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Presidents Carter and Brezhnev sign the SALT 11 Treaty in Vienna on 22 June 1979.
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
The current so-called strategic arms race is a natural consequence of a real political rivalry. It is an expensive method of competition, hut it need not increase the danger or likelihood of nuclear war if each side behaves prudently and with proper and mature attention to the reasonable interests of the other side.
We live in the “Age of Detente”—a time of real and imagined benefits which purportedly come to us as a result of sometimes real, but more often assumed, reductions in tension. It is a time of strange contradictions during which we have seen a continuing and dramatic growth in the Soviets’ military power—far beyond their apparent requirements fof defense. I suggest that it is this growth of strength and the obvious willingness to use it as a basis for projecting Soviet influence around the world that truly characterize the so-called “Age of Detente.” It is also this trend that establishes new requirements for the strategic planners of the Free World. Deterrence of war is an even more urgent imperative today than ever before. However, the bases and requirements for deterrence have changed dramatically if recent years. It is this change which provides the im-
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ne three elements are inextricably related. A credi-
petus for the following appraisal, which, it should be n°ted, is primarily concerned with the military aspects of our security program. As such, it does not deal with other important factors such as economic and domestic policy questions. It is not a prescription for a comprehensive national program.
Certainties and Options: There are only two certainties in the strategic situation existing today between the United States and the Soviet Union:
^ Any war between the United States and the H-S.S.R. could escalate into a strategic nuclear exchange.
^ Such a strategic nuclear exchange could result in the destruction of both nations as viable 20th century societies.
Obviously, these are not “certainties” in the sense that they describe an inevitable sequence of events. Rather, they highlight the fact that it is the un- 'tiown factor—what could happen—that serves to tRtiy both us and the Soviets the option of war with each other. It is important to recognize that I am not suggesting that any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably lead to a strategic nuclear exchange or that such an exchange "■ould inevitably destroy both societies. The point is that these are real possibilities and, because of their overwhelming potential consequences, we must search for policies and strategies to minimize the tisks wherever possible.
The cornerstones of a policy for survival include:
^ Avoidance of war with the Soviet Union Preservation of the American way of life Honoring of U. S. commitments as a Free World leader
Policy for survival must be responsive to all three ternands. Development of such a policy should begin Wirh a critical assessment of deterrence as a strategic Policy.
Deterrence as a Strategic Policy: A review of policy statements by U. S. leaders during the past several tecades establishes deterrence—particularly deterrence of nuclear war—as the fundamental military Policy of the United States. In general terms, it apPears that there are only three possible outcomes if eterrence fails and nuclear exchange between the °viet Union and the United States ensues:
A condition of relative advantage for the United States
^ A condition of relative advantage for the Soviet Union
^ A condition in which both societies are essentially destroyed and neither side emerges with a clear advantage
Given the quality and quantity of weapons now maintained by both the United States and the Soviet Union, it is generally assumed that the third possible outcome is the most likely result. This feeling, normally expressed in the statement that “there can be no winner in a nuclear war,” provides the primary impetus for our policy of deterrence. Unfortunately, it may also contain the seed of doubt which could destroy the credibility of that deterrence. To better understand this apparent paradox, let us first examine the nature of deterrence.
To deter is to dissuade someone from undertaking an action through fear of the consequences. Deterrence depends in great measure on the beliefs of the adversary, his image of how the deterrer will react in various circumstances, and on his own capabilities and goals.
Thus, it is not only what the deterrer is capable of doing, but what the opponent perceives him capable of doing that makes deterrence effective. However, it is not safe to assume that capability and deterrence need not be directly related. A policy of deterrence requires ability to do harm. Without capability, deterrence becomes bluff. History has shown that bluffs tend to be called—frequently with disastrous results. Fear, based on a perceived threat, is an essential factor in establishing a deterrence system. The certainty of response is at least as important as its magnitude. By applying these rules to the current world situation, it can be argued that the strategic deterrence systems between the United States and the Soviet Union could fail if the Soviets were convinced that the government of the United States had lost the will to use its nuclear force. They could be tempted to risk confrontation if they were to believe that the Americans, convinced that there was no chance of achieving relative advantage in a nuclear exchange, would decide against mutual destruction and would accede to Soviet pressures.
Considering the risks involved, it is difficult to hypothesize a goal which the Soviets would consider important enough to make such a scenario a realistic concern. Clearly, their analysis of our will would be only one of many considerations involved in such a decision. Nevertheless, the one thing which can nullify a deterrence strategy faster than anything else is outward evidence of an unwillingness or a reluctance to carry out the threat inherent in the strategy.
The single most desired characteristic of deterrence is stability. The unknowns and uncertainties inherent in any deterrence situation—(What is unacceptable to your opponent? How does he perceive the cost-
versus-gain equation? What does he believe to be your threshold of provocation?)—and the total lack of confidence in what would happen if the “button" were pushed, combine to create a degree of stability between the United States and Soviet Union which is quite independent of specific measurable factors.
Given the range of uncertainty involved, it is not difficult to understand the depth of the problem of determining what strategic forces are required for deterrence—“How much is enough?” It has been suggested that this problem could be alleviated, perhaps eliminated, if there were a free exchange of information between the adversaries. If each side were more aware of the opponent’s strategic objectives, the capabilities of his weapons, and his future development plans, then a stable strategic balance would be possible. When both sides were satisfied that they had all the facts, and their current forces were adequate to satisfy strategic objectives as they were perceived, the arms race would be stabilized and the continued proliferation of weapons could be ended. The continuing Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) talks appear to be aimed, at least in part, at providing the necessary facts and degree of confidence. The problem remains one of belief. Since 1965, the Soviets have given every indication they believe that nuclear war is possible and that they must have a war-fighting, not merely a warpreventing capability. The belief that military capability can be exploited politically has always been a fundamental precept of Soviet doctrine. There is no real evidence that either the “Age of Detente” or the new “nuclear realities” have altered those beliefs.
The current so-called strategic arms race is a natural consequence of a real political rivalry. It is an expensive method of competition, but it need not increase the danger or likelihood of nuclear war if
each side behaves prudently and with proper and mature attention to the reasonable interests of the other side. The problem becomes one of ensuring mutual understanding of each side’s view of its vital interests as well as educating each other to modify unreasonably expansive views of such interests.
Consider briefly current U. S. policy with respect to deterrence. It postulates a spectrum of conflict ranging upward in intensity from “sub-theater or localized warfare” to “strategic nuclear war.” The “balanced force” concept implies that nuclear weapons
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deter only nuclear war and that conventional arms are required to deter nonnuclear war. A fundamental assumption inherent in such reasoning is that a major conventional war, involving the United States and Soviet Union as adversaries, is indeed possible. Much as been written on the problems involved in limit- *ng a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not necessary to agree or disagree with any of the popular theories. It is important only to ^cognize that they are in fact only that—theories, here is absolutely no way to guarantee the non-use
° nuclear weapons (tactical or strategic) in a U. S.- U-S.S.R. war. 6
The concept of a possible spectrum of conflicts between the superpowers appears to present a strategic Paradox. The argument has been made that, if we punishment is designed to fit the crime, and a range of responses is available to the deterrer—is proposed as a defensive measure against escalation. However, the doctrine suffers from two potentially fatal flaws:
► It is a worthless policy if not accepted by all participants in a conflict (and that may not be possible because of differences in available weaponry or target systems).
► By making war seem more practicable, and the cost of war apparently more acceptable, such a policy could serve to make war more likely.
There are advantages to be gained from a flexible posture, but flexibility should not be aimed at expanding the kinds of war we can fight. It should provide us a variety of options to conduct the kind of war nobody desires but which could result from esca-
ia- fai1 to deter the full spectrum of conflict, the Soviets ief °u^ carry out aggression in a piecemeal fashion, ial . c act of aggression being too slight in itself to sts ,,Usj’fy nuclear reprisal. At first glance, the so-called ;a- ■a arn' tactics” appear to provide the Soviets with a &nuicant potential advantage. However, once 8ain, the inescapable fact is that, in pursuing such a ct lcy> the Soviets would have to accept some risk of a annihilation. And even if the degree of risk k re Perceived to be small, the stakes at risk would e the highest possible.
e doctrine of condign deterrence—in which the
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lation or accident. To the extent that “flexible response” policies create an impression of a willingness to fight some kinds of war, essentially on terms dictated by our opponent, they jeopardize our survival. There is a clear and pressing need for U. S. planners to recognize the fundamentally changed strategic relationship which exists between the Soviet Union and the United States and to generate a new posture which goes beyond deterrence—away from reliance on assured destruction—toward a policy of assured survival. This does not dictate, as some have suggested, a return to isolation, renunciation of all “foreign entanglements,” abandonment of our allies, or resurrection of the doctrine of “massive retaliation.” Our survival demands an awareness of world trends and positive involvement in international issues commensurate with our responsibilities as the most powerful Free World nation. We have a leadership role. We cannot walk away from our heritage or attempt to confine it to our small corner of the world.
In recent years, particularly since the original SALT agreements, there has been growing concern with what has been termed the “mutual hostage” relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The initial SALT agreements seemed to institutionalize mutual vulnerability of civilians as a basis for deterrence. That concept is now being challenged on both moral and practical grounds. Much of the discussion on both sides of the issue, by implying an element of choice, ignores the facts. The mutual hostage relationship which exists today is a physical reality and is essentially impervious to policy. Given the quantity and quality of weapons available to both sides, there is no certain way to prevent destruction of both societies in a strategic nuclear war. We must develop a policy which accepts these hard facts as an impetus for avoiding war.
Strength in Numbers—Mutual Defense: Since World War II, the United States has participated in numerous mutual defense treaty organizations aimed at deterring war by raising the number of potential participants and risks for an aggressor. More often than not, the United States has been the guarantor in these alliances. Our military strength has provided the means for deterrence and our nuclear umbrella, the underlying guarantee. Given the new circumstances which exist today, the nuclear umbrella concept must be reevaluated. Any agreement which creates a situation whereby the United States is left with only the choice between war with Russia or renunciation of the given treaty should be recognized as perilous and unrealistic. If the concept of an American nuclear umbrella is to have any validity at all in today’s world, it must be based on total flexibility of choice on the part of the United States. It is such flexibility that provides a cornerstone for our survival.
How then can the United States survive and still contribute to the defense of those who look to us for support? First, we should be certain that our commitments are not based on promises which we may not be willing to honor or are not capable of fulfilling. Our allies would be more realistically served by forthright statements of an American willingness to act when and if our interests require it. Our allies must understand that avoidance of a Soviet-American war is a primary goal of U. S. policy.
Inherent in this potential “new look” would be increased participation by our allies in all elements of their own defense. We must be willing to consider the potential advantages of establishing a truly regional defense force in Europe which would confront the Soviets with a real possibility of nuclear war even if they were able to avoid direct conflict with the United States. Such a force would be enhanced by the support and selective participation of the United States. These things could be achieved only after exploration of fundamental issues with both the Soviets and our allies. For example, defining a role for Germany in a truly European defense force would pose very special problems, and the legitimate sensitivity of the Soviet Union toward that role, whatever it is* would have to be recognized. The likelihood of the diverse NATO allies achieving sufficient political cohesion to make such a solution possible is also dependent on a whole range of mutual concerns. However, the potential gain in world security, and particularly in enhanced U. S. survival, may make the end result well worth the effort.
Nuclear Proliferation: At least two compelling reasons argue for a careful reevaluation of the currefl1 U. S. policy on nuclear proliferation: y Some knowledge and technology sharing is inherent in the proposal for a truly regional defense ford which includes a limited nuclear capability.
► Among some sovereign states there is a fundamental lack of acceptance of nuclear proliferation treatin' which seek to sharply limit their options, thereb! condemning them to permanent inferiority.
A fundamental flaw in the frequently heard argD ments in support of non-proliferation treaties is th1 contention that it is the number of players that is th critical factor in a nuclear confrontation. I belie'" that the facts indicate otherwise. Certainly, th Soviet Union has demonstrated that a single nation willing to dedicate a significant portion of its tf
sources to the effort, can develop a nuclear capability which of and by itself threatens the survival of its enemies.
Because of the quality and quantity of their respective nuclear arsenals, the United States and the oviet Union can now threaten the survival of any other nation in the world, including each other. No other nation is in a position to seriously threaten that ‘lateral dominance for the foreseeable future. And s ould the attempt be made, both the United States and Soviet Union are in position to adopt countermeasures to reduce the risk to themselves. The frequently offered dire projection of a future Soviet nion equally concerned about the gigantic U. S. strategic might, the developing Chinese capability, and the possibility of a German nuclear force, and erefore hesitant to pursue bilateral arms control Measures, does not survive critical analysis.
Raising the number of nuclear powers may increase the possibility of nuclear war, at least acciden- a nuclear war. However, it is not inevitable that uternational terrorism would acquire a new dimen- Sl0n of threat. Nor is it a certainty that the threat of actual use of nuclear weapons would be drastically “creased by a more flexible U. S. approach to the Proliferation issue. We should seriously reexamine °Ur policy in the light of the requirements for survi- • If proliferation, is indeed inevitable, then we °uld be trying to determine how that eventuality tuny be turned to our advantage. Certainly, there is n° reason to believe that a more liberal sharing policy qu the part of the United States would invoke a simi- ar response in the Soviet Union with respect to its a >es or with neutral powers.
Flexible Response: Notwithstanding their importance in the event deterrence fails, conventional rces and theater nuclear forces cannot be justified “ the basis of their “contribution” to deterrence. oj°r ‘J0 rhey provide a conclusive option below that strategic nuclear war. At best, they offer a possible -p ernat‘ve to immediate escalation to general war.
ls is not to say that they are valueless, or that they °Uld never serve in exactly the manner hoped for.
Too often, our goal seems to have been to develop a conventional force capable of definitively settling a major confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union. Such reasoning ignores the new realities. Maintenance of nonstrategic forces at levels which envision their being employed in protracted, finally conclusive, conflicts between the superpowers may be unnecessarily wasteful. In addition, by providing the ability to fight extended “limited” wars, such force postures may make war more likely, and thereby increase the opportunities for escalation to total destruction. Our capability and our declaratory policy should make it clear to the Soviets that we seek first to avoid war, but that if war comes, we can and will determine the punishment which best suits the crime. It should also be clear that this doesn’t imply either a tit for tat” or a “massive retaliation" policy.
The Triad Forever? Maintenance of the triad— manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles—has become an almost invulnerable, unquestioned article of faith in the theology of U. S. strategic thought. The widespread belief that the overall success of our strategic endeavors is critically and absolutely dependent on the success of each independent leg of the triad could lead to the allocation of the most funds to the least productive element. There is no convincing evidence that the existence of the current triad repre-
sents anything other than happenstance. Our strategic forces evolved as our technological capability expanded. The triad concept did not become an element of strategic dogma until after the systems were in existence. But once accepted, the dogma has become virtually locked in concrete. Current debates on strategic force issues, such as the decisions to kill the B-l bomber, develop the MX missile, and investigate a counterforce capability for Trident, all reflect generally unquestioned acceptance of the triad requirement.
It has been suggested that we might more profitably (from both an economic and a strategic viewpoint) consider sawing off a weak triad leg rather than attempting to prop it up. Then, depending on our needs, we might get along with two legs or develop one or more new and different legs. In reevaluating the true contribution of the triad to deterrence, we need to strike a balance between what is required for survival and what is desired for reserve. We should be careful not to confuse the two objectives. Neither should they enjoy equal status in our hierarchy of priorities.
Passing the SALT: Many Americans hold the belief that “any” SALT agreement is better than no agreement. I certainly do not. At best, arms control measures may reduce costs, buy time, and provide an atmosphere of reduced tension. Together, these not inconsiderable benefits enhance the possibility that negotiations eventually will replace fighting. However, an arms race is like a war in that it can be won or lost, and it becomes an inherently bad thing only when it is lost. To be helpful to the cause of peace, an arms control agreement must be formulated so that it serves to convince all the parties to the agreement that they cannot achieve their objectives through the use of force or the threat of force.
Such an agreement could help maintain an effective deterrence system while at the same time reducing the cost in men and treasure. However, deterrence remains the primary objective—not reducing costs. We must realistically recognize that any arms race is infinitely less expensive than war and, in fact, is an acceptable, albeit undesirable, substitute for it.
With respect to the ongoing SALT discussions, two paramount interests of the United States should be accommodated in any future agreement. On the one hand, we must not surrender our capability to neutralize the Soviet war machine in the one rational way open to us—through advanced technological developments. And secondly, any SALT agreement which adversely affects European security—such as one which allows the Soviet Union unlimited numbers of “Backfire” bombers and mobile, MIRVed SS-20 ballistic missiles—would have serious adverse repercussions across a broad spectrum of associated issues. A great concern is that a treaty which would reduce NATO’s capability to deter war would actually increase the possibility of war between the United States and the Soviet Union!
Civil Defense: In October 1978, President Carter approved Presidential Directive 41, thereby reintroducing civil defense as a factor in the U.S.- U.S.S.R. strategic balance. Subsequent discussion has generally centered on two basic points:
► Civil defense won’t work, and therefore it will have no effect on the strategic balance between the superpowers.
► Civil defense would be extremely provocative and would force the Soviets to escalate the arms race by developing offensive systems and tactics to counter our defensive measures.
The first argument ignores the important fact that any effective civil defense system—even a limited one—may make significant contributions to deterrence by demonstrating visible capability and will- Moreover, active civil defense measures correctly recognize the fact that, despite our best efforts, deterrence may fail. Any such war would be a disaster of unprecedented proportions—and in that sense, would be unacceptable. Nevertheless, 40 million dead Americans would be worse than 20 million (if nowhere else, at least in the eyes of the 20 million survivors). The argument that a U. S. civil defense program would be provocative to the Soviets appears to be somewhat contradictory to the first argument- If it won’t work, why should it be provocative? And why would the Soviets view a U. S. civil defense program provocative when their own continuing civil defense efforts are estimated to cost nearly $2 billion every year?
For too long we have emphasized the hopeless phi' losophy that nobody can win a nuclear war. While this may or may not be true, it true that one can lose such a war. If, after a nuclear exchange, one nation is in a position of relative military and/or political disadvantage with respect to its opponent, that nation can be said to have lost the war. This is true regardless of the extent to which the opponent may have suffered in the conflict. Our overriding objective should be to prevent nuclear war. But we cannot afford to rule out measures that would reduce potential damage to the United States and its citizens in th£ event deterrence fails. A realistic civil defense program would be a prudent adjunct to a national polio) for assured survival.
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Our strategic policy with respect to the Soviets must be reevaluated to be certain that it takes into account the new realities and that it is based on a realistic appraisal of probable Soviet objectives and ■mentions as well as on their growing capabilities. It seems reasonable to believe that their fundamental national interest is the same as our own—survival. It ■s when we attempt to interpret essential components °f their survival policy that honest differences of °pinion arise. I think that for the foreseeable future the Soviets can be expected to continue to give seri- °us consideration to maintaining the integrity of their borders, ensuring the adhesion of the East European states and the maintenance of fundamental hegemony, continuation of the party as the major instrument of national power and control, and maintaining—probably improving—the strength of the Soviet armed forces. At the same time, we should not ignore the historical record which indicates the ^steem the Soviets have for the “appearance” of a °tward or offensive posture—nor their apparent be- let that strategic parity (or superiority) with respect t° the United States enables them to indulge more reeIy in political or military “adventures.” In their llctions to date, the Soviets have made it abundantly
clear that they see no fundamental conflict between such adventures—or national prerogatives—and the “spirit of detente.”
Therefore, it is imperative that we reconsider, and where necessary recast, our attitudes and policies on the full range of strategic issues, including those cited in this brief review. Survival is our objective. We must ensure that our policies are fully consistent with that primary goal.
Captain Carlin has been intimately involved in strategic issues and associated command and control matters for over a decade, both as a Navy strategic planner and as Iff' Jf an anab'st'/irmnager with the 1113M Corporation of Mc- K Lean, Virginia. During this period, he has served with the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air ^HBI Force Base, Nebraska, and as a senior research fellow, Strategic Research Group, National War College. His last active duty assignment was as special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe/U. S. Commander in Chief, Europe. In that assignment, Captain Carlin had primary responsibilities to General Alexander Haig for NATO and U. S. command, control, and communications systems and procedures related to the employment of nuclear weapons. He is now Manager, Tactical Command and Control Department for the BI)M Corporation. Captain Carlin has published several articles in military journals on the topic of strategic deterrence. He lives in Alexandria, Virginia.
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Half Empty or Half Full? ---------------------------------------------------------------------
When we first landed in Vietnam, our Marine unit was painfully short of supplies. The ntarby Army radio installation, however, was fully equipped. It became a game to con the ^rrny out of some of its supplies, and the commander of the Army unit was furious over his ^>sses. One Marine work party, in search of lumber, drove a truck to the Army compound, atEed it up to a pile of lumber and began loading. When they were nearly finished, an tmy Mp strode up and asked what they were doing. “Just dumping this lumber, Sarge,” Marine replied. “Not here you don’t,” retorted the MP, whereupon the Marine coolly ordered, "All right men, load it back up.”
John Steele
Hands-on Experience
Some years ago when the Navy football team was playing Notre Dame at South Bend, lnT the game was hard fought and a number of penalties were called, most of them against tlu’ SJavy. Sitting behind us were four WAVES who did not take kindly to these Navy St•Tacks. After one 15-yard penalty, a WAVE demanded, “What’s it for this time?” “Illegal °f the hands,” my husband told her. “Wouldn’t you know it?” she said. “That’s the avy for you every time.”
Audrey Pruneda