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Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Development—Vice Admiral Hayward’s article is an excellent exposition by a naval officer with unsurpassed qualifications to speak on the subject. I have always had a strong interest in this area, but I have generally expressed it in terms of an interaction of technology with tactics. Obviously, strategy may be viewed as strongly driven by tactics and clearly the impact of technology extends to strategy as well. In fact, Admiral Hayward’s lead-in summary paragraph frames the concept in terms of tactics—a U. S. destroyer’s "reaction” to the technological innovation of the Soviet missile-armed submarine.
I am not as pessimistic as some about the answer to his question in that paragraph. I have concerned myself with the problem, both at sea as a task group commander and in the execution of my research and development (R&D) responsibilities as Chief of Naval Development, and I believe there is a body of tactics which mitigate in favor of the destroyer.
These tactics are indeed different from the conventional destroyer tactics of the past, and demonstrate clearly the very impact that Admiral Hayward is discussing. My current concern is with a second interaction of this interplay—the impact of tactics on technology. The nexus of the development of technical weaponry for the future Navy is a sort
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of technological parallel to the Hegelian Dialectic. Using Admiral Hayward’s example, we might say that:
Thesis—appearance of the missilearmed submarine.
Antithesis— tactical reaction of the destroyer to defeat it.
Synthesis—appearance of new technology in the context of the new tactic.
Note that the new technology must be responsive to the new tactic. If it is not, it becomes a non sequitur, which may have the effect of elevating the level of concern in the technical community, and frequently effects the budgetary demands as well. I believe that, frequently, our technical community many times is not sensitive to tactical responses and consequently produces less-than-satisfactory results.
In a sense, I believe the historical problems of warfare are cultural-anthropological rather than technological. Admiral Hayward defines technology as society’s skill at inventing what it "needs.” I view the process as being more complex than that. It seems to me that invention is the product of the need of a particular type of mentality to "invent.” Many times, the invention becomes a solution looking for a problem; one might show cases where invention indeed becomes the mother of necessity. An example would be the invention of the railroad, and the government land-grant "response.” The land grants had the effect of creating a "necessity” for the railroads, by virtue of land sales by the railroads along their right- of-way. On the other hand, the survival of an invention depends largely on economic exploitation, and in this process
many, if not most, inventions disappcJ The survival process has a quantifiab dollar-and-cents basis.
Military invention, however, has c such hard basis, although one think that the factor of battles W could be so used. As a result, miliff
inventions or innovations seem to 1 largely adopted on a more sociology and (unfortunately) traditional ba$r The "Systems Analysis” of the Namara era largely failed to chan? this—running aground on the sW* of quantification. People (partial^ military people) are slow to change thf tools, as Admiral Mahan is quoted : the article, and so the wheels of ^ military-technological parallel of ^ Hegelian Dialectic grind exceeding slow.
Obviously, the speed with which d process operates can have substan11' consequences on the course of peaced1*1 military history—an important ingf^ ent in the cause or prevention of w Admiral Hayward cites the appafd speed of the Soviet process as compJ^ to our ponderous paper (study) methc> The so-called prototyping program * stituted by David Packard, while he
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Comment and Discussion
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Deputy Secretary of Defense, was an attack on this. As a participant in the Navy’s component of this program, I am completely convinced of its merit, but I have found that it, too, has problems with the Establishment, within which the McNamara "study” approach has now become the classical method.
It is obviously impossible to fathom completely the arcane processes by which military technology changes or grows, but the impact on strategy (and tactics) as developed by Admiral Hayward certainly demands an effort for granted insight. I believe that military technology is adversely influenced by: lack of tactical sensitivity by the technical community; lack of development of truly competing technologies in a given problem area; overemphasis on analysis, underemphasis on hardware "try-and- see;” and lack of empathy of the technical community with the simple solution.
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I believe that it is necessary to deal with nuclear strategic weapons on a somewhat modified basis. Here, technology apparently has exceeded the "critical mass” in complexity and has arrived at an era where the weapon is "total” and the impact on strategy is also "total.” Although the nuclear weapon has been used, a nuclear war in the modern sense has never happened (and may never happen). Hence, the derivation and application of strategies are peculiarly the products of "analysis.” Without a real-world stalking-horse, the analyst’s model cannot be "proven,” and in this vitally important area we are unusually dependent on a necessarily shaky analysis.
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Admiral Hayward cites the Chinese as saying that they can lose 200 million citizen^ and survive. While I can believe that the Chinese have said this, I cannot ascribe any meaning to the statement in the normal sense. It is simply beyond the scope of the human mind to know whether such a statement is true or false. Therefore, analysis of the sentence must concentrate on the motivations and beliefs of those who make the statement vice the statement itself. Here, we immediately enter the zone of national psychoanalysis and other murky areas, where one must accept, as the total supply of facts, thoughts that are in the minds of men. Thus our problem is predominantly politico-technological
and needs to be treated quite differently than the general-purpose deterrent.
Having arrived at this point in a rambling discussion of this exciting subject, perhaps I should summarize and hope that the foregoing thoughts will be interesting to enough readers to generate discussion. I view the technology impact on strategy as a more complicated syndrome than was outlined by Admiral Hayward, although I am sure that he simplified his own views in the interest of cogency. I also believe it is an iterative process and that it is important to develop an insight in this area, in the higher echelons of direction within the Pentagon.
such procedures. I will not, however, categorically state that no other such standard qualification program exists.
I should like to note here, parenthetically, that this article is perhaps mis- titled. "Conn” connotes shiphandling and, although this vital surface warfare functional area is discussed at great length, so too, in equal detail, are postgraduate education, specialization, et al. Perhaps a more appropriate title for this article would have been "The Surface Warfare Officer and Spin-Offs.”
Further in his introduction, in quoting Captain Bowling, Commander Larson states that it is imperative (emphasis mine) that we follow the concept of deliberate retouring of a given officer to the same force and to the same shipboard departmental area. Later, in discussing OOD qualification standards, the author refers to requalification when an officer transitions from shallow-draft to deep-draft ships or vice versa. If the young surface warfare officer, at least prior to his tour as an executive officer, is to be retoured in the same force, in the destroyer forces, at least, it is difficult to imagine an individual rotating from his first ship to later ships experiencing a significant difference in the draft of the platform he is called upon to conn. Perhaps some contradiction exists between these two sections of Commander Larson’s article.
In the section subtitled "Shiphandling,” again the point is made that the pattern for shiphandling qualification "lacks overall planned objectives and programmed means to assure the desired ends.” My earlier comment addresses this point insofar as ComCruDesPac is concerned. After the inception of this program in 1970, ComCruDesPac forwarded the appropriate implementing documents to other type commanders for possible use. This particular standard program unfortunately failed to gain acceptance by other commands to the best of my knowledge. It is submitted that each of our Fleet commanders task their respective type commanders to institute such a program within their commands, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare (OP-03), as one of his responsibilities, monitor the success or lack thereof of these planned means to assure the desired ends within the Navy.
In the "Shiphandling” section, Com- mander Larson suggests enforcement of shiphandling training. He indicates a "requirement for compliance with this concept be evaluated and scored competitively in the course of regular inspections of all ships’ training records and procedures.” To this suggestion, I emphatically cry "No!” We, in the operating forces, have sufficient major responsibilities taking our diminishing number of ships to sea and fulfilling our present world-wide commitments without another insignificant, needless administrative burden on which to expend valuable time and effort.
Type (administrative) commanders throughout the Navy are making a major effort to reduce the administrative burden on our ships. To add to it with a shiphandling records inspection is considered archaic and ridiculous.
As he discusses "OOD Qualification Standard,” Commander Larson points out that "every commanding officer (determines) his own criteria for quali
fication of OODs.” He later implies that a standard training program be established to decentuate this individuality.
Point of Fact—Joint ComcruDesPac/ ComcruDeslant Instruction 1210.3 (series), entitled Qualification for Command of Destroyers, is just such a program. Several important shiphandling evolutions must be successfully completed by the applicant, and observed by the Unit Command Qualification Board, generally the destroyer squadron commander. Why, may I ask, establish another exercise in paperwork?
Of equal importance, do not attempt in any manner to lessen the role that the commanding officer plays in this structure. He is the experienced seafarer who knows the person(s) with whom he can entrust the lives of sleeping shipmates and the safety of a multimillion- dollar ship at 0200 in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. The commanding officer is required to recommend to the Unit Command Qualification Board those persons he considers capable in all
respects to gain the recognition th< command qualification letter denote* None of this command prerogati'* should be taken from the commanding officers of U. S. Navy ships of the line- Commander Larson later recommend that a ribbon be created in recognition of successful completion of a stand’ ardized shiphandling qualification pm gram.
In October 1963, the following lette* was submitted to the Chief of Nav»l Personnel via the appropriate chain command:
SUBJ: Suggestion for Insignia; Adopt'11' of
The naval aviator and the submarine wear their respective insignia, the wing* and the dolphins, with considerable pridf These insignie represent the satisfacto^ completion of intensive aviation or suh marine training, and further serve ,0 promote a sense of fraternity among av» tors and submariners meeting each otW in the course of their careers.
To promote a similar sense of pride fraternity among surface line officers,11 is suggested that an insignia be autho1’ ized for those Code 1100 (surface) oflk^ who have qualified as Officer of the Dey underway, yet have not earned the pri'T lege to wear the Command at Sea ins# nia. The successful completion of O&d of the Deck training by a surface offict! means as much to him as the completk11 of flight training or submarine school'11! means to the aviator or the submarine The wearing of Officer of the Deck qu^1 fication insignia both on service dress a11 working uniforms would afford deser',£“ recognition to its wearer. It would rep^ sent visible evidence of a job well dot'*’ which is why our nation presents insig1"1 to its Armed Forces personnel.
A drawing of a sample insignia 1 presented in enclosure (1). The shield p representative of the naval service, ^ ship’s wheel is representative of com11’ of a ship’s movements, and the long gbs is the traditional symbol of the Offi^ of the Deck.
Unfortunately, this letter ne',f! reached the ultimate addressee, be>^ returned by an intermediate command with a polite but definite no in $ endorsement.
•f1 International Law for
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Recently, the Commander, Cruis£t Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic Fk£l' made a similar suggestion in an lir terview with a reporter from the Sd Times. This interview was published ■'
Comment and Discussion
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the 29 March 1972 edition of this newspaper. In this interview, Rear Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, U. S. Navy, stated:
One way to help accomplish (a boost in esprit de corps to help improve retention in the Navy’s surface warfare community) might be the adoption of a special surface warfare breast insignia such as that now worn by qualified aviators and submariners.
"The surface warfare community doesn’t have the feeling of belonging and dedication that the aviation and submarine communities have,” Rear Admiral Weschler said, "and I think adopting a good insignia, one that’s really imaginative, should be seriously considered.”
It is suggested that Commander Larson review the words of ComCruDeslant.
The author of "Some Conn, Some Can’t” reiterated several important points in the development of the surface warfare community. I say "reiterated,” because I fail to read anything which I have not previously read in the last several months. It is hoped, however, that this airing of several vital topics in today’s surface warface Navy will serve to expedite the command-level attention these issues rightfully deserve.
alongside, and the like), with the result that junior ship’s company officers have little opportunity to handle their own ships. There are far too many "sea detail OODs” who perform all close quarters maneuvers while other officers receive little experience in these areas. The Z-grams calling for increased junior officer shiphandling opportunities are often neglected when "the commodore is on the pier” or "the admiral may be watching.”
This shortage of shiphandling opportunities has resulted in a number of serious morale problems among junior officers, often manifesting themselves in the attitudes of many students of our shiphandling course. Such negative outlooks as "Why learn all this material? I’ll never put it to work,” are all too commonplace.
Possibly, the root of the problem is the officer evaluating system; as long as unit commanders continue to evaluate their commanding officers on their shiphandling abilities, COS will continue to
ensure their ship’s maneuver smartly something which may not always happen with an inexperienced man at the conn. Perhaps unit commanders could evaluate their COs abilities to develop new shiphandlers within their commands, rather than the shiphandling ability of the CO himself. This might serve to remove a bit of the pressure.
Mandatory standards of shiphandling are, indeed, required and perhaps this can be accomplished on the type commander level. The Commander, Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (ComPhiblant) has had a program of this nature underway for some time with a large degree of success. Our shiphandling course provides groundwork (and successful completion of the course is required prior to further considerations for qualification). Students are then allowed to obtain practical experience in shiphandling evolutions using a variety of ships and craft. Upon completion of the entire syllabus, trainees are much better prepared for actual
1973 Naval Institute
Centennial Calendar
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Lieutenant Frederick K. Smallwood, U. S. Navy, Course Supervisor, Rules of the Road & Principles of Shiphandling, Fleet Training Center, Norfolk—We are involved in this course of instruction and this is a meager attempt toward providing the requisite knowledge and skills associated with the highest form of the seaman’s art— shiphandling. A large percentage of our students are either officers with very little sea experience or enlisted personnel assigned OOD/JOOD duties under recent directives. A fundamental complaint of many has been that their chances for actual handling of their ships, other than in independent ship exercise (ISE) maneuvers, are all too often extremely slim. There are some commanding officers who realize the seriousness of this matter and afford their personnel ample opportunity to "take the conn,” but all too many neglect this area. In aviation ships, there are often senior officers in the air groups who require various "check-offs” in shiphandling (conning
A Century of the United States Navy
The 1973 United States Naval Institute Desk Calendar and engagement book covers one hundred years of the Navy and commemorates the United States Naval Institute centennial with a tapestry of photographs, many never before published, selected from both official and private archives. An outstanding gift, this collection of photographs will be retained in libraries and treasured long after the calendar year.
This convenient and functional weekly calendar includes holiday dates, Julian dates and a section for monthly planning.
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shiphandling. A similar procedure could be easily instituted elsewhere. FTC Norfolk is the only training facility wherein a five-day course encompassing Rules of the Road, Principles of Shiphandling, and Emergency Shiphandling is available; but if a need exists, the course could be established elsewhere. A Ship’s Characteristics Trainer is a valuable asset to the course, so one should be installed at the site selected if at all possible. Appropriate lesson plans, handouts, and references are available.
If the "zest” is to be restored in going to sea, junior personnel must certainly take an active part in ship control.
Commander Stewart A. Ring, U. S. Navy— In my view, a ribbon is not the appropriate means for recognition. To me, logical means to afford such recognition would be to build upon and use the same rules as those for the command at sea insignia:
A gold star, the same size as that contained in the command at sea insigne, would be authorized for OOD (Independent). The original meaning of the star on the sleeve or shoulder mark to indicate "unrestricted line, eligible for Command at Sea” would appear to serve as a precedent and an argument.
The same gold star superimposed on an anchor would be authorized for OOD (Fleet Task Force Operations). Its authorization would supersede that for OODI. Criteria for attaining OODF qualifications should be established Navy-wide and be clearly defined in order to preserve the distinction between OODF and OODI.
Authorization to wear the Command at Sea Insignia (which would, in its current form, be the OODF insigne with the addition of a commissioning pennant) would supersede the earlier insignia authorized.
These two insignia for providing recognition to OODs underway would be worn in the same manner as the Command at Sea Insignia, viz., on the right
breast, if currently serving as OOD in' ship, and on the left breast if the qual1' fication had earlier been attained, bu1 was not currently being exercised.
Such insignia would serve to reef# nize all who achieved the qualificatitf of OOD underway: the ensigns in vd! small ships under organizational pf^ sure to qualify; the small percentagec; aviators who so qualify; the unusu» supply and staff officers who make # special efforts to qualify; and, the exccp tional enlisted men who qualify perform in this capacity.
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Plunder and buried treasure, villainy, fortune, and skulduggery form the crimson background to this narrative of great and daring exploits.
Where golden treasure trains gathered, there were pirates; and Masefield's great work,
On the Spanish Main, tells the story of the buccaneers, some of whom, like Drake and Morgan, became national heroes, while others swung from the hangman’s gibbet.
The late Poet Laureate’s mastery of his sources is clear from the detailed chapters on the ships involved: their rigs and guns, the way they were crewed and fought, and life below decks—food, drink, rewards, and punishments.
The stark tales of piracy combine with maritime
history of the highest order, resulting
in a book to satisfy the most discriminating reader.
344 pages 22 illustrations
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As a related issue, I fully supp0' Commander Larson’s recommendatitf to differentiate between an insig1’1' which recognizes, literally, commandJ; sea and one which recognizes comma!11 of aviation units. The two positions an1 their responsibilities are different. 0a1 wonders if aviators who are serving, ^ have served, as commanding officers & ships would not wish to be in the fo^ front in recommending distinctive ttf ognition for command of a ship at &
Comment and Discussion 91
"Sea Courts” and the U. S. Navy
James Dawson, Marine Insurance Broker, Lloyd’s of London—All who have served at sea in Navy ships know what a "sea lawyer” is, usually to their cost, but "sea courts” are less well known. The article* in the Proceedings concerning the Andrea Doria and the Stockholm has brought the need for swifter court hearings—with naval probity in attendance—into sharp relief. This is not intended as a slur against U. S. or other maritime courts, but as a fundamental reappraisal of a process that seems to be creaking very slowly—backwards.
Sea Courts have been functioning in Germany since 1871, and have proved very effective in the quick discovery of such factors as drunkenness, mental illness, and uncertificated officers in responsible positions. These factors are frequently the cause of "accidents” and are attributed to "the human factor.” Before describing how this "instant justice” works, let us look at the situation as it stands. A pioneer psychologist, Wilhelm Stern, brought the problems of hearsay, rumor, and total, partial, or nil recall into the psychological laboratory, with some startling results.
In one experiment, he showed his subjects pictures, and after 45 seconds asked to have them described. This process was repeated later at various intervals of time. Further questioning revealed that over a period of merely weeks, errors increased dramatically. The author of Experience and Behaviour, in describing these revelations, of the frailty of human memory, adds that the word "see” may be taken to include being selectively blind or deaf or otherwise imperceptive to information because of contrary motivation. One would surmise that such motivation would have to be caused by a dramatic or derogatory "assault” and would be a progressive reversal of reality in the mind of the victim—or witness. This author heard a witness being questioned in detail, five months after the event, as to whether the gunsmoke smelled stronger in the kitchen or the living room.
C. Carrothers, "The Andrea Doria-Stockholm Disaster: Accidents Don’t Happen,” U. S. Nava! Institute Proceedings, August 1971, pp. 26-32.
Substitute a young watchkeeping officer on the bridge of a liner being asked months or years after the "accident,” how many ships were on the radar screen and on what bearings? Point taken? "Ego defense” is one of the most potent defense mechanisms we know of, and it will function more efficiently under the stress of courts of law than elsewhere. In Lloyd’s we speak of "radar-assisted collisions” with good reason, since collisions increased with the advent of radar.
The Toney Canyon Court of Inquiry in Genoa, described in the (British) Journal of the Institute of Navigation, brings the point out vividly, that a man can convince himself that an event he describes is accurate when the reverse is the case. This ship’s captain was asked "Did you have the best ship in the world?” On this question, and his answer, devolved the whole case of the shipowner’s involvement in liability. The questioner was patently far more astute than the exhausted captain, who had had no shore leave for 12 months. The affirmative answer he gave exonerated the owners from all blame. The real governing facts of the case then became irrelevant and obscured—that there had been a history of fuses blowing in the remote-control steering system, that the ship carried no charts or pilot of the area in which the ship stranded, and that the master and chief officer were deadly enemies, and so on.
The point I seek to make is that, given a weak-willed or weak-memoried witness and a strong-willed attorney, Goliath always beats David. How does this situation have any bearing on the U. S. Navy? To my mind, at three vital points.
The first point is made by John Carrothers in his Andrea Doria article. Had naval techniques of inquiry been used, the findings of the court would have differed radically. Naval practice in assessing causes of collisions was excluded by a technical knock-out, since the ships clinched in international waters and did not fly the U. S. flag. This leads to a still more vital point. A Navy-trained deck officer has an inquiring turn of mind. Buckminster Fuller proves this over and over. Why say "How are things up there?” to Apollo teams when, at the time, they are under the
questioner’s feet? This kind of approach is what is evidently lacking in the lines of inquiry used in maritime courts. Add to this that good seamanship in merchant ships has been relegated by computers and balance sheets to the status of obscure poetry, and you have your present chaos in congested sea lanes.
Add the last and most important point that the German Sea Courts are staffed by retired naval and merchant marine officers, and the purpose of my thesis will, I hope, be clearer. It reverses the dictum of a former naval person, Winston Churchill, who said "The usefulness of a naval invention ceases when it is enjoyed by everyone else.” He did not have good seamanship in mind when he said this.
Well-trained naval experts in court would lead to safer shipping. It is not uncommon for public inquiries in maritime collision, fire, and stranding cases to be heard literally years after the event. A complicated collision case, albeit with nautical assessors on the Bench, was heard 21 February 1972, when the events it was appraising occurred on 8 November 1969. Another judgment was given in November 1970, for a collision that occurred in June 1965. These are very typical on both sides of the Atlantic. The total absurdity of delay in the context of Wilhelm Stern’s experiments, fills one with wonder. You may add to this the language barrier. My favorite language story concerns the total loss on the rocks of a Danish ship in clear, calm weather on the Great Lakes. The Canadian pilot made a remark about the weather to the Danish captain. This was intercepted by the Filipino helmsman who took it for a right hand helm order and—crunch! I could quote many more such stories, but they illustrate a point beyond this thesis.
The German system, evolved over a period of a 100 years, is constituted around naval expertise. A civil justice sits with the state attorney, (in the particular case I have studied, a retired admiral) and four naval or merchant marine assessors, again on the retired list. Also present is the civil clerk of the court. The court was convened within hours of the collision between a trawler and a cargo ship. On the face, a jury would inevitably find for the small trawler—poor fisherman, with wife and
children—and against the big merchant ship. The facts, however, were alarmingly visible. The skipper and all of his crew were drunk, and were seen to be drunk. The helmsman had no license, nor had the skipper. The Sea Court saved a lot of reputations, time, and money, and the trawler master lost his ticket.
From the range of an 18th century cannon-shot to the warship-enforced 200-mile claims of some present day Latin American states, the definition and extent of “territorial seas” have led to controversy and conflict in international politics and law.
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1972. 300 pages. Bibliography. Index.
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It is difficult to assess the possibility of applying the Sea Court principle to the United States without some idea as to how they function, in theory as well as practice. In the Federal German Republic, as in other maritime countries, criminal law and the apportionment of blame are two separate functions of the courts. Sea Courts sit in Emden, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Liibeck, and Flensburg. They consist of a chairman, who is a lawyer, and four assistants, two of whom must have deepwater master’s tickets, and one of whom must have held command at sea for the past ten years. A civil servant acts as clerk to the court, and the public interest is taken
care of by a state solicitor, who is usually a senior naval officer, appointed for each sea court by the Ministry of Transport.
to make his pronouncement, givlll>i grounds for concluding that a gU® party is to be judged. The accused n5'' respond to this pronouncement, ^ does so customarily through his att0' ney. Finally, the chairman and his assi-1 ants retire to formulate their writt£l judgment; persons found guilty of ncr ligence, incompetence, or behavior t® induced the accident, who lose th£l' tickets, must receive a written cop)’1 the court’s judgment and be told fb; they have a right to appeal. The Co5' of Appeal sits in Hamburg or Brem£< haven, and again has a chairman, a f ' manent assistant, and five others, 11 much the same way as the Sea Cou(‘ themselves. The Oberseeamt (Court 1
Appeal) has the power of varying
The purpose of Sea Court inquiries is to probe the causes of maritime casualties with particular emphasis on faulty navigation and equipment, maneuvering, and compliance with local and international Rules of Navigation. It also probes into whether the status of certification of the persons ultimately judged is justified and if not, if this factor is responsible for the accident. It has power to withdraw licenses on grounds of physical, intellectual, or moral grounds. Again in Germany and elsewhere, the term "maritime casualty” is not rigidly defined by law, but as a rule, an inquiry is held whenever the public interest might be in jeopardy. They are mandatory following the abandonment or the sinking of a ship, if a vessel is posted "missing,” or if fatalities are involved. Sea Courts are customarily held in the case of ships damaged in collision or by stranding, or by fire and
when serious injury is involved.
All charts, log books, and other rdf tive documents must be produced o® ■ demand. Rights and obligations, ho*’ ever, are a two-way stretch and the fendant’s attorney has the right to amine the court’s papers, object II' prejudiced members, and within 14 dap of judgment, may submit writtt® grounds for appeal to the Marini5' Court of Appeal. The most importt5' feature is, of course, the main hearing and decision. During the course of C hearing, the chairman calls upon ^ nesses and experts, and warns them 0 the consequences of deliberately m5 leading evidence or perjury.
Following the brief summing up ^ the results of the preliminary inves’1 gation, the chairman will interrogate tb witnesses involved; these have pte<t ously been considered as to their 1(1 volvement, and if this is found to ^ "positive,” they have the right to att£5‘ throughout the hearing, other witness0 being excluded from the court un5 called for. The assistants and the sta° solicitor may also put questions 5I> discuss any statements they wish to.' order to safeguard his own interest each person involved in the accident given ample opportunity to interrogJ,‘ other witnesses involved, either "cjcV’' to eyeball” or through his legal assista5'
When all the evidence has bC heard, the state solicitor is called up0'
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other reason. An unsuccessful appellant must bear the cost of the appeal in the proportion that the Appeal Court requires, and these include travel expenses, cost of engaging experts, interpreters, and so on.
To conclude, it must be borne in mind that the fundamental function of Sea Courts is to pronounce on expertise, or lack of it, and to find the cause of accidents. Their judgments in collision cases, for example, are not binding and are the prerogative of the civil courts.
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This system is not, of course, totally comprehensive, but the majority of "accidents” occur in inshore or coastal areas where maximum congestion prevails. But the method of cross examining witnesses before they have time to connive in inventing "group ego defense” evidence, has a great deal to commend it. When the questions spring from trained naval deck officers’ minds, it surely emerges as superior to the existing method on all counts.
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An example of how the naval approach can be conclusive, was a collision between a destroyer and a merchantman in the Dover Straits just after World War II. The case was nearing its close in the Admiralty Court, when the defense attorney posed a question to the British coxswain of the destroyer. "Were you not surprised to receive the helm order 'hard-a-port’ out of the blue?” The coxswain, who had a Cockney accent, answered, "Ta tell ya the troof Guv’nor, ya could’ve triggered me froo me oilskins!” The judge looked stonily down from the bench over his bifocals and said, "What did witness say?” The defending attorney, without an instant’s hesitation replied "M’lud, witness implied he was taken aback.” This sort of samir faire is unhappily a rarity in the maritime courts.
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Considered by many to be the fines} of their type, the Tribal-class destroyers may have seen more action over a longer period of time and over a greater area of the globe than any other class destroyer. Serving the Royal Navy, the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy from 1938 to 1969, they took part in almost every Home Fleet and Mediterranean action, the D-Day operations, the East Indies, the South-West Pacific amphibious landings, the Battle for Leyte Gulf, the surrender of Japan and the Korean War.
On all the Tribals, from HMS Afridi to HMS Zulu, technical details are provided, together with lists of commanding officers, pennant numbers, and the ship's crest.
250 pages. Over 100 photographs.
List price: $13.50 Member’s price: $10.80
An American wit once said that "Guilt is ^he condition of one who is known to have committed an indiscretion, as distinguished from the state of him who has covered his tracks.” It takes time and forethought to cover one’s tracks, and especially So afloat. Further, "A jury is a number of persons appointed by a court to assist the attorneys in preventing law from degenerating into justice.” Now that we have our definitions right, how would such Sea Courts work in practice?
Comment and Discussion 93
As I see it, there should be such courts available at short notice- measured in hours not days—at all of the major seaports around the United States. The U. S. Coast Guard could be a ready-made connection link between the accident site and the port concerned, if they were a significant distance apart. This would have an added beneficial effect in breaking the huge log jams in the Federal and State Courts, which results in such interminable delays in the establishment of guilt in maritime litigation.
In regard to the use of retired naval officers, it could be said that they would not be up to date with modern merchant marine navigational techniques. But a stronger argument is that the sea does not change, and "once a sailor, always a sailor” is not a truism, but a good hard fact. What a lifetime on the bridge of a warship develops in a man is an ability to assess different navigational computations quickly, accurately, and intuitively. This also applies to as
Biography of a Destroyer Class
by Martin H. Brice
sessing similar abilities, or the lack of them, in other men. The need for swifter appraisals of the causes of accidents at sea is vital and urgent. Thankfully, the manning problem of Sea Courts in the United States would be minimal, as a natural spin off of a large, powerful Navy.
A typical example of what is behind this thesis came from a first-hand account by a trusted friend, of a proposition made to him on behalf of a "flag of convenience” ship owner, the master, and the mate of whose ship had been disclosed as uncertificated. My friend has a naval equivalent of a master’s certificate and was offered a large sum to sail dumb and blind across the Atlantic with no executive authority, in order to conform to the regulations. He naturally refused, but someone else will no doubt fulfill this dangerous contract, which was offered to him by no less a person than a lawyer. A merchant navy sage says "Ships are alright—it’s the men in ’em.” You can say that again!
THE
TRIBALS
(Please use order form in book list section)
"The ASW Officer: 'Jack of all
Trades, Master of None’ ”
(See R. R. Mackie, pp. 34-40, February; and
p. 93, December 1972 Proceedings)
Captain S. Dombroff, U. S. Navy— Dr. Mackie’s article is timely and his thesis is correct. Those people in our Navy who supervise the ASW operations afloat are inadequately trained. A good appreciation of this situation can be gained by observing how valuable the foreign exchange officers, particularly from England and Canada, are to our ASW schools and staffs. Dr. Mackie demonstrates that our truncated officer training for ASW is aimed at a two-year stint at sea rather than at a career in ASW. This limited objective, I believe, is sound regardless of the present inadequacies in attaining it. The place for educating the officer who desires to concentrate on ASW during his naval career is at the Postgraduate School in Monterey. A meaningful two-year Underseas Warfare curriculum can be formulated, which is primarily oriented toward oceanography, acoustics, and ordnance engineering. Some planning in this area has already begun.
While the article is addressed to training of officers in ASW, proper training of enlisted members of the ASW team is also critical. Formal training of enlisted sonar operators is non-existent after they complete their basic ASW schooling. A watch supervisor requires a much wider spectrum of knowledge than he acquired during his "A” school indoctrination. In this connection, a proposed supervisors course is under development, which could provide up to eight weeks of needed instruction at ASW schools or at Fleet Training Centers. Also, a pilot course is now being conducted, which provides selected chief petty officers with a year’s instruction in the advanced technology associated with ASW systems.
What Dr. Mackie did not make clear is that ASW operational training has two broad areas; intra-platform training and inter-unit training, both of which are essential and neither of which is currently being attended to properly. Not only must a plane, submarine, or destroyer have a finely honed team of specialists, but we must also achieve a team of types—these three platforms working closely together in various
combinations. First, both areas of team skills must be acquired, and, in addition, they must be constantly sharpened by at-sea operations. Let as much as a month go by without training, or let one key member of, say, a plane crew leave, and the efficiency curve goes down.
The governing factor in at-sea operations for the past 15 years has been the non-availability of appropriate submarines to work against. We must have sufficient submarines in our peacetime inventory to provide constantly available services for training and the development of tactics and, more essential, we must have sufficient submarines in our wartime allowance to permit the same training tasks simultaneously with the traditional offensive commitments of the submarine force.
"Patriotism: Where?”
(See M. F. Jordan, p. 92, September 1972
Proceedings)
Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy (Retired)— The letter will generate some comfort to the rapidly dwindling ranks of old Service fuds who were brought up as youngsters to believe that it is not improper to express openly one’s pride in his Service, devotion to his duty, and love of his country.
I am encouraged when a young officer asks publicly how freedom can be defended for those who neither recognize their enemies nor even desire a defense for that freedom. 1 am comforted when a young officer surveys a deplorable situation, backs up his concern with frightening examples, and courageously points an accusing finger at "new” politicians who argue "relevance” and "meaningfulness,” but ignore the sobering lessons of history.
The fact that the letter was authored by a comparatively junior officer gives me added comfort. I hope it reflects generally the sentiments among his peers. It would be especially encouraging to know that his is not an isolated concern for the preservation of the principles upon which the greatness of our nation was structured.
Lieutenant Jordan’s letter deserves wider circulation and much closer attention than it will receive from its publi
cation on page 92 of the U. S. Nav* Institute Proceedings. Therefore, I inten- to take a step in that direction, and would suggest that others do likewis* I congratulate Lieutenant Jordan o' a comment that is eloquent in its coR cern for our nation. Indeed, his titk- "Patriotism: Where?” poses a cogC question. I do not know Lieutenaf- Jordan, but I wish I did. I am sure tV I would like the cut of his jib.
Comment and Discussion 95
Personnel Stability—Please
Commander Richard L. Madouse, Executive Officer, USS Horne (DLG-30)—This is a plea from a seagoing sailor for personnel stability, at least an acceptable minimum of personnel stability for our operating forces. Regardless of what might be termed, but perhaps not correctly termed, our best efforts, we remain our own worst enemies in the personnel world. The time is now to cast aside the daily negative trivia that consumes us in our shipboard transient barracks and get on with more substantive and productive issues.
When 380 men come and go across the quarterdeck of a 400-man ship in a 15-month period, something is wrong.
When the commanding officer, operations officer, weapons officer, and engineer officer of a DLG-26-class frigate are all relieved during the course of a deployment to the Gulf of Tonkin, something is not right.
When a promising, well-qualified 1,200-psi boiler technician suddenly finds himself in receipt of a set of orders to fill an "urgent” need on a 600-psi ship, something is not right.
When one of our fine combatant ships completes a Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspection with one crew and then, 11 months later, is scrutinized during a Nuclear Weapons Proficiency Inspection with a brand new set of faces, the relationship between acceptance and increased proficiency begins to lose its meaning.
When the orderly prosecution of that much-desired one-in-six rotation is sidetracked by a steady stream of new unqualified people, something is not right.
When five promising firemen (only one of whom was on board for at least a year) are suddenly picked off without any regard for their 1,200-psi qualification progress, something is not right.
When those sets of surprise message orders show up in the Exec’s daily message traffic, something very definitely is not right.
We stress combat readiness, or at least we profess to be in favor of combat readiness, and yet we pursue personnel distribution policies that do not contribute in the slightest way to this desired state. A ship that is truly combat- ready has successfully implemented,
applied daily emphasis to, and carried out a meaningful training program, but we are not giving ourselves a chance to do this. Presently, we are not operating on a team concept. When a sailor goes to sea, he should expect, and fully understand, that he is entering a team atmosphere—an atmosphere of dedicated, on-target training, individual and team, where sustained combat readiness really takes on meaning. The hard fact is that a training program, for those who really have one, simply cannot function with our present turnover rate. Only by the wildest stretch of the imagination can our seagoing forces be viewed as combat ready with out personnel merry-go-round. It is distressing enough that so many of our ships are undermanned, but when the faces of those few numbers who are available are randomly changing at any point in the operating cycle, the problem approaches the ridiculous.
If we are making a determined move toward a smaller, high-quality Navy, then we must stabilize our crews. If money is so tight, and who can deny that it is not, then let us stop shifting people. That sudden, unexpected set of transfer orders is still the most formidable morale-destroyer we have been able to devise. It is the one disturbing event in a sailor’s life that defies a reasonable explanation. In our new people-centered Navy, 60 days advance notice on all moves is the standard. That fine goal is still being treated as a lot of hogwash in some circles. Centralized detailing from the seat of government is now a way of life, but not much has changed. Although the personal, "urgent need” phone calls by enlisted personnel distribution offices (EPDO) and individual commands are on the decline, "transfer- within-three-days” orders still are common.
If you have been directly involved in the personnel business during the two months prior to deployment on a major combatant, then you have an appreciation for the countdown nightmare this can be. Mix a liberal amount of fresh inputs designed to "beef up” the crew, with the usual amount of problem types who just cannot deploy at that particular time, and your "Excedrin” headache runs with the best. The chances are good that from that draft of people
hastily assembled to permit a fine ship of the line to perform her mission, one will shortly identify far too many who should never have been hastily assembled for anything. The entire exercise is guaranteed to make you disappear over the horizon with a sigh of relief.
As a proposal, let us establish a starting point and resolve not to move people during a certain phase of a ship’s operating cycle, and hold to it. And if a unit is deployed, no one should be moved on or off. The author is proposing that the hands-off period run from the midpoint of regular overhaul to the completion of the first deployment following regular overhaul. For each succeeding deployment prior to the next overhaul, a point in time approximately four months prior to the deployment should be blessed as a suitable starting point for the training work-up with a stabilized crew, and it should be "hands off” until that succeeding deployment has been completed.
It would be nice to man our forces in the same manner some other navies have done in the past—from regular overhaul to regular overhaul—but that would appear to be a giant step for the U. S. Navy, and perhaps unattainable for the present. As the Fleet inventory decreases, however, I am reluctant to say that we could not shoot for it. Perhaps the first thing we would have to do is formally fix the cycle and stop slipping overhauls.
The only losses, aside from unforeseen extreme hardships, with which we should concern ourselves, are those involving a man’s normal termination of obligated service. And indeed, we should be authorized to extend the expiration of obligated service (EAOS) by three months when deployed. When you are preparing a key personnel relief schedule, a man’s EAOS is a very workable input—the shockers in the message traffic are not.
It is incomprehensible that our personnel leadership should continue to fall back on the "can do” attitude of the operating forces, to support totally unacceptable personnel moves that simply do not make sense. "Can do” does not belong in this situation, because we have enough problems.
Until we take a serious approach to personnel stability—and at the moment.
I can detect no such trend in a serious direction—in no way can we say that our operating forces are truly combat ready, and in no way can the conscientious ship driver pursue an effective and meaningful training program. It just is not so, and that is basic.
"The Sea Control Ship”
(See D. V. Cox, pp. 113-115, April 1972
Proceedings)
Captain William J. Rube, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Cox states that this simple, 15,000-ton helo-ship (with a few Harriers) ",.. is quite unlike anything before—an exciting concept of the future aimed at ensuring control of the seas.”
Agreed! But a concept using helos and Harriers out of the Navy’s present inventory only begins to show the great promise of this new ship system.
Captain Stephen T. De La Mater, U. S. Navy, in his May 1972 Naval Review essay, recommends a 40,000-ton Sea Control Ship to do the job, but implies that a 20,000-ton ship, a DH—".. .more capable than any other escort-type, non-aviation, surface ship . . .’’—with 16 to 20 helos and a few Harrier-type aircraft might work for limited operations against a moderate air, surface, and subsurface threat.
Such 15-to-20,000-ton V/STOL aircraft platforms are considerably larger than the helicopter-destroyer concept described by Rear Admiral Thomas Davies, U. S. Navy, in an article in the May 1969 Naval War College Review. Here, it was believed that a 6,000-ton, low-cost, six-to-eight-helo destroyer, with all of her sensor and weapons capability airborne, would extend sea control well beyond the limited horizons of the traditional warship (with her shipborne systems), and provide far more control of the sea lines of communications.
None of these three concepts, however, seem to show much capability for coming to grips with the long-range, anti-ship missile threat.
These leading conceptual thinkers also seem to vary as to why this ship should exist. Admiral Cox sees the Sea Control Ship as a convoy escort to complement "the escorts (DEs, DDGs, PFs)—other sea control assets which
V
might be available.” She would provide the additional air capability necessary to create a moving sanctuary around high- value ships, or to sanitize any desired area. As described, this ship seems to function like the escort carrier of World War II, either for perimeter defense of a convoy or, with her escorting destroyers, sweeping the oceans out ahead of the convoy. Captain De La Mater’s Sea Control Ship, for limited operations, offers in her own right a marginal measure of sea control (for ensuring safe passage of high-value resupply shipping) in those vast ocean areas of low air- threat, where our limited carrier forces would be spread too thin to do the job. Admiral Davies’ ship offers an added continuous over-the-horizon sea control capability to the present destroyer. (But she is too scanty in aircraft to provide more than one unit continuously airborne at all times—not enough, it would seem, either to provide effective sea control of a limited area of the oceans, or to provide adequate protection for the ship.)
Against these diverse views as to the character and use of this new type of ship, there appear to be certain considerations which seem to generate a need for a sea control ship system of even different character and primary role.
A major consideration affecting the Sea Control Ship is the long-range, anti-ship missile. Mahan has noted that a change in weapons—and the new anti-ship missile represents just that— creates a need for changed tactics. To a lesser extent, the long-range, terminal-homing torpedo also forces a certain modification in tactics, particularly in the escorting of high-value ships. But, by comparison, the missile’s impact on tactics for protecting shipping (or keeping the sea lines of communications open) is so profound as to call for a whole new concept of tactics—which should drive the character of this new type of escort/Sea Control Ship.
What is indicated by the threat posed by enemy long-range, anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, are tactics which will tend to minimize the effectiveness of long-range, stand-off delivery of such weapons.
The tactic of convoying becomes suspect in the environment of this weapon.
Using convoys, with protecting war acri
ships—to force their passage across the (
oceans by actively making a sanctuai) of a large volume of the ocean around tier
their path—seems to provide a favorable ate
tactical situation for the long-range mb' dot
sile firers. Identification by the eneffl)' ^oi
at extremely long range is easily Ion
achieved by ready recognition of consid suc
erable numbers of massed targets along enQ
with the identifiable noise of the wan situ
ships’ electromagnetic and sound sen- exp
sors blasting away. The very tactical hig
concept of convoying to force eneffl) ^ati
units into the close proximity of the Sea?
convoy’s strong defensive forces is sub Wo\
verted by the nature of the ne" *ha]
weapon—the anti-ship missile. The Yet
stronger the convoy’s defenses, through bit
protective activity, the more practical >' is for attacking units to increase theh a ], separation from the convoy’s strong a
defenses (while being able to ensure an UC|
economic return for their limited, e*- pensive, long-range weapons against tan bet
gets which are certain to be of high ^t-t
value.) And it would appear, from thc tn0
reservations expressed concerning Sc* shi|
Control Ship capability, that this praett obt
cal separation is already in excess of th£ S«lj
50-mile ASW limit cited. sai]
There is no question that the bruffl Safe force tactics of actively sanitizing a vd ume of the ocean around critical ship W
ping—as with convoys carrying maj<>! °t>t
troop reinforcements—may be a ^ °f«
quirement in sea war. But the gte3* vaf
numbers of protective units required pe! e*a
critical convoy mean that only a trickk of resupply shipping could be protect^ typ in this fashion, on a monthly basis.
When one considers, however, th-,: 'hit
today there are over 17,000 Free Wor^ fan ships supplying overseas resources & (
national economies which have expt‘fl' ^Ot enced a vast expansion since World tact
II, it becomes evident that far greafd stra
numbers of ships now must transit thc btc
oceans in wartime than were requir‘d sbij
in World Wars I or II. The sinking s°p 800 ships—over two million gt°9 5
tons—in a three-month period in tb£ spring of 1917, created a critical situ3' tion for the allies. Today, such loss^ bor would have little effect. Similarly, tod3) s°h there just aren’t enough Free . Wod“ Se*) warships to protect (in traditional fa^’ ion) the total numbers of Free WonJ ships which, of necessity, will be movifg I'sti
Comment and Discussion 97
across the oceans around the world.[3]
Quite obviously, most of the Free World shipping would not be of sufficiently high value to the war’s immediate outcome to require massive protection. At the same time, such shipping would be doubtful targets for expensive long-range missiles—which must be in such limited numbers that there are not enough to create a critical economic situation for any particular country if expended on unidentified, random, high-seas targets. And, the indiscriminate sinking of any ship on the high seas, without positive identification, would rapidly cause the missile-firers to make enemies of all maritime nations. Yet, a global maritime war without friendly neutrals and only a few allies becomes almost impossible to wage on a long-term basis.
What, then, might be concluded, tactically, from these considerations? For one thing, high-value shipping might better be moved across the oceans in a better manner, making such shipping most difficult to recognize from other ships on the oceans. This means unobtrusive transit in small numbers. Self-identifying, overt actions—such as: sailing in formation, emanating classifiable noise, zigzagging, using uncharacteristic speed—should be minimized. Undoubtedly, more protection than that obtained by just running with the herd of ocean shipping is required for high- value shipping (as giant tankers, for example, would be regarded in today’s wartime economy). This is where a new type of ship is indicated for a new role, with new tactics designed particularly to minimize the effectiveness of the long- range anti-ship missile.
Captain De La Mater’s 40,000-ton Sea Control Ship concept could serve this tactical situation well, but cost constraints and the numbers required dictate that pnly a far-smaller, lower-cost ship, with aircraft of considerably less sophistication may evolve.
Within this real world environment—of strategic nuclear weapons (and the constraint they place on national objectives which might be reasonably resolved by conventional war at sea), of long-range enemy homing
weapons, of greatly-expanded industrialization and shipping of maritime nations, of severe cost constraints in acquiring new weapons systems, and of disappearing bipolarity between the Free World and the Communist bloc—sea control (to keep sea lines of communications open) has to be effected, it would seem, in a fashion other than by means of convoy tactics or those used by a large aircraft carrier with high- performance aircraft.
The sort of discrete tactics which seem called for, include the moving of high-value ships in groups of no more than two or three ships, in random formation with minimum identifying emanations, and with protection provided passively by a ship with good air capability—a Sea Control Ship. With such a group moving quietly across the oceans—using passive airborne and shipborne sensors, minimizing communications—the enemy long-range missile firers are forced to close this "convoy of the 1970s” and commit overt acts to ensure classification of targets for economic use of their weapons. Quiet/ passive tactics rather than noisy/active ones seem to meet Mahan’s dictum for this new weapon—at least until the enemy units are in close proximity to the escorted shipping.
The advent of the Harrier V/STOL aircraft into the U. S. Navy inventory expanded Admiral Davies’ concept, from an air-capable, helo-destroyer to a larger, more multipurpose sort of ship which could exert a measure of sea control over a limited area of the oceans. But the concept should not stop there.
The new short-take-off, vertical-land (STO/VL) aircraft, of which the Harrier represents one end of the spectrum (and the helo the other), seem to be the raison d’etre for the Sea Control Ship. With a short take-off of no more than 200 feet, and favorably using the generated wind over the deck, a STO/VL aircraft of weight comparable to that of the proposed helos, but considerably faster, can lift into the air enough additional fuel to more than double the range of sea control ASW operations while providing the endurance necessary for continuous coverage with only a small number of embarked aircraft. Similarly, with its short take-off, it can lift into the air more payload in AEW
equipment, fly higher, and have more airborne endurance than a comparative helo with its vertical take-off. By being able to land vertically, it can fit well into the relatively complex flight-deck operations of a small ship, which may also involve rapid-response attack operations (by an aircraft like the Harrier) and helo operations (dictated by missions requiring extended periods of hovering).* The Sea Control Ship is "an exciting concept of the future,” if allowed to evolve with the development of STO/VL aircraft to complement the helos. The STO/VLs long-range characteristics can keep pace with growing separations of missile firing units from their high-value targets, and high- performance STO/VLs with characteristic rapid response can put in jeopardy enemy units attacking with torpedoes or other short-range weapons. The ship can be relatively small and simple, and her aircraft functionally simplified and tailored for specific tactics with this sort of complementing team of aircraft on board—meeting the necessary cost constraints for new escort-type ships.
"Ship Classification—
Time for Overhaul”
(See W. D. O’Neil, III, pp. 115-118, April; and pp. 95-94, September; and pp. 93-94, November 1972 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar, Compiler and Editor, United States Section, Jane’s Fighting Ships— Lieutenant Commander O’Neil has aptly diagnosed the problem of U. S. Navy ship designations; the system is now sick. However, his cure for the sickness would kill the patient.
The basic U. S. ship designation system, officially established in 1922, is good. Virtually the whole world knows that a CV is an aircraft carrier and an LST is a landing ship. Even the British use LPH for amphibious assault ships and commando ships (see the United Kingdom section of Jane’s and publications of the Institute for Strategic Studies). Now, Commander O’Neil would have us call carriers AH and A, tank landing ships would be MB, and the LPH becomes
* See G. G. O’Rourke, "The Wondrous World of Jet V/STOL,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1972, pp. 33-41.
LV. Why destroy a system known and used by historians, today’s Navymen, analysts, and even some journalists? Why not just bring some order to the existing system?
We started getting "cute” in 1955, when we changed the designation DL from destroyer leader (or larger destroyer?) to frigate. In virtually every other navy, the term frigate meant a small destroyer type ship, like our destroyer escort or DE. Indeed, during World War II, the U. S. Navy operated 102 DE-type ships designated as frigates (PF 1 to 102).
More "impurities” have crept into the system. In the Professional Note immediately preceding Commander O’Neil’s piece, we have Rear Admiral Cox writing about the "sea control ship” or SCS. How can a ship of 15,000 tons, carrying about 15 helicopters and three Harrier-type aircraft, with no sonar, minimal defensive weapons, no ASW armament, and minimal radar and electronic warfare equipment, be a sea
control ship? Such terminology tends to mislead Americans and make foreigners chuckle. Is the SCS a destroyer-type ship—it started with the designation DH? Unlikely, since destroyers generally are versatile, multi-purpose ships. Is the SCS a "carrier”-type ship? Probably, because her sole purpose appears to be carrying and operating aircraft. Thus, let us get her into the carrier family. In World War II, the escort carriers were slower and less capable than the larger flattops; so is the SCS. Thus, let us be somewhat objective and call a CVE a CVE—or at least something that will give intelligent people some idea of what we are talking about.
Next, the U. S. Navy has 30 "frigates” in commission and is building a few more. These are 5,800- to 10,000-ton ships. They are no resemblance to what the rest of the world calls a frigate nor to the U. S. frigates of World War II. Now, to further complicate the situation, the Navy is planning a class of 50 ships displacing 3,500 tons, which are
being referred to as frigates (PF). Ho5 confusing!
To most people, a warship over 5,0$ tons is a cruiser. But size tends to be come meaningless as the Soviets provide more capability for most roles in 1 6,000-odd-ton Kynda or Kresta than will have in the 7,000-ton Spruance-d® destroyers. Why not pick a convenid1' and measurable capability as a dividing point; for example, ships with an ant1' aircraft missile having a range in exco' of ten miles (Terrier, Talos, Goa, Gob let) will be "cruisers” (C-designatiof and ships with lesser missiles (TarWf will be "destroyers” (D-designation) Under such a system the 8,850-tof- nuclear-propelled, missile-armed frigaK USS Bainbridge (DI.GN-25) would beco("( a cruiser (CLGN or CGN). All Tartar-armed destroyers would stay DDGs. There already is some precedent for such a move: When two all-gul1 Mitscher-chss frigates (DL) were arrn^ with Tartar missiles, they were redes# nated DDG.
Under such a system, we should drop the term "frigate” or apply it only ((l DE-type ships—as does the rest of tbf world. Of course, it also would be log1' cal for us to call the 3,400-ton,'420-fo°l frigates now planned "ocean escort5 (DE)—like the other ships of that sk( and approximate capability in the U - Navy. Also abandoned would be tb( previously discussed SCS as well as d>( SES (for surface effects ship). If the SP were to be primarily an ASW ship, '' would be designated DE-something °l possibly P-something. Being a "skit”' mer” should not be reflected in missi^ designations; for example, catamar-lfi submarine rescue ships are still ASR are single-hull rescue ships. If cons^ ered significant, give the surface effcct antisubmarine ship a suffix letter, sud1 as DEV or whatever and the mineswer’F ing SES should be MSV.
It would help if all underway repk|; ishment ships had a letter to help ^ out that capability. But again, let us P0' ruin a basically good system. For exl^ pie, an ammunition ship (AE for au*': iary, explosives) could be made AER tC indicate replenishment capability °[ even AEU for underway replenishm^1’ but not the UY suggested by CoP mander O’Neil.
A NAVAL BIOGRAPHY
by Christopher McKee
Preble's naval career began in the Massachusetts state navy, and Professor McKee's narrative of his service aboard the famous frigate Protector and the equally memorable sloop Winthrop provides the best history to date of this little-known aspect of the American Revolution. Also, this is the first major published study of Jefferson’s naval policy—including the controversial gunboat program in which Preble played a key role.
In carrying out Jefferson’s resolve in Tripoli, Preble demonstrated that despite monumental handicaps, objectives could be at least partially won and honor wholly sustained.
The supporting illustrations include maps, battle plans, gunboat designs, and portraits and paintings.
394 pages. Index. Bibliography.
List price: $16.00 Member’s price: $12.80
Naval Institute Press (Please use order form in book list section)
Hopefully, our Navy, which lives °1'
Comment and Discussion 99
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alphabetic sustenance (and for valid reasons) can bring some semblance of sanity to this problem. Ironically, the problem appears to be increasing in magnitude as the importance of ships is increasing in many respects, and the U. S. Navy is striving for "new initiatives” to maintain a viable capability and public support.
At the rate the U.S.S.R. is improving their Navy today with truly effective and economical weapons systems, it is possible that they solved such a dilemma some years ago.
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"This Business of
Project Management”
(See F. H. Featherston, pp. 22-29, January
1972 Proceedings)
Commander William D. Allen, U. S. Navy—Captain Featherston specifically raised the question of the Navy’s need for restricted line officers as project managers. In view of the 28 May 1970 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum on the recognition of project managers and the Chief of Naval Operations position on major command equivalency for project management billets, it appears that restricted line officers (RLO) are apparently now to be further displaced by unrestricted line officers (ULO) from these essential and challenging positions for which they have been trained. Today, a ULO who "sees the handwriting on the wall” may now reorient his career toward project management in an effort to salvage his chance for flag rank. While not all ULO aspirant project managers will be so motivated, the competition for these jobs should increase many fold. For the Navy, such competition can be good. For the individual RLO it effectively decreases his opportunity for advancement and increased responsibility. Since the ULO is now to be more involved in the management of the weapons acquisition business, it might be appropriate for the RLO communities to conduct a painful, but perhaps vital, self-examination of their functions and roles.
The RLO and the ULO in project management can and should complement each other, one as the essential technical expert and the other as perhaps the operational and financial expert, with either officer qualified to manage the entire project, and the best of the two assigned the position of project manager, not just on the basis of designator alone.
"Common Purpose—Common Ship?”
(See E. E. Johnston, pp. 25-33, April 1972 Proceedings)
N. Thompson Downs—The suggested 35-mm. twin mounts may be adequate against "low value surface targets” (although a larger gun such as the Swedish 57-mm. could be considered because of heavier shell weight), but a shore bombardment capability should be included.
To be sure, it is difficult to assess the value of the shore bombardments in the Vietnam conflict. But the mobility of the warship either forces the enemy to guard long stretches of coastline or to forego the use of these areas. And, of
course, the gunline ships did do military damage to the Communists. Further, while the Communists have used small craft on the Vietnam coast supply line, light guns would be inadequate to deal with coastal steamers under similar circumstances, while such targets would not be worth an Exocet because of cost and the small number carried. (An analogy can be made here to submarines in the two world wars which, when possible, would use gunfire to sink a small merchantman or to finish off a damaged large one, in order to conserve the sub’s limited supply of torpedoes.)
Further, these ships should be prepared to provide close-in fire support for invasion forces. Commander Johnston’s contention that other gun-armed ships would be available is not necessarily accurate. For one thing, gun-armed ships may be deployed on their primary missions; the Countys and the U. S. DLGs and DDGs again come to mind, since their primary mission is AAW and/or ASW screen. The deployments
SLIDE RULE for the mariner
By CAPT. H. H. SHUFELDT, USNR (Ret.)
This unique book will be an invaluable aid to the navigator and ship handler, providing a wide variety of time-saving methods of slide rule computation. Not only can the slide rule be used to perform many of the mathematical operations required at sea with acceptable accuracy and far greater speed than with other means usually available, but it can also be of great help in making rapid checks for gross errors in long, conventionally worked calculations.
Included is a brief review of the use of the slide rule, a short section on plane and spherical trigonometry, and examples of slide rule methods for inshore navigation, offshore navigation, and many miscellaneous computations such as temperature conversion, barometric-pressure conversion, fuel consumption, propeller slip, rigging loads, wind-generated pressure on ships, and draft variations when heeled.
208 pages. Illustrated.
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could be reversed, but it would be less desirable to expose more valuable ships to the dangers from shore batteries and mines that accompany in-shore fire support.
Despite an increase in cost of perhaps 10%, mounting one or two destroyer- caliber guns on the "Free World Frigate” would enable her to carry out important missions that would justify the cost increase.
"Technology and the Military”
(See S. Sandler, pp. 54-61, March 1972
Proceedings)
Lawrence C. Allin—Dr. Sandler’s paper invites speculation and causes much thought on one of the more difficult problems sailors have had to face in the last 200 years.
Writing in 1900, more than 40 years after the Whitehead Automobile Torpedo was first fired, a French naval officer, Lieutenant Commander Rene de Cartout, set out, in Revue Maritime, the desirable characteristics a useful weapon should incorporate. It must be: safe and simple to operate, strong and dependable, and be efficient, i.e. capable of doing "the greatest injury” to the enemy. He maintained that the torpedo possessed only one of the four virtues—efficiency.
In the same year in which de Cartout wrote, the Prize Essay of the U. S. Naval Institute dealt with "Torpedo Craft: Types and Employment.” This essay, by Lieutenant R. H. Jackson, U. S. Navy, appeared in the same Proceedings with articles on the torpedo system by Lieutenants L. H. Chandler, U. S. Navy, and A. P. Niblack, U. S. Navy. These officers agreed that the Spanish-American War had taught the U. S. Navy little concerning the torpedo weapons system. The torpedo boat had been used as a tug, blockader, and dispatch boat, as well as in other roles. It had not been used to perform the task for which it was designed: delivery of the torpedo on target in battle.
American naval officers of the time entertained ideas of foreign policy, geography, tactics, and strategy that affected their patterns of thinking on and understanding of the torpedo weapons system. They believed that American foreign policy was commercial and
non-aggressive and sought no overseas territorial conquests. They believed that this foreign policy gave the Navy and its weapons a defensive mission. They therefore placed the torpedo weapons system in a defensive role.
The geography of distance affected the sailor’s view of their role and their weapons. Potential enemy fleets were based in Europe, at least a week’s steaming from the Atlantic coast. The relatively poor seakeeping qualities of the torpedoboat convinced American naval officers that neither European or American torpedoboats could cross the Atlantic to attack a hostile shore. Both foreign policy and geography combined to reinforce a defensive attitude in the Navy toward its employment of torpedo- boats.
Strategically, American naval officers saw a great fleet action, fought in the Anglo-Dutch manner, as the key to victory in a future naval war. They believed that this great battleship slug-fest would take place in the waters east of Nantucket Island. They believed it would be decisive as to the war. After this great fleet action, minor units would defend the coast and commerce against a few enemy raiders or the blockade of a victorious enemy. The torpedo and short-ranged torpedoboat were seen as the minor tactical unit that would carry out this defensive task.
The torpedo weapons system had failed to achieve spectacular results in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 or the Spanish-American War of 1898. By De Cartout’s first three criteria, the torpedo had also failed to achieve operational reliability. Because of its lack of spectacular results and delicate mechanical constitution, the Americans attempted to devise uses for the torpedo weapons system that would harmonize with their views of the Navy’s mission and give maximum employment to the weapon. It was advocated that the torpedoboats be stationed in divisions all along the Atlantic coast with only a few boats on the Gulf and Pacific coasts. These divisions would be based upon facilities that could keep the torpedo itself and its delivery vehicle in top mechanical condition. So placed and maintained, the torpedo weapons system would serve for harbor defense.
Tactically, it was supposed that the
torpedo system was a weapon of suf prise. It could only expect success, $ the view of 1900, by issuing forth frofi1 a harbor or inlet on a fog or rail1' shrouded night in groups of a ha® dozen or more. Achieving momentary surprise, the boats could attack the enemy from all points of the compa** and hope to score a fatal hit or tw°- The Americans would not affirm that the torpedo and torpedoboat could he decisive in a naval war.
In France, De Cartout held that th£ battleship, with her mixed battery heavy, medium, and light guns, was th£ premier weapon of naval warfare. believed that the tactical speed of thf torpedoboat was too slow to make l>e( useful against the battleship, and c£l' tainly too slow to permit her to achiev£ surprise at sea. To overcome the tot' pedo’s shortcomings, De Cartout b£' lieved it needed to become submersible along with its delivery vehicle. Disap pointingly, De Cartout felt that the £*’ ploration of the tactical and strategy consequences of a submersible torpe^ system was premature in 1900.
In the United States, Lieutenat1 Jackson dismissed the French "attentio11 to submarine marvels” as part and part*-' of their proclivity for panacea weapon* His fellow officer, Lieutenant Chanff1'1 saw the submersible torpedo system "the perfection of coast-defense torpe^' work.” Implicit in the thinking of the^ Americans was the inability of the t°r pedo system, surfaced or submerged,l<) fulfill De Cartout’s criteria for a sou^ weapon. Also implicit in their thinkin? were the considerations of politics, f ography, tactics, and strategy that ded the American torpedo system Stfr' faced or submerged, to the coast defend concept in naval warfare.
It required the desperate imagination of Germany in World War l—V1 Sandler’s weaker military power caugl’1 in a stalemated war—to consider & Cartout’s consequences of making tb£ torpedo weapons system submersible. $) using technology that was within fbc state of the art in 1900, Germany, 1917, freed the torpedo from its defc11' sive role on the coast, and directed lt toward new tactical and strategic eb1' ployments that, in their turn, exercis^ a profound effect upon the technolog) of naval warfare.
Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, U. S. NV (Retired) — In the flood of far-left prop*’ ganda now deluging this country, it|! encouraging to find a young officer511 concerned for the safety of his count*! and so eloquent in describing the selfi5** 1 and euphoric spirit which decries pat*1' otism and "duty, honor, and country- The very backbone of a country- freed om is the willingness of its peop,; to defend that freedom. Concerted at1* continued attacks upon their own la*1” by pseudo-intellectuals, far-out polk dans, and self-seekers have all bu drowned patriotism and respect for tt: Armed Forces. America is not sick America is a great, dynamic, humanist'1 nation. It is the most compassions1* nation in history. In this century, have twice saved freedom, although let a lot of it slip at Yalta. A natkf: which has attained the highest level l’: prosperity in all time, and whose peop'1 enjoy nearly the ultimate in person*' freedom, is not sick. Our poor we ha'*' but the vast majority of them are rid1 when compared with the downtrodd*5 masses of Asia, Africa, and Sou1' America. Is there an American "wid soul so dead” that he has not thrill at the television pictures of America^ walking on the moon?
I hope that Lieutenant Jordan’s let**1 can be given wide circulation, and tb*1 other young officers will feel free k express themselves on this vital matt** There are, I know, many who feel d>* same.
One of the great novelists, Willia1*1 Somerset Maugham said:
If a nation values anything more th*11 freedom, it will lose its freedom: and ^ irony of it is that if it is comfort ‘l! money that it values more, it will 1°** that, too.
"The Surface Line Officer:
Some Conn, Some Can’t”
(See D. R. Larson, pp. 42-49, July 1972
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander T. C. Grzymala, U. S. Navy— Several areas of Commander Larson’s article are considered worthy of comment by one who matriculated into our surface Navy in 1962 and, since then, has seen many changes occur in the Navy in general, and in this warfare community in particular.
The author clearly states in his introduction to the article that shiphandling and command-at-sea require adequate planning and programming, and he laments the lack of specific standards of qualification within the Navy. Before making such an absolute statement, it is submitted that Commander Larson should have done a bit more homework.
[2] personally know of a particular shiphandling qualification program within the Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific Fleet (ComCruDesPac). In this command, each young officer is required to keep an Officer-of-the-Deck Underway Watch Qualifications Log, specifically documenting his progression up the qualification ladder, eventually resulting in his ultimate qualification as a Fleet Officer-of-the-Deck. This Qualifications Log is the individual surface warfare officer’s personal possession, and remains in his custody throughout successive tours of duty.
Perhaps other type commanders have a similar program; at this point in time I plead ignorance of the existence of
[3]See L. C. Kendall, "To Use the Sea,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1972, pp. 58-67.