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FY 1980-1989: 10-11 SSN
(at current rate) 6-10 SSBN
U. S. Submarine Construction Authorizations
FY 1960-1969: 44 SSN
32 SSBN
FY 1970-1979: 30 SSN
7 SSBN
the Sturgeon's, BQQ-2 sonar and Mk-^j fire control system being capable 0
,nt£
The “year of the submarine” is the term that some observers are using to describe probable congressional action on the Navy’s shipbuilding program this year. This follows 1979 being the year of the aircraft carrier when, after two years of intensive discussion and debate, Congress forced the Carter Administration to accept a carrier “package” consisting of the fourth Nimitz (CVN-68)-class nuclear carrier, conversion of an amphibious warfare ship to a V/STOL carrier, and funds for continuing the design of a new V/STOL "light carrier,” in addition to the development of a naval version of the Advanced Harrier (AV-8B + ).
Now Capitol Hill—the principals, staffers, and their consultants—is taking on the submarine problems. The Carter Administration has proposed a building program averaging only one nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and one Trident strategic missile submarine (SSBN) per year for the foreseeable future. Assuming a 25- to 30- year submarine service life, this means that by the late 1980s the Navy will fall short of the goal of 90 SSNs and 27 to 37 SSBNs, the latter number depending upon the mix of submarine types.*
Interestingly, there is no near-term problem in attaining the 90-SSN goal. The Navy now has 74 nuclear attack submarines and 6 diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in service. The additional SSNs already under construction or authorized through Fiscal year 1980
•Strategic missile submarines will be addressed in “The U. S. Navy” feature in the March 1980 Proceedings.
will provide a peak of 94 nuclear submarines in the mid-1980s before the retirement of older submarines at a rate faster than the new construction rate of one-per-year drives down the SSN force level. With a 25-year submarine life, there would be about 85 SSNs in 1990 and some 50 SSNs in 1995. A 30-year service life, which many experts feel is possible for the later SSNs, would delay the decline by five years.
Many members of Congress are concerned about this decline. But there also is concern over the cost of modern SSNs, with the Los Angeles (SSN-688)- class ships costing $473 million in fiscal year 1980 funds; the very restricted nuclear submarine building base (now only two shipyards); and submarine manning problems. Finally, there is the increasing threat. The Soviet ocean-going fleets—both naval and merchant—have been increasing, and Soviet nuclear submarines are being produced at the rate of some ten per year, with the new SSNs being faster, deeper diving, and more heavily armed than even the new Los Angeles.
These concerns led Congress to direct the Navy to conduct a study of submarine alternatives to include “evaluations of lower cost, lower capability nuclear-propelled submarines and the use of non-nuclear submarines for some missions, in combination with submarines of the SSN-688 class.” While the study results are still secret, Admiral H. G. Rickover, head of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, has publicly commented on the results, providing some indication of their thrust.
Although the study was under the direction of Dr. David Mann, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Evaluation & Systems), Rickover cited it as demonstrating “again the Defense Department disposition to produce voluminous expensive studies to support the pollyannish notion that cheaper is better.”
Apparently, the study acknowl' edged the fact that the Los Angeles 15 the “best” SSN that the United State5 can now construct. But it also raised the option of building cheaper, albe*1 less capable, SSNs in greater number5 than the Los Angeles class could be pt°' cured in the current political and funding environment.
As Admiral Rickover pointed out- “The Navy is perfectly capable of de' signing and building cheaper sub' marines, just as Detroit could desig11 and build cheaper automobiles. Th£ question is, will these cheaper version5 serve the purpose for which they afe intended?”
Obviously, Detroit was forced c° build cheaper (less capable) aU' tomobiles because of foreign competj' tion and domestic political-econort1'1' realities. Chrysler’s concentration 0,1 larger (more capable) cars in part le“ to its catastrophic problems, while the “less capable” X-model cars are ^ overwhelming sales success. And' there are also indications that they arC safer than previous models.
Applying Admiral Rickover’s anal' ogy back to submarines, the princip1’ difference between the Los Angeles clasS and the previous Sturgeon (SSN-63^ class is speed, with the newer ship* being about 5 knots faster. Yet gain those few knots, a Los Angeles displaces some 6,900 tons submerge compared with 4,650 tons for a Stu1" geon. Comparative costs are difficult[ ascertain, but, according to a Nav! spokesman, in fiscal year 1978 dollafS the last (37th) Sturgeon cost $186 lion compared to the 32nd Los Ang^‘s with an estimated cost of $343 1111 lion in the same-year dollars. The t"‘ classes have the same weapons, 'vlt
being upgraded to the Los BQQ-5 and Mk-117 for some $22 m1’ lion in fiscal year 1978 dollars. Thus, three-plus Sturgeon-chss
could have been built for the cost two Los Angeles SSNs, with the sal
112
Proceedings / January
WeaP°ns, sensors, fire control, and Endurance, but with a loss of perhaps 5 'nots in speed. Also, additional Stur- Re°n SSNs would benefit from reduc- tlons *n unit maintenance, logistics, ‘lr>d crew training costs. Speed is important in SSN operations, but at what COSt’ an<J in what relationship to improvements in weapons, sensors, div- depths, and other features? While e L°s Angeles SSNs’ speed is better suited for operations with carrier battle groups, there are now 35 of these submarines either built or authorized, Wlth only 13 carriers in service.
The construction of more Sturgeons n place of the Los Angeles program is >ne of many proposals that have been
Put forth to the Navy's leadership. Othe '
low-
ers include the design of
frux SSN, a non-nuclear attack
sub
^ese various options.
Marine (ssx), and combinations of Although an
SSX
‘odurance of a nuclear submarine, the °n-nuclear submarine would be luieter than “nucs” when operating on br ■ in
■would not have the high-speed
atteries, well suited for operations restricted areas such as the eastern
Medit,
u,ld, operate, and man in both com- ba-
l terranean, and much cheaper to bu-' > r
dt and training roles. Further, the
bfrent U. S. deployment of support a Ts at Sardinia, Holy Loch, Guam, rn-,- ''/°kosuka—if these bases are of ?tainet^—would ease the problems Ofward deploying non-nuclear Sut>rnarines.
According to a senior Navy esman, the study of submarine al- atives is “on the shelf—a matter
sPok
tern
in rtCor^- The Navy now is conduct- 8 follow-on studies of the alterna-
tly^n
p Proposed in the Mann study. aps of more interest to the sub
marine community’s leadership—the Office of the Deputy CNO (Submarine Warfare)—is a proposal to produce an improved Los Angeles, a submarine slightly larger and faster, for essentially the same cost as the basic SSN- 688. The improvements can be realized at virtually no cost, it is believed, primarily through improved construction techniques and the “learning curve” of now having built a large number of the class. (The fiscal year 1980 buy brings the class to 35 ships.) The construction techniques cited are the use of improved hull form shaping machinery, improvements in welding, and better procedures in fabrication.
These techniques, of course, would be applicable to the various submarine alternatives to the Los Angeles. There also are reports that the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, the nation’s leading submarine shipyard, has applied these techniques and other technology advances to the design of an improved SSN that would have the sensors and other electronics of the Los Angeles, with an improved weapons capability, and in a smaller hull, but at the cost of a few knots of speed. The cost would be almost one- third less than a Los Angeles, principally because of using a modified S5W reactor plant (as in most pre-688 attack submarines and in all Polaris- Poseidon submarines).
The weapons feature is significant because all U. S. submarines built since the early 1960s have only four torpedo tubes, with the SSNs believed to carry just over a score of weapons. The need for a modern SSN to carry Mk-48 and Mk-37 torpedoes, SUBROC antisubmarine rockets, Harpoon anti-
ship missiles, and possibly in the future Tomahawk antiship and land- attack missiles, as well as mines in some scenarios, makes the weapon loadout most difficult. The Electric Boat design is believed to provide for more weapon launch tubes and reloads.
This design and other alternatives being put forth are being considered in the context of a new (or additional) attack submarine design for the mid- 1980s shipbuilding programs and, incorporating possibly more advances, especially in sonar, a new design in the early 1990s. Less definite—but still significant—is how a non-nuclear attack submarine (initially for fleet target and training) could fit into the construction picture.
It is thus apparent that we know how to produce the "best” submarine possible within the current U. S. submarine design system, and based on studies produced over a decade ago, we have some knowledge of submarine force requirements. Now it is up to the various participants in U. S. defense planning to determine the overall attack submarine force that is most effective within the political and fiscal constraints. Blind adherence to a specific design or type, or equally blind opposition to one, cannot contribute to the development of the most effective force.
Submarines are important to U. S. use of the seas. The Carter Administration’s one-per-year SSN rate appears too low to meet U. S. Navy requirements, especially in view of the Soviet and Third World naval advances. Alternatives must be considered. Last year then-Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor said at the Naval War College that “there is no reason why we should not consider the possibility of developing an attack submarine to complement our present nuclear- powered submarines by handling missions that may not demand the full range of capabilities embodied in the high-performance Los Angeles class.” There is no reason. . . .
EDITOR’S NOTE: See R. M. Chapman's "Attack Submarine Development—Recent Trends and Projected Needs," August 1978 Proceedings, pages 97-102.
'eding-s / January 1980
113