If technology has brought the major powers to a state of nuclear deterrence, it has also made the fighting of small wars far more important—and far more difficult. How, for example, can a new, 27-knot, U. S. destroyer defend herself, or her convoy, against a 30-knot Soviet submarine, which is armed with missiles that can be fired from 200 miles away?
Does technology have any relationship to strategy? There are many who see little or no relationship between them. It would appear that an historical review, as well as a consideration of the present day would show otherwise. First, it is necessary to try to define in detail what is strategy and what is technology.
It might be said that strategy is the process of planning to make the most of one’s assets to accomplish one’s objective while, at the same time, minimizing one’s weaknesses. Strategy concerns itself with large issues: Should the Allies of World War II concentrate first on Germany or Japan? If the former, should they strike first at Germany directly across the Channel or by means of the Mediterranean? If the latter, should they strike at Sicily or Sardinia?
The assets of a strategic planner may include, among many others, geographical position, industrial power, natural resources, and naval strength. A strategist must employ such assets to dominate, or respond to, a specific condition or set of circumstances. Three examples of the use of one of these assets—geography—quickly come to mind. The first is Russia’s regular employment of her great size in response to the invasions of her enemies: Charles XII, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, and Hitler. The modern theory of Chairman Mao, in which the countryside is conquered in order to isolate the cities, is another example of geography put to use as a servant of strategy. And, until the 20th century an appreciation of the sea which surrounds her was the basis of England’s approach to strategy.
It may be appropriate to say that a strategist should maximize his country’s strong points and minimize her weak ones, but in practice it is a hard thing to do. The problem of actually doing these things becomes apparent as we see what modern technology has done to the weaknesses and strengths of various nations. The United States, for example, once subject to invasions from abroad, became relatively immune to such dangers as her navy became strong and her relations with her neighbors became good. But the development of very long-range bombers, and then of missiles, armed with nuclear explosives, stripped away that immunity.
When we come to a modern definition of national strategy, it can be broadly defined as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, technical, and military forces of a nation in peace as well as war to support to a maximum the national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.
Modern strategy, therefore, has many nonmilitary phases, so we can expect that many civilians will be involved in formulating it. Strategy is an inherent part of statecraft and only in its narrowest sense is it limited to the military side of life. From Machiavelli to Hitler, we can readily see that certain well-defined themes are ever-present, and people have tried to use them as principles of war. They range from the concept of lightning war to the war of annihilation. We see the war of maneuver, the war of position, plus all the other facets, such as the relationship of economic power to military strength. We can even see one of the problems that face us today—the question of the professional army versus the militia. We must realize that ideas and ideologies are related to war. The life of a nation depends upon its national interests and an understanding of these by its citizens. They must then understand the fundamentals of strategy. War and conflict are everyone’s business, so it is imperative that we all have a very broad comprehension of all the facets of national strategy and our objectives.
Technology, simply defined, is society’s skill in inventing, developing, and manufacturing the instruments it needs. Before addressing technology’s relationship to strategy, let us look at a bit of history.
An interesting, if simple, example of the influence of technology on strategy stems from the Punic wars between Rome and Carthage. The Romans were good soldiers, but they were outclassed afloat by the more seaman-like Carthaginians. However, when Rome developed, produced, and issued to her fleet the corvus, a device which permitted men to board one ship handily from another, she could bring her powerful infantry into play on the enemy’s decks. Thus, through the use of the technology they possessed, the Romans not merely brought about the triumph of a hitherto obsolete style of tactics (boarding) over the Carthaginians’ more advanced naval tactics (ramming), but they were able also to make the best use of their assets—their infantry—and to minimize their weaknesses, which in this case was mainly their clumsiness as shiphandlers.
The result was that the warships of Rome cleared the sea of the ships of Carthage and, instead of Carthaginian soldiers fighting on Roman territory, Roman soldiers fought on Carthaginian soil. Carthage, rather than Rome, disappeared; Rome, rather than Carthage, ruled the Mediterranean for centuries after. And, eventually it was a Roman, rather than a Carthaginian, heritage which was to underlie the civilization of Europe and the Americas.
In 1588 A.D., about 1,800 years after the Romans crushed their North African foes, the Spaniards, strong cultural descendants of Rome, attempted an invasion of England with a mighty armada filled, as were the fleets of Rome, with a brave and able soldiery. But the English defenders, using their highly maneuverable ships to capitalize on another development of technology, the shipboard gun, were able to thwart that invasion. The smaller English ships, able to stand off at cannon range, fired into the bulky ships of the armada, while the soldiers of Spain, armed with sword, pike, and musket, and committed to the tactic of boarding, could do nothing. The Spanish attempt at invasion failed and Spain’s efforts at defeating her island foes had to be pursued by other means.
In both cases, that of Carthage and Rome and that of Spain and England, the use of a new technology led to new tactics which in turn yielded new grand strategies. Carthage could not maintain her armies any longer in Italy; Rome could at last place armies on the North African shore. Spain could no longer think of invading England but thereafter England could, and did, attack Spanish convoys, colonies, and Spain itself.
Interestingly, we can see that strategy has an influence on technology, too. To make the northern blockade of the Southern ports effective in the Civil War, Chief Engineer Benjamin Isherwood of the Federal Navy had to make his steam engines more reliable than they were; otherwise Southern blockade runners could elude the Northern blockading squadrons. And in World War II, the need to be able to conduct the Pacific island-hopping campaign and to re-enter Europe led to the development of entirely new types of ships and craft, such as the LST and LSD.
As Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan has pointed out, however, people are slow to change their tools or their tactics even when technical progress makes it possible to make such changes as would improve their chance of strategic success. This may be mainly because technical advances are made by relatively small groups of people, while to change the nature of the tools used, or the method by which they are used, involves many people with the inertia inherent in such a mass.
Another possible cause of slowness to change is that a great deal of money, time, and skill are involved in the creation and maintenance of any important tools or tactics of war. For years before 1941, the battleship was considered the primary naval tool; the United States had a great investment in such ships and U. S. naval officers were highly skilled in the maintenance and improvement of those ships and the tactics to which they were central. This material wealth and these personal and institutional skills could not easily be discarded. It was only when the Japanese deprived us of those ships at Pearl Harbor that we were freed from their mesmerizing influence.
Clearly, technology often is a controlling factor in developing a military strategy. At the close of World War II, Russia saw that the United States was supreme in two specific and decisive technological areas: naval power and “strategic air power,” and that our superiority in both areas rested on our superiority in the technology of aviation.
Rather than attempt to develop similar systems for themselves, they followed entirely different routes. One was the long-range missile, a recent German development; the other was the submarine, which had been an important part of Soviet armaments for years. These, combined with the fission-fusion weapons, were the tools they needed.
They went to work on the key technical problems. The more thrust and better specific impulse that a rocket engine could have, the greater could be the payload and the range. This required the development of materials which could be used with high temperature rocket exhausts, and it made work with cryogenic and storable liquid fuels necessary, for liquid fuels had basically greater specific impulse than solids.
The other important field was guidance, and here the Soviets started with the early work of the Germans on integrating accelerometers. How well they have done this is attested by the fact that they shoot their missiles with great accuracy into a small impact area thousands of miles out in the North Pacific.
The Russians follow an interesting pattern of development, first creating the components basic to systems, and producing them as well as science and engineering will permit. When the rocket or aircraft engine is as good as they can make it, they decide what system the component will be used in. This is a lot faster than the ponderous paper process the United States employs. Looking at the many new types of fighter aircraft and submarines that the Soviet Union has created recently, it is apparent that their system works.
If we look at some of the broader military strategic questions such as sea power, airpower, and land forces, we can quickly say that the weapons were merely the tools of these forces, and strictly of minor consideration. This may have been so prior to the 20th century, but modern technology has overtaken that parochial look at our present problems of a national strategy. The advent of fission and fusion weapons, plus the advances in propulsion and guidance, now shape our national strategy whether we like it or not.
These advances are based on many technical innovations besides the warhead. The systems have aircraft, nuclear submarines, and even the use of space vehicles as components. Our placing of men on the Moon on 20 July 1969 employed our technical innovations across the entire spectrum not only of the physical sciences, but of all the sciences. This was a culmination of billions of dollars of effort and the work of thousands in the research and development laboratories of our country.
No one can deny the brilliance of the achievement, nor its world impact. It may perhaps be best identified under the components of national strategy in the political and psychological areas. No one can fail to sec its military implications to the world in the mere fact of the flawless performance. A nation which can do this surely can make an ICBM system work effectively.
If we doubt the influence of technology on strategic thinking, let us examine in detail the nuclear posture of the United States and the arguments surrounding the ABM.
Well over a century ago Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous book, Democracy in America, said, “Almost all the natural defects of a democracy are to the fore in the conduct of foreign policy, whereas its good qualities are hardly to be seen.” Today, we have only to listen to the arguments on Vietnam, in the media and the halls of Congress, to see the truth of this. There is one national objective, however, that I believe all Americans would accept. This is that we do not desire a nuclear war or exchange of such weapons.
We thus come to the strategy of deterrence. This strategy is the product of technology and it is aimed at achieving our national objective of no nuclear exchange between the Soviet and ourselves. It is based on the belief that we can deter war by having sufficient strategic systems to permit us to destroy our enemy under any set of circumstances.
It is a different strategy than we had before the advent of fission and fusion weapons. It is the product of several factors and if any factor is zero, the answer is zero deterrence. We must have a reliable weapon system. We must have the will to use it. The enemy must know that we have it, that it does work, and that we will use it. Should we use it, we must be convinced it will destroy or cause unacceptable losses on the foe.
The enemy must believe this also. This is complex in that our values and those of the enemy are different. What may be unacceptable to us as a nation may be acceptable for the opposition.
A glance at the ABM debate is of interest. If we accept the idea that our objective is to prevent an exchange of nuclear weapons, we ask ourselves, will this system help us attain that objective? If we say no to that, we are against the system. If our answer is affirmative, we are for it.
Frankly, I believe the answer is a loud and clear no.
Our strategy, once again influenced by technology, should be the maximum use of the sea and skies for our deterrent systems. This makes for assured destruction of the enemy. Surprise is a remote possibility if our system is at the far corners of the ocean.
Such systems are dependent on reliable communications and here the modern communication satellite has made such coverage practical. It is a spin-off of the technology that placed those men on the moon.
One could in truth define deterrence as the use of latent military power as a form of political persuasion. This definition takes it out of just the nuclear arena and places it across the spectrum of the challenge against us. It must be related to the opponent’s capabilities as well as his intentions. The dilemma of deterrence is how to mix our knowledge of what an enemy could do, with our judgment about what he might really do.
Political intentions can change overnight while true capabilities in a military sense can take years to acquire. The standard U. S. military approach is to equate only the capabilities. This is essentially a safe approach and, with the large interests at stake, a wise one.
So we quickly come to the conclusion that, if it ever becomes necessary to employ our nuclear arsenal in an exchange, our deterrent system in reality has failed of its objective to deter.
We can also see that if positive deterrence is obtained, it will not prevent the Soviets from engaging in local military activities, nuclear or non-nuclear; in fact, it may serve as an inducement. This means that we must not only have a positive nuclear deterrence posture, but must also have an improved means of fighting small wars. It is also quite apparent that the whole theory of deterrence as a strategy rests on the rational behavior of all the nations involved, rationality being defined as a state’s deliberate avoidance of acts which inevitably invite national destruction.
If we accept the premise that the basic strategy of the United States rests on the capability of its nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to attain the objective of deterrence of a nuclear exchange, we immediately come to the rest of the spectrum of the challenge to us. In many ways, this area is more difficult to assess. The clear-cut national objectives are hard to find. It is harder yet to get a clear national agreement. The present situation in Southeast Asia is a good example of the problems we face.
Let us look at technology and its impact on naval strategies of the future. The sea and its control and use will always be vital to our interests. Nuclear propulsion, both for submarines and surface ships has already given us capabilities not known before. The impact of this is still to be realized, or let me say, understood by our planners.
To take one example, the ability of a surface ship to move rapidly is vital if she is to succeed in combat against a submarine. Yet, our new DE-1052 class of ocean escorts can, at best, steam at 27 knots—and that only if both boilers are on the line. If they are not, the ship must be content with some lesser speed for an hour or so until the second boiler is able to contribute fully. How can such a ship combat a submarine which can steam at will at 27 knots, or 30 knots? Gas turbines might have permitted the escort better speeds more quickly attained—perhaps as much as 40 knots. Why were they not included in the design of the new DEs?
The quick reaction of a gas turbine would permit an escort, even one steaming slowly, to leap ahead so as to get quickly within weapon-launching range of the enemy submarine. A nuclear power plant would permit the same thing, though so far, technology has been unable to reduce either the bulk or the expense of such a plant so as to permit small ships to have them.
So far so good, but technology also permits the opposing submarine to launch a missile from a distance of several hundred miles. This means that, in order to protect a carrier or a convoy, the air must be controlled out at least as far as the enemy can fire a missile, so that the enemy submarine cannot surface to launch her weapon.
Technology has made obsolete the old escort of convoy as we knew it in World War II. A submarine can shoot missiles at a convoy several hundred miles away. What would a modern DE do against this threat? Even if the missile were shot from only 15 miles away? IR homing and semiactive radar guidance make this a relatively easy problem. The impact is to accentuate the control of the air within the missile radius of the convoy. An air weapons system is one counter to this dire threat and with effective point defense could satisfy our anti-cruise missile needs.
Modern sensor technology will open the seas to the enemy. Today and in the future it may be possible to spot large convoys or task forces almost by the minute. The information fed to computers and further refined may soon lead to the ability to shoot large-warhead ballistic missiles at such targets. This is particularly true if nuclear weapons are envisioned. A task force with a speed of advance of 30 knots will cover only 15 miles in 30 minutes, which is the flight time of a ballistic missile launched 5,000 miles away. Multiple warheads are here, so the future will certainly focus efforts in this area.
When we see the advances in sensors that can be obtained today, it is clear that sea surveillance will be an important factor in naval strategy. Folded optics, multiband cameras are capable of taking several “tone pictures” simultaneously in wave lengths of the visible light and infrared portions of the spectrum. Optical mechanical scanners, which are actually special cameras, are able to “see” and record heat variations from long distances. Microwave devices, such as side-looking radar, can take detailed images through clouds, darkness and even dense foliage. There are problems to be solved before these tasks can be efficiently performed, but many of the technical problems already have been solved, so I am sure sea surveillance will be a reality to be faced in the future by all naval planners, and naval planners will have to face the reality of such sensors in developing their strategic plans.
The ability of the guerrilla in the Southeast Asia war gives one pause as to the possibility of a guerrilla war at sea waged by submarines. People may be skeptical, but as the modern submarine becomes a part of the Navy of many countries, it could happen.
The other components of national strategy play as important a role in our struggle to attain our objectives as does the military. We, for years, have said that the economics of raw materials are vital to our economy in peace, as well as war. An American study and proposed design for a 250,000-ton nuclear submarine tanker already has been completed. It will carry 1,220,000 barrels of oil and operate normally at 700 feet. It will have a speed of 18 knots. It takes little imagination to see the military applications. In England, a 50,000-ton nuclear submarine for carrying ore has been proposed.* These systems can be put completely under water at the port terminal as well as at sea. Advances of this technology will most certainly influence our strategy. The areas of food, such as miracle rice and hybrid corn, are other examples of technical progress that assist us in our national strategic approach to our objective in peace as well as war.
What we are saying is that the strategy of the United States depends on its technological leadership in the world. The broad definition of national strategy makes this apparent, for it applies to all the components that go into this definition. Our strength has been built upon the foundation of advanced technology.
Let us take a short tour of the world and observe the problem from a strategic point of view with some of the impact of technology on our future action, if some purely personal opinions may be expressed. Europe is our first area. The Atlantic Alliance will need constant tending. The years and their affluent economy have dimmed fears of the Soviet Union. This is 27 years after the end of World War II. Our problems in Southeast Asia and involvement at home have led some members of Congress to raise the question of withdrawing our forces from Western Europe. The present administration has taken a very strong position, and successfully defended it, that no U. S. forces should be withdrawn except on the basis of mutual, balanced reductions agreed to in negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This does not mean the area is of less strategic importance, but the proper use of the technical avenues open to us—such as the air and the sea properly exploited—offer possible new defense considerations for the future.
To make a prediction, the Middle East will have a diet of continuing tension as has been going on for years. Fortunately, the main conflict between Israel and the Arab nations at this writing has been quiet for many months as the result of a cease-fire arranged by the United States. What is our strategy? Since it is to keep a balance of power between Israel and the Arab countries as a means of discouraging either side from opening hostilities, our technology must be superior in its products. The advent of modern Russian technology in the form of surface-to-air missiles plus modern aircraft could affect this delicate balance. Israeli air superiority has been the key to their continued success and existence.
Regardless of where we stand on this question, we must now make some strategic decisions on the matter. These decisions to a great extent will depend on the available tools which are the product of our technological base. Our strength rests on this cornerstone. It consists of our industrial capacity and ability to produce workable, useful hardware systems out of these technical advances. It also depends on the continual research and development push into the broad spectrum of all the sciences. The understanding of our people of the complexity of this problem is a must if we are to remain a world leader of the free nations. The strategic options open to the leaders of our country in the years to come will rest on how well we do our technical work.
Asia will be the continent of decision between the East and West. There will be renewed attempts to reach an understanding with the Peoples Republic of China. Taiwan will not be sacrificed, but it will not stand in the way of a U. S.-Peoples Republic of China agreement. We will remain an Asian power and will keep our commitments there. Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines, predicts that Russia, not the United States will become the block to Red Chinese domination. Russia is moving into Asia with a determination unmatched since the Tsar expanded across Siberia in the last years of the 17th century.
Latin America is a place we speak of, in many ways, with preconceived ideas. Our policies have not been credible over the years. Western European influence has shaped this part of the world to a greater extent than has the United States.
This quick tour around the world and the problems we face in these areas serve to accentuate the importance of the sea to us in any strategy we employ. Our power to use the sea, now and in the future, is dependent on our technology and our use of it in modern weapon systems at sea. As we have seen, the use of surveillance systems may rob surface task forces of the ability to hide in the vast ocean spaces. This, coupled with advances in guidance and homing, may make the surface force vulnerable to long-range missiles. High-speed computers and data links are components of such a system. It is apparent that technical progress can alter our strategic uses of the sea. New large submarine capabilities give us pause for thought on the uses of the depths of the sea. It is such technological progress that will make an oceanic strategy practical as well as credible to the world.
The world is a dangerous place. This century certainly cannot be called one of peace. Five major wars, two of which were world-wide, have occurred. The violence in Asia, the Middle East, or, closer at home should raise doubts in the minds of people who believe an appeal to reason will move men away from violence and bloodshed.
The belief that all nations are rational in their actions can be fatal. Our strength has to be such that, whether it be the Russians or the Chinese, they must see that a nuclear exchange would be an irrational act on their part, assuring their destruction. Hitler was willing to accept a Götterdämmerung and there may be others of his type existing today. One must not forget the wargaming equation:
Utility of something = Value – the Cost.
Each nation puts different numbers in this equation, particularly the cost. China has said it can lose 200,000,000 citizens and survive. It is obvious we could not put this number in the equation. A look at the numbers show that 67% of our population live in urban areas, as do 46% of the Soviet, while only 6% of the Chinese are urban dwellers. There are 156 Soviet cities with over 100,000 people. If 1,000 Chinese cities were hit, 89% of that nation’s population would survive. The numbers above show the choices we have in the above equation. It is because of this that we must understand our requirement for overwhelming strategic forces to accommodate for the range of these variables.
In conclusion, we can see that our technological base covers the whole spectrum of challenge against the United States. It is also clear that it supports all the components that go into the definition of national strategy.
Is it strategy in itself? No, not really, but without it, our ability to survive as a free nation would be in serious jeopardy. We must look at the whole problem and not at its separate parts. The black and white definitions of strategy and tactics relating to the military alone have become as obsolete as the biplane. We must accept the challenge to our creativity across the board in order to meet our national objectives.
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A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the class of 1930, Vice Admiral Hayward retired from the U. S. Navy on 1 September 1968. His last assignment was as President of the Naval War College. He began his naval career as an enlisted man in May 1925. He had many technical assignments in his career, being the Commander of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Head of Weapons Research for the Military Applications Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the first Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Development. He is the author of many technical papers relating to instrumentation, weapons, and their development. His first such article, “The Absolute Altimeter,” was published in the Proceedings in 1939. He is now Vice President for International Operations for the General Dynamics Corporation.
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That Makes Two of Us
During World War II, an officer in the Royal Navy was commanding HMS Creighton, a small corvette on escort duty in the North Sea. Guarding the same convoy was the submarine HMS Stingray. As dark approached, the submarine ran up flags to signal night intentions:
“In the event of attack, I intend to remain on the surface.”
“So do I,” was the corvette’s reply.
—Contributed by Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, USAR (Ret.)
* This proposed submarine is 604 feet long with a maximum diameter of 72 feet and a 150 megawatt boiling water reactor, giving 50,000 s.h.p. for a submerged speed of 25 knots.