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1985: Where Did All the Young Men Go? 99 Vertical Missile Launchers: Part II 105
By Lieutenant Commander R. T. E. Bowler, III, U.S. Navy By Lieutenant Commander Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy
New Maritime Role for Dutch Aircraft 101 By James Duncan Ferguson
In the mid-1980s, Navy recruiters will start to ask, ‘‘Where did all the young men go?”
The answer: ‘‘They were never born.”
The baby boom is over! This aspect of U.S. demographics will be increasingly felt in our society. It does not augur well for the recruiting prospects of the Navy and the other military services.
The rate of growth of the U.S. population has been in a long-term decline. The only exception to this decline is the period following World War II, the years 1946 to 1964—the so-called “baby boom” years. In both 1973 and 1974, just over 3-1 million births were recorded in the United States. This represents the lowest annual figure since 1945. It is well below the 4.3 million annual births that occurred in the 1957-1961 time frame—the peak baby boom years.
The problem which the end of the baby boom poses to Navy recruiting is a clear-cut one: the pool of potential Navy recruits is going to shrink considerably by the mid-1980s, and it will continue to shrink for the decade following that.
Commander George E. Thibault, in “A New Era in Navy Recruiting” (April 1976 Proceedings) states that since 1970 the 17- to 30-year-old population segment in the United States has remained constant and no significant changes are expected
through 1980. His figures are basically correct. But, after 1980 significant changes will occur. Before discussing these impending population changes, permit me to anticipate a logical question, “Isn’t it a bit premature to worry about population changes eight or nine years hence?” I don’t think so. Many of the weapon systems the Navy will have in the 1985-1995 time period are in the fleet today. Most of the others are past the drawing board stage. Prudence dictates that we consider now how these weapon systems will be manned.
In order to determine the magnitude of the problem the Navy will face, let’s examine the population figures I’ve referenced. If 1 July 1976 is used as a base date, inspection of Figure 1 demonstrates that Commander Thibault is correct. The 17- to 19- year old male population in the
United States will not vary more than \% through 1980. (I’m considering only the 17- to 19-year-old males since they make up approximately 75% of our annual recruiting requirements.) But in 1981 this population segment will start to decline. By 1985, we will have about 15% fewer 17- to 19-year-olds than in 1976. This decline will continue, reaching its nadir in 1992—about 24% fewer than in 1976—before it starts to rise again. So in the late 1980s and early 1990s the pool of potential Navy recruits will be about 15 to 20% smaller than its present size.* All other things being equal, the Navy may face a 15 to 20% recruiting shortfall. All other things not being equal, the potential exists for the actual shortfall to be even greater. The kind of young person the Navy needs, the relatively bright high school graduate, will be in demand—for certain by our college education system, and perhaps by the civilian economy. In the case of the colleges, many educators already realize that if they do not continue to fill their classroom seats to near capacity, in the face of a dwindling population, their doors will be closed. Be assured the colleges will not close their doors before mounting a strenuous ef-
* These Census Bureau projections are based on a fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman. In 1975 the fertility rate was 1.8 births per woman. So the eventual shortfall may even be greater.
The U.S. Navy mast develop a new program to meet its personnel commitments in the 1985-1995 time frame if it plans to keep its classrooms filled with young male recruits.
fort to recruit the same young persons the Navy needs. According to Commander Thibault, the opportunity for further education is the single most important factor in a young person’s decision to enter the service. Therefore, the competition from the colleges may be especially difficult to combat.
Since the inception of the allvolunteer force in June 1973, the Navy Recruiting Command’s efforts in meeting Navy manpower needs have been impressive. Despite initial fears that the all-volunteer force would cause the Navy to accept significant quality and quantity degradations in recruiting, this hasn’t proved to be the case. In fiscal year 1974, the first complete all-volunteer year, the Navy achieved 96% of its overall recruiting goal. In fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977, 101%, 100%, and 96%, respectively, of the overall goals were met. And, apparently, quality hasn’t suffered. About 84% of the 1975 recruits had high school diplomas, compared to only 69% high school graduates in fiscal year 1973. However, before we breathe a collective sigh of relief and proclaim the allvolunteer force concept an unqualified success, consider that Navy recruiting efforts most likely have been helped by two factors: high unemployment rates and a historically high number of 17- to 19-year-old males. The unemployment rate may vary in the future: up—good for recruiting; down—bad for recruiting. But we must accept as fact that it is too late to manufacture more 17- to 19-year-olds, at least for the 1985-1995 time frame.
What are the implications for the Navy of a population-induced recruiting shortfall in the 1985-1995 time period, and, given this long lead time, what can the Navy do about it?
Assuming that the size of the Navy through the early 1990s will remain about as it is today, the Navy’s mission commitments will be about the same, and high-quality people still will be required to man our increasingly sophisticated weapon systems, let’s examine the alternatives.
Faced with 15 to 20% fewer annual recruits, the Navy could cut back on its commitments to accommodate the shortfall. Given the continued resurgence of the Soviet Navy, this alternative is probably not acceptable. To anyone with a keen appreciation of seapower’s importance to our country, it’s certainly not an acceptable alternative.
The Navy could say “can do” and internally accommodate the recruiting shortfall by meeting the same level of commitments with less manpower resources. Deploying units could be kept fully manned, while undermanning stateside units, as was frequently done during the Vietnam War years. But the sea is an unforgiving taskmaster; sooner or later fleet readiness is bound to suffer. And, with fewer men assuming the same sea duty burden, the potential exists for igniting a vicious retention problem. The nuclear submarine officer community is experiencing a similar problem right now. It goes like this: people start spending disproportionate amounts of time at sea; retention starts to decline, leaving fewer people to shoulder the same sea duty requirements; and retention continues to decline. Hopefully, the nuclear community can break the vicious cycle with its new bonus plan. In any event, it is an expensive proposition.
Another way the Navy could meet the same commitments with fewer men would be to accelerate efforts to design future weapon systems which require fewer operators. For example, some of the bridge functions have been automated in the new guided- missile frigates, resulting in a smaller bridge watch. The trend toward modularizing solid-state electronic circuitry should allow defective modules to be replaced and sent ashore for repair, thereby requiring fewer on-board technicians. But, future design changes can solve only part of the problem since the majority of the weapon systems the Navy will be using in the 1985-1995 time period are already in the fleet.
The Navy could meet a 15 to 20% male recruiting shortfall by significantly changing the mix of its recruits. Presently only about 5% of the recruits each year are females. The Navy has no trouble in meeting this quota, and the females are all high school graduates. By raising the female recruit quota to 20 or 25% of the total, the male shortfall could be offset. Of course, this policy change could have important implications in itself. The female recruit quota is kept purposely low because the law presently forbids females from serving in combatant ships or aircraft. If the law were not changed and the female recruit quota were raised, females would be absorbed into a greater proportion of the shore billets, thus providing the males with more sea duty. Again the potential exists for starting the retention problem cycle mentioned above. If the law were changed, allowing females to serve in combat billets, the Navy’s recruiting problems might be solved. However, the prospect of going to sea and maybe to war may not have a positive effect on female recruiting and retention.
The most cost-effective alternative would be to significantly improve the Navy’s retention rate, especially in the critical ratings, thereby reducing the requirements to recruit large numbers of new people. Also, a corollary benefit to improving the retention rate would be the reduction in training costs. But, what are the chances of significantly improving the retention rate by the mid-1980s? Factors, both within and outside of the Navy, affect the retention problem. People’s “expectations” bear an important, but little understood, role in the retention equation. In this area, servicemen seem to have become uncertain of long- accustomed benefits. Congressional discussions and proposed bills to cut back on commissary savings, the retirement system, health care to dependents, and so on have a devastating effect on the serviceman’s plans for the future. Although many of these proposals have fiscal merit, many servicemen, rightly or wrongly, view them as attempts to “break their contract.” Their cumulative effect certainly affects retention adversely. This author doesn’t profess to know the solution. One commentator recommended, perhaps unrealistically, that Congress and the services decide on a "minimum” package of benefits—one that wouldn’t be cut in any event. This proposal would at least serve to give the serviceman a benchmark against which to gauge his expectations.
Further expansion of the Navy’s recruiting effort through increased funding and manning may be another way of reducing the impending recruiting shortfall. How successful this would be is unknown. Certainly the law of diminishing returns governs the recruiting effort, as it becomes increasingly expensive to recruit the last several men in the quota. The additional cost of recruiting sufficient numbers to offset the 15 to 20% shortfall may be astronomical.
Finally, if the military services find they are absolutely unable to reduce the shortfall and manning levels approach critical levels, the services could ask Congress to reinstate the draft. Unless a state of national emergency existed, this is probably a politically impractical solution. As time passes and the country becomes more accustomed to the draft-free environment, the chances of bringing back the draft will he reduced further.
Before concluding, let me paint a worst-case situation that the country could face in the late 1980s. Let’s assume the economy is relatively healthy, enjoying a 5% unemployment rate. Furthermore, the Department of Commerce’s population projections indeed materialize, and we face a 15 to 20% smaller 17- to 19- year-old population. Bang! The United States gets involved in a limited war such as Korea or Vietnam— something short of a Pearl Harbor- type provocation. Will the Navy and the other services be able to recruit sufficient numbers of young men to fight the war? Probably not. In a recent survey conducted by the U.S. Air
Force among its new recruits, some 37% of the recruits said they would not have enlisted if there had been a war in progress. Most came into the service for the education and training benefits, not for patriotic reasons. In a situation like this the recruiting problem bcomes a serious constraint inhibiting national policy. Certain kinds of politico-military actions that were feasible in the past—a limited war of some duration, for instance—may no longer be feasible. As a result the country’s alternatives become more limited. Not having a measured response alternative, the United States may be limited to two extreme alternatives: acquiesce or “push the button.”
In conclusion, it’s apparent that in the 1985-1995 time period the Navy and the other services will face a critical recruiting problem. The alternatives to ameliorate the shortfall problem discussed here are only a few of many possible courses of action. The common thread, however, is that they all require time to implement. There are no quick cures for this problem.
The Navy has overcome far more serious problems in the past. In one sense, it’s a rare luxury to be able to look ahead eight or nine years and recognize a problem that will—with near certainty—manifest itself. Certainly enough time remains for the Navy to bring its not inconsiderable planning and management talent to bear on the problem.
New Maritime Role for Dutch Aircraft
By James Duncan Ferguson, a specialist On North Sea offshore search and rescue operations and a regular contributor to aviation publications
Until recently, design trends for maritime surveillance aircraft have resulted in platforms which are often over-sophisticated, and always extremely costly. This cost factor effectively places them beyond the budgetary capabilities of many smaller nations whose offshore interests—fishery protection, anti-smuggling, pollution control, etc.—may most require them. Over-sophistication normally surpasses the operational and maintenance skills of many potential users. Recently, however, these deterrents have been recognized by a number of aircraft manufacturers, and more suitable systems are emerging for the less complex, yet equally demanding, “coastal” maritime patrol task.
The first of these to appear in “hardware” form — paper design studies exist a-plenty—is the Fokker F27 “Maritime.” It is currently engaged in competition for what is regarded by the aircraft industry as a 50-60 airframe market worldwide. Tailored around the popular F27 airliner/transport (over 675 sold), it is aimed directly at those states whose offshore interests rate high priorities, yet whose budgets and indigenous skills cannot make effective use of existing sophisticated patrol types. With over 20 years’ experience of the basic F27, the “Maritime” development team has been able to spend the past three years (since project inception) working almost solely on the new variant’s specific mission requirements. This concentrated effort was of immense value throughout the first phase of a flight/systems test program which was completed without any serious problems.
The basic F27 is a medium-sized, high-wing, twin turbo-prop transport aircraft. The F27 has always been powered by two reliable Rolls-Royce “Dart” prop-turbines; and the “Maritime’’ is equipped with the new and up-rated 2,320 s.h.p. Mk.7 units. The advantages of this type of engine over jet units for the offshore task are already well-known, and the spin-off from the high-wing layout includes exceptionally good visibility and unrestricted 360° radar coverage.
With minimal airframe changes having been required, the only external differences between the "Maritime” and its airliner/military transport counterparts are in the belly radome, bulged cockpit and after fuselage windows, and underwing pylon fuel tanks. Design studies and systems installation took slightly over two years, and the “Maritime” flying test-bed (a converted Mk. 100 Friendship airliner ex-THY of Turkey) first flew from Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport on 28 February 1976. Phase 1 of the test program was completed earlier this year, and only a few minor modifica-
Many countries are in the market for a cost-effective, relatively unsophisticated, maritime surveillance aircraft. The F27 “Maritime" was built to meet this requirement. A Peruvian Navy "Maritime” is pictured flying over a North Sea oil platform prior to delivery.
tions have proved necessary to what has become the “baseline” standard of the new variant. This baseline fit, as defined by Fokker, is the minimum package capable of carrying out all designated maritime surveillance parameters, although enhanced performance can be obtained to a customer’s special requirement with the installation of additional equipments and systems.
The F27 “Maritime” concept has been given the widest possible mission choice so that maximum cost-effective use can be made of the aircraft in the greatest possible number of roles. Offshore capabilities include patrol, search and rescue, seaborne traffic and pollution control, liaison with afloat task forces, photography, ice surveillance, etc. The “Maritime” can also readily be used as an ad hoc transport, parachute trainer, air ambulance, etc. Baseline systems are sufficiently accurate for use in legal cases of fisheries limit violation, illegal tank pumping, and the like.
The “Maritime” mission envelope is simple: high-speed, high-altitude transit (255+ knots/15,000 feet) to and from the operational area, then genuinely fuel-economic coverage of the assigned task. In the search role operational heights well under 1,000 feet are within the aircraft’s capabilities, and visual coverage (of perhaps an area of wreckage) is further enhanced by a low-level pass potential at less than 150 knots. The radar search altitude would of course be much greater, but as a considerable
FOKKER-VFW INTERNATIONAL B.V.
portion of maritime surveillance activity is spent at relatively low levels, the aircraft’s demonstrated performance is of real value. In the flight-test phase its low-level maneuverability was explored in considerable depth—360° turns in 45 seconds with a radius of under 500 yards were found possible, and of immense value in the search task.
The “Maritime’s” field length requirement of only 3,000 feet is a further attraction in view of airfield limitations of many of the less affluent states, and environmentalists have already accepted the lower noise levels of the twin turbo-prop installation. The outstanding degree of reliability developed by the F27 over the past years has been specifically extended to the “Maritime,” and no specially acquired—and crushingly expensive—-skills are required of operational and maintenance personnel with reasonable aviation backgrounds. The specialized systems will of course require suitably trained personnel, but to a far lesser degree than more sophisticated equivalents.
Problems caused by offshore corrosion were studied during the “Maritime” development program and improved airframe protection methods have been evolved for the most vulnerable areas. Existing F27 protection criteria for other areas have been accepted as being adequate, but a further refinement has been the design of installation of a special windscreen de-salting system which is installed as part of the baseline standard.
F27 “Maritime” Baseline Systems and Avionics Fit
Note: Additional customer-required equipments such as TACAN, DME, Decca, etc., can readily be installed as options, and any baseline items can be replaced with similar items from other vendor sources. Trials of a low-light television system have been extremely successful and a wide choice of interior displays is possible, as is a videotape capability.
Table 1
VHF COM Transceiver (dual) VHF COM Transceiver UHF COM Transceiver VHF COM (FM) Transceiver Interphone
Crew Address System Inertial Nav. System T.A.S. Computer Gyro Compass (dual)
LF/ADF (dual)
UHF/VHF ADF Radar Altimeter VOR/ILS (dual)
Autopilot (AFCS)
ATC Transponder Search Radar HSI (dual)
The radar installation for any maritime surveillance aircraft has a “make or break” effect on the success of the entire system, and with the exacting task specified for the “Maritime,” total compatibility together with fulfillment of all possible role parameters is even more essential. Early in the design stage Fokker held a vendor conference to which a number of prominent systems suppliers were invited. After an extensive study of various radar equipments the Litton AN/APS-504(V)-2 installation was selected. It fulfilled design criteria better than most of its competitors, but in particular its resolution of sea clutter effect was outstanding. The Litton unit has a multi-role capability (search, mapping, navigation, beacon identification, and weather), and the belly-mounted scanner has an unobstructed 360° coverage. Two scanner rotation speeds (12 and 45 r.p.m.) can be selected, with the former being used primarily for long-range search. A five-unit digital plan position indicator (PPI) display is located in the cockpit, and can be used in the Weather mode by the pilots. A seven- inch PPI display is part of the main systems console in the cabin, and all tadar modes are controlled from this position. The equipment’s high-
Collins 618 M-3 Collins 618 T-3 Collins AN/ARC-159 Sylvania AN/ARC-160 Fokker/Delta Electronics Collins 346D-1B Litton LTN-72 IDC 422-18152-914 Sperry C-9 Collins 5 1 Y-7 Collins DF-301E Honeywell AN/APN-198 Collins 51 RV-1 Smiths SEP-2E Collins 621A-6A Litton AN/APS 504 (V)-2 Collins 331A-9G
resolution properties stem largely from its narrow beam width, being further enhanced by its 100 kilowatt peak power output. For maximum in-flight maneuvering capability—a stumbling block for several other allegedly more sophisticated systems—the installation is gyro-stabilized, which allows bank angles of up to 20°. A range and bearing cursor, together with a protractor, enables the operator to strobe targets for range and relative bearing, and the display can be ground- stabilized to give a true motion effect. The display can additionally be referenced to either True North or aircraft heading, and selectable sector scan enhances detection/identification potential by permitting repetitive painting in a particular direction. Although the system operates on the X-band, an optional identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) capability is available with an IFF/siF (selective identification feature) interrogator.
Comparable in importance with the "Maritime’s” radar system is its navigation/flight control systems. The design team studied a number of installations, and, looking for compatibility with the task parameters, the Litton LTN-72 was chosen. This inertial navigation system (INS) has a proven accuracy of better than one nautical mile-per-flight-hour, and operates by sensing inputs from a gyro- stabilized, four-gimbal, all-attitude platform. The INS as installed in the “Maritime” has no flight limitations on any operational aspect, and initial alignment takes only 15 minutes. LTN-72 output functions include accurate present position (latitude/ longitude) information (vital in apprehending fishery limit violators and the like), course computation, steering commands, pitch/roll details, and heading data. A micro-electronics general-purpose digital computer handles navigation and guidance material, and any normal long-range ambiguities are eliminated by a wander- azimuth technique. The INS computer accepts true airspeed from the integrated data coding computer, which handles the resolution of wind speed into true form. Alphanumeric data are shown on the control display unit in the following references: lat/long present position, vector distance to a given waypoint, waypoint heading and time to go, target vector, wind direction and speed, drift and track angles, and desired track angle. This information is additionally displayed on a cockpit repeater display unit, which permits flight crew monitoring of navigator-selected INS data. The aircraft can be flown on a prior- programmed search pattern by setting this up on the INS’s search mode unit, amended as necessary by the tactical coordinator (TACCO) as the mission progresses. In the “Maritime” INS steering data are signalled direct to the Smith’s SEP-2E flight control system and cockpit Collins 331A-9G HSls, and other flight instruments. INS stabilization signals are also transmitted to the search radar to accommodate in-flight maneuvering which would otherwise degrade equipment performance in what could be the most important part of a search mission. Immediate reversion into manual flight control is possible at any stage of the mission without deterioration of the INS data flow to the control display unit.
One or two maritime surveillance aircraft have suffered from a lack of total involved-agency communications capability. And this was borne very
much in mind by the "Maritime” design team when, early on in the program, it decided that the standard aircraft’s equipment package would have the maximum possible fit. The result is as impressive as it has been successful, with the Maritime carrying VHF (AM) for aviation use, VHF (FM) for marine purposes, UHF for military communications, and HF for general air and marine traffic. A directionfinding capability is provided for all frequencies (including the standard
distress channels), and the usual ADF (automatic direction finding) equipment is fitted as standard for the aircraft's own use.
The baseline F27 “Maritime” carries a flight crew of six—two pilots, a mission commander/navigator/tactical coordinator (TACCO), a radar operator, and two observers. The pilots are accommodated in a new-technology cockpit (now being installed in all F27s and designed from operational experience accumulated over the past 20+ years), and jump-seat provision has been made for a third crew member. In view of the long mission flight times (seven-eight hours), pilot seat design has assumed additional importance, and the greatest possible degree of comfort has been provided. All F27S are designed for two-pilot operation, and there has never been any normal requirement for the carriage of a flight engineer/crew chief. In the “Maritime,” context technical troubleshooting requirements are envisaged as being handled by one of the observers who can also handle maintenance checks while on detached operations.
The “Maritime” pilots’ responsibilities include flight safety/man- agement, radar (weather) operation, visual contact information, and airways and terminal navigation (backed up by the systems operators as necessary). The co-pilot has an additional responsibility for in-flight communications if a separate (optional) station is not installed. The TACCO and radar operator sit side by side at the outboard-facing mission console. In addition to mission command tasks, the former is responsible for basic navigation, position-fixing, INS updating (providing guidance commands for manual or automatic steering control of the aircraft during long en route transits), etc. The TACCO’s functions also include, in the tactical control role, indications of “fly to” points and maneuvering recommendations. Included in the data correlation task is the coordination of all visual and systems data involving tactical and communications information. The prime tactical navigation task is the planning of related maneuvering, in conjunction with the pilots, coupled to the general oversight of the mission’s progress.
The radar operator’s responsibilities cover the use of this equipment, with the notification of related information to the appropriate crew member(s), operation of IFF equipment (if fitted) for the interrogation of surface/air- borne targets, and the classification of any resultant coded responses.
The interchange of operational information between involved crew members is of paramount importance in the maritime surveillance environment, and the aircraft’s intercom system has received very particular attention during the design and flight-test processes. One or two refinements have been made to the original installation in the light of operational experience, but no modification of the crew-address system has been necessary.
The two remaining crew members are normally employed as observers during the visual search phase, but can also handle other tasks as required. Two bulged observation windows are located at the aft end of the cabin and, being optically flat, can be used as photographic stations. Comfortable observer seats are provided, together with plotting tables, and the former have been engineered to provide maximum movement, with a high degree of comfort to assist in the maintenance of alertness during long searches.
The cabin also accommodates a general-purpose launch chute, but in view of the incidence of in-flight accidents with flares, these are dispensed from stowages located at the after end of each engine nacelle. Their release—either singly, salvoed, or en masse—is controlled from the cockpit, and full provision is made for emergency jettison. With patrol endurance of from six to nine hours, the "Maritime” design has included a major study of the causes of crew fatigue. Since interior noise levels have been assessed as a primary factor contributing to crew fatigue, extensive sound-proofing has been given particular attention. The result is cabin noise levels lower than many civil airliners, and well ahead of similar military types. Interior cabin design has also been refined to give an attractive working environment (something normally totally foreign to most military minds), with a comfortable rest area and adequate galley space. The seat rails have been left in place to allow for the carriage of passengers in the ad hoc transport role, and the whole systems installation can be removed within two hours if full conversion is required. Facilities for the carriage of casualty litters are also available.
In 1977 prices the F27 “Maritime" equipped to baseline standard costs approximately $5 million (U.S.), some 25% of the price of other more sophisticated surveillance aircraft. Flight-testing has confirmed a similar proportional value for flying hours and maintenance funding, and the ground support equipment holding is even less costly. Part of any Fokker deal always includes a crew/maintainer instruction course, a spares package, and the 24-hour availability at Amsterdam of replacement items to handle any aircraft-on-the-ground problems.
With the emergent nations of the world becoming more and more aware of the value of their offshore resources, both mineral and piscatorial, the market for a genuinely cost-effective, yet unsophisticated patrol aircraft is continually expanding. And, with the impressive record of the commercial F27 behind it, it would seem that Fokker is poised to repeat its success with the new “Maritime.”
Vertical Missile Launchers: Part II[1]
By Lieutenant Commander Rodney P. Rempt, U.S. Navy, former Commanding Officer of the missile-armed patrol gunboat, USS Antelope (PG-86), and now assigned to the Research and Technology Directorate of the Naval Sea Systems Command as Assistant for Advanced Combat Systems
Since no time is lost loading or pointing a vertical launcher, extremely high rates of fire can be expected. Not only can several missiles be launched almost simultaneously, but this high rate of fire can be sustained until the magazine is expended.
A vertical launch system is om-
nidirectional; there are no blind zones caused by the ship’s superstructure. It can launch weapons against air, surface, or subsurface targets from the same launcher. Weapon selection can be accomplished rapidly without striking down or jettisoning an undesired round. In fact, different missile types can conceivably be launched simultaneously, and no clumsy adaptation rails need be unloaded after firing.
Perhaps most significant among firepower considerations is the modularity of the launch system design. As many as 60 or 80 launch canisters can be arranged together in a single launch complex, or as few as four or eight can be employed where required. The launcher can provide a missile capability to ships unable to accommodate conventional mechanical launchers due to weight and space limitations. This includes noncombatants such as oilers, stores ships, and other auxiliaries as well as high- performance hydrofoils and surface ef-
feet ships.
Further, the vertical launch canisters can be dispersed around the ship to take advantage of available space, provide increased tactical flexibility, and reduce one-point vulnerability. With vertical launchers, firepower limitations will change from launcher cycle time to channel capacity in the fire control system itself.
Vertical launchers are inherently more reliable because of simple redundancy. Instead of one or two mechanical launch rails, every missile in the vertical-launcher-equipped ship’s inventory is already positioned in its own independent launch canister. Currently, failure of a single-arm launcher puts the entire weapon system out of action. In a vertical launcher, a different launch canister can be immediately selected and firing initiated or resumed. The common parts of the launcher system and missile initialization circuitry can be built of low cost, solid-state design which permits installation of redundant launch control systems.
If launch canisters are stowed vertically within the ship’s hull, they provide maximum protection against enemy damage up to the instant of firing. The vulnerability of current ASROC missiles in their exposed cells and the susceptibility of current surface-to-air missile launchers to one-point damage or failure are well- known.
Perhaps the greatest contribution to vertical launch reliability is the simple canister design. There are no large ready-service rings, snubbers, ammunition hoists, launcher train and elevation drives, blow-out patches, or complex hydraulic systems. The single moving part envisioned for the vertical launch system is a deck door over each canister or group of canisters to provide protection against green water and enemy near-miss blast fragments. There is not much that can fail. Finally, each launch canister with its missile already in place will be received on board ship as a hermetically sealed “wooden round.” No shipboard maintenance will be required. Upon loading missiles, the crew will simply install restraint bolts and connect the electric cables.
It seems hard to believe that the firepower and reliability benefits detailed above may be available at lower cost. In fact, however, it appears that operating costs will be significantly reduced and procurement costs cheaper than those associated with existing launchers. Vertical launchers combine the launcher and magazine into one unit and provide unencumbered deck space for underway replenishment or similar evolutions. It is estimated that a vertical launcher will be approximately three-fourths the weight of a conventional launcher with a like missile capacity. By their modular canister design, the vertical launchers will be relatively easy and inexpensive to install in a wide range of ships. Once installed, they would require only 20-kilowatt peak (four- kilowatt average) power instead of the approximately 200-kilowatt peak (50-kilowatt average) power required for conventional launchers. During alert conditions there are no large power drives or motors to keep running.
In port, shore power is more than adequate to energize the launch system. Canister design permits highly efficient environmental control, and there are no large, open magazines or manned spaces to heat or cool. The vertical launcher is unmanned during operations. Only two men will be required on a part-time basis to perform electrical and deck-door maintenance. It is envisioned that no more than four men will be required to conduct strikedown operations at the launcher. The launcher’s redundant reliability requires very few repair parts be carried on board ship. The launch canister itself is reuseable and will require only minor refurbishment prior to reloading at a weapons depot. Clearly, operating and maintenance costs should be relatively low.
Procurement costs cannot be determined exactly at this time. Preliminary estimates indicate a vertical launch system will be about 30% cheaper than a comparable mechanical launcher. This is not surprising in view of the simple design and construction of the vertical launcher. Of course, vertical launchers are penalized by the need to buy a canister for every missile. However, this fact is mitigated by the canister’s doubling as a shipping container and remaining serviceable for several firings. Furthermore, shipboard installation expenses can be expected to be much less for the canister-launch system than a mechanical system which requires extensive machining and alignment.
The proposed shipboard installation envisions a densely packed but accessible module containing one-third more missiles at reduced weight in the same space of the current Mk 26 Mod 1 Guided Missile Launching System. Rows of vertically standing canisters would be connected to plenum manifolds that could safely contain missile blast during launch. They would re-
common data buses make such a scheme feasible.
The development efforts conducted to date under the Navy Advanced Prototype Program point to success in achieving a vertical-launch capability in a wide variety of ships employing potentially many different types of missiles. The significant operational and maintenance benefits outlined here appear attainable at a lower level of resource expenditure than is being experienced with current missile launchers. Current and future surface ships could be equipped with simplistic, highly reliable launchers that will provide a quantum jump in fleet firepower.
quire little shipboard support and would not be manned. Such a vertical launch system is now in full-scale engineering development with “Approval for Service Use” expected in the early 1980s.
Clearly, overall fleet firepower can be improved most if the larger ships, which have fast reaction antiair warfare as their primary mission and possess substantial magazine capacities, are fitted with vertical launch systems. Accordingly, the engineering development launcher can best exploit the rapid fire, multi-channel capability of the Aegis weapon system. It is expected that this system will provide the baseline to which the modular launcher will be designed. The vertical launch approach provides an apparently cost-effective option for a launcher-installation decision under the formal Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council process for the Aegis destroyers (DDG-47s—DD-963- class hulls).
In addition to providing a missile- launcher option for the strike cruiser (CSGN), DDG-47, and other large hulls, vertical launchers may provide a formerly unattainable capability for low-mix ships. The vertical launchers modular design makes the installation of any number of canisters possible Within the weight and space limitations on board FF-1052, FFG-7, or similar-sized combatants. With the necessary upgrading of fire control systems, such ships can become ready-launch platforms for SM-ls, SM-2s, or other new missiles without costly launcher backfits or modification costs. Also, lightweight canister launchers provide the only possible missile capability for the new high-performance platforms. Surface effect ships and hydrofoils place a high priority on streamlined exterior construction and cannot afford the weight of trainable launchers and mechanical loading systems.
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Although the vertical launch has been addressed primarily from the AAW surface-to-air missile viewpoint, as exemplified by the Standard Missile family, vertical launchers appear equally useful for surface-to-surface and ASW missiles. Advanced development efforts are under way to demonstrate a vertical-launch capability for ASROC and Harpoon missiles, as well as for other, less clearly specified future missiles. In fact, exploratory work is continuing to develop a modular booster capable of vertically launching and conducting rapid pitch-over of a wide variety of missiles. Contained in this concept is a modular autopilot unit that could provide the unique initialization and trajectory commands for each different missile in response to inputs from different fire control systems. Recent technological advances in remote micro-processing and transmission of raw information via
[1]The first part of this professional note covering the testing of the vertical launch concept was published in the October 1977 Proceedings, Pages 88-89.