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resources of the high seas to its exclusive use
^ The concept of the territorial sea, which P° that coastal states have near-absolute sovereignty nocent passage being the principal exception) °vef narrow band of waters adjacent to their coasts ► The concept of special contiguous zones, nel.n exercises of limited jurisdiction by coastal states ^ response to particular problems for which the terrlt rial sea/high seas system proved inadequate
a^e
This basic framework worked reasonably well un
For the past ten years, the U.S. Government has been engaged with representatives from all of the world’s other nations in negotiations concerning the creation and revision of rules to govern the exploitation of ocean resources and to regulate other uses of ocean space. The agenda for these negotiations, sponsored by the United Nations, is comprehensive, consisting of more than a hundred items and sub-items dealing with virtually every existing and potential use of the sea.1 Among the issues being negotiated are those that could alter the international law rules concerning navigation and other activities of warships on the high seas, in territorial waters, and in international straits. The purpose of this article is to identify those issues in the law of the sea negotiations that have potential effects upon missions of the U.S. Navy and to discuss alternatives for ensuring that our ocean-related national security interests are adequately protected.
The article does not enter the debate on the role of international law in national security policymaking. Among the schools of thought in that debate are the following positions:
^ International law is a “pious fraud” and should have no effect whatever on the making of national security policy.
^ International law should be considered as one among many relevant factors in determining national security policy.
y International law should be regarded as absolutely binding on the United States and determinative of all national security policy decisions.
That issue can be begged in the context of this article because it is quite clear that (covert intelligence operations aside) in the types of peacetime and preconflict roles and missions which are considered here, the United States complies with all relevant international legal rules concerning navigation and other activities on the world ocean. Conceivably, if radical 'For footnotes, please turn to page 39- departures from the existing international law of c sea were made, one might imagine the United State departing from its law-abiding attitude in this re gard, but that is speculation beyond the scope ofc article.
Background: Until the middle of the 20th century’ the law of the sea had developed primarily throug the evolution of rules based on the actions and PraC tices of states as they made various uses of the sea Some national claims were accepted by other coun tries (and even copied), ultimately ripening ‘nt^ rules of “customary” international law. Other assel tions met with opposition and never achieved t status of internationally acceptable conduct, main tenets of the international law of the sea svfuc evolved in this manner were: . u
► The concept of freedom of the high seas, posits that no nation may appropriate any areas
osits(lO'
the intensity and diversity of the use of ocean SP‘ ^ began to produce conflicts over ocean resources access to ocean space. Following a period of 'v ,• might be termed “uryestricted freedom of the seaS’ there occurred a period characterized by the cone of “reasonable use of the seas” in which nations eluded that the freedom of the seas must be 4 pered by a reasonable regard for the rights of othefS ^ This vague standard soon became insufficient, , the world entered what might be termed a 1 ^ phase in the development of the law of the sea “regulated use.” This phase was characterized by ^ adoption of bilateral and multilateral treaties regu . ing particular types of conduct on the ocean-
lawyer says, “Like the land, the sea must have understandable, ecluitable, enforceable laws.” “Agreed,” says the U.S. Navy admiral, but e<luire our warships to move only in designated sea-lanes and you make it e**sy for an enemy to find them, interdict them by naval or air forces, or | rjli' them up with mines. Restrict passage through international straits and ^<}ti kngtben the reaction time with which our naval units might be deployed 0 specific sea areas. Forbid our vessels from entering a 200-mile economic *’source zone, and you stop us from gathering intelligence or data Qt might be useful to us in wartime, but you also stop us from conducting e naval oceanographic research that is as vital to us in peace as in war.
11
treaties involved rules of the road for navigation, restrictions on the taking of fish, and the like. In some extreme cases, however, even general regulation was deemed to be insufficient, and the law of the sea has in those situations reached its fourth and final phase, the creation of “property rights” in the ocean. The classic example is the doctrine of the continental shelf which accords to coastal states exclusive sovereign rights to explore for and exploit the resources of the seabed and subsoil in their adjacent continental shelves.5 The promulgation of 200-mile exclusive fishing zones is another example of the attempt to create property rights in ocean resources.6
This evolutionary process was accelerated following World War II when there occurred technological developments of such a magnitude that a virtual revolution in man’s attitude toward the sea took place. Simultaneously, on the political scene the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa emerged as independent entities to join their brethren in Latin America in creating a new political order in which the technologically advanced states were no longer a dominant world force. These two developments— technological breakthroughs and world political reorientation—worked on the existing law of the sea to force a reconsideration of the old rules.
The current law of the sea negotiations began in 1967 with the introduction to the U.N. General Assembly agenda of an item relating to the peaceful use of the seabed beyond the continental shelf. The agenda item quickly blossomed into a review of the entire spectrum of ocean uses, however, and a U.N. committee was formed to examine the problem. The Seabed Committee worked for five years, at the conclusion of which the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened. Following a procedural session in New York in December 1973, the full conference met in Caracas, Venezuela, in the summer of 1974.7 It soon became apparent, however, that the negotiations were not being treated as an opportunity to reach technical solutions to the problems of ocean resource management, including rights of navigation. Rather, they were being used by the underdeveloped nations as a political forum in which their aspirations for a “new international economic order” could be fostered. The Caracas session was therefore inconclusive, and a 1975 session was scheduled for Geneva, Switzerland. That session, too, was inconclusive, but at the request of the president of the conference, the chairmen of the three main committees produced what they called a “single negotiating text.” It consisted of their personal views of the consensus which had developed from the years of discussions in the Seabed
Committee and the two sessions of the Third Confer ence. This was not an agreed text, simply a device to facilitate negotiations. A further session was held 1° New York in the spring of 1976, at which time the negotiating text was revised to its present form, the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT).8 Sti another session was held last fall in New York, but it too proved inconclusive and, according to many °b servers, sounded the death knell for the ability of the conference to produce a global treaty covering the many items on its agenda. Another session, probably the last, is now in progress.
The important thing to note from these delibera tions is that should the conference fail to produce a treaty, it does not necessarily follow that there be chaos and anarchy in the ocean. Indeed, the his tory of the law of the sea has been predominantly * history of the evolution of customary rules throug state practice, and that process will likely contir>ue even if the conference fails to produce a treaty.
Therefore, in considering the likely future deve opment of the law of the sea and its possible impaCt on navy missions, reference will be made both to tb6 RSNT (as an example of possible treaty agreemen and to state practices and positions (also sometir°ej evidenced by provisions of the RSNT) which cou lead to the development of new rules of customer) international law. Whatever the process, however there will be some law of the sea governing navigat»0(1 activities during the next few years.
Law of the Sea Outcomes and Their Impact 0,1 Naval Missions: International legal rules affectfe? the deployment and navigation of naval vessels tcdS have four general types of adverse impacts. First, rules may inhibit mobility. For example, restriction5 on passage through international straits may precis1 the passage of warships in certain situations, rbu* greatly increasing the reaction time in which sue naval units- might be deployed to specified sea area5' Second, legal developments might increase the vU* nerability of naval vessels to surveillance. For exart1 pie, by requiring navigation of warships only in &eS ignated sea-lanes, surveillance by enemy forces com be greatly facilitated. Third, naval vessels may suffef increased vulnerability to interdiction. In the exart1 pie just given, the use of a single navigation la°e would make the mining of that area or the interdic tion by naval or air forces a much simpler task tha*1 if a broad ocean area were involved. Fourth, and ** nally, legal developments might impose limitation^ on data- and intelligence-gathering activities of navS vessels. For example, if 200-mile economic resoufce zones are construed by coastal states to authorize
regulation of scientific research vessels, naval Oceanographic research might be restricted within u miles of the coast of any nation.
Given these general areas of possible adverse imPact on naval missions, let us now turn to a set of Sj^ec*fic outcomes of the law of the sea and discuss ^ eir impact on naval missions.
Territorial Sea Breadth:
Emerging Law: If anything in the law of the sea negotiations is clear, it is that the 12-mile territorial breadth will very shortly be—if it is not ^ready—accepted customary international law. early 60% of all coastal nations now claim such a lrn*t, and although the United States still officially ^ertsonjy a three-mile limit, we tacitly accept ■mile claims insofar as naval operations are con- frried- The option for the United States to declare ir will never acquiesce in a territorial sea breadth |>reater than three miles has apparently not seriously Considered, though such a tactic could greatly k £v,ate some problems caused by territorial sea readth expansion, especially with respect to the raits question (see below). .
Constraints Posed: First, there is a growing trend fri0ng underdeveloped coastal nations to require,
through enactment of domestic laws, advance notice before naval vessels may navigate their territorial waters in innocent passage. The United States opposes this view (and presumably refuses to comply with such restraints), and neither the present law of the sea nor the RSNT requires such notice. Such a rule would obviously restrict naval mobility by quadrupling the width of the corridor in which warships might be denied access or encounter delays in access. Second, if such a rule were accepted by the United States, or if the nation chose not to operate within others’ territorial waters on naval presence missions, the additional distance from the coast could have an effect on the perceptions of decision-makers (and the public) in coastal states toward which the mission was directed. Being able to see a carrier from the beach is one thing; having to use field glasses from the top of a hill to view her is another. On this latter point, however, it should be noted that public perceptions of naval power are largely irrelevant in most Third World nations because of their totalitarian forms of government. The head of state knows what vessels are situated where and probably has his copy of Jane’s Fighting Ships (or a knowledgeable admiral) nearby to tell him the nature of the threat posed.
Credibility of the threat becomes the critical factor at that stage, and whether the public can actually see the vessels would seem to be of relatively minor importance.
^ Straits:
Emerging Law: As noted, there is a clear trend toward a 12-mile territorial sea breadth. This will result in many straits now containing a corridor of high seas being converted entirely to territorial waters. This conversion changes navigation rights from one of high seas freedom to transit subject to the rules of innocent passage. Under the latter, overflight and submerged transit are forbidden without consent of the coastal state.9 The RSNT provides for a regime of “transit passage” ensuring unimpeded navigation for warships and aircraft, provided they comply with certain regulations imposed by the littoral state. In the absence of a treaty, however, straits states may attempt to unilaterally impose restrictions on passage, such as advance notice requirements and the banning of nuclear-powered vessels.
Even with a treaty in the form of the RSNT, however, there is a debate whether the provisions guarantee rights of overflight and submerged passage. There is no explicit provision therefor, and several different articles have to be read in conjunction to make the case. Further, this reading must be done in the context of the negotiations in order to ascertain the m tent of the parties negotiating the treaty. Accor ingly, even if the present RSNT provisions on strait5 were to be adopted in a treaty, there would be room for contention and argument concerning their impaCt on submerged transit and overflight.
Constraints Posed: Restrictions on straits passa£e could impose severe restrictions on naval mobil^T Access to and from the Baltic, the Mediterranean* the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea could be paired. Entry to semi-enclosed sea areas such as r Caribbean and the Sea of Japan could be adverse ] affected by rerouting requirements. Likewise, eXlS^ ing rights of overflight could be curtailed afl overflight of the Strait of Gibraltar was the only r°u^j open to the United States for the resupply of Isra£ during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
^ Archipelagoes:
Emerging Law: The RSNT provides that ®r chipelagic nations may draw straight baselineS around their outermost islands, creating chipelagic waters” on the inside. Although innocent passage would be applicable in archipelagic water5’ such nations may also designate sea-lanes in wl>*^ high seas freedom of navigation would be retail ' Should an archipelagic state not designate such sea, lanes, the right of “archipelagic sea-lanes passage^ may be exercised through the routes normally use
(n Ob. 200-
f°r international navigation. The customary interna- tlonal law development process is likely to produce a similar regime.
Constraints Posed: The constraints are generally the Sa®e as for straits, with the additional major prob- ern of fleet transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through the Indonesian archipelago. Under an innocent passage regime, the coastal state or archipelagic nation might restrictively interpret such rnles to the detriment of passage by warships. Also, Under a “sea-lanes” concept, the location of forces by enemy could be made easier, thus increasing ’•heir vulnerability, though in peacetime, naval forces transiting archipelagoes do tend to stay with predictable routes.
v p .
economic Resource Zones:
Emerging Law: Another of the few near-certainties lri law of the sea development is that—whether by treaty along the lines of the RSNT or by unilateral acti°n—all coastal states will soon have or claim exclusive jurisdiction with respect to living and non- lv*ng resources within 200 miles of their coasts. An- ClHary jurisdiction may also be asserted over pollu- tlQn and scientific research, and the combination C°uld work to restrict navigation in the 12- to ^0-mile area. The issue in the law of the sea negoti- atl°ns has been called the question of the “residuum authority. That is, should jurisdiction with resPect to matters other than living and non-living resource exploitation in a 12-200 mile economic zone rest with the coastal state or with the international c°nimunity as a whole? If the former, then the c°astal state could arbitrarily impose restrictions on nayigation within the zone; if the latter, only by c°nsent of all the world’s nations (through a global treaty or by evolution of a new rule of customary 'Uternational law) could restrictions on non-resource Uses of the economic zone be imposed.
Constraints Posed: Strict control over scientific reSearch could greatly restrict, or prohibit altogether, naval research in the 12- to 200-mile belt. Pollution lutisdiction could be used to harass merchant ship- or naval transit of the 12- to 200-mile area. Ven direct regulation of navigation is not out of the ^Uestion; the RSNT does not make it clear, for exam- that the waters of such economic resource zones tetain their status as high seas. Underdeveloped na- tlous have pressed for what they term a sut generis Sta.tus for the waters of the economic zone, i.e., Either territorial waters nor high seas. This ap- Pr°ach is consistent with the concept of residual °U-resource) rights resting with the coastal state.
viously, if naval vessels felt constrained to avoid mile economic zones in reacting to crisis situations, the impact in cost and delay could be considerable. Further, if alternate routes were limited, vulnerability to surveillance or interdiction could be increased.
► Continental Shelf:
Emerging Law: Existing legal rights to emplace antisubmarine warfare tracking and detection devices (the fixed undersea surveillance system, SOSUS, for example) on the continental shelf, slope, and rise derive from the fact that exclusive coastal state rights in continental margin areas relate only to natural resource exploitation.10 The RSNT does not, in present form, alter this regime. Unilateral action by coastal states can be expected to do so, however. Mexico and Kenya, for example, offered a proposal at the Caracas session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference that would have made any use of the continental margin (including deployment of passive antisubmarine warfare devices) dependent on coastal state advance consent.
Constraints Posed: In view of the covert nature of the antisubmarine warfare device emplacement process, the legal constraints would appear to be minimal, even if a ban on such activity were unilaterally imposed by the coastal state. If the United States were party to a treaty containing such a ban, however, the policy question would be made more difficult, and internal bureaucratic restraints might well dictate compliance. A reduction in the ability of the United States to monitor Soviet submarines could, of course, have extremely serious implications for both our policy of strategic deterrence and for conventional warfare capability.
► Semi-Enclosed Seas:
Emerging Law: The RSNT recognizes the special interests of littoral states surrounding semi-enclosed seas such as the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Sea of Japan. Although the provisions of the RSNT on semi-enclosed seas relate only to resource exploitation, unilateral claims could assert more competence in such areas, including restrictions on navigation. The proposals for “zones of peace and security” (which would bar all warships from the Indian Ocean) indicate how littoral states might proceed in this regard.11
Constraints Posed: Denial of or restrictions on access to semi-enclosed seas (in addition to those noted above, consider also the various “China” seas) could work a severe hardship on the Navy in carrying out strategic deterrence, projection of power, or naval presence missions.
► Historic Water Claims:
Emerging Law: There exist reasonably well settled international legal principles governing claims by a coastal state of internal water status for areas previously considered as high seas.12 A study by the United Nations lists three basic elements which must exist before any such claim can be deemed valid: an effective claim to sovereignty by a national government; a continuous exercise of the authority claimed; acquiesence by other nations.13
Nonetheless, claims are occasionally made without foundation, as in the case of Libyan assertions of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sirte. Where all other legal bases fail to provide underpinning for a seaward extension of coastal state competence, one can expect to see historic water claims advanced.
Constraints Posed: The constraints posed by historic water claims are potentially more severe than any of the previously discussed actions since they constitute a claim of internal water status (i.e., the claim is to move the baseline seaward). If that status is accepted, international law requires consent of the coastal state for any navigation whatsoever, innocent passage not being applicable.
Requirements to Counter the Threat of Adverse Law of the Sea Development: If the possibility of occurrence of any of the constraints noted above is considered a sufficient threat, the United States should be prepared to take measures to alleviate the problem. Depending upon the particular constraint posed, several alternatives are available for pursuing this goal.
The Third Law of the Sea Conference: To date, virtually all efforts to achieve favorable law of the sea developments have gone to the Third Conference. This international conference has been dominated, unfortunately, by ideological conflicts between developed and underdeveloped nations. A widely accepted, comprehensive treaty now seems highly improbable. Accordingly, other methods will have to be pursued.
The conference has been valuable, however, in eliciting statements of national interest on a wide variety of ocean issues. In that connection it should be noted that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken identical positions on most security- related law of the sea issues—straits passage, advance notice for innocent passage, high seas characterization for economic zones, and so forth. Nonetheless, asymmetries may exist in U.S.-U.S.S.R. naval hardware, deployment, or missions such that a divergence from present policy positions might be warranted in some instances.
Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties: This approach is particularly applicable to the problem of straits and archipelagoes. Beginning now to negotiate appropriate agreements with the key states (Indonesia and Spain, e.g.) could prevent problems from ever arising in the event that the conference fails to produce a treaty and is disbanded. Rather than have a hiatus between a conference failure and the time we secure favorable arrangements with straits and archipelaglC nations, the groundwork could be laid at present so that naval interests are protected without delay.
Such agreements might be construed to constitute tacit acceptance of the 12-mile territorial sea breadth or archipelagic claims and thus limit U.S. flexibil’ty on the broader question of customary internationa law development in these areas. However, in t*ie 1973 U.S.-Brazil shrimp agreement, prefatory statements were inserted permitting each nation t0 assert continued adherence to its then existing inter national position (Brazil, that a 200-mile “territoria sea” claim was legitimate; the United States, that hj was not) while at the same time accepting a nxe duration modus vivendi for solving the particular pr°h lem at hand (Brazil, avoiding the negative values as^ sociated with an east coast version of the “tuna war. the United States, securing continued access for lts shrimp fishermen). Such statements are obviously self-serving to a large degree.
^ Threat or Use of Force: One way to deal with unfa vorable law of the sea rules is, of course, to prevent them from arising in the first place. Since the future law of the sea is apt to evolve through a customary claim-response process, the United States should he prepared to respond in a variety of ways to claim5 which threaten naval missions. Such adverse claim5 might take one or more of the following forms: y Imposition of restrictions on navigation in an eco nomic zone (
y Requiring advance notice for innocent passage 0 warships through territorial waters y Restrictions on, or denial of, overflight or sub' merged transit of straits ^
y A ban on all naval vessels from a semi-enclose area.
Potential responses could include the following: y The United States may wish to acquiesce in som^ claims, either because no significant threat to uava missions is perceived or because the disadvantage may be greater to a political enemy, thus giving rhe United States a net advantage. One must, however^ be very cautious in this approach, since acceptance 0 the claim, though advantageous in the limited c°0 text, could result in legitimization of the claim on 3 global basis, to be asserted subsequently by other5 elsewhere to our substantial detriment. y Assuming that acquiescence is deemed undesir able, the United States could transmit protest note5 and undertake whatever other diplomatic steps (1(1 eluding treaty negotiations) as may be appropriate t0
,l>ti
a withdrawal of the claim or favorable resolution of
Jhe conflict.
Again assuming undesirability of acquiescence, ar[1]d either in conjunction with or independent of ’plomatic measures, the United States should be Pfepared to respond rapidly by inserting appropriate ^ayal forces so long as the political/legal benefits to e gained by such action outweigh the costs in- 0 ved. The declared objective should not be confron- at<on with the claiming state, but rather, mainte- n.ance of a general, globally applicable international 'ght. The United States would thus not be the “im- r^rialist bully,” but rather a defender of existing in- ‘ational legal rights. In that regard, the action
^tn:
tak,
e° should simply constitute an exercise of the ^‘ght which the claim denies—the exercise of high 48 freedom of navigation or overflight, or of innoPassage in the claim situations identified above. cla'S act‘on constitutes an effective protest to the la lfn an<^ thereby retards the process by which uni. tetal claims ripen into binding rules of customary ^national law.
en short, the precedent for rights of navigation should he na Wished before a crisis requiring use arises, not during lj' ^bis will assist both in avoiding escalation of a p^’ted commitment of U.S. naval forces and in . c*iitating movement to and operations in the area tjai° Ve<J. This sort of “pre-crisis” planning is essen- aj. “ tnaximum naval mobility/speed is to be avail- e at the time of crisis.
overt Operations: The emplantation of passive an-
state knowledge and where the coastal state would be essentially powerless to intervene even if it knew of the operation. Accordingly, in the event that either a treaty or a unilateral claim proscribes deployment of antisubmarine devices on the continental shelf without coastal state consent, the Navy should be prepared to covertly deploy such devices where required for national security purposes.
Conclusion: The law of the sea is today in a state of flux. The United States must take all measures necessary to ensure that future legal developments concerning the use of ocean space do not unacceptably retard our ability to carry out traditional and prospective missions of our naval forces. To that end, a mix of strategies must be adopted, including global negotiations, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the threat or use of force, and the conduct of covert operations.
tisub
marine devices on the continental shelf is the
example of this alternative. The political costs appear to be negligible (if not zero) in cases
*Quld
He;
Professor Knight is Campanile Professor of Marine Resources Law at the Louisiana State University Law Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Since 1972, he has been a member of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea which serves the National Security Council’s Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force. During 1976 he served as a consultant to the Naval Studies Board (National Academy of Sciences) for its summer study “The Next Generation Navy: National Needs and Technological Opportunities.” He is an Associate Editor of Ocean Development and International Law: A Journal of Marine Affairs and a member of the Board of Review and Development of the American Society of International Law. Professor Knight received a bachelor’s degree in political science from Stanford University in 1961 and a doctor of jurisprudence degree from Southern Methodist University Law School in 1964. Before joining the LSU Law School faculty in 1968, Professor Knight worked for four years in general business law practice, specializing in land and natural resources law, international law, and marine resources law.
re the deployment can be made without coastal
e0c ^ Knight, “Issues Before the Third United Nations Confer-
hs °n °f the Sea,” Louisiana Law Review, Winter 1974, pp.
55-l96
*c
t j ^Vent»on on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 4rt'A,S- No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, in force 30 September 1962, Pur ^ ^"^e seas being open to all nations, no State may validly
3 ^°rt t0 subject any part of them to its sovereignty.”]. l95;vent.°n on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 29 April State ^ U-S-T. 1606 (1964), Article 2 [“The sovereignty of a coastal anJextends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed nd subsoil ■•]
' See . .,
free^’ e 8 > Convention on the High Seas, op. cit., Article 2 [“These
0rns, and others which are recognized by the general principles of th'a[2]°na^ ^W’ ke exercised by all States with reasonable regard $ease^lnterests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high which the United States extended its jurisdiction over fishery resources to 200 miles from the coast.
7 On the Caracas conference, see H. Gary Knight, “The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference: Caracas,” Am. Univ. Fieldstaff Reports, October 1974; John R. Stevenson and Bernard H. Oxman, “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session,” American Journal of International Law (1975).
8 “Revised Single Negotiating Text,” U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/ Rev. 1/Parts I, II, & III (6 May 1976) and A/CONF.62/WP.9/Rev. 1 (6 May 1976).
9 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, op. cit.. Articles 14-23.
10 Convention on the Continental Shelf, op. cit.
11 See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI), 16 December 1971.
12 For a discussion of the legal precedents, see United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975).
13 United Nations Secretariat, “Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays,” U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (9 March 1962), 2 Y.B. Int’. L. Commn. 1 (1962).
[1] Co
Option on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471 , b4)’ T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, in force 10 June 1964. e8-> the “Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,” *C 94-265, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 13 April 1976, by