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favi
^ civilian dime, w iiidL cue
^ minimum seabag requirements? any people haven’t known for years, ess faced with the prospect of an Pcoming seabag inspection.
don’t advocate abolishing civilian ning privileges, but somehow we rUst establish, once and for all, a t 'stic policy on uniforms and stick "■ Change for the sake of change is ^sting untold dollars which could be .est used elsewhere. The recent deci- ... n t0 return to the tried and proven t^UrnPer style” uniforms is a step in right direction, with one glaring k Ptlon. The uniform is intended to svorn by E-4 personnel and below, Sa'I means rhe normally proficient 0r who makes E-5 on his first
American Caesar
The ‘Wear and Tear’ of Uniform Requirements”
J C. Wocher, p. 102, October 1979 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Sonar Technician Robert F. !erce, U. S. Navy—Uniform consistency within the naval service has been ln complete chaos since the late Six- tles- Recently it would appear that we j*re attempting to fight off a recession y having umpteen uniform changes t0 stimulate the growth of the textile industry.
With the latest uniform change information, through E-5 may now, 1 they wish, maintain six different ""•forms—i.e., summer whites, ^Urnmer blues, winter blues, service ress blues (of which two varieties are j°w available), and the old reliable Ungarees which also come in two types. This mass of uniforms creates a Running stowage problem for the av- ^rage shipboard bluejacket. The prob- ■ . |s compounded by where to keep ls civilian clothing as well. With the Senerally limited stowage facilities ^ailable on board ship, all too often tQS resourceful sailor will be tempted 0 hedge a bit on maintaining his """irnurn seabag requirements in 0r of his civilian attire. What are enlistment has the choice of wearing it until his separation or reenlistment at which time he must purchase a different type uniform. This promotes a problem at inspections where E-5s are in different uniforms. This problem could easily have been resolved by making jumpers a mandatory uniform for all E-6s and below after a "phase- in” period. This is such a simple solution, I am amazed the uniform policymakers have overlooked it.
It is not too late to remedy the situation with yet another (and perhaps last) change to the regulations.
“The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment”
(See G. Charbonneau, pp. 35-40, March 1979; T. Blades, pp. 83-84, June 1979; H. A. Caldwell, pp. 21-22, July 1979; W. J. Ruhe, pp. 89-90, August 1979; A. P. Guzowski, p. 93, October 1979 Proceedings)
Captain K. W. Estes, U. S. Marine Corps—Russia’s priority investment in shipbuilding facilities, vital resources, and manpower for her long-term naval program has established her as a first class sea power in the short space of ten years. The most formidable offensive arm of the Soviet Fleet is the submarine force, now believed to number about 500 units. But Russia does not appear to be turning out submarines at the phenomenal rate achieved about two years ago. It is believed that she is converting her plants to the manufacture of new types with improved propulsion and more lethal weapon systems. Russian leaders have already forecast the early appearance of guided missile cruisers and destroyers, and there is evidence that Russian marine engineering and shipbuilding resources are being concentrated on nuclear powered vessels. In recent months it has become clear that the overall technological lead which the United States held over Russia is diminishing. Russia is now a first-class
Contents:
Uniform Requirements
The Soviet Navy and Forward Deployment
The Mobile Channel Ballistic Missile
Strategic Deterrence in the Age of Detente
Strategic Metaphors
The Medical Officer Quandary
International Terrorism and the Defense of Offshore Facilities
Two Proceedings Soviet Naval Diplomacy Naval Guns
Needed: Heavy Firepower
Soviet Amphibious Warfare Capability
Countering Soviet Imperialism
Seapower in the Indian Ocean: A Requirement for Western Security
Soviet Policy in the Indian Ocean
Counterinsurgency: Corrupting Concept
Time Out for Tactics
Tactical Complacency
The Future of U. S. Sea Power
Through-Deck Cruiser: The New Capital Ship
Retention: Our #1 Goal
The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots
The Drift Toward the Draft
Navy Said to be Unfair to Blacks
into the coast defense category. Indeed, when the Soviet Navy is viewed as an anti-carrier force in the 1958-70 time frame and an anti-SSBN and anti-carrier force in the post-1970 period, quite a lot of the navy’s vaunted presence and sea control operations are explained. In fact, the postulated deployment of surface units to protect Soviet SSBNs from U. S. ASV? forces now completes this coast defense hypothesis.
But why the undoubted presence cruises of some units of a defense- minded naval force? Historically, even the German coast defense navy of Wilhelm I was noted for its far-flung cruising in support of German commerce and diplomacy. Naval presence is a logical peacetime employment of ship5 which really has little to do with what they do in wartime. In fact, the very complexity of the new ship design5 now emerging from the Soviet ship' yards may characterize the final pillar of the Blue Water Bear, economic reconstruction. Is not the rise of yet
another Russian fleet symptomatic
naval power, second only to the United States.
Impressive words to begin any essay on the “Old Bad Blue-Water Bears,” aa Mr. Caldwell terms the Russian Navy of today: The only caution here is that these very words were written more than 20 years ago in the preface to the 1958-59 edition ofJane's Fighting Ships, reproduced above sans quotation marks. All this serves to applaud Caldwell’s sober note that it’s not the Russians who are our problem, but ourselves and our very Russian-like paranoia, exacerbated perhaps by the thought of the big bucks we inherit if we really can scare everybody on The Hill about Gorshkov’s Sailing Circus.
Soviet “seapower” today suggests that Leninist doctrines may have had little effect upon the essentials of Russian sea traditions. For what we see today bears every resemblance to the continual efforts of Russia to build big ships and reconstitute a high-seas fleet since the last one went down off Tsushima. Two World Wars gutted the efforts of Nicholas II and his heir, Josef I, to bring the fleet programs of 1912 and 1936 to fruition. Stalin resumed his high-seas fleet program belatedly after the rubble of the Russo- German War had been sorted out, modeling it perhaps on the untried, untested German Plan Z of 1939- His death in 1953 iced the plan while the succession ensued, leaving Sverdlov cruisers, fleet destroyers, many improved U-boats, and plans for carriers and battleships. Such a fleet hypothetically would have depicted the coast defense-commerce raiding doctrine of the 19th century Jeune Ecole, despite the radar-jet plane technology of the 1945-55 period which rendered such a doctrine and Plan Z inoperative.
ENTER THE FORUM
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Enter Gorshkov, but more importantly Nikita the Great (or Terrible), who said “no” to the heroes of the Fatherland War and forced a turn to higher technology as an answer to counter postwar capitalist naval supremacy. Small battle groups with missile weapons could counter the U. S. carriers (a strategic threat to the Russians) without the capital investment, overhead, and training deficiencies that would have accompanied a Soviet carrier force designed to battle U. S. forces. Innovative designs (not all successful) flourished precisely because Khrushchev urged his admirals to avoid the weapon-for-weapon exchange with potential opponents that seems to haunt our own programs.
The current Russian Navy is thus modern, highly technical, and possesses different ships than we are accustomed to in the West. Our real difficulties come when we try to assess the mission—hence threat—of this navy. If we can turn from the monotonous and fallacious tallying of shipboard weapon systems which passes today for doctrinal analysis, we can test our candidate in each of the following categories: (1) coastal defense, (2) amphibious support of armies, (3) strategic, (4) presence (show flag), and (5) sea control.
If one views the Russians in the context of their developmental cycle through the 1960s, one sees them embracing all of these missions to an extent, but where lies the emphasis? Certainly strategic forces play a role as hallowed as in the U. S. Navy, but these encompass only a small amount of combat and support units. Hence they may be considered auxiliary units better lumped with the Strategic Rocket Forces. For the same reason we can briefly set aside the army support mission—very traditional to Russian sea forces but also absorbing little in the way of cost. A coast defense mission should not be thought of as gunboats and three-mile limits. Modern weaponry means defensive forces must be able to act over a thousand miles offshore to secure one’s homeland from naval attack. Even long-range voyages to reinforce threatened flanks, such as Rozhdestvenski’s ill-fated sortie from Leningrad to Port Arthur, fall nicely of
the excruciatingly lengthy recovery of war-ravaged Russia, to the extent that a navy had at last become affordabR and—given the satisfactory development of higher-priority strategic ground, and air forces—forgivable?
None of the above is intended t0 appeal to the pacifist or appeaser, j wish only to join with and applau° Mr. Caldwell’s excellent observation that we must accept the Russian fle£t for what it is, not what we would have it be. If the Russian is a potential opponent he must be considered in our fleet doctrine and organization. Bn1 we must not model or even orient ouf fleet solely to his peculiar ships an tactics. The problem and paranoia 0 today stem from a perceived U. S. 4e" cline from a massive, obsolescen1 World War II navy to a smaller, off*' cient, technical arm at the same time that the U.S.S.R. is reaching the sarne force configuration because of a <fe layed rearmament at sea. Actually, c^e Russians are subject to the sarne doubts over the application of sea power and naval missions today as are, and they have the added doubts a5 to the viability of a showpiece fleet without operational experience.
The Mobile Channel Ballistic Missile (MCBM)”
(See R. p. Hulson, pp. 103-105, September 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael A. Janas, U. S. Naval Reserve—Commander Hulson’s Proposal for using the inland/ ■ntercoastal waterways as areas over ^hich to move ballistic missiles in arges, thus making this leg of the Strategic Triad (an outdated concept lr> my opinion) less vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive strike, has many things going for it. However, there are three major flaws in the proposal.
First, while mobility over the Waterways protects our missiles from strategic strikes, such movement inCreases their vulnerability to terrorist/ extremist attacks. Ballistic missile submarines, Strategic Air Command ases> and missile silos can be easily guarded. Missile barges cannot be so Protected. What is to prevent small Powerboats with 200 h.p. outboard rootors from keeping pace with the slower towboats? What would happen if some group decided to board, bomb, or hijack a strategic towboat- barge? The speed at which something like this could happen precludes adopting this idea if for no other reason.
Second, would voters accept the transit of missile barges through or by their towns and cities, especially in light of recent demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups and the Three- Mile Island incident?
Third, while Commander Hulson points out the excellent safety record of barges, the possible ramifications of an accident involving nuclear-armed missiles, given the tides and currents which could carry debris a long way, are another factor against the use of the system.
Nonetheless, I find the Mobile Channel Ballistic Missile a better concept (with some adaptation) than the mobile MX system, if for no other reason than some of the inland waterways parallel the East Coast. Consequently, in case of a preemptive strike, most of the nuclear fallout would be carried to sea by prevailing winds, thus preserving a large part of the United States. Unfettered mobility, as presently engendered in missile submarines, as opposed to area mobility (dog on a leash), is still the key to survivability.
“Strategic Deterrence in the Age of Detente”
CSee R. J. Carlin, pp. 28-35, September 1979 Proceedings)
“Strategic Metaphors”
(See J. C. Scharfen and K. S. Wilcox, pp. 36-41, September 1979 Proceedings)
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Rear Admiral Charles Adair, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I first read the two referenced articles quickly and then realized that they required rereading to understand better the many points brought out. I recommend to those who may not have read these articles do so at the first opportunity. I was surprised to find that the folks who brought us the “Vietnam Disaster" are now prepared to bring us a "Nuclear
Disaster” by use of a “Controlled Nuclear Conflict” or, as they say, a "CNC.”
There is no doubt in my mind that the United States must never again allow “rank amateurs” to control tactical operations which are thousands of miles from Washington. It would be helpful if we would all remember that unwritten law: “If you would avoid a war, be prepared to win it quickly.”
“The Naval Officer/Medical Officer Quandary”
(See M. S. Smith, pp. 42-45, September 1979 Proceedings)
William R. Campbell, M.D.—I served on active duty with the Navy between 1969 and 1971 and had experiences similar to Dr. Smith’s. My Navy orientation was nonexistent. I spent a year at NAS Albany, Georgia. Because of the number of retirees in the area, the medical officers were overworked, and morale was quite low. We were allowed only ten minutes per appointment per patient. The walk-in privileges were terribly abused, and our commanding officer was unwilling to make any effort to correct the situation. Our contact with the remainder of the base was virtually nil. I was refused permission to travel at my own expense to Jacksonville so that I could be qualified to fly in the backseat of the RA-5C, the principal aircraft at the base.
My second year of active military duty was spent in Vietnam attached to an Army MACV advisory team. Because of the attitude of the Vietnamese physicians and the fact that there were adequate Vietnamese personnel available, the advisory position was a complete waste of time. I succeeded in convincing the powers that be in the pacification program of this, and the program was terminated when we rotated home.
I have always been interested in the military and would probably have made the Navy a career if my experiences had been different. There was no effort made to sell me on the Navy or give me any sort of overview as to what a Navy career would be like. I realize that the presence of the draft at that time was probably a major factor. I believe that for the Navy to attract and retain physicians it must improve the working conditions, especially for the general medical officer who sees the majority of the patients. There must also be an effort made to show the prospective medical officer, firsthand, the opportunities available.
Considering the recruitment budget, would it not be feasible for a prospective or recently commissioned medical officer to spend a few days at a Naval Air Station, a Naval Regional Medical Center, and on board a submarine, a destroyer, and a carrier? If this opportunity had been afforded to me, I would most likely still be a naval officer.
sion of training/developing a cadre of persons skilled to patrol the offshore facilities to negate the threat. Upon mobilization, Coast Guard missions would be changing in any event and assets would be diverted from offshore patrols. The Navy’s reservists would mobilize and take over this mission. I believe this can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner.
With Cuba so close to the oil fields of the U. S. Gulf and the scenario of Soviet subs operating from Cuban bases in wartime not impossible, 11 becomes prudent to plan for a response to such a contingency. It’s not too late to invest now in the protection of U. S. offshore oil production facilities- Also, let’s not forget the retention boost such a hands-on training program could give to the Naval Reserve-
Two Proceedings
Robert B. Ross—As a subscriber to Pf°' ceedings and a civilian with no Navy experience, I get two different impreS' sions of the Navy’s capability fro111 reading the magazine. The advertisements of Navy hardware, aircraft) missiles, radar, etc., indicate the Navy is well equipped to defend this country. Many of the articles, however, describe Navy problems which give the impression that the Navy lS not as well organized as it might belt seems as if the Proceedings acts as a safety valve so Navy personnel can let off steam about the apparently serious problems in the Navy.
Book Review—
Soviet Naval Diplomacy
(See S. Kime, p. 95, September 1979 Proceedings)
107®
Captain James Roche, U.S. Navy—^ reading of this work produced quite a different assessment from that of y°uf review. I find this to be a valuabft book, one that fills an important gaP in the literature on the Soviet Navy- However, it is not that judgment but rather a crucial policy implication 0 the reviewer’s image of the SovieC Navy that I want to address. CoU[1][2] mander Kime is a most insight'11
)
]
mense proportions. For example, there ^as scarcely a requirement to declare dense Condition Three during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, if the ’■ship Soviet Mediterranean Fleet constituted a bluff. More important, t e reviewer’s hypothesis could sug- &cst that the future tasks of the U. S.
avy in countering Soviet coercive diP ornacy in the Third World would of
commentator on the Soviet Navy. However, I cannot agree with his finding that this book fails "in disprov- lng the idea that “Soviet naval diplomacy is based on bluff. ...” Poshly, “disproving” is asking for too much. Let me suggest, rather, that che evidence presented in the book is compelling.”
If it were true that Soviet coercive ■plomacy has been only bluff, then this nation has made a long series of strategic and tactical mistakes of im- necessity be relatively undemanding: have only to deploy the necessary fces "to get the drop” on the Vlets> and they will turn around and 8° home.
I don’t find this thesis to be very plausible. The Soviets clearly have the wherewithal to be “serious” in the Third World, and to be so at times and places of their own choosing. Their capabilities, both naval and otherwise, are growing. I believe that the Soviets increasingly will project their power and influence in the Third World. Further, their navy will be an important instrument in their projection activities.
In a crisis the naval balance onscene is always important, but focusing attention exclusively on relative naval capabilities in the abstract can lead to conclusions which are egregiously wrong. The political impact of the general-purpose forces of the superpowers is closely linked to— some would argue, reflect—the state of the strategic nuclear balance. In the period leading to “essential equivalence” (that covered by Soviet Naval Diplomacy), the Soviets could and did engage in effective coercive diplomacy when the circumstances permitted. Should “equivalence” end and the
Soviets achieve strategic superiority, the range of circumstances favoring their politico-military success in the Third World will grow. Thus, the idea that the Soviets have been bluffing could lead us, if we believe it, to take actions which a broader and more realistic outlook would not suggest. Soviet Naval Diplomacy does a praiseworthy job of tracing the developing Soviet commitment to coercive tasks in the Third World. When combined with an appreciation of the generally adverse trends in the overall military balance—especially the strategic nuclear component—the insights presented should give the serious student of national security requirements an appreciation of the complexity involved in developing strategy to counter or cope with Soviet coercive diplomacy. Unfortunately, things just are not as simple as some would have us believe.
(Continued on page 17)
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 27)
“Naval Guns”
N. Polmar, pp. 121-122, August 1979; - ■ R' Blakeley, p. 17, October 1979 Proceedings)
Needed: Heavy Firepo wer”
T- Blades, pp. 50-54, July 1979; A. W. ear. P- 27, September 1979; W. J. Stewart, P- 17, October 1979 Proceedings)
The Growing Soviet Amphibious Warfare Capability”
, ***• h Whelan, pp. 111-112, August Proceedings)
The Future of U. S.
Sea Power”
J. B. Hayward, pp. 66-71, May 1979;
• S- Lind, pp. 22-24, July 1979; R. A.
*ng, pp 87-89, August 1979;
■ Outerson and V. Kennedy, pp. 20-21,
' Ct0ber 1979 Proceedings)
Countering Soviet Imperialism”
E’ Hopkins and W. R. Warren, pp. 197g ’ June *979; A. D. Baily, p. 21, July
1070 n' W' Grazebrook, pp. 90-93, August J Proceedings)
^nmander Harold M. Olson, U. S.
^r' ^Nmar’s survey of U. S. for3 gUnnery Provides further rein- t[leCernent for Commander Blades’ f0SlS t^lat heavy firepower is needed tio SU^0rt °f our amphibious opera- thenS' Captain Whelan’s analysis of farg No wing Soviet amphibious war- in tCapabillty was generally presented Phily^ °f new classes of Soviet am- ihe f °US s*liPS- Not mentioned was has aCt tbat t*le Soviet Navy currently barrel^ 100 six->nch (152-mm.) gun p0wC S t0 support its projection of jn |i<Lr ashore. The one-inch advantage fhe ^ tbarneter the Soviets hold over C S guns remaining in the
Cant k Set may n0t Seem very s‘gn*h- proj’ ut °ne must keep in mind that
Pror,eCtile Payload (>-e., weight) is ra(jj 0rtl0nal to the cube of the bore’s
jectiJS> b°r a ru*e thumb, a pro- e s payload is roughly equal to
five times the radius cubed. Using more precise figures, an increase in bore diameter from five to six inches equates to a 44% increase in payload, whereas an increase from five to eight inches equates to a 156% increase. The 14-pound 76-mm. projectile has only 20% of the capability of a five- inch projectile, or as above, the five- inch represents a 400% increase over the 76-mm. Since payload is directly proportional to killing power, it is hoped the point will be obvious. The Mk-71 8-inch/55 caliber major caliber lightweight gun (MCLWG) offers a dramatic improvement in killing power—and range—over the five- inch gun.
Current gun requirements for naval gunfire support (NGFS) are reduced by Mr. Polmar to a table attributed to "Marine Corps Doctrine.” I question the validity of this table for two reasons: (1) underlying assumptions are not presented (i.e., availability of tactical air support); and (2) too many variables are not accounted for (e.g., target ranges, hardness of targets, counterbatteries, mines, weather, etc.). Basing our force structure on these requirements without a solid concept of their implications is risky.
Mr. Polmar rightly concludes that the MCLWG is needed. However, he offers no answer to the question of which ship class it should be placed upon. If placed on a high-capability ship that will be needed to operate with battle groups or strike forces, operational commanders will be reluctant to free the ship for NGFS duties. Alternatively, arming older destroyer types provides a solution for only the few remaining years of life left in these hulls. Using the LSD-41 class as an MCLWG platform sacrifices a large measure of flexibility as to where and when fire support can be delivered. By combining the functions previously carried out by more specialized ships, we have already put many of our eggs into one basket with our current amphibious ship classes. Adding NGFS to the missions of an LSD, LHA, or LPH would be detrimental to the overall performance of their primary duties.
As an alternative, I propose a totally new class of ship that would use the proven Spruance “common platform” specialized for NGFS. Even though this ship would look like a destroyer and would be carrying out one of the missions historically associated with destroyers, she should be designated an amphibious fire support ship (LFS) to make her association with the amphibious forces clear and to avoid the politics associated with defining the role of a new destroyer class. The LFS would be an all-gun ship intended to operate with amphibious ships, and therefore should have no antisubmarine warfare capability and only close-in antiaircraft warfare protection. The elimination of the sonar dome and associated equipment would allow greater freedom while maneuvering in shallow waters, reduce manning requirements, and allow more space and weight for ammunition stowage.
The weapon suite for the LFS would consist of two 8-in./55 caliber MCLWGs, three 5-in./54 caliber Mk-45 guns, two 20-mm./76 caliber close-in weapon systems (CIWS), and two EX-83 advanced modular naval armament systems (AMNAS). Gunfire control would be accomplished using two Mk-86 systems, each integrated with a Seafire electro-optical fire control system. The EX-83 Mod 0 AMNAS is a seven-barrel “Gatling" gun and is included in the LFS weapon suite as a complement to the six-barrel 20-mm. Mk-15 Phalanx CIWS system. The EX-83 can deliver impressive firepower against surface targets and hi-dive air targets, whereas the CIWS is optimized for the sea-skimming antiship cruise missile threat. Capable of firing up to 4,200 rounds per minute, the EX-83 can fire a 30-mm. explosive projectile designed for antitank purposes. With its independent ballistic processor,
1. 8-in./55 MCLWG 4. AN/SPQ-9 radar antenna for the Mk-86 GFCS
2. 5-in./54 Mk-45 gun mount 5. 20-mm/76 cal. Mk-15 CIWS six-barrel Gatling
gun
3. Seafire electro-optical fire control system 6. 30-mm. EX-83 Mod 0 seven-barrel Gatling gun
H. M. OLSON
define insurgency as:
“A condition resulting from a revo^ or insurrection against a constitute government which falls short civil war. In the current context! subversive insurgency is primarily Communist-inspired, supported, °r
base5'
Huh
this mount could be readily integrated with the Mk-86 gunfire control system. A burst fired across the bow of any ship with this gun would truly gain attention. The Seafire director will contain a laser capable of illuminating a target for the guided projectile as well as range-finding, a thermal-imaging system (i.e., forward-looking infrared radar), and a daylight TV system. Seafire will be capable of three-dimensional automatic tracking and will provide improved performance in an emission control/ electronic countermeasures environment, counterbattery firing, and covert night operations.
Captain Bowling was correct in his August comment that the Mahanian concepts of battle groups have been debunked and that we need a more balanced composition of forces in the U. S. Navy than that resulting from our current emphasis on 12 battle groups. Commander Grazebrook projects the decline of U. S. amphibious capability in his August comment. Bringing together these complementary ideas recently espoused on the pages of the Proceedings would lead me to believe that we need to get our act together—now!
The LFS would provide needed major caliber fire support concentrated on a proven platform, would not be subject to overriding operational demands to support strike forces, would not be a relatively high-cost investment, and would be a reasonable step toward a more balanced force structure. When “gunboat diplomacy” is called for, let’s show the flag on board a ship that looks like a warship—an amphibious fire support ship.
“Seapower in the Indian Ocean: A Requirement for Western Security”
(See J. Lacouture, pp. 30-41, August 1979;
R. A. Best, p. 21, September 1979 Proceedings)
“Soviet Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean”
(See W. F. Hickman, pp. 42-52, August 1979 Proceedings)
Commander J. Lacaille, French Navy—The two referenced articles appear to be slightly contradictory. The former goes deeply into all the different aspects of all Western interests and navies involved in the Indian Ocean area; the latter just skims the ocean (the northern side only) and' picks up only the ships which appear through very special glasses indeed: right eye for the U. S. Navy, left eye for the Soviet Navy . . . and no eye for other flags!
I suggest you arrange a meeting between these two valuable contributors to your superb magazine. Maybe Captain Lacouture will be able to supply Lieutenant Commander Hickman with some valuable and useful information about a new “balance of power” in the Indian Ocean!
“Counterinsurgency: Corrupting Concept”
(See W. F. Long, pp. 56-64, April 1979;
J. C. Snedeker, pp. 86-87, July 1979; H. McCaffrey, pp. 94-96, August 1979 Proceedings)
Charles J. L. T. Kovacs—The Vietnam War had many bad effects on our country, and Colonel Long identifies quite a few of them. However, I wonder how right he is to attribute these effects to counterinsurgency g<r re- The Dictionary of United States Mid' tary Terms for Joint Usage (December
1964) and U. S. Army Field Manua 31-21, Special Forces Operations (Jufie
1965) , define counterinsurgency as: “Those military, paramilitary! political, economic, psychologic* and civic actions taken by a g°v‘ ernment to defeat subversive insurgency.”
The previously cited sources further
exploited.”
Although these definitions le*ve blurred the distinctions between gue rilla warfare, irregular warfare, an conventional conflict fought in un usual terrain, as a practical matter, 111 surgency tends to be defined as a 1°^ level, low-intensity conflict fought W an indigenous populace against an 1(1 digenous or foreign government’ which in turn may or may not hav^ external support. The unique aspect insurgency, as opposed to irregu* warfare, is the inability of the ‘nSllf gents to escalate fighting above 1 platoon/company level, generally ^
and/or the absence of secure
Malaya, Kenya, Sarawak, and the
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insurgency in the Philippines are examples of insurgencies, and in all of these cases, the insurgents were unable to concentrate their own forces above the company level, and were therefore, for that and some other reasons, defeated by the successful use of counterinsurgency techniques.
Vietnam was clearly another story. Even in the French-Indochinese War, the Vietminh were successful in fighting battalion and regimental actions as early as 1949, and eventually they wore down the French Union forces by fighting a war on several levels: petty skirmishes by lightly armed guerrillas which forced the defenders to spread themselves thinly on the ground, and thus make them excellent targets for the conventional main force units, which by 1953 included infantry divisions complete with battalions of medium artillery. The Vietnam War followed much the same script. Although it always had its links to North Vietnam, until the early 1960s it was a low-level affair with only a few thousand North Vietnamese joining in the fighting each year. By 1963, however, the Vietcong began to fight and win battalion-sized actions, and indeed, American ground forces were first committed in 1965 largely because the Vietcong were winning so many of these battles that the South Vietnamese Army was in considerable danger of collapsing.
Subsequent to the arrival of U. S. ground forces, fighting followed the French pattern: it was still a multilevel war, although American technology and firepower made it virtually impossible for the Vietcong to defeat any American unit larger than a company. North Vietnamese involvement, however, continued to escalate, and of course, the final campaign in 1975 probably owed as much to Guderian and de Gaulle, as it did to the precepts of Chairman Mao.
The initial U. S. response to Vietnam may have been to see it simply as a counterinsurgery problem. However, by 1965, it was evident that the real issue was North Vietnam’s aggression against the South, and this became progressively clearer (albeit not to the U. S. public) as the North Vietnamese funnelled ever larger forces into the
South. Although U. S. forces were engaged at the tertiary level in counterinsurgency, civic actions, etc., they were committed to fight the North Vietnamese Army and the Vietcong main force units. This is what most of them were doing, and from a purely military point of view, to very good effect at that. The problem was, I submit, that even though large-scale battles were fought, the nature of the war was unlike Korea or Western Europe, but very much akin to the engagements in Burma during World War II. Although the U. S. forces were incomparably better supplied and had far greater mobility than their Commonwealth counterparts, they were subjected to a greater strain than they could bear, given their psychological preparation, sociological background, and all the other circumstances and factors which came to bear on the makeup of the U. S. forces committed to Vietnam.
I would also submit that the main cause of our failure in Vietnam was not in the shortcomings of the counterinsurgency concept, but rather in our failure to establish clear-cut and easily understandable war objectives. Perhaps this was simply not possible under the political atmosphere of the mid-1960s. This is something for the historians to decide, but the lack of objectives had the following negative effects:
^ We could not use the Special Forces in their original role because we chose not to pose a threat to the political survival of the North Vietnamese regime. Had one of our objectives been to liberate North Vietnam, our Special Forces might have played the same role as the units of the Special Operations Executive did in World War II.
► The body-count syndrome was part of the war of attrition we decided to fight, because we hoped to dissuade Hanoi from sending more troops by killing as many as possible of those who were sent. This would have been unnecessary had we declared it one of our objectives to stop North Vietnamese aggression in a manner and at a place of our own choosing. This might have made for a rather short war, in turn avoiding the bureaucratization of the conflict.
^ Had our soldiers been given good reasons for fighting in Vietnam, and had they known that it was our intention to win the war by carrying 11 home to the aggressor, the discipl*ne of our armed forces would not have disintegrated.
^ What came home from Vietnam was not counterinsurgency, but rather, the effects of the first nationa defeat in American history, and this was a defeat which might have been averted, not by a different approach to counterinsurgency, but by greater courage and better leadership on the part of our politicians.
Colonel Long is painfully right m identifying the negative effects of the Vietnam War; these effects may yet turn out to have been catastrophic m their impact upon our ability to dea with the political and military cha lenges of the coming years. However- I submit that our defeat in Vietnam cannot and must not be simply laid at the door of counterinsurgency, hov' ever misunderstood that term may be' Unless we now intend to withdraw' from all commitments in the Thif^ World, or unless we intend to resp°n to all challenges there with massif force, we will probably have to res° ^ to both insurgency and counterm surgency. Judging from the headlm^ in our newspapers, this may hapP sooner rather than later.
—————
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“Time Out for Tactics”
(See M. A. Libbey, pp. 52-57, January 1979;
C. F. O'Leary, p. 27, April 1979; B. A.
Daly, pp. 88-90, July 1979; H. J. Donigan, p. 29, August 1979 Proceedings)
“Tactical Complacency: Change Now or Fail Later”
(See M. A. Libbey, pp. 34-43, April 1979;
R. A. Dalla Mura, p. 88, July 1979; P. M. Shepherd, p. 87, August 1979; S. D. Arnote, p. 24, September 1979; W. K. Meyers, pp. 99-100, October 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael G. Goodwin, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Libbey’s recent articles which highlight the lack of imaginative tactical thought in the U. S. Navy merely illuminate the tip of the iceberg.
Having served on exchange at the Royal Navy’s shore operations training center (The School of Maritime Operations, HMS Dryad) for over a year, I have witnessed a process for the development and dissemination of tactics which I have not seen in the U. S. Navy. There are four basic elements of this scheme. First, there is a two- volume publication designed to elicit thought and discussion on tactical development. Volume 1, being a datum publication which lays down accepted national and naval doctrine, is a compendium of past experiences and the resulting proven tactics. It explains considerations influencing the various aspects of naval warfare and summarizes the recommended tactics for particular operations. This book is written in the seagoing reader’s terms, is compact and concise, and can be read in a single day’s time. Updating is on an as-required basis. Volume II is used to evolve or improve tactics, and is considered a place for tactical discussion. Officers ashore and afloat are expected to study this book. Volume II is completely revised annually in order to contain the most recent thoughts on tactical development. All aspects of naval warfare are covered by topical area. Within each area the tactical problem under discussion is presented along with a summary of the background, current procedures/ trends, and comments by leading agencies (i.e., training commands, fleet staff, type command staff, afloat staffs, and ships). Individual officers are encouraged to comment through their respective chains of command.
Second, a national publication, known as the “Bible” of tactical development, promulgates tactics and procedures under development. Items are carried in one of two categories. First are those which propose doctrine as alternatives to national or NATO procedures but are not yet accepted for national use (i.e., still in the initial trial and evaluation stages). These procedures are used only at sea for evaluation purposes. Second are those of experimental doctrine accepted for national use as alternatives to current NATO doctrine. These items are taught and used throughout the Royal Navy and are the basis for recommendations for changes to established NATO doctrine. This publication is reviewed continuously and amended, as necessary, every four months.
The third element is The School of Maritime Operations (SMOPS). SMOPS is the heart of Royal Navy shore operations training. It is through the shore training that tactical and procedural doctrines contained in the governing publications are propagated and reinforced via both basic officer and ratings training and more advanced training. In addition, SMOPS staff members are active contributors to both NATO and national tactical and procedural publications.
The final element in the Royal Navy’s tactics program is the Maritime Tactical School (MTS). Colocated with SMOPS at HMS Dryad, the primary task of this school is the five- week maritime tactical course designed to update officers en route to assignments as commanding officers, squadron commanders, and/or chiefs of staff in such areas as the current threat, electronic orders of battle, and tactical procedures and doctrine. The instructors are post-command warfare specialists, and the course is well subscribed to by several NATO navies. Secondary functions of the school include sponsorship of the publication described as the first element and hosting study periods at which senior officers from several NATO navies convene to conduct an in-depth study of a specified area of naval warfare. In short, MTS is the Royal Navy center for tactical thought.
The bottom line to the Royal Navy system is the involvement of the fleet on a daily basis in the evaluation, modification, and standardization of tactics. With the evolutionary process of national and NATO publications, the Royal Navy is well ahead in, and has extensive experience with, “new tactics/doctrines when they appear as changes to the NATO tactical doctrine-
‘The Future of U. S. Sea Power”
(See T. B. Hayward, pp. 66-71, May 1979; W. S. Lind, pp. 22-24, July 1979; R- A. Bowling, pp. 87-89, August 1979; W. Outerson and V. Kennedy, pp. 20-21, October 1979 Proceedings)
Captain A. H. Vito, Jr., U. S. Naty (Retired)—Someone once wrote that n isn’t the things we don’t know that hurt us, it’s the things we know that aren’t so that do us in. So, Mr. Lind, in his comments on the incompatibd' ity he perceives in consideration of 3 new offensive naval strategy and the big carrier, is misled by some thing5 he knows but which simply aren t so Coincidentally, if Mr. Lind were to read Mr. Caldwell’s letter which it0 mediately preceded his in the Ju^ Proceedings, he may now discover 3 major flaw in his argument.
Mr. Lind says that CNO’s new offefl sive strategy and the emphasis on the big carrier are mutually exclusive an that they contradict one another, h* bases this conclusion on some thing5 he knows. First, the Soviet Navy primarily a submarine navy. Secon > big carriers “loaded with attack a>r craft” have little capability to threat*-13
clincher, few of these attack aircr< will ever reach their targets anyh°^ Third, the Soviet Navy has no big ca^ riers. Ergo, big carriers are no long militarily useful.
Perhaps because the carrier has be around for so long a time, there never been a shortage of "mtm analysts” ready to conclude her has ended. After World War II, th^ were many thinkers, including at1 ^
*
A
th«
submarines, and, he adds as
■aft
one Secretary of Defense, who "
The ■
cruj Irnpetus for the flight-deck fere ^ arose at the London Naval Con- tech11"0 °*' 1930 where my father was a confe"^ advisor. The purpose of the nient^H06 WaS t0 hmit naval arma- thernS an^> if possible, to reduce Pton i 0tl1 were accomplished. The ac0se°Sa /or the flight-deck cruiser terrris Pt'marily because under the tonn ° ^on^on Treaty the carrier age allowance of the 1922 Wash-
ready to write off the carrier as obso- ete- Two wars later, Mr. Lind labors t0 the same conclusion, ignoring his- c°ry and the record, and basing his c inking on what he knows about the erivation of military requirements. Mr. Caldwell explains better than I |^at the justification for a strong ■ S. Navy and a vigorous naval strat- e£>y is not and never has been directly ated to the composition of the oviet Navy. The United States is not ’ e Soviet Union. Our resources, our fe°graphics, our alliances, and our a*rns are not the Soviets’. Our military °rces are not tailored to Soviet re- ^*rements- The day that Mr. Lind ^ others who are concerned with
th \ m'litary strength understand at basic fact and unlearn some of the Qln^s they already know, we will be n our way to a more effective applica- tl0n of our resources.
Through-Deck Cruiser: The ^ew Capital Ship”
^ M A. Cairl, pp. 34-42, December 1978; T '■ “5hneider, pp.' 26-27, February 1979;
J. T u°baCk' P' 81- March 1979; J. Buziak,
• ayward, and N. Friedman, pp. 86-89,
Prjr J979’ W' E- Me>’er- P- 93, June 1979 uceeatngs)
lj ar Admiral William A. Moffett, Jr., cla '( (Retired)—I am writing to
star* ^ ^*Ce Admiral J- T. Hayward's tee jernenc 0n Page 87 of the April Pro- .'n& where he asks, "Wasn’t Rear 'fli 'llIfa* ^‘hiam A. Moffett’s ihis t^eC^ cru*ser a forerunner of rough-deck cruiser concept?” kis • ^ t^lere is indeed some truth in gav^n ^rence> the circumstances which fli l ,*rth t° the concept of the lj„h Nc ec^ cruiser throw a different inferred ^ Su^iect from that which is
ington Treaty was not changed although the United States desired an increase. In fact, because the United States had only built 69,000 tons of the 135,000 tons allowed under the Washington Treaty, it was only after the most strenuous efforts by the U. S. delegation that efforts to reduce the U. S. carrier allowance were defeated. Thus, under the terms of the London Treaty, each signatory power was permitted to place flight decks on 25% of its cruiser tonnage: the United States and Great Britain, 80,000 tons, and Japan, 43,000 tons. This clause of the treaty had a general provision which required that none of these ships would be adapted "exclusively as an aircraft carrier.” Under the treaty the United States could have built eight flight-deck cruisers of 10,000 tons each. It was the consensus that carriers were fully provided for in the 135,000 tons which the United States was allowed under the old treaty strength but had failed to build. This restriction on cruiser-carriers was very disappointing to the Bureau of Aeronautics because the bureau then had plans for a 30-knot cruiser armed with six 6-inch guns and eight 5-inch antiaircraft guns and a complement of 30 to 50 planes. Even though there was some question of diplomacy in describing these vessels as “cruisers” rather than carriers, Admiral Moffett wanted seven of them included in the building program. But the General Board would agree to no more than one flight-deck cruiser, recommending that the rest be as originally designed under the treaty of 1922 and demanding, instead, the building of another small carrier. Since even this recommendation came to nothing, the Ranger (CV-4), as laid down in 1931 and commissioned in 1934, remained the only carrier of her size in the fleet.
In a statement issued to the press in January 1932, pleading for the building of the Navy to the treaty limits, since this country was farther behind in the aircraft carrier category than any other nation signatory to the London Treaty, Admiral Moffett said:
"Every effort should be exerted to procure the passage of a continuing naval program to build up to the treaty limits. All classes of naval
vessels other than aircraft vessels have been well provided for by existing laws. But, in spite of the great importance to the fleet of aviation, only 3 out of a total of 14 permitted vessels are built or building. I, therefore, urge the early construction of the remaining aircraft carriers and of eight flying deck cruisers. If expectations of the capabilities of the latter type are realized, their construction will add tremendously to the effectiveness of the Fleet.”
At about this same time, in a letter to a close friend he wrote:
"The 'Naval Holiday’, if agreed to under the conditions which now appear probable, will be greatly against our national interests. Other nations have built since the London Treaty, whereas we haven’t. Japan has actually greater tonnage than we have. The only satisfaction I have in regard to the Japanese is that we are far ahead of them in Aviation, and any war with Japan would be decided by Aviation more than would be the case with any other nation.”
From the foregoing I believe it is clear that Admiral Moffett’s aim was, by any means feasible under the handicapped conditions of the times, to get naval aviation to sea in strength to the maximum degree possible at the earliest date possible. The flight- deck cruiser was not meant to be a panacea. It was to have been but one more rung in the ladder of progress as indeed were the escort and light carrier types at a later date.
It would appear that the problems confronting the Navy today as to types and numbers of vessels it should build are not greatly unlike the problems experienced in the earlier history of our Navy. Perhaps the problems are a bit more complex now, if for no other reason than the very rapid advances in technology. In any event, I believe it is a very encouraging note to see such widespread interest in this very vital question.
ero0
In an article published in the January 1941 Proceedings on the subject of the flight-deck cruiser, I surmised that the "present” war might contribute an answer to the questions of what
hiix of aircraft carriers we should have. I believe it did give an answer for that era and that most of these same concerns apply today.
Retention: Our #1 Goal”
(See R. x Anderson, pp. 82-85, July 1979;
J- S. Jones, p. 23, August 1979; J. Siembieda lo ^ ^a^es> PP- 79-81, September 979; j. J. O'Connell, pp. 11-12, October *979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Brian E. Blair, U. S. Navy Resigned)—I read with interest but *ncreasing disappointment Lieutenant bS-) Anderson’s explication of the avys retention problem. I plowed r rough it hoping to find something at I had not already heard many tlrnes before at command retention tearn meetings, retention inspections, and in plan-of-the-day notes—all the fetention rhetoric that bombarded me '? my four years’ experience as a divi- Sl°n officer.
^ My personal experience is as a rmer crew member of the finest grating battle-ready cruiser of the • S. Atlantic Fleet, with awards to ^0ve *r. Lieutenant (j.g.) Anderson es identify what I agree to be the Primary problem: job dissatisfaction, ot how does the dissatisfied junior lcer express that dissatisfaction to a !*ni°r officer who has been in the , avy for 10-30 years and for whom se. Mavy is his whole life? To that sen,ior officer these ambiguous distractions are completely obscure.
er all, he’s happy doing what he’s e°ne for years. Thus, the JO usually erges from a counseling session (the ^ ce-annual one, when he receives his ^ n®ss report) even more dissatisfied as as been unable or afraid to communicate his plight to his senior. He .. ntlers what he does to earn those °P 5% comments in his fitness re- P°rt when daily all he can remember Demg called upon to produce a new <j*Planation f°r Seaman Recruit ^‘th s haircut and Seaman Appren- C^0nes white socks, th 116 *00^s hard and long to see
Wh at tf*e en<f °f tf'e tunnel
en he can offer to his people the thaS^eCt t*lat t*1'n8s w‘ll better so . at they can take a little rest. But
life*. J
’ mere's the tender availability to
finish, the cruise with only three weeks to get ready, the flag-waving port visit down south, that squadron inspection upon return, the PEB visit after that, the 3-M inspection that’s overdue, the preparations for overseas movement, and so on.
Now the JO finds himself responsible for “selling” the Navy to his own first-termers. But who’s been making a continuous effort to sell the Navy to that JO? Who has that responsibility? Who is it that the JO bumps into daily as he’s OOD on the bridge, or as he’s walking through his division’s berthing space, or as he’s trying to understand why this piece of gear doesn’t work, so he can explain the problem? Who? The commanding officer! But that man’s under tremendous pressure to get his ship safely to a certain point at a certain time and in condition to perform at least several functions simultaneously. And that man has been exposed to and uses a particular motivational technique that works time and again to produce results quickly: fear. The CO hasn't much time to spend selling his Navy to this JO while the ship is dead in the water and the destroyer squadron commander is screaming on the red phone because the flim-flam on the JO’s gedunkus is busted.
Perhaps all this is a little exaggerated, but not much. The inexperienced JO who is charged with selling the Navy to his people is often not even sure why he himself is in the Navy. Who wants to spend 20 years of his life under the stress which fear produces?
The division officer is a key link in the Navy’s retention program because he occupies the position of nearest officer-level communicator in the chain of command to those first- termers the Navy needs. But he’s going to have to believe in the product he’s selling, which means someone has to sell the Navy to him first.
The retention rhetoric implies that the JO is satisfied and happy with his job. From the viewpoint of a very disillusioned former JO, in part responsible for the retention of my own men, I found my position untenable. Perhaps the attrition rate of JOs can be attributed to feelings similar to my own.
Does therein lie the root of the problem? I only hope this might spark some frank communication in wardrooms I'll never see. After all, somebody’s got to drive the Navy’s ships.
Book Review—American Caesar
(See J. R. Wndleigh, pp. 97-98, July 1979 Proceedings)
C. E. Case—I am amused and mildly surprised that Amiral Wadleigh neglected to mention William Manchester’s misrepresentation of the notorious “The World Wonders” message from Fleet Admiral Nimitz to Admiral Halsey during the battle for Leyte Gulf. Manchester says, the message went: "All the world wants to know where is Task Force 34?”
Well-informed historians know that the message actually read: TURKEY TROTS TO WATER RR WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS. The two nonsense phrases tacked on before and after the body were meaningless padding meant to confuse enemy cryptanalysts. An inexperienced communications officer (an ensign, of course) removed the first phrase (TURKEY TROTS TO WATER) but left the last (THE WORLD WONDERS), and Halsey read it: WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS. Halsey’s misinterpretation of the message sent him into a snit of undeserved indignation. Were it not for the potentially disastrous effects of Task Force 34 not being where it should have been, and Nimitz’s need to know this, the entire affair might have been consigned to obscurity.
^r°oeedi
Manchester’s reporting of the incident shows Nimitz to be a belligerently sarcastic individual, which anyone associated with naval history knows is a gross canard. The best complete analysis of “The World Wonders” message I have seen is contained in E. B. Potter’s magnificent biography, Nimitz (Naval Institute Press, 1976), beginning on page 411. The Potter and Manchester volumes make striking bookshelf companions and beg for detailed parallel study of numerous other historical points.
The Plight—and Flight—of Our Fighter Pilots”
J- R' Woodfield, pp. 94-95, June 1979; A' E. Smith, p. 24, August 1979; C. Kline 197 C N' Meyers’ PP- 81-82, September J79; D. E. Cummins, p. 93, October 1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander L. W. Blackmon,
• Navy—Admiral Smith proposes
t0 require all candidates for aviation Gaining to sign an agreement that ey will not resign to join a commer- ^al airline for 15 years, unless the - S. Government is reimbursed the ,C°*t °f their aviation training ^50,000).” He further suggests that stockpile” of aviators would relieve k e Pr°hlem of family separation simi- r t0 the blue and gold crew concepts Used by the submarine forces. These uSgestions appear to be both con- fadictory and self-defeating, k he retention of pilots has always ^een a problem and is particularly ute during periods of commercial r lne expansion or reasonably pre- ‘ctable periods of senior commercial ^ ot attrition. A 15-year commitment ^°uld not alter these facts. It could, °Wever, ten<d to discourage a consid- 0.pp e Percentage of aviation-minded ^ lcers and impair the recruiting of re°U aviation candidates. The end u ts, if taken to not too illogical extrnes’ would be a reduction in newly in repiacement pilots, an increas-
nj y senior military aviation commu- o^y> an accelerated reduction in the anj military aviation population, sa c°ncomitant increase in those
Wcmj COncerns that a “stockpile” u d supposedly rectify.
e ^rift Toward the Draft”
LaV■ L Sage’ PP- 38‘45’ June 1979; A. G. Gab ar°n’ p' 24’ AuSust 1979; R. A.
Rohrie1’ P' 91, SePtember 1979; F. W. m’ Pp. 87-89, October 1979 Proceedings)
Smallshaw—After reading thQUte-ant Colonel Sage’s article, I tni 'if . t*1e v‘ews of a draft age youth ^ t interest the membership. eheve that reinstatement of the pjfstw°uld be a mistake at this time.
those " mUSt remembered that e who are draft age grew up in the
Vietnam era. Many of my peers have a bad feeling towards the military because of this political and military blunder. I do not see risking my life or the possibility of being maimed to fight a no-win war. Many times I have heard the comment from friends, "I will fight to defend my country, but I’ll go to Canada before I am forced to fight in a Vietnam.” Although the violent and disruptive demonstrations against the draft are over, the spirit of them still lingers.
Second, the draft is forced military service. The U. S. Government forcing its citizens to do something against their will goes against the principles of free will that this nation was founded on. Most people raised on a freewill doctrine will resist a mandate with the ramifications that the draft has. It cannot be expected to force a structured and ordered society, such as the military, on free people without resistance.
Third, the reaction to the draft at this time is unpredictable. A draft might be accepted passively, or it may cause demonstrations matching those of the 1960s. Those demonstrations caused a dangerously unstable situation for our country’s system of government. This nation needs the support of its young people, not their defiance.
Two points made by Lieutenant Colonel Sage really bother me. First, he wants to educate the “American public about the real need for a draft.” The only way I could see him selling the draft is by launching a massive propaganda campaign. Being in the armed services calls for long hours at low pay. To many, this is too much of a sacrifice no matter how much "adventure" the Navy claims is involved. Maybe an education that instills, not forces, pride for our nation in the youth would be more productive.
The second point that bothers me is the statement, “The fact that more than one-third of those who would be affected favor the draft is certainly a surprising measure of acceptance and an indication that many young Americans place national defense high on their list of priorities." I do not see these figures as a positive acceptance, but as a sad reality that almost two-
thirds of America’s youth fail to see the importance of the defense of their country.
These views I hold are not the result of an anti-military attitude; I support the military. Every nation must defend its citizens. I feel so strongly on this point that 1 volunteered for military service. Although I was rejected for medical reasons, I still strongly support the military.
The draft offers a quick solution to the serious manpower problems of the military. But because of the bad feelings left by the Vietnam conflict, the violation of our principles of free will, and the unpredictable reaction to a draft, I believe the draft could cause problems that far exceed those it will be intended to solve. I hope the officers in the military service can accept these views of a 19-year old.
“Navy Said to be Unfair to Blacks”
(See G. C. Wilson, p. 126, August 1979
Proceedings)
Henry Lewis Swank—Mr. Wilson’s report on the purported unfairness of the Navy to voluntary black enlistees smacks of sophistry. If his thesis be equal opportunity for each enlistee, should not each enlistee offer minimally equal potential to achieve the highest standard of proficiency possible in his naval warfare specialty? After all there are no second prizes in a sea battle!
The dictates of political and social interests, however well intended, are completely misdirected when they attempt to set arbitrary standards for the selection of personnel for a nuclear navy. Should such a navy ever be defeated because of the educational inadequacies of its people, the social scientists, and others would see the immediate negation of the very thing they had sought to achieve.
It does not seem reasonable that any American ask that our first lines of defense be manned and commanded by any less than the most able. Competence is not determined by color, but color of any kind is not a substitute for competence.
et-o0
“International Terrorism and
The Defense of Offshore
Facilities”
(See J. F. Ebersole, pp. 54-61, September
1979 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James Murphy, U. S. Naval Reserve—A thorny problem not addressed by Lieutenant Commander Ebersole is that exploratory rigs working on the U. S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) need not be U. S. flag. Section 30 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 provides exemptions to the requirements that vessels, rigs, platforms, or structures be U. S. flagged and manned. U. S. jurisdiction over such vessels is clouded and has yet to be tested in court. Turning the problem inside out, what type of response would the United States make to a Soviet-flag rig or construction vessel on the U. S. OCS should it be sabotaged by U. S. citizens?
[2] agree with Lieutenant Commander Ebersole: the Coast Guard and Navy should form a mutual system for prevention/response to the offshore terrorism scenario. However, I would suggest the Coast Guard be tasked with the mission in peacetime for operational matters. Despite the number of missions already assigned, the Coast Guard already has an offshore presence. Short of mobilization, the Naval Reserve can be tasked with the mis