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A navy is not a completely isolated organization. It is subject to the influences of the society from which it draws its personnel and controlled hy the political philosophy and economic strength of the country it protects. The navies of developing countries are, however, subject to some influences which do not have the same importance as in developed countries.
Perhaps the most important factor which needs to be studied by naval officers of developing countries stems from an assessment of the political stability or, rather, instability—of the country’s governing institutions. Developing countries are those to whom political independence is a recent phenomenon and, therefore, a state of affairs with which people have not yet become familiar. Energies which were combined in earlier days to throw out the imperial or colonial power now get diverted into acquiring power in the representative bodies of the country. This results in what politicians are fond of calling “political awakening.” Quite often, this actually means appealing to the lowest group, tribal, or caste loyalties to win elections. Under such shortsighted assaults, society soon breaks up into its constituent parts. The results may vary from open civil war, through rapidly changing governments, to permanently weak central governments. This state of affairs invariably leads to either left or right totalitarianism. We shall, however, ignore these two forms of government for the present.
The erosion of “nation consciousness” and the fostering of ethnic, caste, religious, and tribal loyalties invariably seep into the armed forces from the socie outside. Surprisingly enough, these differences ten^ to sway the officer class more than men of the 1°" decks. The latter accept such differences in a mor^ natural manner than one would suppose and t proceed to gripe, like all servicemen, on matted_ closer to them—food, leave, the daily routine, a11 ^ watches, family problems, and sex. It is the m° ^ financially settled officer cadre which, being tnot ^ ambitious, is likely to gravitate into separate gr0iaP having extra-organizational loyalties. The Hausa- conflict in Nigeria, the Muslim-Christian a tagonism in the Philippines, and the Bhumipu ^ policies of Malaysia are all examples of the polit,ca turmoil in the country impinging on national navi ^ and personnel policy decisions being based on con siderations other than merit alone. A case of a^ tionalism in the officer corps leading to the brea down of a navy and the subsequent capitulation 0 country in a war has been well documented ) Holger H. Herwig in his book The German Officer Corps: A Social and Political History: 7S9 1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973)- wig makes out that the social differences among c officer corps in the German Navy were so mar 'e and resulted in so much distrust and internecine strife that the navy’s overall morale was destroye This collapse, according to Herwig, was a contribut ing cause to Germany agreeing to capitulate in 19 If a navy wedded to high standards of discipline a a having a tradition stretching to 100 years could e hamstrung during a war by strife within the ofice corps, the magnitude of this problem among navie of developing countries with no national naval tra 1 tion can be understood.
The strength of feeling among the Junkers tS brought out by Peter W. Becker in his review 0 Herwig’s book (American Historical Review, Ju°e 1975, page 669). He stated that the upper classes among senior officers kept themselves socially >s°' lated from the groups below them, and actually sabo taged the submarine force. It would appear, accor '
Ing to Becker, that the senior officers, a group of middle-class conservatives, feared that . . . “an incase in the number of junior grade submarine offiCers would reduce the position and influence of the Senior officer corps,” and that naval initiative would Pass into the hands of the young, radical submariners, ^oday, we can say with hindsight that the Junkers Carried the day and permitted the German Navy to repeat the exercise in World War II.
The navies of developing countries must be aware ^at such pulls exist and not adopt an ostrich-like attitude and pretend that rigid standards of training, mixed with average patriotism, will act as effective atriers to this creeping disease. Just as fissiparous mndencies grow in political life, they will also grow m the navy and not recede with the passing of time.
in all problems, the first step to solving them is to acknowledge their existence.
The second factor of importance to the navies of '■jeveloping countries is technical competence. This is •kely to be easily misunderstood. It is not technical 'gnorance, or lack of technical schools, or shortage of technical facilities. It is a psychological state of mind ^hich does not strive for practical efficiency in tech- mcal matters. This attitude is again a part of the egacy of the society as it exists in developing counties, where prosperity is measured by the size of an °ffice and poverty grinds men into hard and unremit- t,rig 14-hour days of manual labor, year in and year °Ut- To such people, financial emancipation means Nst one thing: a white collar job. The attraction that a white collar job holds for the population of poorer c°untries is a reflex against the memory of unrewarding manual labor over the centuries. Apart from the antagonism to working with one’s hands, there is the attraction of belonging to a bureaucracy whose power is all-pervasive.
This unwillingness to work with one’s hands manifests itself soonest in the poor material state of ships. This may not sound like a special problem of the navies of developing countries, but it is. This poor material state results from massive technical inefficiency among the personnel. In developed countries, on the other hand, it is more often a question of improving management in materials, inventories, or planning. Quite often, the corrective measures taken to improve the material state prove to be counterproductive. Today, “management” is in fashion. When things don t work, it is presumed that the corrective action lies in some organizational or material changes not readily apparent to the layman. For this, one has to import consultants who will arrive at any conclusion, except the correct one—that thousands of men have a lackadaisical approach to work. Since the basic problem is not understood, corrective action invariably takes the form of providing more dockyard facilities, afloat support facilities, class and inspection authorities, and many other things. These steps worsen the situation immediately as the number of chair-bound mechanics increases abruptly and provides avenues of promotion and resettlement
to the existing chair-bound mechanics. Since they are both birds of a feather, the manager who had hoped to repair ships with vast quantities of paper now moves to more important repair responsibilities with attitudes unchanged.
The problem of poor material availability does not end there. It results in less sea time for operational crews, to whom their own ineptness and inefficiency now become apparent. The frustration that this engenders is swapped back and forth in bull sessions until it saps morale permanently. At this stage, the original problem has spread like the tentacles of an octopus so that most persons see only one leg of the beast and recommend its prompt hacking to save the entire situation. Not many persons who live in advanced countries can quite appreciate the problems involved in training a 30th generation farmer to be a mechanic or electrician. His ambition accepts work in a machinery compartment as only a stepping-stone to a white collar job. This gives rise to a pecking order in which the most junior do the actual work and the more experienced men find employment in dockyard liaison, inventory control, administrative work, and other paraphernalia of bureaucracy rather than technical work.
The education of masses of people to change their attitudes is, of course, a difficult one. One normally hopes that literacy, technical education, and university degrees contain elements of attitude-changing processes. This is true to a certain extent, but when the population at large has built-in prejudices, taboos, likes and dislikes, the removal of these stumbling blocks has to be a specially thought-out program with an intelligent psychological bias. The communist and socialist countries have understood this aspect of the problem extremely well. With the help of their authoritarian regimes and a hard core of incorruptible party ideologists, they have succeeded in attacking tradition-bound, backward-looking strongholds and thus changing mass attitudes in one generation. There have also been instances in which modernizing influences, carried out merely as an economic policy without a strong core of zealots at the grass roots, have resulted in the setting up of reactionary forces actually attempting to take the country backward. Current events provide adequate examples of such reactionary movements.
The lesson for navies is clear: education to remove psychological millstones has to be attempted, however vague the problem may sound. Vfhether the attempt takes the form of using Stakhanovites, Red Guards, or the principle of the gentle personal example advocated by Mahatma Gandhi, a beginning has to be made—unless, of course, the navy hopes to
bungle along until the whole country become adequately “educated” to supply flawless recruits.
The third and perhaps the most important o c problems that affect the navy of a developing cou'ir^ is that of motivation and commitment. Wit ° these qualities, no navy can function or progress, in the infant state that such navies find themse v<^> motivation and commitment of the officer corps ‘ all that stand against the destructive forces within ^ country that constantly assail a disciplined, conservi tive force such as a navy. The qualities mention^ here, while undoubtedly of universal application, * indispensable because of some special factors.
When independence is obtained, and a develop*0 country goes on the path of national development, the navy also expands. While the absolute expans* may not impress established navies, the relative ^ pansion is always impressive—invariably never than an average of 200-300%. The senior officers unlikely to have previous experience in dealing wl this kind of problem or in leading and controlling maritime forces of such size. One can only hope t ^ during the years of flux, the allurements of the g°° advertised by the military-industrial complex an ^ other such pitfalls will be avoided by a blazing realism born out of total commitment to the Navy- Industry in a developing country is spurred on 7 internal competition, and performance is apt to judged relatively. Thus, an efficient group in a e veloping country is praised and wins kudos for scan ards that would not enable it to survive in a deve oped country. A navy, on the other hand, is in a f*e of activity where there are no “runners up. Even ^ the absence of war, the professionals of any navy a quite knowledgeable on their chances in a vV‘ against this or that country, no matter what c politicians proclaim. A navy’s standard can only ^ judged against international ones and with all ' handicaps, the navy of a developing country is n exception.
It may be assumed, then, that with many f°rC. working against them, including the ones covered this article, the officers of the navy of a developi°jj country have to be fired with an enthusiasm that w guarantee their motivation and commitment whefl men all about them are losing their heads. The quent wars in Third World countries during c 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s have shown that the Pilf ticipants had often permitted their armed forces become so flabby and corrupt that their performance could be said to be competent only against their o'*0
Pe°ple. jn most- cases the contestants were of the Sarne race and had the same living standards; the °nly difference was the commitment and motivation 0 the officer corps.
Motivating the officer corps is not very difficult if c°untry has a genuine enemy. One can expect nor- rnaI patriotism to burn at a sufficiently high level to Preserve day-to-day efficiency and honesty. Of bourse, incompetent governments prefer to have a °&eyman to mask their incompetence, but the Pe°ple tend to get bored and unpatriotic after awhile. Fascist and other authoritarian regimes can Sooaetimes build up sufficient hate in a country to achieve motivation, but this again is a quick-burning se which sometimes burns in the wrong direction, ornrnunist countries have had some success in the Past in motivating the officer corps by incessant Political education. The task is somewhat easier for t^e*r admirals in that Marxism strives for revolution, ar>d in their vocabularies, peace is just another state of War. The theory is that flagging enthusiasm is re- P'Venated by exhortations from the political officers '''ho themselves have been fired with marxist ideol- °8y once and for all. Professionalism was not exPected to do the job, because it tended to lead to ^lifism and personality cults. After 50 years, it has ec°me apparent that motivating the officer corps ^ith any political ideology is not a permanent an- j^wer. Moreover, the politicization of the armed forces as had unpredictable repercussions in the develop- lng countries, and the leadership in many developing c°untries bears witness to what can happen when the devices get over-motivated and over-committed.
A look at the British attempt to weave some sort of a motivating philosophy into the Jordanian and Iraqi armies in the 1920s gives an illuminating precedent to us today. We must give kudos to the colonial report that perceived the necessity for a motivating force among the officer corps of the newly formed Jordan. In the Iraqi case, recruitment was carried out openly, and the pressure of unemployment pushed up a majority of boys from lower- middle-class backgrounds whose ambitious efforts enabled them to overcome the competition from the other classes. The liberal British policy encouraged them to study politics in the academy to prevent them becoming mere mercenaries. This was supposed to educate them to be loyal to the civilian government in power, and this national loyalty was in turn supposed to trigger motivation and commitment. All of this came true, until a few years later when these honest officers saw that the object of their loyalty was a corrupt, faction-ridden coterie whose basic loyalties were only to themselves. In Jordan, recruitment was limited to the Bedu, and the majority of officers were promoted from the ranks of preserve ethnic loyalty and purity.
History shows that outstanding military systems lasted longest when led by an officer corps which had been brought up on the code of conduct expected of an officer by virtue of his being an officer and a professional leader of men. This is borne out by the system of knights in the old days, knights Templar and Hospitallers in the Middle Ages, the Samurai tradition of Japan, and the European military traditions of the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries. This tradition never recovered from the blows dealt it by the mud of Flanders during World War I and the unrestricted submarine warfare and savage bombing of civilian targets in World War II. Like all systems, political, religious, and economic, the "officer and a gentleman” system was showing bedraggled edges by the early 20th century. But this must be attributed to human weakness rather than the demerits of the system. Indeed, in all the instances in which Third World forces have been routed by other Third World nations, the defeat has never been attributed to failure to impart technological knowledge to the sailors, but invariably to corrupt officer corps devoid of any standards of personal character. Even such technical failures as obsolete weapons, poor communications, insufficient ammunition, untrained sailors, lack of electronic warfare, and badly maintained weapons can all be laid at the door of an effete officer corps. Its members had made money on arms deals, flitted through key appointments without accountability, failed to keep up to date with their profession, and
ice. A finer analogy that would be worth quoting Colonel Charles W. Larned’s defense of the “Thay ^ System” of West Point. He said, “If in the ^eve ment and guidance of the intellect and facilities t ^ be not co-ordinate discipline and distinct rn
ioral
nal
magazines in his own country and abroad.
permitted all standards to slide because of lack of supervision.
Unfortunately, the “professional gentleman” concept has come under much abuse owing to a misunderstanding of its aims. Latterly, it is true that it has devolved into starched uniforms, careful articulation, and prompt payment of bills; but in a nutshell it may be called personal integrity. Unless a deliberate attempt is made in the early days of a navy’s growth to preserve the purity of the officer corps, giving the highest weight to the commitment of the officer to the service, standards in all other activities will rapidly slide.
The mistake that the navies of developing countries make is to set up their training institutions on a functional basis only. To make matters worse, those aspects of the curriculum which were incorporated for character building and whose immediate use is not readily apparent are shunned as being the paraphernalia of imperialists and colonialists and thus quite anachronistic. A frequent example of this way of thinking is seen in the amusement caused to modern-day whiz kids who see horses in training academies. Some of them honestly believe that the academy has acquired them either for parades or in the belief that the cavalry will play an important part in the next war. Since the building up of character or attempts to enhance the personal qualities of an individual are processes which cannot be computerized, the arguments and justifications for these processes will remain inherently weak. Hence, those advocating the complete allocation of finances to tangible technical assets and training are likely to carry the day against saner counsel advocating the greater importance of intangible human qualities. For instance, one would imagine that for newly awakened people with scanty maritime traditions the beginning of naval training would be conducted under sail. But no!—such a suggestion would be considered insulting. The level of perception in the navies of developing countries does not appear to be sharp enough to overcome the vanity of doing it more “technically.” The major navies list approximately 14 qualities that officers should aspire to, and interestingly enough “comitment” is not one of them. Even more interestingly, a paper entitled “Career Opportunities and Commitments Among Officers,” written on the military in the United States by Mayer N. Zold and William Simon (in Morris Janowitz, The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization [Philadelphia: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964], pages 257-86) appears to have missed the point altogether in that commitment has been equated to the number of years that officers would prefer to remain in the serv
direction—a harmonizing with the verities—there must result degeneration (
Point and Higher Education,” in Army and Navy ^ V ’ June 1906, page 65). Since the “Thayer System adopted in the early 19th century and remaine ^ force for about 100 years, during which time t United States was a developing nation, this homi appears most relevant. .
There is a substantial philosophical support*n^ background to the fostering of nobility in the pro sional officer. The first such justification by Carl vo^ Clausewitz extolled the development of mental * intellectual qualities among the officer cadre as a ^ suit of a zealous application of their minds to problems of winning wars. Pierre Proudhon ca^n^' things a little far when he extolled the virtues o w as a constructive force in itself. But the point may aptly illustrated by the fact that while the controver sies were raging during the days of Clauses it ■’ Proudhon, and Karl Marx, the Royal Milita ^ Academy at Woolwich invited John Ruskin to eC^ ture to the cadets on the philosophy behind the a titudes of a noble professional officer corps. HistoO does not record these minor details, but it becom understandable as to how the officers of ®r*tiUj0_ army contributed to archeology, cartography, exP ration, poetry, and Oriental literature in the a 19th century apart from soldiering. _
The motivating force for the services of a demo cratic developing country is the defense of the ^ern°e cratic way of life. Officers must, therefore, not “managers” as the whiz kids would have it, would they be mercenaries; but ideally they woul ^ modelled on the officer who defended Greek derno^ racy at Marathon and Thermopylae or the “few w defended the skies of Britain in 1940. With ideas as the philosophical background for an inte gent, clean, and committed officer corps, the convU sions inherent in the life of the navy of a develop'1^ country can be withstood.
Commander Menon is a product of India’s National D fence Academy Kharakvasla. He was commissioned 1961 and specialized in submarines in 1965. He held numerous sea commands and is now commanding officer of the antisubmarine frigate Andaman- graduate of the Defence Services Staff College, e ^ lington, he is a frequent contributor to profess100