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Once again, in 1979, the United States found itself enmeshed in a confrontation with the Soviet Union over Cuba. What is important concerning the Soviet combat troops in Cuba is the international environment in which their presence was revealed and the commentary on U. S. diplomatic and defense policy which has resulted.
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°uly three years; the Cuban sugar economy was in ^r'°us trouble; Soviet economic aid to Cuba had arelF started; the Caribbean political environment 35 relatively stable; and the United States held a
passive strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. Uric'
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y as 1963 with tanks and technicians assisting ^ geria in a border dispute with Morocco. The ^bbean political environment in 1970 was less 1 ,a w than in 1962 and was characterized by riot and •>, naPping in such diverse locations as Trinidad- Qp aS°, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. ^ utrnost importance, by 1970 strategic force trends <^0l>ved the Soviet Union surpassing the United j ates in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missile ^uUchers and rapidly closing the gap in total num- ^rs of missile launchers. The strategic superiority ricB the United States enjoyed in 1962 had evapo- eu, and the Soviet Union was approaching a con- lt|Qn of strategic parity.
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-•-he continuing Soviet involvement in Cuba illustrates the deteriorating ability of the United States to ty^UenCe events cons*stent leadership in the
estern Hemisphere. Part of this difficulty in con- tr°lling foreign affairs is inevitable, a result of dra- change in the international power structure Slnce World War II.
^ But of more immediate concern is the fact that the nited States has been at serious fault in the Carib- 'ean and Latin America. In 1962, at the time of the 'an Missile Crisis, Fidel Castro had been in power
°der these circumstances, a presidential ultimatum *n retrospect, a low-risk venture, and the U. S. a£>reement not to invade Cuba in return for removal ^e missiles was an acceptable quid pro quo, par- cularly in view of the Bay of Pigs debacle of the f’^vious year.
By 1970, when the Soviet Union attempted to es- Bsh a naval base off Cienfuegos for servicing submarines, the international environment had changed. astro’s accommodation with the Kremlin had reted in Soviet economic aid approaching $1 billion /''dually. In 1969, the Soviet Navy had commenced efiodic deployments to Cuba and the Caribbean. ban overseas military adventures had begun as
Be official U. S. reaction to the construction of at appeared to be a Soviet nuclear submarine base enfuegos was less agressive than President Ken- ^viet Union. Diplomatic action was designed to ^'t the Kremlin to withdraw from Cienfuegos ^ tiout losing face. Publicity concerning the crisis ^ s fow key and existed to the extent that it did only ecause of an unauthorized release by a Pentagon
spokesman of full details concerning the Cienfuegos buildup. The diplomatic effort was quiet, persistent, and successful without a dramatic confrontation. The 1962 understandings were enlarged to prevent the establishment of Soviet strategic bases in the Caribbean and to preclude the servicing of Soviet submarines in or from Cuban ports.
Today the international environment is even more of a controlling factor in the negotiation of a satisfactory settlement to the question of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The Cuban economy in 1980 is almost completely subsidized by the Kremlin. Soviet economic aid approaches $3 billion annually. The U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European allies purchase three fourths of the annual Cuban sugar crop at about 40 cents a pound, while the world price is around 9 cents a pound. They buy most of Cuba’s second major export, nickel, at 50% above the world market price. The Soviet Union sells Cuba nearly all of its crude oil requirement at $14 per barrel, one third below the world market price. Projects financed by the U.S.S.R. supply 30% of Cuba’s electricity, 95% of its steel, and 100% of its sheet metal. But despite Soviet subsidies, the Cuban economy is in complete disarray. Whether current economic problems are a result of the loss of U. S. managerial expertise and markets which sustained the Cuban economy in the past, or whether these problems are a product of Castro s investment of Cuban manpower and money in overseas adventures is conjectural. What is factual, after 20 years of a socialist regime, is that thousands of Cubans are abandoning their country and Castro in search of a better life. Obviously, any strategy developed by the United States to displace the Soviets in Cuba must offer some sort of better solution to Cuban economic problems than the Soviets are providing.
Paralleling the increase in Soviet economic aid has been the escalation of Cuban involvement in national liberation movements overseas. Since the 1970 crisis, 200 Cubans have provided guerrilla and pilot training to South Yemen forces; 20,000 Cuban troops have intervened in Angola; and 16,000 more troops have been exported to Ethiopia. In each of these cases the perceived interests of the United States have been defeated and leftist-oriented regimes established in areas of strategic importance—controlling the entrance to the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and a crucial middleground in Southern Africa.
The Caribbean has also changed dramatically since 1970. The U. S. flag has been lowered over the Panama Canal Zone, marking the first step in the turnover of this vital waterway to Panama. In Nicaragua the regime of former President Anastasio
proaching a parity situation between the
States and the Soviet Union in 1970 have prog
resse<
to a point at which the Soviet Union has ^ superiority in the total number of missile launc ^
offensive warheads. It is clear that if strategy
Somoza was ousted by the rebel Sandanista movement which originated in Cuba in 1961. A similar uprising led by the Popular Revolutionary Bloc is on the verge of success in El Salvador. In February of this year, leftist guerrilla activity erupted in Colombia when 13 diplomats, including the U. S. ambassador, were taken hostage by terrorists. The situation was ultimately resolved in late April by paying ransom and transporting the terrorists to Cuba. Antigovernment forces supported by Castro are active in
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Honduras and Guatemala. It seems to be mere matter of time until Jamaica falls prey to nat‘o11 liberation forces.
Finally, the strategic force trends which were i
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id
as well as in missile size, while the United $ta1 -£ retains an advantage in the total number of stra^e
trends influenced the diplomatic response t0 Cienfuegos crisis in 1970, such trends must be ^ more influential in resolving any future Cuban frontations.
42
Proceedings
/juiy16
As a consequence of this progression of events^ ^ the past 18 years, there has been, from the ^ viewpoint, a steady deterioration in the internal
! env*ronment which affects the ability of foreign pol- lcy decision-makers to handle Cuban problems ag- | fitessively. Escalated Soviet involvement in Cuba has 'tteant an increased probability of serious confrontation with the Kremlin and a consequent risk to de- >ent? and arms limitation if U. S. interests concern- ln8 Cuba and the Caribbean are to be defended. The Carnatic expansion of Cuban influence overseas | whether by export of troops and equipment to Africa ar>d the Middle East or through subversion in Latin America is widely acclaimed by anti-status quo na- | d°ns of tf,e Third World for whose support the n*ted States also competes, thus further intimidat- ■ lrig U. S. foreign policy toward Cuba. Finally, im- I Proved Soviet strategic capabilities substantially inCrease the risk factor if confrontation is allowed to escalate to the 1962 level and serve as a strong deter- |etlt to aggressive decision-making at the highest I eVe^s of the U. S. Government.
Interwoven with the issue of the international I eilvironment is the manner in which U. S. diplo- ^at<c and defense policy concerning Cuba md the I ar*bbean has been implemented. The ambivalence I atld ambiguity of U. S. foreign policy in an area in-
I^gtal to the defense of the Gulf coast and the anarna Canal puts the matter of national priorities n serious question. Two examples will shed some ‘ght on the real background of foreign policy prob- erris in the Caribbean.
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson intervened military force in the Dominican Republic when 11 became apparent to him that Communist elements ' ete involved in the overthrow of the U. S.- ^Pported government of President Donald Reid abtal Huberto. Some 20,000 U. S. Marines and
U. S. NAVY (T. W. WOODWARD)
paratroopers were landed, a naval task force patrolled offshore, and the rebel troops were neutralized by force of arms. The unilateral nature of this intervention without prior consultation with members of the Organization of American States caused great criticism at home and abroad. Charges of “gunboat diplomacy” were leveled at the United States, and the military operation was rapidly converted into an OAS peace-keeping force. The outcome of the Dominican intervention was twofold: another takeover by leftist forces in the Caribbean was thwarted but at the expense of U. S. chastisement in the court of world opinion. Foreign policy planners learned once again the special problems faced by a superpower in the conduct of aggressive diplomacy.
A second example of U. S. action in the Caribbean during the period since 1962 illustrates another aspect of the foreign policy dilemma. Following the Cienfuegos crisis in 1970, a special squadron of destroyer-type ships was organized in the Atlantic with the primary mission of surface surveillance. The ships in the squadron had special intelligence collection capability. They were successors, in a sense, to such earlier intelligence collection ships as the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) and USS Pi/eblo (AGER-2) but made no attempt to disguise their mission. They operated with full combat capabilities in the event that they had to defend themselves. The purpose of the squadron was to meet, escort, and collect intelligence on Soviet naval vessels throughout their Caribbean deployments. The squadron acted in direct support of a newly defined mission of the Second Fleet: "... defend the sea and air approaches to the Panama Canal.”
Destroyer Squadron 18 was commissioned in July 1971, with headquarters in Key West. During three Caribbean deployments from October 1971 until February 1973, the Soviet surface ships and submarines involved were met in the Western Atlantic and escorted throughout their deployment. Every aspect of Soviet underway operations was observed. When the vessels entered Cuban ports, a permanent patrol was established at the harbor entrance outside a 6-mile limit, and surveillance escort was resumed when the port visit was completed. Numerous Soviet naval maneuvers were analyzed, including simulated missile firings in the Gulf of Mexico; antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercises utilizing "Hormone” helicopters against “Foxtrot”-class submarines in the Florida straits; intensive ASW training for Cuban patrol vessels; and combined harbor defense exercises off Havana and Cienfuegos in which Soviet ships acted as an invading force and came under coordinated attack from Cuban torpedo boats and MiG-21 aircraft with “Foxtrot” submarines also participating.
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ganized, the concept was abandoned. The squa1 ^ was decommissioned in July 1973, a victim ot bot the thrust toward normalization of relations
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surface surveillance and the sudden closure West as a base for ships gave a clear signal to
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One incident during surveillance operations in the spring of 1972 showed a clear Soviet intent to test the Cienfuegos understandings and the willingness of the United States to respond. For the first time, the Soviets deployed a ballistic missile submarine to Cuba for servicing by a submarine tender in a Cuban port. In its usual manner, the Kremlin chose a vehicle, a time, and a place which made U. S. response as difficult as possible. The submarine chosen was a diesel-powered “Golf II.” She was not one of the Soviets’ first-line ballistic missile boats, but she was still capable of launching intermediate-range ballistic missiles while submerged. The time chosen for this deployment was during the final sessions of the bilateral negotiations to prevent unintentional confrontations between warships at sea. It was only three weeks before the Moscow summit conference at which the results of these negotiations and the SALT I agreements would be signed by leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. During this period, U. S. commanders at sea were specifically warned to avoid any serious incidents with Soviet naval vessels which might jeopardize the negotiations. The place chosen for the rendezvous of submarine and tender was in Bahia de Nipe on the northeast coast of Cuba. It is as far as possible from Cienfuegos and provides relatively easy access to and from the Atlantic.
The submarine tender arrived first and anchored inside Bahia de Nipe. The U. S. surveillance patrol was established 6 miles off the harbor entrance, and early on the morning of May 1, the submarine was intercepted approaching Bahia de Nipe on the surface. Identification was made, and appropriate U. S. authorities were notified. (Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, was the operational commander for surveillance purposes and primary action addressee on all reports.) The “Golf II” remained alongside the tender for five days. At dusk on the sixth day, she sortied and, as permitted by the topography of the coastline, submerged immediately outside the harbor entrance. The surveillance ships, augmented by P-3 patrol aircraft from Guantanamo Bay, gained sonar contact and succeeded in surfacing the submarine. For the next two days and nights, the Soviet formation—with U. S. surveillance ships in company—moved slowly out through the Caicos passage into the Atlantic. During the day, the submarine remained on the surface. Each night she submerged and attempted to evade the surveillance escort. Elaborate deception and decoy measures were used by Soviet ships to mask the submarine when she dived, but each time sonar contact was gained and held continuously by the surveillance units. Late on the second night, the Soviet ships launched an intensive coordinated effort t0 force a break in sonar contact which would allow d>e submarine to escape. Close high-speed maneuvers by the Soviet ships, which included a merchant tanked forced the surveillance ships into radical course an speed changes. Flares were fired at the P-3 aircraft' By the time sonar contact on the “Golf II” was l°5t beyond recovery, the Soviet formation was well ir>t0 the Atlantic.
There was no publicity in the United States con cerning the “Golf II” episode. Nor is there any eVI dence on the public record that the U. S. Govern ment lodged a formal protest accusing the Krend111 of violating the Cienfuegos understanding by servic ing a ballistic missile submarine in a Cuban P°rt The Soviets guessed correctly in the timing of ^ visit. The summit and SALT I were stakes wn>c U. S. decision-makers would not risk in a Cuban confrontation. If a surface surveillance force had not been present at Bahia de Nipe on that May morruff in 1972, it is possible that the Soviet submarine visit to Cuba would have been undetected.
Destroyer Squadron 18 had a short life. Exact y two years after the surface surveillance force was
Cuba and of budgetary cuts. Old ships with h|f maintenance costs were expendable, no matter n valuable their mission. At the same time, the N ^ terminated use of Key West as a base for submar* and naval surface ships, even though it is strategy ^ ly located at the intersection of the Atlantic and *• Gulf of Mexico, only 90 miles from Havana- ^ abrupt abandonment of our aggressive program
of b-•
and the Kremlin that U. S. defense policy *n Caribbean was once again in the process of change^ These two examples of U. S. action in the ^
eign policy development in the western hemisp since World War II. In reviewing the internati' environment and events of the past 18 years, comes clear that, despite realistic constraints on ^ eign policy development imposed by major in the world power structure, much of the C . dilemma is a product of our own making. ^at'°||rc priorities and defense policies in the Caribbean ^ subservient in every aspect to our perceived intef . and defense policy relative to the Soviet Um°n . Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. )r ^ cally, at a time when the global view of foreig0 P icy took priority over hemispheric interests,
the
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Caribbean and throughout Latin America, not ssarily by resurrecting the Monroe Doctrine, al-
r°ughout the globe. More often than not, the nited States finds itself relegated to a defensive ategy in such confrontation, with the Kremlin °osing the locale for action and Washington feel- i& compelled by the perceptions of the power strug- 5° react. The current situation in Afghanistan is a ect example. It is a futile foreign policy, because st Soviet incursions into the Third World are
nited States found its strategic goals in Angola, Miopia, and Yemen frustrated by Cuban troops, because of the declining ability of the United .ates to influence world events through the tradi- t,0nal exercise of power in diplomatic and military [errns, there is a tremendous sense of frustration. The test Cuban imbroglio over Soviet combat troops is, as niuch as anything else, a venting of such frustra- |)‘°ns by a Congress and an administration which ave not been able to deal with basic changes in international politics. Certainly the presence in Cuba of a brigade of combat troops without sea or airlift CaPability does not threaten U. S. national security neady so much as Soviet pilots flying MiG-23 airCraft out of Cuban airfields or the potential for the StTvicing and replenishment of Soviet ballistic missile „ Marines in Cuban ports as demonstrated by the ^°lf 11" incident. The U. S. Government did not Itla^e an aggressive response to either of these latter Cases, and it is this erratic action reflecting an incon- 'Stency of principle in foreign policy which is the ^ai°r peril to the national interest of the United tates in the Caribbean.
^ consistency of principle can be reestablished in ^ uUgh it served a useful purpose in its time by coor- Jt>ating foreign policy and public opinion. Instead, should revitalize an inter-American partnership ty'ch has been allowed to languish in the post- °rld War II environment of superpower confronta- °n. The Third World which should concern us Q°st is the Third World of our own hemisphere. s^Ur investment in the welfare of emerging nations °uld concentrate on solutions for economic dis- . nty and social unrest in Latin America. The na- °nal security of the United States should be ex- ed to include the regional security of a powerful °c °f American republics.
^°ld War philosophy has dictated that U. S. for- tj^n policy attempt to counter Soviet influence
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self-destructive and because it abrogates a leadership role for the United States among these emerging nations. A revitalization of inter-American relationships which grants hemispheric problems first priority on a consistent basis and which develops a strong regional partnership as a major principle of U. S. foreign policy would replace the futility of Cold War diplomacy with a positive philosophy of leadership.
A new consistency of principle in Latin American affairs should be paralleled by a consistency of action in defense policy. Naval forces should be deployed to the Caribbean on a regular basis, not sporadically in response to Soviet initiatives. Joint Navy-Air Force exercises in defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal should be a continuing feature of such deployments concentrating on strategic access to the Caribbean through Windward and Mona passages. Key West should be reactivated as an operational and logistic base for Caribbean operations. Of primary importance, a surface surveillance force should be recommissioned to escort Soviet naval units in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean, collecting on-scene intelligence and proving to the Kremlin that Soviet deployments in the Western Hemisphere are a matter of major concern to the United States and will not be ignored.
At a time when the international environment has reduced U. S. options in confrontation situations and Cold War diplomacy persists in superpower relationships despite detente, it is time to build a positive foreign policy. We must strive for consistency of policy and action by the State Department and Defense Department. Latin America is the place to start.
Captain Fenlon was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1949 and served on board the USS Missouri (BB-63), USS Pursuit (AGS-17), USS Bigelow (DD-942), and USS Newport News (CA- 148). He commanded the PCE-874 and USS Rich (DD-820) and was Commander Destroyer Squadron 18 during its two-year existence described in the article. Ashore Captain Fenlon served at the U. S. Naval Academy, in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, with a MAAG in Korea, and on the staffs of Commander Training Command, Atlantic Fleet and Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, Europe. He earned an M.A. in international relations from the American University, Washington, D.C. and was a distinguished graduate of the Air War College. Captain Fenlon retired from active duty in 1976 and is currently completing his dissertation as a doctoral candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, specializing in international security studies.