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The DX Competition”
(5ec J. W. Devanney, pp. 18-29, August 1975
Proceedings)
Artis I. Plato, Head of the U. S. Naval Ship Engineering Center’s Shipboard Manning /Design Work Study/Human Factors Section and a member of the original DX proposal evaluation team—In his footnote dumber nine, Dr. Devanney labels the Davy’s imposed requirement for a Design Work Study (DWS) approach a
• ■ . heinous example of the waste ■ • •” that eventually cost the taxpayers about $1 million and produced no useful results. From his nebulous statement in chis footnote, it is quite clear that Dr. devanney does not know much about the dws process and about the benefits that can be derived from its application.
Essentially, the DWS process, a subset °f Industrial Engineering (IE) discipline, consists of a synthesis of method study, work measurement, and other IE techniques adapted for design management Use. dws considers the operator as an integral part of the operating system and recognizes that decisions affecting any subsystem may have an impact on the '''hole system (i.e., the ship and her tnanning). Despite Dr. Devanney’s innuendo that DWS is a nebulous practice, the process has a clear objective: the achievement of the most economical and effi- c,ent combination of payload and support subsystems that will allow the new design to accomplish its assigned mission and tasks. ^n addition, DWS also provides a uniform design problem solution format which results in excellent documentation for management.
If properly applied, the DWS process must start with an analysis of the proposed ship’s missions and tasks; then it must develop functions and subfunctions needed to accomplish them. Especially during the early design phase, the DWS engineers must be able to demonstrate that the proposed ship, with all her men and hardware systems, can carry out the missions and tasks and meet the performance requirements established by the CNO.
In the latter phases of ship design, the process is more concerned with detailed studies of individual subsystems. This results in well integrated subsystems, where the best possible ship arrangements have been developed and where men and machines have been combined in the most effective manner.
One of the final results of the application of the DWS process is the establishment of precise ship manning requirements. This is achieved through an analysis of all possible operational requirements and by establishing other on-board workload requirements, such as administrative, support, maintenance, utility, and military duty manhours/ week. The operational and workload requirements are then combined, in accordance with guidelines established by CNO, resulting in a preliminary Ship Manpower Document (SMD).
Additional description of and information about the DWS process, and its impact on equipment and space selection and arrangements, together with shipboard manning development, can be found in technical papers and publications (such as NavSea Manuals, ASNE Journal, and NavSea ASE papers).
Prior to the DX development, the Navy had already demonstrated, with other ship designs, that the application of the DWS process resulted in an approximate 15% manpower reduction and a generally improved and more effective ship. Based on this experience, the special requirements for DWS were injected in the DX request for proposal (RFP) and not to satisfy the . . biases of certain subgroups of the proposal evaluation team. . .
Initial Naval Ship Systems Command in-house feasibility studies had indicated that a DX type ship, carrying systems similar to the proposed payload and conventionally manned, would require about 334 officers and men. The manning for the DD-963 class (DX concept) presently stands at 251 officers and men. Without the conscientious DWS effort by Litton, this dramatic reduction could not have been possible. At this time, one may wonder what additional ship weight and volume requirements would have been necessary to accommodate about 84 more officers and men. Each man that is placed on board the ship generates a need for bunk space, additional living area, messing space, supply storeroom space, administrative and medical support, larger distilling capacity, etc.
Additionally, each man eliminated, based on 1969 average billet costs, represented a life cycle personnel savings of about $250,000. Thus, we can assume
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published in the Proceedings.
that the implied minimum ship operational life cycle manpower savings for the 84 men could be expressed as about $21 million in terms of 1969 dollars. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the $1 million that Dr. Devanney claims were wasted on the DX-DWS effort will pay a terrific dividend of 2,100%. I do not believe that the system improvement and manning study question would have been addressed by Litton, to the required extent and depth that produced the above stated savings, if it had not been formally included in the RFP.
When Dr. Devanney states that the Navy ". . . automatically assigned a lot of people . . to the evaluation team because the project represented a big investment, he fails to perceive the real reason for this action. In the first place, the Navy received three huge proposals that consisted of more than 30 volumes of material in each case. To meet the evaluation deadline, responsibilities for evaluation had to be subdivided. In addition, the Navy desired that each technical subsystem be evaluated by experts in this area rather than generalists. Due to the complexity that is inherent in ship design, this necessitated the assignment of more members to the evaluation team. It is generally believed, even if not by Dr. Devanney, that these individuals did a creditable job in evaluating the tons of documents supplied.
"Linebacker Strike”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 46-51, August 1974;
J. T. Hayward and K. J. Davis, pp. 76-77, December 1974; R. C. Powers, pp. 85-86, April 1975; P. R. Osborn, pp. 79-80, September 1975 Proceedings')
Commander J. Michael Rodgers, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer of the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7)—Captain Osborn has submitted an excellent item for discussion concerning our fleet’s conventional gun capabilities. I most wholeheartedly share his concern and agree with his thesis. However, I’m afraid he has picked a poor example to illustrate his argument.
tionally inaccurate article which ap- (
peared in the 2 June 1975 issue of V.
News and World Report concerning the recapture of the SS Mayaguez and the successful recovery of her crew. I can verify that no reporters from that magazine were on the scene, and I’m afraid its source is being paid more than he is worth. First of all the two U. S. destroyers on the scene carried a total of three 5-inch guns; one on the USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1074) and two on the USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7). All three guns were in working order. Subsequent to rescuing U. S. military personnel from the sea and the crew of the Mayd- guez, the Henry B. Wilson fired close to 200 5-inch rounds at enemy positions which were firing on the ship, the Marines on Koh Tang Island, and the U. S. Air Force helicopters attempting to extract them. Our gunfire resulted in the confirmed destruction of three hostile machine gun emplacements and the sinking of an enemy gunboat (a former U. S. Navy PCF). In addition, several other secondary explosions were reported by Air Force aircraft, Marine
Roy Rowan
-The
row Days of
Mayaguez
MAYAGUEZ
by Roy Rowan
One of the most controversial and dramatic incidents in the post- Vietnam period was the recapture of the American cargo ship Mayaguez after it was seized by the revolutionary government forces of Cambodia. The whole truth of what happened during the capture, the attack, the recovery, as well as why the President made the decision he did, and the personal stories of the crew members themselves have not been told until now.
Roy Rowan, a Far Eastern bureau chief for Time magazine, sailed aboard the Mayaguez after her recovery and conducted extensive (and, in many cases, exclusive) interviews with the captain and crew and, later, with the Washington officials responsible for the decision to attack.
Here, in a revealing and perhaps historic narrative, the author details the diplomatic effort to obtain the release; tells why the Marines, the Air Force, and the Navy were ordered to attack; and relates what actually happened to the crew during and after their capture.
It is a compelling story of bold confrontation and heightening drama, of the courage and heroism of the captured crew and the Marines during those four tension-filled days.
1975. 224 pages. Illustrated. Map.
List price: $7.95 Member's price: $6.36
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Captain Osborn refers to the excep
C°fps ground observers, and Henry B. Wilson topside personnel.
At one point the forward 5-inch gun n'ount suffered a broken weldment which reduced it to one-sided operation Wlth half its normal high rate of fire. The after gun mount experienced no problems. The forward mount was repaired by ship’s force artificers and restored to full operation in 40 minutes. This illustrates the value of redundancy ln sensors and weapons systems.
We in the Henry B. Wilson have been plagued by this very inaccurate article ln U. S. News and World Report for some tlme now. Regrettably there appears to be no way to rectify this error. A letter sent to U. S. News and World Report in June 1975 was not answered. The maga- 2lne contains no "letters to the editor” column, and it is apparent they publish no retractions.
Parenthetically, based on what we observed in the Henry B. Wilson, on a scale of one to ten, Time magazine receives a seven, Newsweek a five, and U. S. News and World Report a zero for the accuracy (with points subtracted for Bum Dope”) of its description of what actually happened in reporting the 'Mayaguez Affair.” 'Warship Design:
Ours and Theirs”
(See J. W. Kehoe, pp. 56-65, August 1975 Proceedings)
Captain D. I. Thomas, U. S. Navy (Retired) —Captain Kehoe’s article provided a perceptive explanation of the different philosophies of the U. S. and Soviet navies in the design of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. It is reassuring that the outwardly apparent superiority of Soviet warships in armament can be explained by differences in their mission performance characteristics, "first strike” superiority, and awesome armament arrays for "showing the flag,” rather than as evidence that the Soviets have achieved clearly superior overall designs.
In one respect, however, I believe Soviet design philosophy is clearly superior: the insistence on multi-shaft propulsion systems. The 62 ships of the FF-io4o (Garcia), FF-1052 (Knox), and FFG-i (Brooke) classes are single-screw ships, as are some of our new major amphibious warfare ships like the six Iwo Jima-chss LPHs, the two Blue Ridge-class LCCs, and the five Charleston-class LKAs. This supports Captain Kehoe’s observation that propulsion ranks last in apparent design priorities of post-1960 U. S. warships, while ranking second only to weapons in Soviet designs.
(Obviously there have to be trade-offs in design characteristics of warships if payload, performance, size, and cost constraints are to be met. But is singlescrew propulsion a wise trade-off in valuable warships facing 20 years or more of demanding service?
The speed and endurance characteristics of the 27-knot Garcia-a.nd Knox-class FFs and Brooke-class FFGs have been met with a two-boiler, 35,000 h.p. single shaft engineering plant. These ships are logical follow-ups to the destroyer escorts of the Dealey, Courtney, Claude Jones, and Bronstein classes; each of which was designed to be a low-cost ship that could be built in quantity. Obviously this single-screw design allowed a lighter, more compact, and less costly main engine plant. It is arguable (and it was heatedly argued in OpNav in the late 1950s) whether 27 knots would be sufficient speed for these 4,000-ton first- line ocean escorts. Had speeds above 30 knots been required, it would have exceeded the capabilities of a single-screw design and forced a multi-engine arrangement. As noted in Captain Kehoe’s article, "the Soviets appear unwilling to commit even smaller frigates to a single propulsion shaft. They apparently consider that the savings in volume, weight, and costs associated with single-shaft ship design are outweighed by increased maneuverability and availability associated with multi-shaft ship design.”
Less easily explained, except on the basis of cost, is the single-screw design of the Iwo Jima-class LPHs and the Blue Ridge-class LCCs which utilize the LPH hull and machinery design. Their 20 knot-plus speed characteristics could be met with a single-screw 22,000 h.p. plant, but does a single-shaft design make sense from a military viewpoint in a high-value amphibious assault ship carrying 1,800 Marines and 20 helicopters or in an extremely valuable command ship? I recall, at the time the Iwo
Reckoning
by H. H. Shufeldt and G. D. Dunlap
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Jima was in design stage, that a substantial body of operational types advocated a twin-screw ship, but the final decision was determined by cost; either singlescrew or defer the program for lack of a million dollars or so.
An unfortunate parallel of "single screw-itis” is evident in the design of commercial supertankers—VLCCs and ULCCs. Nearly all these monsters— 200,000 tons deadweight or more—are single-screw ships, reflecting the overriding importance to the owner of building his tanker at lowest acceptable cost. The short life span—five to ten years—of these ships has not justified to the owners the higher initial and operating costs of a multi-shaft design. But when one considers the enormous damage to the environment (not to mention dollar loss to the owner) that would result from the stranding of a disabled, fully loaded ULCC drifting onto a lee shore, then a good case can be made for twin engines in these ships.
Modern warships are expensive, and it is understandable that costs which are not offset by added effectiveness should be avoided. In their 20 years or more of active service they will likely face perils of enemy action, severe weather, and demanding operating schedules not found in merchant service. A disabled tanker can be towed to port with loss only of money, whereas in wartime a dead-in-the-water warship hazards not only her crew (and embarked troops in amphibious ships) to loss from enemy action, but also precludes accomplishment of her mission and that of the force to which she is a part.
With the advent of compact machinery designs that gas turbines can provide, it is earnestly hoped that "single- screw-itis” will not compromise the design of new ships such as the FFG-7 class, and that the added "insurance” of twin screws will be incorporated.
Rear Admiral John R. Wadleigh, U. S. Navy (Retired) —Captain Kehoe has detailed an excellent comparison of today’s U. S. and Soviet surface combatant ships and clearly laid out reasons for their differences in his article. The continuing erosion of our fleet in numbers and more frequent publicity photographs of new Soviet ships combine to give the average U. S. citizen a feeling of "doom and gloom” when comparing the two navies. Captain Kehoe’s article does much to place ships of the two fleets in proper perspective.
Figure 7, Apparent Design Priorities, is of particular interest. In this table we see our Navy shifting for the first time from a priority on weapons. Historically we have emphasized weapons, the heavily gunned wooden frigates of the Constitution class, battleships of the Connecticut class with 12-inch, 8-inch, and 7-inch batteries jammed in a 16,000-ton hull, and the 15-gun cruisers of the Brooklyn class are classic examples. Our World War II ships were crammed with weapons, many added to combat the increasing aircraft threat. I well recall entertaining a Royal Navy "Captain D (DesRon Commander) on board my 2,200-ton destroyer in Devonport in 1950- The commodore was disturbed at the lack of accommodations for a squadron commander in my ship. I assured him that all 2,200-tonners had essentially the same quarters and that somehow we stuffed a commodore and his staff on board. My guest then described his facilities in a Tribal-class ship and added, "but confidentially, skipper, you have more guns than we do.” Today, a U. S. commodore visiting one of Admiral Gorshkov’s new ships would probably feel like that RN officer in my ship of 25 years ago.
U. S. emphasis on habitability has resulted in an offshoot benefit which might have been emphasized more by Captain Kehoe. Today, more than ever before, our new ships have room for the addition of new equipment, particularly sensors and weapons. Twenty years is no longer the life of a ship. There are 30-year-old ships with the fleet today, and we seem to be building with this in mind for the future. Twenty years ago I made a visit to the new Canadian escort destroyer, St. Laurent, in company with the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Force material officer. The comment of this senior engineering duty officer at the time was, "BuShips would never let us build one like this, there is extra space on board.” In the St. Laurent class Canadian designers were leaving space for improvements and added equipment. In looking at our ships of the CG-26 (Bel- ^ap), CGN-38 (Virginia), and the FF-1052 (Knox) classes, U. S. designers seem to have followed the Canadians. Here is a positive factor in today’s U. S. conduction that seems to be lacking in the crowded profiles of Admiral Gorshkov’s Navy.
The Female Naval Aviator:
A Free Ride?”
(See R. p. Shipman, p. 84, September 1975
Proceedings)
J- Scott Harmon, former lieutenant, U. S. Navy—The major problem with Lieutenant Shipman’s argument against wornen naval aviators is that he is not attacking the source of the problem, but lts result. It would be interesting to know how many women the lieutenant has consulted. Those that I know be- heve that if women enter the service, e«her voluntarily or by a future draft, they should receive the same considera- tlon as men, including participation in combat. The requirement that women not engage in combat is not by the choice of the women, but of the people who make our laws, our congressional representatives who are predominently men. If Congress would lift that restric- rion many of the other evils which Lieutenant Shipman sees in having rvomen aviators would be eliminated.
Women then would be required to pass carrier qualifications (CQ), thus adding that score into their overall flight school grades and making them competitive with other fledgling aviators for rhe good billets. There is no physical reason why women could not land on a carrier equally as well as men. The Question is then, who says women do hot need CQ? The answer, I am willing ro bet, is not the women who are involved, but men who still do not see rvomen as capable of performing a demanding job with abilities equal to their male counterparts.
For a male to enter flight training it seems as though there are two prerequisites: ability, and, more importantly, inclination. If a man has no desire to %, no amount of ability will help him; but if he has the desire, he must also have the ability. The same holds true for women. Few women I know want special considerations, and if they were to volunteer for flight training they would expect to meet the same physical standards as men. Again, who says women cannot meet the same qualifications as men? It is men. I am certain there are plenty of women in this country who have not only the inclination but the ability to meet and surpass all the stringent standards of flight school.
The only point Lieutenant Shipman mentions which deserves further consideration, is what he euphemistically calls the women’s "upper respiratory infection.” Why not call it what it is: a menstrual period. There is no real problem here. I have known mothers who take care of three or four children every day of the month, and if that does not require stamina, I invite fathers to try it for a while. But an even more reasonable solution would be to give the men a few days off each month; it may prove of benefit to everyone.
The problem which Lieutenant Shipman’s comment does not attack is how to obtain equality for all our people when society is dominated by one segment of the populace. The Navy is moving in the right direction, but it will not achieve true equality until its members rid themselves of the delusion that women are inherently incapable of the same tasks as men.
Commander John E. Burgess, U. S. Navy—l think it demeaning to women and naval aviators to refer to the females of the species as "waviators.” That is about as useful as referring to someone as a "male chauvinist pig.”
Lieutenant Shipman’s first worthwhile comment is that women are restricted in the types of flying they can do, because of "regulations.” Laws, not regulations, govern. Regulations governed back in the days toward the end of the enlisted aviation pilot (AP) program when APs would go to "support” flying billets. This did not prevent them from performing outstanding service for two generations. Lieutenant Shipman should talk to "Pappy” Byrne to discover what naval aviators are all about.
As for carrier quals (CQ), I never had to CQ as a flight student (a prospective seaplane pilot) either. In fact, I never saw the blunt end at night until I’d had my wings almost eight years. Nevertheless, I was fortunate enough to command an antisubmarine squadron, and don’t regret any of my 5,000 hours of patrol, transport, or antisubmarine flying. If for reasons unknown to me our lady aviators do not CQ in the Training Command, this does not preclude them from having useful careers. I think they should have the opportunity to CQ for the sheer joy and confidence it gives and on principle—but nobody asked me.
Lieutenant Shipman also complains about the physical requirements of the Pensacola PT program as applied to ladies. I was recently informed by one of their former training squadron skippers that they did in fact have to meet male standards, that it was tough, and that they succeeded. Whether true or not, I think it would be more germane to ensure that they were in top form in agility and stamina. (After all, it’s not that hard to open a San Miguel.)
The matter of who was assigned as instructor, and why, is also one of those age-old questions in naval aviation. For example, only the most patient, fearless pilots have traditionally instructed flight surgeons, who are notoriously suicide prone. When I was a flight instructor,
I was green enough to volunteer to instruct a group of foreign students who had obviously been picked on the basis of political leanings rather than by their English language aptitude. Providence saved me, and fortunately the Soviets got to teach them more advanced courses in MiG-2is—The result was a lot of broken MiG-2is. Any aviator can go on for hours on the subject of his instructors, and how bad they were in comparison to somebody else’s instructors. It is a fun exercise at happy hour.
There has been, in recent years, a serious problem of "stashed” aviators serving ashore while awaiting their first fleet seat. This is basically a function of the long lead time from recruiting to pinning on wings, around which we don’t plan wars. We had an imbalance at the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam when the lame and the sick found themselves back in cockpits unexpectedly. Toward the end of the war, the pipeline was moving more pilots than was justified. Stashing is better than the system my contemporaries endured back in 1957, when 50% of all students in the Basic Training Command were arbitrarily cut. Nevertheless, the fact that a small handful of women naval aviators were given fleet seats isn’t all that much of an additional injustice.
I am not especially anxious to have women in combat; here I think Lieutenant Shipman and I agree, but probably for different reasons. I would find it hard to have a worse "boarding rate” than a woman pilot, and am too old to get much better. Trivia aside, nearly one-third of our aviation billets are essentially shore based, and many could be performed superbly by women. If and when the Equal Rights Amendment passes, like it or not, we will have women officers and aviators at sea. I for one would like to have their vanguard (and them) as members of the first team—full-fledged naval aviators.
"Those Storm-beaten Ships,
Upon Which the Arab Armies
Never Looked”
(See F. C. Miller, pp. 18-25, March 1975
Proceedings')
Lieutenant Paul H. Scherf Jr., U. S. Navy—Lieutenant (j.g.) Miller has written an excellent synopsis of the 1973 Middle East crisis and the role that the Sixth Fleet played in its outcome. He has not, as many others have not, mentioned the role of the Seventh Fleet. Although it did not have as direct an effect as the Sixth Fleet, the Seventh Fleet did play an important part in supporting U. S. foreign policy during this critical time.
On 25 October 1973, the USS Hancock (CVA-19) was operating on Yankee Station when DEFCON III was set worldwide. On 26 October, Task Group 77.6 was formed under the command of Rear Admiral Owen H. Oberg and consisted of the Hancock, USS Gray (DE-1054), USS Bagley (DE-1069), USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8), and USS Preble (DLG-15). The task group headed south to a point 100 miles east of Singapore and awaited further orders. Shortly after arrival at the designated point, TG 77.6 was directed to proceed into the Indian Ocean and to continue heading west until further orders were issued. After entering the Indian Ocean, orders were received to proceed to the northern Arabian Sea— the timing coincided with Secretary of State Kissinger’s arrival in Cairo, Egypt, to begin peace negotiations.
After operating in the northern Arabian Sea for several weeks, TG 77.6 proceeded to the western end of the Gulf of Aden. There were reports that the Egyptians were blockading the Bab el- Mandeb Straits, the southern access to the Red Sea. On 29 November the McCormick and the Bagley transited the Bab el-Mandeb into the Red Sea for a port visit to Massawa, Ethiopia and returned to the Gulf of Aden operating area on 4 December. Following these transits, TG 77.6 departed the Gulf of Aden.
During the 59 days that TG 77.6 was at sea, it operated as far as 4,000 miles from its home port and the air wing on board the Hancock operated without the benefit of any emergency divert fields. The ability to remain on station for such a long period of time was achieved through the relentless efforts of the Pacific Fleet’s Service Force ships shuttling replenishment supplies.
The purpose of the task group’s deployment to the Indian Ocean was to establish a U. S. naval presence which would serve to maintain freedom of transit in international waters throughout the area. In addition, it can be speculated with good rationale, the Seventh Fleet task group helped to provide a stabilizing influence during the Middle East negotiations.
Use Acronyms?
Captain F. M. Munroe, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—My comment concerns an 0 ^ "fud’s” dislike of acronyms, plus a respect for the English language. "The Competition” in the August issue ls a horrible example of acronym abuse— 20 times, CODAG (which required Inference to the notes to find its mean- ,n8) 13 times, DWS seven times, and ^SRdc five times. Dr. Devanney’s article also showed shades of Webster, Roget, arid H. L. Mencken: "marinized” and t'unmarinized”!!! My old friend, young” Ike Kidd, was rather liberal w*th acronyms too in his article appear- lng in the same issue. DoD and NMC are ^cognized by now and are not really °bjectionable, but he sprinkled other acronyms within the paragraphs of his article.
Editor’s Note: We sometimes might get a little too close to the forest and would aPpreciate a short note from our readers who have an opinion on this subject.
Time for Aerial Task Forces?
Colonel William C. Moore, U. S. Air Force (Retired)—The U. S. Navy has been capable of maintaining a two-carrier task force on station in the Mediterranean, and a three-carrier force in the western Pacific (WestPac) with its 15 aircraft carriers. This deployment pattern supports the Navy’s estimates of operational requirements in those areas. The practice °f carriers backing up the five deployed units is in accordance with the Navy’s one-third formula” in which one-third °f the carriers are in position ready to fight; one-third are undergoing overhaul, maintenance, and repairs; and the remaining one-third are in training, preparing to relieve the on-station carriers.
When the U. S. Navy’s aircraft carrier force is reduced to 12, either the Mediterranean force must be reduced to one carrier or the WestPac force to two. The problem is complicated by the requirement to periodically deploy a number of ships—often an aircraft carrier and escorts—into the Indian Ocean. These deployments have been made, up to now, by Seventh Fleet units, thus stretching the Navy thin in that area.
In order to mitigate the possible adverse consequences of this situation there have been proposals that Air Force B-52S, equipped with the Navy’s Harpoon antiship missiles, be given a role in sea surveillance.
Another alternative, which has received only limited publicity, is to use aerial task forces. These forces could roam the air lanes above international trade routes much in the same manner as naval task forces roam the sea lanes.
Soviet leaders are certain to get the message if, for instance, an aerial task force composed of B-52 bombers, tactical fighters, aerial tankers, and, on occasion, some gunships, cruised through the Indian Ocean every six months or so, loitering over the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, or Diego Garcia for many hours, and then proceeded to home bases or to friendly bases in the Pacific.
Aerial task forces would not impinge on the traditional role of naval forces. The two would be complementary, not competitive. Aerial task forces could, in fact, operate much the same as naval task forces, conducting sea surveillance worldwide, policing potential trouble spots, denying free passage, conducting blockades, establishing "airheads,” making shows of force, and deploying quickly to trouble spots in accordance with the principle and objectives of naval forces.
Working together, aerial and naval task forces would serve to offset the disadvantages of the other. Naval forces, although slower to deploy, can exploit their far greater ability to remain on station. An aerial task force is very limited in this regard. On the other hand, the swiftness and flexibility of an aerial task force would permit it to arrive in the threatened area quickly. Getting military forces to trouble spots "first” to forestall agression is often more important to deterrence than getting there "with the most” after aggression has begun.
The development of the aerial task force concept is within current U. S. capabilities.
► B-52 aircraft have routinely conducted airborne missions of 24 hours duration and could easily increase this duration manyfold.
► C-130 gunships proved conclusively in the Vietnam War that aircraft could stay on station for long periods of time, policing enemy supply routes, detecting and destroying supply convoys, or protecting friendly ground areas against enemy intruders. Moreover, during the siege of Khe Sanh, C-130 aircraft were used as airborne battlefield command and control centers.
The aerial task force concept has been employed to a degree in some special U. S. operations. The Son Tay raid into North Vietnam to rescue American POWs is a microcosm of the concept of aerial task forces. The small airborne assault on the prison camp itself captured public attention, but this part of the force was only a portion of a large aerial task force involving gunships, navigation ships, pathfinders, decoys, attack aircraft—Navy and Air Force—
and an airborne command aircraft. All of these were controlled and coordinated as a single aerial task force.
The Mayaguez recapture operation also bordered closely on the aerial task force concept. During the early hours of that crisis, aircraft were the sole military power available to maintain a U. S. presence, to keep a continuous watch over the U. S. ship, to gather information, and to interdict some enemy surface vessels involved in the incident.
The recent experimental ICBM launch by an Air Force C-5 foretells the use of the wide-bodied jets as airborne platforms for launching many types of weapons. The size of these aircraft permits doubling or even tripling the crews, and allows the crew to set up a housekeeping environment. Conceivably they can remain airborne for many days, perhaps weeks, out of harm’s way.
An armada of these aircraft armed with stand-off smart bombs, remaining outside the range of Soviet naval forces, would be more than a match for Soviet naval forces. The mere presence of such a force would be likely to inhibit Soviet decisions to harass U. S. or friendly ships at sea, or moves to exploit political situations in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.
"Mine Countermeasures:
Who’s Fooling Whom?”
(See J. M. McCoy, pp. 39-43, July 1975 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Brian McCauley, U. S. Navy (Retireei), former Commander, Mine Warfare Force— Lieutenant McCoy is a most intelligent and innovative naval officer. In addition to developing the sweep plans for North Vietnam, he was largely responsible for the new statistical and computer techniques that we used. He was so good that I seldom went anywhere without taking him along as my advisor. With this background all of us interested in naval warfare should listen carefully to what he has to say. I could not agree more that the Navy should develop reliable and new methods of mine countermeasures "through increased technology, funding, and priorities.”
After the near disaster at Wonsan, top Navy leadership relearned the effectiveness of mines against an unprepared force. The result was a greatly expanded mine force. Surface ships were improved in quality and numbers, and the helicopter was brought in. By 1972 all of this leadership was gone. When the directive to sweep North Vietnam came, all we could muster was a force of ten MSOs, a newly commissioned minesweeping helicopter squadron, and, fortunately, one competent and enthusiastic Marine CH-53 squadron. Against known, simple, and sensitive mines they were superb. When the Suez operation came the next year all we had left to deploy was the minesweeping helicopter squadron. Again the suspected mines were known, simple, sensitive, and expired. The task was accomplished.
•There is no question that even at full strength our current minesweepers have only limited capabilities against sophisticated mines. Had these been used in either North Vietnam or Suez the task would have been infinitely more difficult and dangerous. The British and French have shifted to mine hunting techniques because of the limitations of the towed arrays. Their mine hunters, together with our side scanning sonar, were used to locate unexploded ordnance in the Suez Canal. There was, however, almost no silting (a maximum of four inches) in the canal. Since most mine hunting techniques today are based on sonar location these methods would have been almost totally ineffective in the deep si[1][2] (up to ten feet) of a channel such as the Haiphong main channel.
The vulnerability of the United States to a mining campaign must be obvious to anyone who takes the time to loo at our coastline. The limited mine forces that we have now must be maintained, and a major effort must be made to upgrade the helicopters’ capabilities. The requirement, expressed so articulately by Lieutenant McCoy, for priorities an funds for new technology in mine countermeasures must be met.
The "destroyermen, aviators, and submariners,” who lead the Navy today must sacrifice some of their more glamorous projects to meet this need. If this is not done, today’s or tomorrow’s leaders will be forced once again to relearn the old "traditionalist” adage: The most effective minesweeper is a single ship" for one mine.
°f traditionalist. Just a few years ago (or so it seems) I was an impatient, young officer and a student in the Staff Officers Course at the Naval Schools, Mine Warfare. I, too, was appalled by the ^efficiency and time-consuming nature of conventional mine countermeasures operations, and my solution to the problem, expressed in a formal paper, '■'■'as the "unsinkable minesweeper”—the ultimate mine countermeasures device, ln my view.
As most followers of the trade will recall, such a device was for a brief time part of the mine force arsenal. MSS-i, where are you now that we need you?
Lieutenant McCoy is unquestionably correct when he says that the Navy needs "a reliable, versatile mine countermeasures weapon system,” and that "we need it now.” He is not correct, however, despite his invocation of the late Rear Admiral Charles W. Cummings as an authority, when he implies that "the technology exists” to create a totally new system of mine countermeasures through the application of lasers, and tnfrared and magnetic radiation to "zap” mine circuitry or otherwise render mines harmless. Perhaps on the planet Mungo, but unfortunately not here and now!
The frustrations expressed in Lieutenant McCoy’s article are, curiously, similar to those that impelled senior decision-makers to stake all on an operationally unproven airborne mine countermeasures system. There had to be a better way, the reasoning ran. We were in the space age, and it no longer made sense to invest in horse and buggy technology in the mine countermeasures game.
Well, the horse and buggy technology worked—painfully and slowly to be sure—but it worked. The record written in two world wars and in Korea can hardly be ignored. And thus far, at least, airborne mine countermeasures remain more a project manager’s promise than a practical reality.
The Navy is today more vulnerable than ever to that most venerable and patient of weapons—the sea mine. On this point, Lieutenant McCoy and I would seem to agree perfectly.
sticks to its traditional approach and continues to produce task-oriented officers. The mission of the Navy is to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness .... for the performance of military missions. We cannot forget this charge. The taxpayer is interested in having his Navy ready to accomplish military tasks.
One point of real disagreement is whether or not the assigned tasks are worth accomplishing. There is also the question of what constitutes satisfaction. Many Navymen were taught in their training that the primary goal is to accomplish the mission and then to look after the welfare of the men. How can it be otherwise? Many of us receive a great deal of satisfaction if our unit accomplishes its assigned goals. This type of satisfaction is not restricted to any rank or age group. We must kill this idea, as put forth by Lieutenant Svendsen, that mission accomplishment can be compromised for such factors as "follower satisfaction.” The men who make up our units have consistently shown their willingness to give even their lives for mission accomplishment. Few of us could muster that same sense of dedication for follower satisfaction and development. One real task of a leader is to keep his unit from being harassed by meaningless make-work tasks, but this in no way lessens his responsibility for mission accomplishment.
Should the Navy desire that more time, effort, and resources be spent on follower satisfaction then the CNO can issue appropriate orders making that a part of the mission. In that way the task-oriented officers will bring it about. The difficulty, of course, is that many personnel will not find that providing for follower satisfaction is worth the sacrifice required and will leave the service anyway. We may be seeing some of that now. The leadership that counts is that which gets necessary, difficult, and often unpopular tasks accomplished. For many of us that is also where the most satisfaction lies.
Commander D. A. Morton’s article, "The Naval Shore Establishment and Parkinson’s Laws” (pp. 44-53, June 1975 Proceedings), provides some insight into the effects of commanders losing sight of task accomplishment.
Commander R. L. Schreadley, U. S.
(Retired)—Inasmuch as I am probably one of the "traditionalists” referred to in Lieutenant McCoy’s spirited article, I feel compelled to write a few words in reply.
[2] confess to feeling strange in the role
"A Framework for Naval Leadership”
(See M. R. Svendsen, pp. 18-23, July 1975;
H. E. Haufman, p. 90, October 1975 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel R. P. Rogers, U. S. Marine Corps, Commanding Officer, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-26>2—Wow! A naval officer wins $1,500 from the Vincent Astor Foundation and the Naval Institute for pointing out that unless we do something soon ", . . the Navy will continue to produce a large majority of officers who are task- oriented.” I for one hope that the Navy