind him. To keep this in perspective, though, we can’t forget that even as Senator George McGovern crusaded against the Pentagon budget during his presidential bid, he carefully assured his local audiences that their air base or Army post was
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lists that were already months long.
But with the draft dead and employment quickening, the steady flow of top-quality youths willing to spend four years at sea policing fisheries violations, at an air station assisting search and rescue operations—last year the Coast Guard saved an estimated 2,500 persons and property valued at $1.7 billion—or at an isolated navigation station, has dwindled.
Lieutenant Commander William R. Wilkens, chief of Coast Guard recruiting, conceded: "We were getting an awful lot of talent for very little money—a type of man that the Service got adjusted to. Now we’re getting the authorized types, and we’re calling them bums.”
Many Coast Guardsmen agree. A lieutenant (j.g.) on board a cutter growled, "I’ve got some losers. Compared to previous years, I’ve got some real losers.”
"They joined the Coast Guard to get out of going to Vietnam and then they get aboard here and bitch,” remarked a chief petty officer talking of the late- Vietnam generation of enlistees.
But despite the influx of "authorized types,” the Coast Guard remains selective. Prospective recruits without a high school education must score in the top half among all men taking the standard Armed Forces Qualification Test. Those holding diplomas can place no lower than the bottom 35%. (The Navy, which has recently tightened up, had been accepting men down to the 89th percentile.)
In terms of race as well as drugs—the two most volatile areas of military discontent—the standards seem to have paid off, although officials ascribe at least part of the Coast Guard’s success in curbing major racial confrontations to its failure in recruiting minorities. Only about 1,700, or less than 5% of the Service is black, officials point out, a figure that has tripled since 1968.
But despite enlistment standards that tend to weed out potential trouble makers—as well as the intimate size of most Coast Guard units—racial incidents have not been unknown. Last February, a little-publicized riot ("The Navy gets all the attention,” ruefully noted one sailor) erupted at the Coast Guard base in Boston. A confrontation
involving blacks and whites was reported in January on board the cutter Sherman, on ocean station in the North Atlantic.
Commander Robert T. Getman, of the Coast Guard’s civil rights office, discounted recent allegations—publicized in the Baltimore Afro-American —that a black petty officer on board a cutter in Curtis Bay had been framed on marijuana charges by prejudiced superiors. "We don’t have that kind of racism in the Coast Guard,” he said, "but we do have a lot of racial ignorance—things like calling a black 'boy.’ This is the cause of most of our problems.”
If the Coast Guard’s accomplishments rarely receive the attention officials believe they deserve, then neither—with a rare exception—do its "scandals.”
A recent announcement that one of two executive-type jets leased by the Coast Guard for a 6-month trial period was manufactured in Israel (the company, Israel Aircraft Industries, came in with the lowest bid) failed to attract a Congressional blast. "I was expecting the roof to fall in,” one official said.
"Our version of the Navy-Litton deal” was the way one recruiting officer described the failure of a direct-mail firm to live up to the terms of its $10,000 contract, a snarl that may cost the Coast Guard Academy as many as 2,000 applicants this year.
However, when a Lithuanian seaman was refused asylum on board a Coast Guard cutter 20 miles off New Bedford, Massachusetts, in November 1970, the resulting furor forced two Coast Guard officers to resign. Hostile mail still trickles into Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, according to a public information officer.
The asylum incident has been all but forgotten on board the cutter Decisive, the immaculate 211-foot patrol craft that plies the waters off New England six months of the year searching for violations of fisheries agreements or lost boatmen.
Despite creature comforts that 20 years ago would have seemed exotic— there is no rationing of fresh water at sea and the "head” is reminiscent of plumbing at a Holiday Inn—morale is not high.
Enlisted men complain of erratic scheduling and long weeks at sea, of the political influence they suspect is behind their orders to stand behind American lobster boats, and of officers who refuse to fight for the ship with Coast Guard brass.
"There’s not a man aboard who would refuse to go out and save a boat legitimately in trouble,” a petty officer third class said. "But to see these same lobster boats cry wolf. . . . This is a political vessel.”
The skipper of one Massachusetts lobster boat tells a different story. "Before the guard began regular patrols in 1971, everything was wide open. Things were right miserable. But now, at least we’ve got somebody we can call when one of these big trawlers tears up our pots.”
Chief petty officers on board the bobbing cutter—her instability is the butt of countless curses—say that the days of automatic obedience are over. But neither chiefs nor officers doubt the crew’s ability to perform in critical situations.
The brutality of the sea itself is one reason almost no men serving their first enlistments on board the Decisive say they plan to re-enlist. "When the waves get high, I get nauseated,” a petty officer third class said. "I couldn’t dig it.”
New Oil Separation System Tested On Coast Guard Ship
(U. S. Coast Guard News Release No. 23-73, 28 March 1973)
Coast Guard cutters will soon be able to pump their bilges and ballasted fuel tanks anywhere, even dockside without polluting the water, with the aid of new oil pollution abatement equipment now being ship-tested.
The problem is oil from machinery that leaks into the bilges, contaminating water that accumulates there.
Present pollution regulations prohibit this mixture from being pumped overboard closer than 50 miles from shore. When ships are moored for extended periods, the accumulating mixture endangers the ship’s machinery by flooding.
Another, more critical problem is the necessity to ballast (fill) empty fuel
Notebook 125
tanks with sea water to maintain the ship’s seaworthiness and collision survival capability. The discharge of this water would normally contain oil.
The system now being tested separates the oil from both bilge and ballast water. Oil is then returned to the ship’s fuel tank and burned as fuel, or pumped to a sludge tank for later disposal ashore. Clean water is then pumped overboard, under the watchful eye of a monitor device, without causing pollution. Called a "filter/coalescer separator,” Coast Guard engineers adapted it from "off-the-shelf” equipment made for oil field use. First lab-tested by the Coast Guard at the Army’s Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, it was installed in the Coast Guard cutter Alert in October 1972.
During four months of testing, some in very rough weather, the system exceeded performance expectations. One
known limitation is the presence of soap or detergents, which inhibit the coalescing action.
The present program, subject to budgetary limitations, provides for installation of the system on all major diesel propelled cutters within four years.
This is one of the steps the Coast Guard is taking to meet federal goals of eliminating oil pollution of all waters by the end of the decade.
Navy Pilots May Fly Aircraft With Instruments They "Feel”
(Office of Naval Research News Release 1-73, 14 February 1973)
The Navy is investigating the feasibility of conveying some flight information to aircraft pilots by having them feel it rather than see it. The concept is that tiny transducers would be attached
to the bodies of pilots, and they would produce coded vibrations or other stimulations that would tell him what his aircraft is doing.
The study is aimed at finding a way to reduce the dependence of the modern pilot on the maze of instruments that are part of a military aircraft cockpit.
In current aircraft, nearly all the information that must be constantly assimilated by a pilot, is displayed on instrument panels that he must scan visually. It has been recognized that scanning even the essential instruments is a fatiguing task. An additional complication is that the pilot must maintain some visual contact with the scene outside, requiring him to look away from the cockpit display. In shifting his attention back and forth, a pilot is apt to overlook vital information.
We can’t end the shortage of electronics men. We can
help you live with it.
Furthermore, there is an increasing realization of the need for the pilot in certain situations to maintain continu-
Someday somebody will figure out how to keep highly-trained electronics men in (he service—despite the lure of civilian opportunities. Meanwhile you have to live with a shortage of the specialists you need to handle growing maintenance Problems.
CREI can help you get more out of the men you have by increasing their tech- Pical competence. CREI Home Study Programs offer your men an opportunity to acquire technical knowledge beyond the scope of military courses. They cover every phase of modern electronics—from
radar and sonar to missile and spacecraft guidance — even the increasingly important field of nuclear instrumentation and control.
The man who enrolls in a CREI Program studies on his own time and pays his own tuition. What he learns can be applied on the job almost immediately.
Many officers not only encourage CREI students, but also recommend CREI study to particularly ambitious men. And they welcome the CREI Field Service Representative who visits their command.
If you’re not familiar with CREI Pro
grams, we’ll be glad to send you complete information as well as typical lesson material for your evaluation.
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ous attention to the scene outside, such as during a landing approach, in reconnaissance, or in combat. A substantial percentage of midair collisions have been blamed on the failure of pilots to maintain sufficient surveillance of the external scene.
The main objective of the present study is to determine whether it is possible to substitute bodily stimulation for some of the visual displays used for aircraft control. These devices, attached to the hand, back, chest, or other sensitive areas, could transmit information to the pilot by means of vibrations, tiny electrical currents, or similar stimulation. Through a "vocabulary” of different patterns, intensities, and rates of stimulation, the pilot would be given information about such flight parameters as roll, pitch, or angle of approach.
Changes in Ships’ Status
Compiled by Lieutenant Commander J. B. Finkelstein, U. S. Navy 1-30 April 1973
Sea Crisis Mounts In Britain; Captains And Mates Fail Exams
(Franklyn Wood in The London Times, 22 April 1973)
An acute shortage of (qualified deck officers is causing grave concern in British shipping companies. Fears are mounting that it will result in delayed sailings and mounting costs.
The immediate cause is a dramatic drop from 73% to 35% in the number of candidates passing the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) examination for first mates’ tickets—the essential certificates of competency. This follows the introduction of a new DTI syllabus over a year ago.
The slump in numbers gaining certificates is so serious that a joint working party of the Association of Nautical Colleges and the DTI has been set up to review it.
The fall comes at a time when the industry is already desperately short of qualified deck officers. Says one P & O executive: "Often it is panic stations to get the right officers with the right certificates to the right ship at the right time.”
Esso confirms the problem at first mate and master level. Because of the
shortage, when a man does qualify his promotion is rapid, says the company.
To help ease matters the passmark has been reduced from 70% to 60%. When the failure rate became apparent shipping companies even circulated "crib sheets” to sea-going officers.
The new syllabus extends training courses by two months in the case of mates and six weeks for master’s tickets. It includes for the first time at first mate’s level subjects such as ship construction stability, electricity, radio and electronics, physics, currents, and routes. Some shipping experts feel that too much emphasis was placed on these new subjects to the detriment of the old one like navigation.
A further complication is that the Merchant Navy Training Board introduced a new comprehensive training scheme from cadet to extra master’s ticket in September 1970. And there is an extended course in the pipeline which has been agreed by the DTI and the training board.
Because of this some training board members feel that the DTI has jumped the gun by introducing the new syllabus in 1972, especially in view of the problems it has brought in its wake.
Ships Commissioned: Date:
ast-21 Pigeon 4/28/73
Ships Temporarily Decommissioned for Conversion: Date:
DLG-8 MacDonough 4/9/73
Ships Stricken: Date:
SS-478 Cutlass 4/12/73
MSO-445 Force 4/25/73
U. S. Navy Shore Establishment—
Facilities Established:
1 Apr. 1973 Navy Race Relations School, Key West, Fla.
U. S. Navy Shore Establishment—
Facilities Modified:
1 Apr. 1973 Change Naval School, Compressed Gases, Class C-l, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va. to Naval School, Cryogenics Class C, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va.
14 Apr. 1973 Change Navy Management and Information Center (NMIC) to Navy Command Support Center (NCSC).
Pass - Down - The - Line
A book of biographies, entitled The Generals and the Admirals, is being written by Robert M. Ancell, Jr., of New Mexico. He notes that it has been a major job to collect sufficient material, and so would like to hear from anyone with material about any two, three, or four-star admirals or generals who served in any of the Services between 1941 and the present. Anecdotal type material is the most useful, but he will welcome any information dealing with these officers. He would also like to receive photographs. Forward all information to: Robert M. Ancell, Jr., 6436 Esther, N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87109.
Our Navy magazine, which discontinued publication in December after 75 years, will continue to make available pictures of U. S. Navy and Coast
Notes
Guard ships from their collection, the world’s largest private list, along with eight different ceremonial certificates covering all line crossings and other functions. For additional information, write Our Navy, One Hanson Place, Brooklyn, New York 11217.
The Final Tournament of the 197-4 World Cup in Soccer is scheduled in Frankfurt, Germany, from 13 June to 7 July 1974. A special charter flight will be arranged by the Naval Academy varsity soccer coach, if enough former Navy soccer players, their families, and parents are interested attending. For more information enthusiasts should write: Soccer Coach Glenn F. H- Warner, U. S. Naval Academy, Annapo- lis, Maryland 21402.
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