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^ erhaps most significant for those concerned with are ^ Promot^on opportunities within naval aviation e rhe opening sentences of that article:
^en> five years ago, these pages featured an article entitled "Survival of the Fittest in aval Aviation,” survival in combat was an everyday problem, particularly for the attack- Carrier community. In today’s peacetime Navy, e struggle for survival is no less intense. Promotion or Else” is still the name of the Same, and it would help if everyone knew the rules.
'■pi
he October 1971 issue of the Proceedings contained inV^ perceptive article entitled "Survival of the Fittest g aval Aviation” by Lieutenant Commander John E. and^CSS Present ardcle is intended as an update fiv recxam*nati°n rhe issues and questions raised e years ago by Commander Burgess.
telat
. Three-quarters of our rear admirals in naval avia- r|°n come from backgrounds in attack carrier aviation, yet only 36% of aviator commanders and cap- 2lns are associated with this specialty. How has this Pattern developed? What lessons are there for today’s young aviation officer?”
A great many changes have taken place in the Navy since Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., took office as Chief of Naval Operations in July 1970. Now, a little more than two years after the conclusion of his term, is a good time to measure the success of those changes.
For officers there were to be multiple paths for promotion. The Operational Technical Management System (OTMS) was and is heralded as the innovation which would achieve improved promotion opportunities for officers. The OTMS concept, when coupled with Weapons System Aquisition Management (WSAM) and other management changes and initiatives encouraged by the new CNO and the Bureau of Naval Personnel, should have had an impact on promotion opportunities. If so, statistics should validate Commander Burgess’ closing prophesy:
"This is a time of change. Old truths and ways of thinking are under challenge. Imagination and ingenuity are at a premium. Competition is already sharpening. Rewards will follow for those with the demonstrated capacity for excellence.
"Within naval aviation, new aircraft and approaches are removing barriers which have impeded the professional growth of many in years past, and new paths to career success will open as the needs of the future Navy are defined. Narrow traditional benchmarks are bound to change as the families of officers in the Navy grow closer.
"The challenge to achieve top leadership is here for those who will accept it.”
Since an officer’s success is measured, for the most part, by his promotions, statistics should show that equal opportunity does exist for those who demonstrate comparable levels of proficiency and achievement. Using information for in-zone officers derived from selection board results for fiscal years 1972 through
Ip?
Promotion to
Table 1
Designator | Lt. Commander | Commander | Captain |
111X | 66.4% | 53.7% | 47.5% |
112X | 73.6% | 72.6% | 64.3% |
131X | 62.3% | 54.7% | 46.4% |
132X | 63.5% | 52.2% | 50.0% |
| Table 2 |
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| Promotion to |
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Designator | Lt. Commander | Commander | Captain |
111X | 66.4% | 35.7% | 17.0% |
112X | 73.6% | 53.4% | 34.3% |
131X | 62.3% | 34.1% | 15.8% |
132X | 63.5% | 33.1% | 16.6% |
1975, a number of comparisons can be made for those with the following designators: lllX, surface warfare officer; 112X, submarine warfare officer, 131X, naval aviator; 132X, naval flight officer. These numbers show the percentage of officers promoted from one grade to the next.
Table 2 indicates the probability of a lieutenant being promoted to the grades listed, again based on past statistics and excluding the fact that small numbers of "early” and "late” selections will inevitably cause small variations over the years.
It is apparent from these figures that a submariner’s chances of going from lieutenant to captain are more than twice those of his counterparts in surface warfare and aviation.
In addressing the "survival of the fittest” question, it is important to look further at aviation in particular in order to do a more thorough analysis of relative pro
"Any system of categorizing types of squadrons Is necessarily arbitrary, but for purposes of further discussion, three major categories will be used.
"Attack carrier squadrons (CVW) are those forces whose orientation is toward projection of power from the sea....
"ASW squadrons are those land and sea-based forces whose primary orientation is toward control of the sea, principally antisubmarine warfare.
"'Other’ will include all other squadrons in naval aviation, . . .”
The following data show the promotion opportunities from one grade to the next for particular aviation communities for the fiscal years 1972 to 1975.
Community |
| Table 3 Aviators | Naval Flight Officers |
| ||
Promotion to |
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| Promotion to |
| ||
Lt. Commander Commander | Captain | Lt. Commander Commander | Captain | |||
CVW | 78.1% | 76.2% | 63.5% | 11.6% | 66.6% | O © |
ASW (land-based) | 57.1% | 51.7% | 32.7% | 59-5% | 48.6% | o © |
ASW (sea-based) | 69.4% | 63.8% | 49.9% | 75.0%* | 52.2%** | — |
Other | 50.4% | 46.1% | 44.7% | 52.9% | 21.4% | — |
♦Limited data for analysis.
** Overall NFO average from previous table.
Table 4
Aviators Naval Flight Officers
Promotion to Promotion to
Community | Lt. Commander | Commander | Captain | Lt. Commander | Commander | Captain |
cvw | 78.4% | 59.5% | 37.8% | 71.6% | 47.7% | 23.9% |
ASW (land-based) | 57.1% | 29.5% | 9.6% | 59.5% | 28.9% | 14.5% |
ASW (sea-based) | 69.4% | 44.3% | 22.1% | 75.0% | 39.2% | 19.6% |
Other | 50.4% | 23.2% | 10.4% | 52.9% | 11.3% | 5.7% |
Table 4 shows the probability of a lieutenant being promoted to the grades indicated, again excluding the minor effects of "early” and "late” promotions.
Obviously, there is not equal promotion opportunity ln all categories. For instance, an attack carrier type P'lot has almost a 4 to 1 advantage over his land-based contemporary in making it all the way to captain.
Ue to the lack of statistical data, a more accurate presentation could not be made for the NFO commu- "UY’ and the nature of the "other” community makes it 'rhcult to make valid predictions.
It is clear that as more statistics are available in the e lively new naval flight officer community, a 1 to 3 j0r a 1 to 4 disadvantage will be experienced by those in anff-based antisubmarine patrol work. This particular c°rnmunity (132X, land-based ASW lieutenant) is already at a 1 to 3.8 disadvantage to the 13IX CVW eutenant in competition for captain selection.
There are a number of different factors which influ- erice promotion opportunities. One of them is that old Standby, "the needs of the service.” In order to adequately respond to those needs, each selection board is 8lven direction as to how many unrestricted line officers rtlay be selected. But no breakdown is given within the Unrestricted line group. Thus, for promotion quota ^rP°ses, submariners, surface officers, and aviation cers of all tactical specialties are lumped together, er the theory—derived from federal law—that all Ur>restricted line officers are to be considered equally that the best fitted of those shall be promoted, k . ttn the long-range personnel planning inevitably einS conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel, it is sel 0rtunate that there is no information available to ction boards which addresses the current variation in hers of selections within unrestricted line subdivi- s which are desired for specific year groups. Addi- ally, future predictions would certainly be most p] . ^or officcr management and individual career ning purposes. The radical changes in opportunity 0rentecI in the previous statistics might be dampened an CVen eIrminated if, at a minimum, cumulative and UaI data were published. At present, Navy policy
does not permit such publication, much less the provision of target goals for selection board consideration.
Another way in which equal opportunity could be manifested would be if each aviation specialty being considered were represented on selection boards in proportion to its actual numbers eligible to sit on the board or in proportion to candidates under consideration. Without going into a great deal of detail, there are some striking anomalies which are not at all surprising in view of the figures shown in the previous tables. Surface warfare officers have been generally underrepresented, although they did reach approximately propor
tional representation with the selection boards for fiscal year 1975. Submariners and CVW pilots have been consistently overrepresented on selection boards. Let me cite a couple of extreme examples. For the captain board in 1973, submariners constituted 11.1% of those eligible for membership, but they comprised 25.0% of the board. In the 1974 commander selections, the unrestricted line officer board was limited solely to surface officers, submariners, and attack carrier types. The rest of aviation was not represented at all on the board. Attack carrier aviators made up 44.4% of the selection board, even though they represented only 11.8% of those eligible for board membership.
Antisubmarine warfare community pilots have been poorly represented, while NFOs were not represented at all for the years in question, probably because the NFO community is still relatively new. A particularly alarming oversight is that there were no land-based ASW representatives of any designator on the selection boards for commander in any of the fiscal years from 1972 through 1975. In addition, there was only token ASW representation on captain selection boards (an average of one air ASW officer served on the captain selection board in each of the four years studied). Examining these statistics does not make much of a case for equal
opportunity through proportional representation, particularly when one considers that the total aviation ASW community constitutes a significant percentage of all naval officers, especially of those in naval aviation itself. This underrepresentation is particularly significant since a substantial, if almost unquantifiable, percentage of "other” aviators and NFOs are former ASW specialists. (There is, however, a certain limited "crossover” from all communities into and out of "other” aviation specialties.)
While there is insufficient evidence to positively prove that these imbalances have caused "equally qualified” officers to fail to be promoted, it is fair to conclude that the cumulative effect has caused considerable inequity. With proportional representation, there would be no doubts about officers being considered getting an equal opportunity to be objectively considered by officers truly experienced in their tactical specialties.
The next area to be addressed is one familiar to all naval officers—fitness reports. In its period of deliberation, each selection board uses fitness reports and other official records to evaluate an officer’s potential performance in the next higher grade. Their predictions are based on past performance, as expressed in written documents by a variety of commanding officers. There are as many variations in this evaluation and reporting process as there are in the personalities of commanding officers.
Comments on fitness reports often lead to the conclusion that there is a significant difference between communities. This is a difficult point to validate, however; a sample of officers from different communities cooperated by supplying specific data from their fitness reports. Based on a sample comprising 569 officers’ Figure 1 shows the probability of an officer receiving a given grade within specific aviation communities- It is clear that this sample supports the hypothesis that the CVW community enjoys a significant advantage over the ASW community when fitness report grading stand-
1 In order to construct this table, a representative but not truly scientific^) selected sample of 569 naval officers (lieutenant commander and below) was asked what community they were in (fighter, attack, land-based ASW, etc! and which grades they consistently received (Accelerated, 1 of Top Fc*5 Excellent, Fine Officer).
Figure 1
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s' | • | \ / \ ' ✓ \ ✓ \ |
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Accelerated 1 of Top Few Excellent Fine OfBcef
CVW
ASW (land-based) ASW (sea-based)
plan
Suited
ards ar*d grades are compared. There are several reasons p1Ven for this apparent disparity in fitness report grades. flrst would be the distribution of pilots in the pipeline r°rn preflight to the fleet and follow-on tours, j The first decision point for aviation officers comes ring the primary stage. At this point the criteria for P'peline selection priority is based on academic and Sot grades in primary stage, after approximately six Weeks of training. This criterion establishes only basic rtlotor skills and flying ability. It lacks the ability to accurately predict overall officer career potential.
^hile the initial selection to a specific community rnay not be indicative of future potential, it could be argued that the CVW junior officer finds himself in a Community of superior performers and thus has a slight ^ may be in a relatively small unit of perhaps 16 ° 20 officers while his counterpart in another commu- offf find himself in a large unit of up to 60
cers. Thus, the officer in the smaller unit achieves e visibility and greater responsibility.
Xamining these points more closely does not sup- rt their validity. First, the selection process for the • tlon field does not support the theory that there is a a^ lhCant difference in the management and leadership v- ,as' These skills are based on many facets of an indi- ai s past and current environment. A more thor- k o evaluation would perhaps show that the land- 0p ^ community is as good for the development
AS\\vtUrC ^eaders as attack carrier squadrons. The young perand °ther” officer is associated with more enlisted °nnel and officers because of the size of his unit. As
e commander or mission commander, he is re- irie^Ca t0 utilize and develop leadership and manage- nt skills in a variety of areas. Operationally, he must
be aware of task force organization and orientation in three tactical environments—air, surface, and subsurface. In addition, he must be concerned with the morale of his crew and the status and maintenance of his assigned aircraft when he is on detached operations. These conditions truly test the mettle of a junior officer and develop leadership and management skills necessary for the future.
The disparity in fitness report grades certainly reflects divergent grading methods on the part of commanding officers. It is not clear that agreement can ever be reached in proving that one community grades high or another one grades low. There are factors, however, which may have influenced grades in the past. In the CVW and carrier-based ASW communities, accelerated
grades given under the "old” fitness report reviewing system were often reviewed by officers of equal grade to the commanding officer. In the land-based ASW community, on the other hand, the report was reviewed by an officer one or two grades senior to the commanding officer. This "dampening” effect may explain why many more carrier pilots are chosen for accelerated promotion than are those in patrol squadrons.
The commanding officers of smaller units may have difficulty in evaluating a limited number of officers with whom they have developed close personal associations. They may not, in fact, have a large enough basis for assigning a spread of grades. The commanding officers of larger squadrons, grading far more officers, are almost bound to spread evaluations over a wider spectrum.
Detailing is an important key to a successful career pattern. In general, as long as an officer remains competitive, he is detailed to sea within his warfare specialty. Unless a shore duty billet requires specific expertise, assignments are made on a nonparochial basis. In order to ensure that the most qualified officers are provided a viable career path, each community should be equitably represented in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. It is not clear, however, that key management areas have a balanced representation from each aviation community. Historically, most policy level billets at the Bureau of Personnel have been held by specific cate
gories of pilots, yet these billets do not appear to require specific expertise and could be filled on a nonparochial basis.
Some key career paths were cut off as reflected in a policy change published in the August 1973 Officer Personnel Newsletter.[1] This change has restricted the assignment of certain categories of aviation officers. This new policy has limited the opportunity of some officers who desired ship’s company tours in key billets, and in particular the carrier navigator billet, later in their careers. This path is no longer open for certain officers without any clear reason why other officers who have not had previous ship’s company tours would be qualified for these career-enhancing assignments. Thus, a significant number of "best qualified” officers may find a viable operational career path—and opportunity for command of ships—closed to them late in their careers.
While there are rewards for excellence, they appear
to be predominantly distributed to select groups. The changes Commander Burgess expected five years ago have apparently not taken place, and the barriers have not been removed. While new career paths have been outlined and emphasized over the past five years, the companion equitable promotion opportunities have not paralleled the institution and development of these programs.
It is clear that the traditional narrow benchmarks have not changed. It remains true that, as Commander Burgess concluded, "the challenge to achieve top lead' ership is here for those who will accept it.” The rewards, as reflected in the promotion statistics, clearly indicate there is not equal opportunity for all equally qualified officers. In addition, it is evident that consistent equal representation does not exist for certain large communities.
Efforts have been made to change the bias at the selection point for flag grade.[2] These explicit instructions do not resolve the central issues reflected in the statistics presented in this article. One can’t become a flag contender without surviving the intermediate barriers. All levels of selection must be addressed. Recognizing that the fundamental credibility of the unrestricted line promotion system appears questionable, lt is considered essential that an in-depth review be made of the promotion opportunities for all officers in order to identify and rectify the fundamental weaknesses inherent in the current system.
Efforts must be made to balance quota assignments over time, in order to equalize promotion opportunities across communities and year groups. The recent reduC'
3 Note recent letters to flag boards.
tions in force levels and other related issues are recognized; however, there appears to be significant need for improvement. Additionally, as quotas are developed and the number of officers to be considered is established, board assignment must guarantee that each community has equivalent visible representation and recognition. If necessary, limiting regulations and laws should be modified.
The fitness report problem presents a more complicated area. While the problems may be difficult to fully resolve, substantial steps should be taken to improve rhe situation. Most are obvious. Where these initiatives have already been taken, they must be monitored and supported.
Since the recommendation for accelerated promotion should be reserved for only a small group of particularly exceptional officers, it would be appropriate to have all recommendations for accelerated promotions reviewed at a level at least two grades higher than the reporting senior, or at the flag level in the case where a captain is rhe reporting senior. Since the officers recommended for accelerated promotion should be few in number, this should not be an administrative burden.
While briefing boards and contacting type commanders and commanding officers to explain the infla- tl0n of fitness report grades highlight the problem, they not resolve it and probably lead to even more mflated grades. Instead, proper board representation and £he identification of commanding officers who inflate §rades or are hard markers would do far more to resolve rhis problem.
With the new optical character reading fitness reports, it should be possible to review more reports in rhe future, establish grading levels and patterns and Identify biased reporting. In addition, a multiple could e developed in order to dampen identified biases and present boards with adjusted statistics which present a true perspective of officer performance. Clearer guidelines should be established for early selection opportunities. It is doubtful that many officers thoroughly understand the current system. In fact, there are indications of significant bias and this area should be carefully monitored, both through the precept system and by administrative means.
It is recognized that the period discussed during this study was one of significant combat operations for the attack carrier community. An officer’s exposure to direct combat situations would probably have a direct influence on his promotion opportunities. This advantage however, must be weighed with the need for experienced officers in other categories, such as antisubmarine warfare, particularly at the more senior grades. If it is, nevertheless, necessary to continue the promotion probabilities presented in this article, then the Bureau of Naval Personnel must clearly spell out each officer’s promotion potential by community in order for junior officers to make sound career decisions.
Lieutenant Commander Turkington entered the Naval Reserve in 1949 and qualified in submarines in 1952. After graduating from California State University in June m jfif 1958, he was .commissioned and served in the Office of \^Wk Naval Intelligence. After augmentation into the regular Navy, Lieutenant Commander Turkington was designated a Naval Aviation Observer in 1963. After a tour of duty with Patrol Squadron Four, he served as the executive officer of the Naval Facility, Point Sur, California. Subsequent assignments included Patrol Squadron 45 in Jacksonville, Florida, and Patrol Squadron 30 at Patuxent River, Maryland. In June 1974, Lieutenant Commander Turkington graduated from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, and was retained as a member of the Navy Instruction Department for the next year. He is now assigned to Antarctic Development Squadron Six at Point Mugu, California. He received a master of arts degree in human resources management from Pepperdine University in January 1976.
August 1973, p. 18.
[1] Bureau of Naval Personnel, The Officer Personnel Newsletter, Vol. 18, No. 1,
Them and Us
The aviators fly so high these days that modern blackshoes find it hard to believe their status was not always so exalted—but there was a time.
In 1931, for example, the USS Saratoga (CV-3) was anchored off Long Beach. The officer of the deck called the division officer of one of the deck divisions and said, "Jeff, I told one of your men to do something about an hour ago, and it hasn’t been done. Can you look into that?” The division officer called for the sailor—a long-service petty officer and said, "The officer of the deck tells me he gave you an order and no move was made, what’s the story?”
"My God, Mr. Metzel,” said the startled man, "Was that the officer of the deck? 1 thought it was one of them aviators!”
Commander R. E. Perry, USN (Retired)
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings).