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Jt^rom 4 October to 20 October 1972, delegates of 46 nations met at the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) building at 104 Picadilly, London, England, for the purpose of revising the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, I960, commonly called the Rules of the Road.
The conference cpnvened with high expectations of success because, even as the I960 Regulations had come into force, on 1 September 1965, maritime states had recognized the need for further changes in the Rules. Such changes were urgently needed to take into account the increasing use of radar, the establishment of traffic separation schemes, the emergence of extremely large vessels, and the requirements for increased ranges of visibility for navigation lights and more efficient sound signalling apparatus.
A working group within the IMCO structure had, in fact, been drafting changes in the Regulations for a period of several years before the convening of the 1972 Conference. The United States was represented at working group meetings by the Coast Guard. Several months before the conference convened, the IMCO Secretariat provided all invited nations with a working group draft copy of revised Regulations, and invited comments in writing on that draft. Insofar as time permitted, the resultant comments were circulated to all nations concerned and in any case were available with the IMCO Secretariat at the time the conference convened.
Within the United States, the Coast Guard established an advisory committee constituted of representatives of all government, industry and labor organizations having an interest in the Rules of the Road. It was from this group, incidentally, that the U. S. delegation to the convention ultimately was selected. This committee reviewed the successive drafts and papers prepared by the IMCO working group. The final U. S. position was passed through the Shipping Coordinating Committee, a joint government/industry committee chaired by the Department of State. Thus, after several years of detailed consideration, the United States formalized a position on each substantive issue.
From the foregoing it is clear that the U. S. Delegate, his alternate, and his advisers were well prepared for the conference. It became apparent at the outset of the conference that other nations attending had also done their homework. Since this was to be a technical
-4 All nations must strive to prevent collisions at sea such as that which took 31 lives when the naphtha-laden British tanker Alva Cape, preceding page, collided with an American tanker off Staten Island in June 1966.
rather than political conference, it appeared that the groundwork had been laid for constructive results.
Such an auspicious beginning to the conference reflected great credit on IMCO. It and similar subordinate agencies of the U.N. organization have proved very effective in helping the nations of the world cope with the very practical problems that they all face, such as—in this case—prevention of collisions at sea. IMCO’s efforts probably shortened by years the process of obtaining a new and viable International Convention on the Rules of the Road.
The high expectations of the conferees were fulfilled; constructive results were, in fact, achieved.* Whereas there is much improvement in the wording and organization of the Rules, there are only a few substantive changes that affect the action that mariners would take in a particular circumstance at sea. These are discussed in the following sections.
Action at Long Range. It has long been the practice of the mariner to take action at long range that is not necessarily in accordance with the Rules of the Road. A common experience among naval officers, when conning a ship, is to sight a merchant vessel on the port bow in a crossing situation, perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 yards away, and on a steady bearing. Since the merchant vessel almost certainly would wish to follow her track and presumably could not be trusted to take action until the last minute, if then, a moderate alteration of course to port by the naval ship would avoid any close quarters situation. An even more common action would be for the naval ship to turn a few degrees to starboard and/or increase speed to cause the bearing of the merchant vessel to draw aft.
The foregoing and other actions at long-range have been the ordinary practice of seamen for decades. Used judiciously they have been very successful. On occasion, however, such action, when undertaken by both ships, has resulted in a series of cancelling maneuvers that have led to an in extremis situation or collision.
By the time the October 1972 conference was convened, two schools of thought argued about what to do at long-range. One view, supported by the United Kingdom and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), was that a Rule was needed to recognize a common practice. Although several different wordings for such a Rule were offered, a brief one proposed by the ICS is as follows: "Any vessel which has established at long-range that a risk of collision is liable to develop with another vessel may take substantial action at such long-range so as to keep well clear.”
*The new Convention can come into force on or after 1 January, 1976, but not earlier.
The other point of view, supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, among others, was that long-range action by seamen was undertaken outside the Rules, that the Rules of the Road were therefore not applicable, that the Master took such action at his own risk, that "long-range” was not defined, that if a Rule (such as the ICS proposal) were adopted it might be in direct conflict with the more specific Rules relating to the obligations of stand-on and give-way vessels. In brief, the practice was recognized, but a Rule would be conflicting and confusing.
This rationale, preponderantly persuasive, was entirely justified going into the conference. As will be explained later, because of a Rule on Risk of Collision, some of the rationale is obviated. Nevertheless, it carried the day and efforts to obtain a general Rule on action at long-range were soundly defeated at the conference.
The defeat of this effort to obtain a Rule for action at long-range precipitated a sequence of events that created some ambiguity. There was almost unanimous desire for a Rule that would define or explain "Risk of Collision.” There also was a strong determination on the part of the ICS and the U.K. delegation that something should be done in a more specific crossing situation to ease the restraints on the stand-on vessel so that she might take avoiding action.
In support of the position of the U.K. and the ICS, the responses of licensed Masters to questionnaires overwhelmingly favored relaxation of the responsibilities of the stand-on vessel in a crossing situation. On this basis, Rule 17 (right) was adopted:
Give-way
vessel
The New Rules of the Road 45
There are two key points in Rule 17 that are new. One is that in (a) (ii) the stand-on vessel is given opportunity to take action when it becomes "apparent” to her that the give-way vessel is not taking appropriate action. There is no specified distance at which this action becomes authorized. The proponents of the long-range philosophy claim that it is in effect a "long-range” rule. The best legal advice at the conference was of the view that Admiralty courts would interpret the provision to permit application of Rule 17 (a) (ii) at about 5,000 to 10,000 yards, depending upon the circumstances, size, and speed of the vessels involved, but certainly not over 10,000 yards.
The other point of note in Rule 17 is the enjoinment not to alter course to port on the part of the stand-on vessel. A complementary enjoinment in Rule 15, covering a crossing situation, states . . . the vessel which has the other on the starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.” Having once accepted the concept of action by the stand-on vessel before an in extremis situation arises, these are
"RULE 17
Action by stand-on vessel
"(a) Where by any of these Rules one of two
(i) vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.
(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules.
"(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.
"(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation in accordance with sub- paragraph (a) (ii) of this Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.
"(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way
vessel of her obligation to keep out of the
New Rule 17
No Area "Outside” Rules within Detection Range
—I In extremis
/ action
! /
j----------------------------------- 5,000 yds
I
I
^ Permissible action j / by stand-on vessel
10,000 yds
V\
v. \
Vv
Mandatory
Stand-on
vessel
stand-on
reasonable and logical Rules. It should be noted, however, that if the give-way vessel could be relied upon to take sufficiently early action in accordance with existing Rules, there would have been no need for adoption of such a concept.
Related to the foregoing is Rule 7 (right).
From Rule 7 it would appear that a vessel observing another on the port bow at 30,000 yards on a steady bearing can no longer maneuver "outside the Rules.” There is no range limit to Rule 7 (d) (i). Accordingly, a vessel apparently becomes locked in to the Rules as soon as another vessel is picked up on the radar. In this case, the stand-on vessel is more constrained than under existing Rules to maintain course and speed until reaching that as yet undetermined distance, (probably 5-10,000 yards), at which . . it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action ...”
Action to Avoid Collision is covered in Rule 8. Rule 8 (a) states: "Any action taken to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship.”
If the give-way vessel complies strictly with the "positive” and "ample time” elements of Rule 8 (a), none of the ambiguities latent in Rules 7 and 17 would arise. However, should the "ample time” be interpreted by the "action at long-range” advocates to apply to Rule 17, the situation really deteriorates. Both vessels are then "locked in” to the Rules at radar detection range; either vessel may act at any point in time thereafter and, although there are enjoinments as to how to maneuver, there is no absolute mandate. The wisdom of the 5-10,000 yards interpretation becomes readily apparent.
One point must not be overlooked. The privilege accorded to the stand-on vessel to take action at 5-10,000 yards is an overwhelming view of masters of ships sailing the seas today. This is perhaps unfortunate in that it indicates an underlying suspicion that the give-way vessel will not always comply with its responsibilities under existing Rules. As previously stated, if such action could be relied upon, there would be no need of such a provision in Rule 17. However, the facts of the matter support the views of responsible masters. The collision at sea incidence is so high that one member of the conference, Greece, proposed that the preamble to the convention be altered from "Desiring to maintain a high level of safety at sea” to "Desiring to achieve and maintain. . . .”
One of the most often cited violations of the existing Rules occurred in 1971 in a case where a burdened vessel was crossing an established traffic scheme for deep draft vessels through the high density traffic of Dover
"RULE 7 Risk -of Collision
"(a) Every vessel shall use all available means ap- propriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.
"(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.
"(c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar information.
"(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following considerations shall be among those taken into account:
(i) such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change;
(ii) such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range.”
Existing Rules
The New Rules of the Road 47
Straits. There was no evidence of life on the bridge of the burdened vessel until the privileged vessel arrived at a point close enough to hear a dog barking. Fortunately, collision was averted.
Although that incident occurred near sunset and presumably was on the dog watch, it does support the trepidations of responsible Masters that a stand-on vessel needs an out.
Accommodation of the Very Large Crude Carrier. It should be recognized that one of the major reasons for revising the I960 Regulations was the emergence on the scene of the Very Large—500,000-ton now operating, and 1,000,000-ton in design stage—Crude Carrier (VLCC) and the necessity to accommodate the VLCC in the Rules. The IMCO draft of the revised Rules as prepared by the working group presented the conference with two alternatives, one of which would provide the VLCC with a distinctive signal for identification, and the other of which would accord the VLCC with a degree of privilege.
The matter of privilege itself is new, although it has been implied. That is, under the present Rules, ships not under command and ships engaged in certain operations, such as replenishment and the launching and recovery of aircraft, have been entitled to show distinctive signals. The courts in general have interpreted these signals to imply a degree of privilege and an obligation on the part of other vessels to exercise prudence. In the IMCO draft of the new Regulations, the concept of outright privilege has been recognized; hence, the two alternative methods of accommodating the VLCC were reasonable approaches for discussion and decision by the conference.
Concurrent with the emergence of the VLCC came the more widespread use of traffic lanes and traffic separation schemes. A nation, or nations, develops a traffic scheme for the approaches to its waters and submits it to IMCO, which (if it meets certain criteria) then includes it in an IMCO publication, i.e., Ship’s Routing and Traffic Separation Schemes. This publication also includes advisories with respect to navigation in and around traffic separation schemes and sea lanes.
Returning now to the two alternatives presented to the conference as to how to accommodate the VLCC, the U. S. position was to support an identification signal only. This position was taken, however, with full realization that some sort of compromise would necessarily be arrived at during the conference; i.e., that some degree of privilege would be accorded the VLCC. Although no specific wording of a fall-back U. S. position was developed for the approval of the aforementioned Shipping Coordinating Committee, it was generally understood that an acceptable compromise would
be to provide the VLCC a privilege when navigating within a traffic scheme approved by IMCO. As it turned out, the comments of the U.S.S.R. on the IMCO draft proposed exactly that. However, the Rule finally adopted by the convention was wording proposed by the International Chamber of Shipping relating to a vessel "constrained by her draught.”
Whereas Rule 3 (h) appears to be somewhat ambiguous, it accomplishes the desired purpose. This requires some explanation. The associations of those nations that constitute the ICS, normally the leading advocates of precision and clarity in the Rules, went to great lengths to ensure acceptance of this somewhat ambiguous Rule which presumably accommodates the VLCC.
The convention adopted the Rule as follows:
"RULE 3 (h)
The term 'vessel constrained by her draught’ means a power-driven vessel which because of her draught in relation to the available depth of the water is severely restricted in her ability to deviate from the course she is following.”
So we now have a definition of a vessel constrained by her draft. We have also, by other actions of the conference, a degree of privilege accorded to such a vessel. In the Rule governing responsibilities between vessels, "Any vessel other than a vessel not under command or a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid impeding the safe passage of a vessel constrained by her draught, exhibiting the signals of Rule 28.”* There is no question that the Rules relating to a vessel constrained by her draft were intended to apply to deep draft vessels, VLCC(s), or whatever term is used to describe the extraordinarily large ship. Yet the Rule defines a "vessel constrained by her draught” as a power-driven vessel which because of her draft in relation to the available depth of the water is severely restricted in her ability to deviate from the course she is following.
One could interpret those words in terms of a vessel that has so little water under the keel that she "smells the mud,” or, in more technical parlance, definitely needs the aid of a tug because the rudder and engines are not effective. This concept—in the New Rules—can be construed not to apply specifically to VLCC(s) or other deep draft vessels. As worded, it could apply to a seven foot draft ship having difficulty steering in eight feet of water. Such a ship could show three red
♦Rule 28 prescribes three all around red lights (by night) where they can best be seen or a cylinder (by day).
lights in a vertical row and expect a privilege in that all other vessels would not impede her passage.
It should also be observed that this Rule is not restricted to those IMCO approved traffic schemes that specifically were designed for the VLCC. The Rule as accepted is applicable world-wide.
Another interesting aspect of the Rule is that certainly no international oil company is about to load and route its supertankers so that they are unable to steer. Consequently, as written, the ships for which the Rule was in fact designed might be unable to qualify under that strict interpretation of the Rule. They may require tugs in shallow harbors, but they will not be incapable of maneuvering on the high seas because of their draft in relation to the depth of the water. Actually they have a much greater problem in stopping or slowing, as opposed to steering, in the normal encounter on the high seas.
Obviously, a broader interpretation was intended to apply to a vessel "constrained by her draught.” Hopefully the courts will not conclude that this is a matter of "steering ability,” but rather will construe the words to mean that a very large vessel in a narrow channel or in an IMCO approved routing system could not alter course because of the depth of the surrounding water— not strictly because of her draft in relation to the depth of the water under the keel. The Rule, unfortunately, does not refer to any surrounding water, although the word "available” in the definition strongly supports such an interpretation.
Finally, we must regard this Rule in the light of the words in which it is written. It can be interpreted to apply to any ship of any size in any ocean. There is no solid rationale to support a view that there will not be a proliferation of all sorts of ships displaying three red lights in a vertical row and expecting the privilege that is accorded by that signal.
Only the practice of mariners and the interpretation of the admiralty courts can determine whether or not the Rules relating to a "vessel constrained by her draught” will accomplish their purpose. Almost certainly the VLCC(s) will show their distinctive signals world-wide. Perhaps there will be no proliferation of the signal. Unfortunately, there is no direct tie-in to the IMCO traffic schemes which have been developed for the purpose of getting the VLCC(s) into such traffic schemes. Nevertheless, the VLCC(s) probably will use them simply because it is expedient.
In sum, the ICS succeeded in what they intended to do—getting an accommodation for the VLCC(s). Hopefully, the courts will interpret it properly.
Traffic Separation Schemes. A major accomplishment of the new Rules has been the codification of heretofore loose and voluntary arrangements for sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes into a well defined set of mandatory regulations.
Through the efforts of the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO, various sea lanes and traffic separation schemes had been established throughout the world, with major emphasis on the Dover Straits and the North Sea. Although generally useful, such schemes might or might not be feasible of compliance in the light of the navigational aids available, and—despite a resolution of the IMCO Assembly that nation States enact national legislation to the effect that going the wrong way in a sea lane would be an "offence”—were purely voluntary in nature.
IMCO compiled these schemes into a publication* which included a list of advisories for operating in and around sea lanes and traffic separation schemes.
The system also was fraught with political dynamite, as when the major maritime powers, spurred on by the world’s major oil companies, attempted to stake out Malacca Straits, forgetting the political sensitivities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Under the new Rules, sea lanes and traffic separation schemes will be approved by the "Organization ( (IMCO). This requires reviewing all previous schemes published and eliminating those that do not qualify because of lack of navigational aids or for other reasons. Additionally, the aforementioned advisories have been re-worded and included in the Rules of the Road. They are of sufficient importance to warrant quotation:
"RULE 10 Traffic separation schemes
"(a) This Rule applies to traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organization.
"(b) A vessel using a traffic separation scheme shall:
(i) proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in b'c general direction of traffic flow for that lane;
(ii) so far as practicable keep clear of a traffic separation line or separation zone;
(iii) normally join or leave a traffic lane at the termination of the lane, but when joining or leaving from the side shall do so at as small an angle to the general direction of traffic flow as practicable.
* Ship’s Routing and Traffic Separation Schemes.
The New Rules of the Road 49
"(c) A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid crossing traffic lanes, but if obliged to do so shall cross as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow.
"(d) Inshore traffic zones shall not normally be used by through traffic which can safely use the appropriate traffic lane within the adjacent traffic separation scheme.
"(e) A vessel, other than a crossing vessel, shall not normally enter a separation zone or cross a separation line except:
(i) in cases of emergency to avoid immediate danger;
(ii) to engage in fishing within a separation zone.
"(f) A vessel navigating in areas near the terminations of traffic separation schemes shall do so with particular caution.
"(g) A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid
anchoring in a traffic separation scheme or in areas near its terminations.
"(h) A vessel not using a traffic separation
scheme shall avoid it by as wide a margin as is practicable.
"(i) A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any vessel following a traffic lane.
"(j) A vessel of less than 20 metres in length or a sailing vessel shall not impede the safe passage of a power-driven vessel following a traffic lane.”
There are a few other interesting features in the new Rules which, although important, are more or less self-evident:
► Rule 3. (g) (vi) provides that "a vessel engaged in a towing operation such as renders her unable to deviate from her course” is regarded as a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver. This is entirely logical and such tows ordinarily have been given such privilege by mariners at sea, although not heretofore included in the Rules.
"RULE 5. Look-out.
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”
The intent here presumably is to insure that not only a "sight” look-out would be employed, but also that all other available sensors would be employed. The qualifying words "appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions” hopefully preclude an Admiralty Court from interpreting "all available means” as meaning all hands on deck with binoculars.
"RULE 21 (d)
"Towing light” means a yellow light. . . .” The color is changed from white to yellow. However, the white stern light remains. It is possible to distinguish between white and yellow when the two lights are proximate. Thus, the tow will be visually easy to identify.
► Rule 22 changes the range of visibility of lights for large vessels, most importantly masthead lights to five miles, sidelights to three miles, stern and towing lights to three miles.
One of the unique features of this particular International Conference ■ is that the amendment procedure is left to IMCO. The conference produced a Convention. Regulations (the Rules of the Road) are attached to the Convention. Parties (States) to the Convention will ratify the Convention only and leave to IMCO any amendments to the Regulations. This in itself could be a major step toward subjugation of national sovereignty to international cooperation. It remains to be seen how many nations of the world, including the United States, are prepared to accept such a concept. In this case the rewards for waiver of a very small amount of sovereignty are reduced pollution at sea, reduced loss of ships and cargo in international trade, and increased safety of life at sea.
A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1938, Captain Church commanded the destroyers Herndon (DD-638) and Warrington (DD-843), the fleet oiler Hassayampa (AO-145), and the cruiser Saint Paul (CA-73). After attending the Naval War College in 1947-49, he served variously as Assistant Chief of Staff to CinCPacFlt, senior aide to the Under Secretary of the Navy, on the Joint Staff, and in OpNav. Since retirement in 1968, he has been with various steamship associations in Washington, D.C., and was a member of the U. S. delegation to the International Conference on Revision of the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, London, 1972.