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ROLE OF THE JUNK FLEET ADVISOR IN BASE DEFENSE
128 Role of The Junk Fleet Advisor in Base Defense
By Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Brown,
U. S. Army
131 Panel on Safety In Aircraft Carrier Operations
By Admiral James S. Russell,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
133 The New 5-Inch Gun Mount
By Commander
Richard F. Rockwell, U. S. Navy
135 Practical Operational Studies
By Captain Charles D. Allen, Tr., U. S. Navy
138 Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, and Vittorio Veneto—Cruisers of the Italian Navy
By Commander Ubaldo Garagnani, Italian Navy
141 The International Lifeboat Conference: 5-9 June 1967
By Captain Robert C. Gould,
U. S. Coast Guard
Professional Notes
Captain Walter S. Delany, Jr.,
U. S. Navy Associate Editor
known to have been killed.
—Newspaper Release, Spring 19ot)
At Quang Ngai, about 300 miles northeast of Saigon, Communist troops overran the South Vietnamese Navy base headquarters 0 the coastal junk fleet and blew up its ammunition dump.
At flotilla of junk fleet ships on patro nearby ignored calls for help from the base- A U. S. Military spokesman said flotilla officers apparently did not realize the attack was so severe.
More than 200 South Vietnamese, including 116 Navy personnel and their families fled shortly after the attack began. An American adviser at the base who did not run was killed.
1967
The accomplishments of the Junk Fleet o the Republic of Vietnam are such that they can be proud of their record. This Fleet has helped suppress the shallow-draft supply sys' tem of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong. A foundation for protection of the civilian fishing fleet and control of smuggling essential to nation building in a coastal regi°a> has been laid. Those members of the U. b- Navy who have participated in this effort deserve to share this pride. These advisors have provided more than expertise and liaisoih they have lived, sailed, fought, suffered, a° often died with their Vietnamese counter parts.
Noticeable, as an exception to these ®c' complishments, is their record of base defense- The following newspaper articles tell vrd silent eloquence of that exception.
A small Vietnamese Navy base in Quang Tin province was attacked last night by the Viet Cong. The base where motorized coastal junks are stationed was destroyed. Exact casualties have not been determined, but three U. S. Navy Advisors at the base are
—Newspaper Release, August
, A base usually has a dozen or so motorized Junks, and from one to two hundred RVN ^avy personnel. The U. S. Navy Advisory Team at the base will have a couple of lieutenants, two chief petty officers, two radio °Perators, and a medical corpsman.
The U. S. Navy Advisor is correct when he ftates that defense of the base is a responsibility of the Vietnamese Fleet Commander, “tty the advisor should be sure the defense is s°und, workable, and proven (practiced and jehearsed frequently). Advising can be of 1 ttle meaning if the security of the base is such that it invites or exposes the team to the er>emy.
Clan the advisor, trained in salt water opera- tlQns, do anything about base defense? Yes, and furthermore he should do something about base defense. Here are some suggestions 0ri base defense.
Upon receiving orders, ask for a short c°urse at the Marine Corps Basic School. The tyUabus of that school includes field artillery, field engineering, infantry weapons, and tactics. It seems fundamental that advisors in Vietnam should have some degree of proficiency in those subjects. The record indicates that this may not be the case. If the school is not possible, then go to Quantico and talk to the instructors. Finally, if you can’t go to Quantico, then let Quantico come to you through lessons from the correspondence school.
Obtain some publications on the subject. As a minimum, the library at the base should include Fleet Marine Force Manuals 8-2, 8-3, and 6-4. They are titled Advanced Naval Base Defiense, Operations Against Guerrilla Units, and Marine Rifle Company/Platoon. The U. S. Army Field Manual 5-13, Engineer Soldier’s Handbook, and 5-15, Field Fortifications, are recommended also. It will be well worth the time spent on those portions of these publications that deal with fortifications, obstacles, weapons, and the conduct of the defense.
Upon arriving at the base, make a personal
Most important secondary task of the U. S. Navy Advisor, in his support of the Junk Fleet of the Vietnamese Navy, the author says, is to ensure adequate defense of the bases from which Vietnamese sailors, such as those pictured on a Yabuta junk, must operate.
Here is a final point that may be unique this situation, in spite of being so obvious, of the experts are not at Quantico, many
for
All
are
the
The advisor must give all of this attenfi01^ to base defense as a secondary task. His Prl mary task is to advise the Fleet in naval activl ties. At the conclusion of a long and firms mission with the Fleet, it takes determinafi0' and discipline for the advisor to refrain n° “putting his lance in the rack.” That is 1
inspection of the defenses. Learn all positions, locations, missions, ammunition points, evacuation plans, barriers, alternate plans, fields of fire, command, control, and communication arrangements and facilities, and the rehearsal schedules—to mention only a few important details. Secondly, ascertain if there are immediate and critical requirements for improvements. Finally, decide if the defenses are satisfactory. After having prepared yourself by studying about ground defenses, your decisions and recommendations will be automatic reactions.
If you are the senior advisor, then inform your Vietnamese counterpart of your findings and conclusions and “advise” prompt action. If he refuses to act or if he accepts your advice and does nothing else, then request permission to move your team to a secure location. You probably will not be required to maintain your team at a location that is not secure due to inaction. Of course, if you are not the senior advisor at the base, make the facts known to him.
Assume that you find the defenses acceptable, no matter how marginal. Now schedule inspections with your Vietnamese counterpart and assist him in improving the defenses. The inspection will probably find early warning arrangements inadequate, if there at all. Some outpost organization or ground patrol system should be established, if not both, for especially the hours of darkness and periods of low visibility. Drills should be scheduled, both announced and unannounced, with emphasis on night alerts. Ammunition should not be placed in a single location nor should all of one caliber or type be in the same place. There should be several dumps and each should contain a variety of ammunition. (The Quang Ngai base had a single dump.)
Do not allow a pattern to develop in your activities, especially those activities connected with the conduct of the defense. The enemy will be watching you. He will note a pattern of activities. He will become familiar with your defensive positions. Be assured that he will have a model of the base—of the sand table type if not full scale. Assume that he has a plan, and that he will rehearse that plan until every man can perform his assignment in a co-ordinated attack. The enemy attack will be launched directly upon the base defenses, and will capitalize upon surprise.
It seems rather fundamental to act and think like the enemy in your own plan of defense. Remember every football team trains its own defense against opposition plays before a game. Walk around the outside of the base and examine it from the attacker’s point of view; actually plan an attack against the base. Make a sand table model of the base and study it from both points of view. You wifi be surprised at the number of flaws in the defense that reveal themselves.
Now to the formulation of a better and ever improving plan for the defense of the base’ Since all of the details cannot be remembered) make a check list. (Paragraph headings in the appropriate portions of the above listed pubh cations will make an excellent guide.) N rangements must be made for all outside sup port. Offshore naval gunfire, air supp°rt’ medical evacuation, artillery fires, and even infantry troops are probably available. TblS support must be prearranged if it is to be o tained promptly and effectively when it lS needed. The enemy will time his attack 111 order to trade upon your weakness, i.e., wheI1 you are least alert, more subject to confusW11 and panic, and unable to employ your ont side support effectively. This is usually night. This is why night rehearsals, the danger of establishing a routine or pattern, and t need for an early warning system have bee° emphasized.
in Vietnam. There are Marine and Am1) officers scattered all over Vietnam. Use theSe people and their expertise. Request from group there that a team of inspectors from 1 nearest Army or Marine installation visit y°l base and inspect its defenses. You will ne'7 completely satisfy them. In fact, if you ever satisfied where defenses are concerne > then you are complacent, and that is 1 worst thing that can happen.
hrne when a crafty enemy will strike. The enemy can probably overrun any defense, but he pays a price. In the case of the two bases Itientioned, the enemy did not seem to pay a very high price. Strive for base defenses that are so sound that the enemy is not willing to overwhelm them.
before Going to Vietnam
Marine Corps Basic School: attend or visit Quantico; take correspondence courses. Obtain Publications: FMFM 8-2, 8-3, and U. S. Army FM 5-13, and 5-15.
At the Junk Base
Initial Inspection: self orientation; are defenses adequate or inadequate; confer with Vietnamese commander, or senior U. S. advisor.
Subsequent Actions
Make a detailed check list; schedule rehearsals; arrange for inspections by ground ferce officers; break patterns or routine actions; make a scale model; never stop improv- lng defenses.
y Admiral James S. Russell,
U. S. Navy (Retired),
Chairman, Panel to Review Safety in Aircraft Carrier Operations
PANEL on safety in aircraft
CARRIER OPERATIONS these modern times every Defense project consequence must have an acronym. This °ae not being different, our title, formed the first letter of each major word with a Wel included to make the acronym pro- J°unceable, was PARSACO—for Panel to Re- -jjcw Safety in Aircraft Carrier Operations, p e title indicates clearly the purpose of the ^ttnel that was comprised of 14 members , awn from many activities in the Navy. Rear miral Paul Buie was head of the Naval Vlation Safety Center in Norfolk, Virginia;
Rear Admiral James Holloway had just completed a tour as commanding officer of the USS Enterprise (CVAN-6'5), and had, in that command, two six-month combat deployments to Vietnam; Captain Robert McCall, an experienced pilot in carrier aviation, was a former member of the Ordnance Test Section of the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent, Maryland; Dr. William Murray headed a group from the Naval Laboratories; a Navy medical officer served as a specialist in human engineering; and other officers represented the Naval Air Systems and Naval Ship Systems Commands.
This writer was recalled to active duty to head the Panel after two-and-a-half years retirement, probably because of the prestige of the four-starred rank. But also, and of greater consequence, because of a long involvement in carrier aviation.
I made my qualifying landings on the USS Langley (CV-l) in November 1929 in a “stick and wire and fabric” airplane.
PARSACO was called into being by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Moorer, because of serious fires in two different carriers off Vietnam. Both fires originated from ordnance mishaps. The USS Oriskany (CVA-34) fire was due to the preignition of a flare that set afire an entire locker of flares. The USS Forrestal (CVA-57) fire was due to the inadvertent firing of a rocket from a fighter which struck the drop tank of another aircraft on the flight deck. It spread flaming rocket propellant fragments across the spilled fuel and a massive fire was started within seconds. This fire was extremely serious, for it involved a considerable quantity of high explosive ordnance. Fires on board aircraft carriers are not uncommon. Usually they are extinguished within a few minutes; seldom do they grow to the seriousness of the Forrestal conflagration.
The remarkable flexibility of the sea-borne aviation weapons system is evident in the evolution of the employment of aircraft carriers. In World War II, the fast carriers made forward area strikes, where their mobility afforded concentration of great air strength to surprise and overwhelm aerial resistance, thus to obtain local air superiority. After knocking out local air resistance, two days were usually devoted to a thorough cleanup
of all military targets in the area. Concluding the action, the fast carrier force withdrew, replenished, and then moved against another target complex. Korea brought about the need for a different mode of operating, a sustained application of force over an indefinite period of time. Persistent heavy strikes were made against targets ashore, with only an alert requirement for defense.
Vietnam follows the Korean mode, but with two important differences. The first of these is that Vietnam is being fought with near-peacetime measures. During the Korean hostilities, a national emergency was declared, people joined the services “for the duration,” and the Reserves were called up. At the time of this report, the Vietnam hostilities had involved none of these measures; servicemen complete an enlistment and leave the armed forces; the resignations of commissioned pilots and other commissioned officers are generally accepted. Thus a much greater effort in training is needed to preserve the required high level of skill in combat. This in turn calls for a greater increase in our training establishment.
The second difference between Korea and Vietnam, which particularly applies to carrier operations, lies in the two facts that the modern jet aircraft can make a round trip to the target very quickly and carry an ordnance load which is far greater than its Korean counterpart. Because tremendous quantities of explosive ordnance pass through the aircraft carrier, men and equipment are thoroughly taxed to handle the task.
The Panel’s review found that safety in carrier operations has been well-served by many improvements since the time of World War II and the Korean hostilities. The inherently difficult World War II situation of landing an aircraft down the centerline of the flight deck short of a wire barrier, with the deck ahead of the barrier usually tightly packed with parked aircraft, has been vastly improved by the introduction of the angled deck. The angled landing deck, laid out at a small angle to the fore and aft line of the flight deck, allows a pilot to touch down and, if he misses an arrestment, to make an immediate unobstructed take-off. Parked aircraft are off to the right and clear of the flight path.
Thus, today landing accidents are rare.
The angled deck has brought an additional dividend in that on the infrequent occasions where a bomb, which has failed to release and remains hung on its bomb rack, is dislodged by the aircraft’s arrestment, the bomb will continue along the angle, with nothing ahead, to fall harmlessly into the sea. Safety m launching aircraft has been enhanced by the remarkable power and reliability of the steam- driven catapults. The landing approach has been simplified by providing the pilot with an optical reference to assure him that he is on a proper glide path to the deck. The arresting gear is well-proven in the thousands of arrested landings made uneventfully on the decks of our carriers during their operations at sea. Precision radar for traffic control promotes safety in operations during adverse weather. Finally, a very important contribution towards the elimination, and the control) of fires in aircraft carriers has been made m the change in aircraft fuel. Navy jets and prop-jets burn a special fuel known as JP'^’ It is far less hazardous than the highly flammable, high octane aviation gasoline used 1° the old reciprocating engines. It is of greater stability (higher flash point temperature; than JP-4, the jet fuel in general use ashore'
Despite their awareness of all these improvements made through the years, the Panel came up with a number of detaile recommendations aimed at enhancing safety in carrier operations. These fell into three groups:
(1) Improvement in flight deck fire-fightinS
equipment to provide a remote controlled’ massive suppressant for fires on the fhgbj deck, at least equivalent to that now install in the hangar bays. j
(2) Provision for better personnel survN3 in damaged ships by improvements in equip ment and training, particularly in adopting the standard issue gas mask so that it may be used with a small, portable supply of com pressed air for breathing while in smoke- filled compartments; to add to the masks carrying case, pockets for a flashlight, a compressed air bottle, and a pair of gloves m protect the hands from hot metal. The art o shipboard damage control should be emph3^ sized by making it an important, require study in service schools and training courses- Nothing is more fundamental to a man wh°
The Naval Ordnance Systems Command recently developed the Mark 45 Mod 0
exceptionally reliable. It was not designed
te a replacement for the presently in-
„ ,.,lce’ and still-in-production 5-inch, 54- lahbr
er gun mount Mark 42.
OiQunt
was based upon the need to increase
the
(
t ll0n °f all gun ships to missile or ASW ships.
new construction ships, with
. g"n capability of the Navy, a capability
was being steadily eroded by the con-
§oes to sea than to be able to take his part in keeping his ship afloat, right side up, and c°mpetent to meet the hazards of fire and explosion.
(3) Improvements are needed in aviation 0rdnance-handling procedures and documentation. With the great quantities of explosive Munitions being handled daily, and the lflcreased variety in these munitions, increased attention should be directed to the need for well trained personnel, for expert supervision, and for lucid documentation, particularly in *‘ght of the high rotation rate of personnel.
One final comment: My visits to the carriers and their embarked air wings off Vietnam has me with a profound appreciation for the consummate skill and bravery with which a difficult task is being carried out.
the NEW 5-inch gun mount has
gnn mount, sometimes referred to as the lighten J§ht, 5-inch gun, which can fire standard !nch 54-caliber ammunition.
he all-new gun mount was especially de- sned to be lightweight, easily maintained,
and e> -
to be
The development of the Mark 45 gun
Which
versic
. addition,
antiair defense systems, need a light- 1 gun for gun fire support operations Tu°r enSaflement of other surface targets. e new gun, together with its lightweight r ^6, gunfire control system, was designed primarily for new construction ships. By comparison to the 5-inch, 38-caliber gun, it offers, for approximately the same weight and volume, a gun of longer range, a heavier projectile, and a slightly better rate of fire. The manning level is approximately one- third that of the old gun mount and the new gun mount has improved reliability and maintainability. The mount design incorporates all the improvements achieved in the state-of-the-art during the 30 years since the older mount was conceived. As an alternative to the one presently in the Fleet, the new mount offers one-half the rate of fire (20 vs. 40 rds. per min.) for one-third the weight (50,000 lbs. vs. 150,000 lbs.) and significant reliability and maintainability improvements.
The new Mark 45 gun development program formally commenced in 1964 and the prototype was completed in July 1967. The gun mount was completely designed and built for the Naval Ordnance Systems Command by the Northern Ordnance Division of FMC Corporation. First firings were in 1967 and the first mount installations will be aboard ships now being authorized for construction.
The Mark 45 Mod 0 can be described as having two physical component groups: the lower or below deck fixed structure, and the upper or above deck rotating structure. The lower structure delivers a continuous flow of ammunition to the upper structure. The upper portion loads this ammunition, lays the guns, fires, and ejects the empty powder case (measures 124 inches high by 150 inches long).
The lower structure includes the mount control, loader drum, fuze setter, hoist, and accumulator system. The upper part includes the stand, carriage, cradle, slide, power drive assemblies, and shield. All personnel operating the mount are in the lower structure and none are inside the gun shield.
The mount control panel permits one person to completely operate the mount, including operating the loader components in step control, operating the gun laying system in local control, transferring mount control to weapons control for automatic and remote operation, simulating automatic loader operation, and checking all critical mount functions.
The loader drum stows 20 rounds of am-
tionally interchangeable. Out of a total 96 cards, only 16 amplifier and six typeS u logic cards are used. __
A number of advanced features are inc°r
munition, positions the rounds for fuze setting, and transfers rounds to the hoist. The drum reloads automatically from a manually loaded station, and also permits loading alternate rounds. The hoist transfers ammunition between the loader drum and the cradle, during both load and unload cycles. Doors in the hoist structure permit unloading rounds or inserting a misfire clearing charge. The cradle receives ammunition from the hoist, pivots to synchronize with the slide, and rams the rounds into the breech. The cradle will sychronize to any degree of slide elevation and any velocity of slide travel. The cradle and hoist are located at the center of the mount’s rotation to permit uninterrupted loading while the mount trains. The slide receives and fires the round and ejects the empty powder case. The slide also ejects the misfires.
The gun laying system, which positions the gun in both train and elevation, consists of separate train and elevation power drive assemblies. Each of these assemblies is an electrically controlled hydraulic power system that drives the mount in response to orders from either a weapons control station or the mount control station.
A normal operating crew consists of five men, a mount captain and four ammunition handlers. The mount captain performs mount switching functions as directed. The ammuni' tion handlers load projectiles and powder cases into the automatic loading station. At condition watch, 20 rounds can be fired by a single man at the control panel. The ammuni' tion handlers are necessary only when sustained firing exceeds the initial 20 rounds, when alternate loading is desired, or when 3 misfire clearing charge is to be loaded.
The crew need not enter the upper part f°j" misfires; misfires can be automatically al'c rapidly extracted, a clearing charge loaded, and the gun cleared and returned to service without anyone entering the gun houseUnloading is also accomplished automatically, returning the rounds to the hoist unload doors in the loader drum.
The gun mount has a demonstrated reha bility far superior to that achieved by a,A other gun system. Life cycle test results were better than 1,000 cycles MTBF (mean time between failures) for the gun laying syste111' The increase in reliability of this gun mou111, at least eight times better than the o|der mounts, is due primarily to its simple desig*1’ the use of solid state electronics, and 11 extensive use of magnetic proximity switch^ instead of conventional mechanical interl°c switches.
The gun mount reflects imaginative c°^ sideration of the problems associated vvj system maintenance and repair. The design and construction of the mount is simple, W* few parts to maintain. Standardized par are used throughout the mount. As a example, many of the amplifier and 1°^ printed circuit cards are physically and fuuc
system
orders or the
of five
;d relia' by any Its were in time system- niounP ie oldef - design* ind ^ switches nterlock
ve con;
;d
> design ile, wit1’
■d Parts As an
,d 1 o$iC id fnne;
total n types 0
e incor'
Poratcd to reduce servicing requirements, lapsed time meters within the control panel rePort the hours of mount turn-on, as well as the hours of activation for the various Motors and fuze setter. Counter units report number of times the gun fires and the dumber of loader drum index cycles. These devices provide an accurate record of mount u^age, and permit a maintenance schedule dictated by equipment operation cycles rather Pan the calendar. Initial studies indicate Pat total daily operability check and preven- Pye maintenance effort expenditure (including lubrication) will average about 2.4 man- °urs per day.
The mount’s local control permits total sys- tern exercise and test without jury rigging or Using a dummy round. One man can activate and exercise the mount and verify mount operability in less than five minutes. Display 'guts simplify control circuit trouble-shooting and reports the status of the logic-circuit inPuts. The mean corrective maintenance effort as been estimated not to exceed 2.6 man- °Urs per casualty.
PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL STUDIES
Operations Analysis has become a manage- h T*1 locP °f great importance to both the * ltary and industry. Within the Depart- j lat °f Defense, it has become a major factor Pc approval or disapproval of many major te as weH as in the justification for
Die nical approaches in large-scale develop- Ptal programs. Yet, it is not certain that ^ °f those who use operations analysis tc^rly understand the limitations of this 5ll^niclue, or the enormous demands in time Cost that a thorough, properly executed Pan^ C3n ev°ke- Operational analysis is not a acea, and, in studies of broader scope may
become both so costly that it swallows the cost-savings it reveals and so lengthy that its initial assumptions are no longer valid.
The output of a study is determined by its inputs. The weakness of many studies, for this reason, derives from the multiplicity of inputs. For example, in examining the effectiveness of a surface-to-air missile system, it is necessary to establish what will be the natural environment. Will the action be fought at night or in the daytime? Will it be overcast or clear? Rain or snow? Fog? Haze? In what combinations will these situations present themselves, and what is the probability of their occurring in the combat situation? The implication of each may be vital if we are considering, for example, optical sensors, or infra-red; the probability of occurrence is important if we wish to trade-off degraded performance under adverse conditions against some attractive feature, such as weight or cost savings, over a completely all-weather system.
In this instance, only one facet of many has been considered, namely, atmospheric attenuation of sensors. What of sea state, presence or absence of land, and, if present, variations in topography? How will the enemy attack us? In what numbers? With what vehicles? What tactics will he use? Will he use the weather to his advantage or, will it in some instances, screen us from his action? Consider the Pandora’s Box of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures. Consider our own forces. What of the interaction between the system under evaluation and other defensive systems? How many ships and missile batteries will be brought into play? What of our own resistance to damage if the enemy does get through? All of these and many more are valid inputs to such a study, and must either be considered as independent or partially dependent variables, or fixed as assumptions.
To provide a feel for the complexity of the task, in a recent Navy study of future self defense or point defense surface-to-air systems, well over a thousand permutations and combinations of variables were used. The task would appear to be even more formidable when one considers that the tactical situation used in the Navy Point Defense Study was limited to a single ship defending herself,
with no variations involving outside support. The ship was assumed to be a standard warship of a single prescribed size, cost, and damage resistance. Further, because it was necessary to evaluate some 40 different weapons system concepts to gain an adequate sampling of the spectrum of available systems, something in excess of 40,000 separate “battles” were simulated, scored, and weighted before the study was completed. Remember, this study addressed only one very specific question: What is the most effective selfdefense antiair weapon system for warships during a prescribed time period? Upper restraints on size, and minimum limitations on absolute performance further narrowed the field of study. Yet, this study ran for over a year, and required the full-time efforts of six highly trained professionals, and another 36 experts for part of that time. It cost slightly under a million dollars.
It was the opinion of the authors of this study that it did, in fact, thoroughly and objectively explore the situation within the delineated study scope. All variations that could affect the conclusions were tested, and, most significantly, no variations were ignored in the interest of simplifying the effort. The base assumptions were well-rooted either in established facts (such as those relating to climate, and laws of physics), or in the best information available on techniques and courses of action open to the enemy. No technically feasible course of action was eliminated as unlikely, although in the subsequent weighting it might be downgraded if it did not appear to be an attractive alternative to the attacker. In other words, inputs were well- grounded and evaluated against any rational “what ifs,” which so often bring studies to grief. In retrospect, it seems unlikely that much could have been done to reduce the mountain of work that went into the study without compromising some of its objectivity and validity.
This could be a pretty terrifying prospect if, for example, we might be trying to design an entirely new class of ship with multiple weapons systems, when choices come from a spectrum of weapon systems, sensors, propulsion plants, and hull forms. If this effort were to be based on an operations analysis approach, using as broad a base as the Point
Defense Study, a much more extensive study than that described would obviously be needed. Is it conceivable that such a study could become so complex as to outgrow its usefulness? How could a subject of such very broad scope be boiled down to manageable proportions so that a decision might be reached and implemented before the technological underpinnings of the study were swept away by an advancing state-of-the-art?
One widely used and dangerous device is the use of arbitary, and therefore assailable) assumptions. If, in the Point Defense Study) it was assumed (for whatever reason the authors saw fit to use) that the environmental situation was daytime, clear-air mass, the number of variables would have been divided by six and the entire effort would be simph' fied by that factor. Of course, this would have greatly biased the study towards systems which perform well only in the daytime and fair weather, but think of the time and money that could have been saved. In another instance, a recent study stipulated a fixed- attack geometry (in the interest of simplifying the program), wherein the attacked ships engaged only those vehicles directed against themselves; that is, there was no consideration of mutual support and cross fire. The conclusion pointed to a marked superiority of a particular type of weapons system comp0' nent, completely at variance with the opini°° of the weapons system designers. Heated an° prolonged debate followed between the opera( tions analysts and the system designers. Onfi through a great deal of perseverance, and n° small amount of luck, was the correct technical decision finally made. The point is, 0 course, that a misleading conclusion was brought out by resorting to an assailable (a° in this case, invalid) tactical assumption Treatment of one’s own tactics as a variably would have complicated the study, but wow have produced the right answer.
Speaking in general terms, it should be obvious from these two examples that just as the inputs determine the conclusion, so 10(1 may an erroneous assumed input lead to a° incorrect conclusion. Since there is no W<b to know, with absolute certainty, which inpllis are crucial and which are not, the only 'va- to obtain full objectivity is to provide strict*) factual inputs. Where an input presents tW°
or more rational choices, each variation must Be studied to learn its impact on the conclusion. It is because we have failed to do this lr> the past that one often hears phrases such as last year’s study” or “new guidelines.” Arbitrary assumptions change with each new gambit or feint by the Communist bloc, and, frequently, with the individual requesting the study. A counter argument asserts that studies need not be objective; that they are merely a Cental exercise to insure that something vital has not been overlooked. There is a place, certainly, for this sort of thing in planning, ^t let us not confuse planning with the real thing; nor should we become enthralled with and enslaved by such techniques.
It is not unreasonable to question at this Point, “What of it? If the issues at stake are °f overriding importance, why not take the brne and expense necessary to insure a thor- °ugh study?” There are, unfortunately, two Considerations which may (at least for a 'vhile) put an upper limit on the size of any study from which we can hope to extract VaHd conclusions.
The first of these is the time required to Complete the study. If we are to seek all Variables in a proper fashion, it is likely that jfre more complex studies will run for years, ^member that a valid assumption, in many Cases, will be a conclusion based on an earlier Phase of the study, which also began with °dter valid assumptions, and so on, back to ho beginning. All explorations cannot be °ne in parallel, no matter how clever the analysts nor how numerous the study plants. If a study becomes so complex and, by lts complexity, so lengthy that a conclusion cannot be reached and implemented before lts mputs change, then the study has lost its
valUe. 8 ’ '
The second consideration is one of economics. In the Department of Defense a great deal of emphasis is placed on the economic aspects of alternate courses of action, especially in the technical fields. As studies §ro\v in complexity, so also do their costs gro\v. When we can speak of studies costing the tens of millions of dollars, it is reason. e to ask if that investment will pay its way *n improved cost effectiveness.
Thus, an apparent impasse is reached herein we cannot afford the time or money
to pursue complex studies and still do justice to them. Since the limiting factor is size, what can be done to reduce it?
The first remedy is to be less ambitious in what the study is to accomplish. As has been implied here, the large, more complex studies frequently fail to deliver defensible answers, either because they cannot be completed within acceptable time or cost constraints, or because in order to do so they must resort to the promiscuous use of assailable assumptions. Further education at top management levels in the judicious use of operations analysis may be indicated. More simply, do not ask too much of a study.
nRURL
LOGISTICS
By Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer, USN (Ret.)
A basic text in logistics written for the naval officer seeking knowledge in this critical field. Emphasizes applied logistics within the Navy, describes joint, national, and international logistics planning. List Price $7.50 Member’s Price $6.00
The second approach entails the limiting of inputs or variables, at the beginning, by a careful consideration of the scope required to yield the correct answers. The Navy’s Point Defense Study was in some respects very broad in scope in that it concerned itself with the selection of a weapons system for use in a wide variety of ship types, under nearly every reasonable set of environmental and tactical circumstances. It would be misleading
to imply that all studies would have to provide such a broad foundation. Suppose for a moment that the Point Defense Study were limited to the defense of attack carriers. In that case, the presence or absence of target masking and severe clutter caused by land close aboard would no longer be a variable, and the study would have been simplified to that extent. The assured presence of fighter aircraft on the carriers would further reduce the number of variables by removing some portions of the threat which could readily be detected and intercepted by the fighters at long range.
The establishment of the inputs required and the statement of assumptions for any study is almost one and the same. Threats not included are, therefore, assumed not to be encountered. The delineation of the inputs and assumptions is surely the most critical part of the total study effort, and should receive careful scrutiny of both those ordering the study and those actually involved in its fulfillment. Assumptions determine its size, and, by their validity, its ultimate worth as well. The necessity for assumptions to keep studies within manageable size may be beyond question, but it is mandatory that they be well considered, justifiable, and clearly understood by all who use the study’s findings. Unfortunately, this is all too seldom the case.
What, then, of the omnipotent study as now used, or misused, in the Defense Establishment? As has been stated, the study has severe limitations in scope if it is to retain real objectivity. We have become overawed by operations analysis for its own sake without really understanding either its true capabilities or its very serious limitations. Too frequently, decision makers pose a complex problem to an operations analysis group, providing therewith inadequate guidance on either scope or inputs.
In such cases, the fault lies, more often than not, with the user and not the tool. The underlying cause is ignorance of what operations analysis is all about. Let us get this creature off its pedestal. It should be relegated to its proper and respected place as a mechanical aid in decision making, not a substitute for human judgment. For some years now the pendulum has been swinging towards more and bigger studies. The pendulum is past due for a swing in the other direction.
By Commander Ubaldo Garagnani,
Italian Navy
ANDREA DORIA, CAIO DUILIO, AND VITTORIO VENETO— CRUISERS OF THE ITALIAN NAW
In 1958 and 1959, when Italy decided to reconstruct and modernize her military eS' tablishment, the Navy was faced with a cliff1' cult and complex problem.
The budget was particularly limited f°r the Italian Navy, which had to renew ships> weapons, equipment, and organization. The operational requirements of the ships were multiple in relation to the area in which they were assigned to operate. Particular consideration had to be given to the fact that, our time, technology evolves with such rapidity that equipment is quickly ou tdatecf This means that it was necessary to select the best and most useful material that would also be of service for a long time so that the ships would not need large and expensive alterations in the near future. Within the limitation of the budget, the Italian Navy could build only a few ships of limited displacement.
With these concepts in mind, the Italian Navy designed the Andrea Doria-class of warship and programmed, in 1958, the construction of two ships, the Andrea Doria and Cai° Duilio. The operational requirements of these ships were:
• Antiaircraft capability for protection of other military ships, convoys, and ASW task groups;
• Antisubmarine warfare capability;
• Antiship and limited shore bombardment capability.
The construction of the two ships was assigned to two different shipyards. The
i Andrea Doria was built in the Tirreno shipyard at Riva Trigoso near Genoa. She was Punched on 27 February 1963 and delivered ) to the Italian Navy on 23 February 1964. The Caio Duilio was built in the Naval- aaeccanica Shipyard at Castellammare di Slabia, Naples. She was launched on 22 December 1962 and completed on 30 November 1964.
The two ships resemble light cruisers,* each having a high, slender bow, a wide and Sc[uared superstructure midships, separate and rather low stacks, and wide and flared decks to support a broad helicopter flight deck. Principal particulars of the class are:
Displacement (full load) 6,500 tons
Length overall 483 feet
Learn 56.5 feet
Propulsion 70,000 s.h.p. at 31 kts.
Draft to sonar dome 16 feet
Flight deck 98.5 by 52.5 feet
The propulsion plants are of the conven- Lonal, geared-turbine type. The ships have an endurance of 4,600 nautical miles at 20 Lrtots. The boilers are of the high pressure
* In the Italian Navy, the Andrea Doria-class is c°nsidered a light cruiser. In NATO, they are DDGs.
type (711 lbs. p.s.i. at 842° F.). The engines can be remote controlled from two air conditioned “propulsion stations,” each controlling two boilers and one group of turbines. Both stations can control the auxiliary machinery, the water distilling plants, the fuel replenishment and the transfer of fluids within the ships.
All operations at the two propulsion stations are duplicated at the “engines and damage control station” on the first deck. Here the engineering officer on watch continuously monitors the propulsion and electric generator plants, the condition of openings in watertight bulkheads, air inlets, fire fighting equipment, stabilizing, and air conditioning systems. Two plants provide air conditioning for some equipment as well as all living and operational spaces.
Automation of the propulsion plant has drastically reduced the number of engineering personnel needed, from about 140 men to about 95, and has improved working conditions. Also, it is intended to allow the ship to operate in atomic fallout areas for long periods of time.
Living spaces can accommodate 54 officers, and 100 petty officers, in single and multiple
staterooms, and 350 enlisted men of different rates (about 85 per cent are specialist and career people) in spacious and comfortable quarters.
To increase crew comfort, television screens have been placed in several compartments of the ship; they not only receive standard broadcasts, but are used also for closed circuit broadcasts.
Each ship is stabilized by six retractable stabilizing fins. This allows the operation of helicopters even in severe weather condition.
Principally as a result of the automation of equipment and weapons, the ship has full battle capability (Condition 3—only prospect of surprise is by aircraft or submarine) in all weapons with only one third of her crew. Antiaircraft defense consists of: one Terrier missile system with one twin launcher forward and two fire control systems (the missile system is used against medium-range targets, mainly for air defense of other ships); the “Argo” fire control system, designed and made in Italy, that controls four groups of two 3- inch, 62-cal., rapid-fire, automatic guns (the guns are mainly for the defense of the ship); and two 105-mm. triple-star rocket launchers for illumination.
Two weapons control stations co-ordinate the weapons system. The first, the “air defense station,” above the bridge, may be used to control the assignment of targets, the shifting of firing groups from one fire control system to another, and the interdesignation of the target between the fire control systems. The two star-rocket launchers also can be coordinated and controlled from this station’
The second station, close to the CIC, has remote control of the Terrier missile and gul1 systems. The FCS is very new; its only moving components are the radar antenna and three optical systems, two of which are of the periscope type. Therefore, each fire control system is fitted with three optical and one radar aim line. The radar antenna and the periscopes arc equipped with an automatic) programmed system for the systematic search of air targets. This allows the four FCSs of the ship to be used for radar and visual detection of small aircraft at low levels.
A wide variety of radars and radio equip' ments give the Andrea Doria-class flexibility many tasks, as an air defense flag ship, f°r example. In the near future, a system automatic data processing similar to the Naval Tactical Data System will be installed-
For ASW, the ships have a long range sonar, three Augusta Bell 204-B helicopters (with sonar and two torpedoes), or two SH-34J and °ne utility helo that can be carried in the helicopter hangar, and two three-tube, MK- 44, torpedo launchers. The long-range sonar is used for search, the torpedo launchers for quick reaction, and the helicopters for direct stacks.
The helicopter supports and complements the ship’s long-range search equipment and serves a dual purpose, in an attack role, to engage submarines at close range day or night, or far from the ship reducing the Underwater threat. Fitted with rockets or antiship missiles, the helicopter can also be used in amphibious operations or in an antiship role.
The cruiser Vittorio Veneto is the natural Solution of the Andrea Doria class, with inCreased and improved operational capabilities. The ship is in an advanced stage of construction at the Navalmeccanica Shipyards in Castellammare di Stabia. She was launched on 5 February 1967 and will be commissioned at the end of 1968. The major characteristics of the Vittorio Veneto are:
Displacement (full load) 8,700 tons
Range 6,000 miles at 20 knots
Propulsion plant over 75,000 s.h.p.
Length overall 511 feet
Beam 62 feet
Flight deck height above water 46 feet
Draft 16.5 feet
Six retractile fins stabilize the ship above the speed of 13 knots (the ship can be stabilized at very low speed as well). Living sPaces in the Vittorio Veneto accommodate 75 officers, 120 petty officers, and 395 enlisted ■hen of different rates (about 300 will be sPecialists). The complement is 550 persons. The major differences between the Vittorio Veneto and the Andrea Doria class are in the elongation of the flight deck and in that the helicopter hangar is placed below the flight deck. The hangar can accommodate nine Augusta Bell 204-B ASW or six SH-34J-type helicopters.
The superstructure amidships is lower but longer than that of the Andrea Doria. The ASW Weaponry has been further enhanced.
The helicopters are for direct attacks, and ASROC-Terrier missiles (long distance) and torpedoes (short distance) are for quick reaction attacks. The Terrier system (one twin launcher forward) is an improved type with more modern and long-range missile radars than that in the Andrea Doria class. To it is connected the long-range, ASW system (ASROC-Terrier). Following the successful results achieved by the Italian Navy in realizing a medium-range, ballistic-missile, launching system for surface vessels, the installation of the system in the Vittorio Veneto is being considered. The installation of a short range antiships missile system is also under study. Improved radars and a data processing system similar to NTDS will help to give the ship a greater operational capability. The day is not too far away when vertical take-off aircraft may be used on the flight deck.
The Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, and Vittorio Veneto are escort cruisers, where the classification of “escort” is not subsidiary or complementary but a conceptual reality. In fact, missiles and helicopters give to these ships the characteristics which once belonged to the old cruiser with an antiair role and to the escort carriers in ASW tasks.
By Captain Robert C. Gould,
U. S. Coast Guard formerly Chief Director,
Coast Guard Auxiliary
THE INTERNATIONAL LIFEBOAT CONFERENCE: 5-9 JUNE 1967
On 5 June 1967, in Dinard, France, delegates from 16 countries gathered in the little resort town to take part in the International Lifeboat Conference.
The Conference, which traditionally meets every four years, evolved from a 1924 proposal by Count Yoslin, President of the Japanese Imperial Lifeboat Society, for the establishment of an international lifeboat organization to provide an effective medium for the ex-
change of ideas. These views were expressed at the world’s first international lifeboat conference which had been called by the Royal National Lifeboat Institute (RNLl) of England and Ireland on the 100th anniversary of its founding.
Count Yoslin’s recommendation was included in a resolution passed by the conference, which can be regarded as the origin of subsequent formal international co-operation between the life-boat services. The RNLI accepted the task of distributing information to all other lifeboat societies, which function it continues to perform. Following this first conference in London, the international organization met at four year intervals except for the World War II years. Host countries during this time have been France, The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Portugal, and West Germany. The Ninth International Lifeboat Conference was held in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1963.
This 10th International Conference coincided with the 150th Anniversary of the French Societe Centrale de Sauvetage des Naufrages, the host for this occasion. Vice Admiral d’Harcourt, President of the Societe since 1955, was also President of the Conference. Admiral d’Harcourt explained to this writer earlier, after what must have meant considerable soul-searching, that he had decided that the Conference proceedings would be conducted in English. He acknowledged that his own English was limited, but he felt that it was the only practical medium for this occasion.
The Conference convened at 0930 on 5 June in the Dinard City Hall. We learned that, as the various papers had already been published they would not be read. However, the delegates were provided the opportunity to discuss the papers with their authors.
The United States delegation was headed up by Vice Admiral Paul E. Trimble, Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard. Commander N. P. Ensrud, U. S. Coast Guard, of the Operations Program Branch of the Coast Guard, was project officer. Captain John Waters, U. S. Coast Guard, attached to the National Highway Safety Bureau of the Department of Transportation, had submitted a paper on the central theme of Coastal Search and Rescue on which the papers of
Commander R. W. Witter, U. S. Coast Guard, from the Coast Guard’s Field Testing and Development Center at Curtis Bay, Maryland, reported on Rescue Boat Development; and a paper prepared by Lieutenant Commander Edwin L. Parker, U. S. Coast Guard, Chief of Testing and Development’s Merchant Marine Safety Branch, Coast Guard, outlined the development of equipment for use in Search and Rescue work. As former Chief Director of the Coast Guard Auxiliary, this writer described that organization and its accomplishments. Four years before in Edinburgh, some interest had been expressed in the Auxiliary because it, like many of the European rescue organizations, was composed of volunteers.
The U. S. delegation showed two films- The first had been produced for the Conference and showed the delegates the coastal SAR problems in the United States, and the equipment and procedures employed in their solution. In producing the film, an effort was made not to overwhelm the viewers with the seemingly unlimited equipment and funds available to the U. S. rescue forces. Nevertheless, the chuckles were barely suppressed when our movie projector refused to operate on 50 cycle current. Eventually our hosts produced a French model. The second film portrayed the technical and practical aspects of the Coast Guard’s current development of a 25-foot rescue boat.
Other delegations offered visual presentations as well. The British featured, in t\v° films, their 70-foot rescue boat and the testing which led to the craft’s development. A third was a rather well-done public relations film showing the capabilities of the 16-foot inflatable rescue boat.
The Norwegians used 35-inm. slides to make an interesting report on their Decca chain. Norway has five Decca chains *n operation. The Norwegian delegate humorously related that the Russians were encouraged to use the northern chain to insure that they remained on their side of the international boundary. Decca receivers are available at an annual rental of $1,000, including service.
Not all of the delegations submitted pa" pers, nor did all participate in the discussions-
The Soviet papers had been received too late for translation and publishing, and the three- ttian delegation chose to listen and to take Rotes. The two-man Polish delegation participated only to the extent of reporting the construction of four 92-foot cruisers similar to the type Norway will station off the Shetlands, that Poland has a 500-mile coastline, and that Polish cruisers are always ready to put to sea with their six-man crews. Both the Russians and Poles were most amiable and outgoing
Various organizations ran the spectrum from complete dependence on voluntary contribu- dons, such as the RNLI, to complete government support, such as the U. S. Coast Guard. The first of eight papers presented by the dNLl was entitled “Fund Raising and Publicity for a Voluntary Lifeboat
The Landing at Veracruz: 1914
by Jack Sweetman
during the social occasions. The mid-east crisis flared and waned during the Conference, and although there was considerable interest shown with respect to the news broadcasts, no interdelegation discussion on the snbject was heard. One of the Russians adopted the “Although our governments don’t always see eye to eye our people can be friends . . line, to which there was quick agreement. A similar disclaimer was also heard from the French. The Russians said that their SAR structure consisted of three marine rescue organizations maintained, respectively, by the military, by the Ministry
Fisheries, and the Ministry of Merchant Marine. The Conference delegates were members of the latter agency. Ten agencies comprise the Merchant Marine, of which the Plack Sea, the Baltic Sea, Murmansk, and Vladivostok are the largest. There appears to he no central agency providing search and rescue direction, however, during extensive rescue operations the Merchant Marine’s Salvage Division acts as co-ordinator.
The source of financial support for the
, a Voluntary Lifeboat Society.”
0 a query from South Flolland as to a pre- °minating gender among those leaving :gacies to the RNLI, we learned that the 'ajority are women.
The Marines have landed! Newspaper headlines are dusty now, but this account of the Veracruz episode is fresh and lively, filled with confused politics, south-of-the-border bravado, and snipers bullets. Based in part on memoirs of participants, this record of an almost forgotten incident in U. S. history, is detailed, colorful, readable.
224 pages. Illustrated. Appendixes.
Notes. Index. List Price $8.50. Members Price $6.80.
(PLEASE USE ORDER FORM IN BOOKLIST SECTION)
The Landing at Veracruz: 1914
The RNLI noted, too, that a paper on the J- S. Coast Guard’s 44-foot lifeboat pre- mted at the Edinburgh Conference led to m subsequent purchase by that organization, f one of these boats. A 16-month evaluation 'Criod convinced the Institute of the craft’s
b
the
|tle as
Scribed as employing a V-bottom, planning- ype forebody, with a single, submerged JPe, stern hydrofoil which provides lift for a Uneled afterbody.
interest in the Coast Guard Auxiliary led tnquiries about the effectiveness of the Ublic education programs, and about other ■fgram statistics.
foll,
Th,
owed was dominated by detailed presenta-
ho
Ja
hv0
Vazee, a 69-foot motor-lifeboat powered by
was
suitability, and contracts were let for the instruction of six more in British yards. The British had accumulated 2,500 hours on the P- S.-built boat while cruising 25,000 miles ln three years. A replaced gear box was the only significant unscheduled maintenance.
The RNLI had displayed at Edinburgh a 17- f°ot, inflatable rescue boat for use in highspeed response to inshore incidents. Equipped 'vith a 40 h.p. Evinrude engine, the boat is Capable of speeds in excess of 20 knots, and Can be launched from a small trailer by two 0r three men; two men crew the craft. The *NLI now has 95 of these craft which are ^own as Zodiacs. By 31 October 1966, these Craft had been used operationally 1,449 tlfnes, saving 613 lives.
The Institute also reported on two other new ideas: The development of protective Nothing and life jackets, and a paper was submitted describing their two 70-foot steel neboats, which can accommodate a live- ®board crew of five and have a capacity for *20 survivors.
The interest of the delegates to the U. S. PaPers centered around the floatable rescue Pump, the radio datum marker buoy, and the ^perirnental 25-foot rescue boat. The marker uoy has been developed for air drop to mark j! sPot for subsequent relocation. It is designed °r free fall and will transmit 36 hours. Al- nough the floatable salvage pump was eveloped for aircraft delivery to foundering surface craft, it also has an application where k is necessary to transfer a pump from a life- °at to a distressed vessel in rough seas. The erman delegation expressed disbelief that 49-lb. pump could be procured for as .00. The 25-foot rescue boat was
hr to
e substance of the discussions which 11 of rescue craft which each nation had Sloped. South Holland described the 185 h.p. diesels, a project which funded by Netherlands Navy’s donations in memory of Dutch sailors lost in service. The Germans told us of their rescue cruiser which employs a “daughter boat” principle wherein a smaller craft is stowed in a recessed troughshaped space in the after deck. The smaller craft is launched or recovered by lowering and opening the stern of the parent craft.
The Swedes reported on a new rescue cruiser, Dan Brostrom, which is a 78-foot, single-screw vessel powered with four 210
h.p. diesels. It features a heating manifold, which transfers heat from the exhaust tubes to the wheelhouse for windshield defrosting and to a tube along the bulwarks to prevent ice crusting. A water sprinkler device along each bulwark can put up a curtain of water should the vessel desire to move close to a vessel on fire. Norway presented a paper on the new 92-foot rescue cruiser, Ambassador Bay, named after an American ambassador whose estate funded this, the first of this class. This craft is powered by a 730 h.p. General Motors diesel and is stressed and configured for navigation in ice. Most of Norway’s rescue work, about 90 per cent, involves the towing of fishing boats from points as far away as the Greenland coast.
The two Japanese delegates were members of the Maritime Safety Agency, but we also learned of a 20,000 member non-government organization known as the Japan Lifesaving Institution, which receives supervision and guidance from the Maritime Safety Agency. The Institution owns 112 rescue boats and can mobilize privately owned craft when necessary. The Japanese paper concluded with a rather complete study on tanker lifeboats.
Other delegates discussed equipment under development, or which needed developing. Finland, for example, recommended the incorporation of hoisting loops on life jackets, and proposed that a mass pick up method be devised for rescuing survivors at sea. The need for radio communications between the lifeboat and the ship’s bridge was also cited- Finland supported Japan’s concern over tanker lifeboat development.
Foreign developments of particular interest to the U. S. delegation included the British changes incorporated in the U. S-- designed, 44-foot lifeboat. An engine mount modification resulted in a reduced noise leve in the forward compartment. The manually operated steering gear seems worthy 0 study, as do stability improvement measures-
The U. S. Coast Guard has already recognized the potential of the 17-foot Zodiacs; and a study of the RNLI’s inflatable chamber used on the their latest lifejacket should be included in the continuing effort to develop al1 optimum lifesaving device. Sweden’s articulated hydraulic winch, as seen on the Sad°r Bay, will be looked at closely for possible application toward Coast Guard craft.
The potential of these innovations, as wel as others which had an appeal to the othCI delegates, substantially supports Count Yos- lin’s recommendation of 1924. Moreover, thc U. S. delegation noted two trends which were gratifying. There is a swing toward a two type boat concept (speed and all-\veathcl respectively), a trend confirming a policl expressed by the U. S. at an earlier confer ence; and, the RNLI’s break with tradition >n its gradual change over from wooden hullsi0 steel hulls also supported a view long he by the Americans.
★ ■
Mare Nostrum
The British Naval Force H, which, in 1943, covered Allied operations in North Africa from the Italian Fleet, sometimes used Mers-el-Kabir near Oran as a base. Here the sailors could be given a run ashore, though there wasn’t much for them to do.
Two of them were walking along the coast road to the west of the harbor, when they came to an attractive-looking beach; and they decided to have a bathe. After they had been in the water some time, a man was seen swimming out to them, wearing a cap, which the sailors soon saw was an American soldier’s cap.
The hatted one said to the British sailors, “You can’t swim here. This beach is reserved for the U. S. Army.”
“Look here, Chum,” replied one of the sailors, treading water hard, “We know that that-there land belongs to General Eisenhower, but not the sea. This sea belongs to Admiral Cunningham!”
----------------------------- Contributed by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Algernon Willis, Royal Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)
Progress
The First—Navy F-lllB carrier suitability test landings took place on the USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) on 23 July 1968. A total of ten arrested landings and nine catapult launches were made by NAS Patuxent River Test Center Pilots.
R. G. Weeks, PH2, USN
And the Last—Landing of another, almost legendary breed of naval aircraft, the Navy seaplane, was made on 12 July, when the Navy’s last Martin P-5 was flown to Patuxent River for presentation to the Smithsonian Institution, closing out 58 years of Navy flying boat history.
Harold J. Flecknoe
Research Sailer—The Hero, a National Science Foundation Antarctic Research Program vessel, will be the first ship to be based in the Antarctic. Intended to operate from Palmer Station, on Anvers Island, the 12 5-foot, 300-ton wooden ship has two diesel engines; she is ketch-rigged, her sails affording a second means of power, as well as resulting in a silent ship during research operations. Her 22- inch white oak timbers will bend under stresses which would make steel ships crack. The Hero will carry a complement of ten scientists and ten crewmen.
National Science Foundation
Navy Green—In May, the USS Nueces (APB-40) was commissioned at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Unusual is the fact that she is painted camouflage green. Similar ships operate with the riverine forces in Vietnam, acting as floating bases.
Deepest Diver—The USS Dolphin (AGSS-5 5 5),launched at Portsmouth, N. H., on 8 June 1968, is the world’s deepest diving operational submarine. The ship is 150 feet long, has a beam of 18 feet, displaces 900 tons, and can carry 12 tons of oceanographic equipment. Capable of operating without the support of a mother ship, the Dolphin will be used for development and test of naval equipment and basic oceanographic research.
Jerry Means, PHC, USN
Air Force Radar—An artist’s concept shows the two antennas of the Advanced Design Array Radar under development through an Air Force contract with Hughes Aircraft. Extremely sensitive and powerful, the long- range system can give a split-second defense capability. The smaller antenna is the transmitting one that emits a beam that can be directed in elevation and azimuth. The receiving antenna is hemispherical in shape. Also, there is a power source and a data processing center.
Hughes Aircraft
Notebook
U. S. Navy
s 100 Planes, 50 Ships To Be Retired
(The Washington Post), 8 August 1968 by George G. Wilson) The Navy, to save money this fiscal year, will retire eight air squadrons and 50 ships, it was announced yesterday.
The Pentagon said the move will save $118 million in fiscal 1969. Other economy measures will be announced later as part of Defense Secretary Clark Clifford’s drive to squeeze $3 billion out of the Pentagon’s budget.
The Defense Department said the Navy economy measures were “to meet the limitations enacted by the Congress” this year. Besides saving $3 billion in spending, the Pentagon is trying to reduce its new obligational authority account by $5 billion.
The eight Navy air squadrons to be deactivated account for about 100 antisubmarine warfare aircraft—P-2 Neptunes, S-2 Trackers, and Sea King helicopters. The specific squadrons, however, have not yet been named. The Pentagon said yesterday that their retirement will not affect military operations in Vietnam.
Of the 50 ships to be taken out of first-line duty, 32 will come from the Atlantic Fleet and 18 from the Pacific Fleet. Twelve of the 50 ships will be used for Naval Reserve training and the rest will be put in mothballs rather than to be scrapped.
Ships to be retired include the guided missile cruiser Topeka, the antisubmarine warfare aircraft carrier Randolph, and the nuclear-powered submarine Triton.
Besides these ships, the following are scheduled to be deactivated this fiscal year:
Destroyers Beale, Cony, Conway, Eaton, Gyatt, Waller, Beatty, Witek, H. R. Dickson, Philip, Sproston.
Destroyer escorts and DERs Mills, Evans, Bridget, Bauer, Hooper, Newell, Lowe, Brister, and Koiner; auxiliary submarine Sea Cat, and submarine Sterlet.
Attack transports Rockbridge, Telfair, Monrovia, and Cavalier; the tanker Mattabesett.
Cargo ships Uvalde, Oglethorpe, and Mathews; high-speed transport Kirwin; net- laying ship Nahant; repair ship Pandemus.
Minesweepers Bluebird, Frigate Bird,
Hummingbird, Jacana, Kingbird, Limpkin, Meadowlark, Parrot, Shrike, and the mine counter-measures ship Epping Forest.
Oiler Cimarron; refrigeration ship BellatriXt and stores ships Castor and Pollux.
s 2 Nuclear Frigates May Be Built
(San Diego Union, 11 July 1968 by L. Edgar Prina) The Navy hopes to let production contracts for two nuclear frigates by the end of the month but fears Congress may delay a new program for conventionally powered destroyers.
Rear Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, coordinator for the DX-DXG (Destroyer and Missile Destroyer) program for the Chief of Naval Operations, voiced these hopes and fears during an interview in his Pentagon office yesterday.
The new frigates, DLGN-36 and DLGN-3?> will give the fleet five of the nine nuclear- powered, missile-firing ships it will need f°r the two nuclear attack carrier task forces no"' planned. The Navy has one nuclear carried Enterprise, in the fleet and a second, Nimtih under construction. Also in the fleet are three other nuclear surface ships, the cruisers Long Beach and the frigates Bainbridge and Truxtun.
Weschler, the Navy, and the Department of Defense all thought the DX program was on the track until the House Armed Services Committee last week cut $221 million out of of the fiscal 1969 budget for five of the ne"' antisubmarine destroyers. The Committee explained that the design of the ship was not yet ready and asserted that the money could not be spent this year anyway.
Asked what the impact of the Committees decision would be if it were confirmed by the House and Senate, Weschler replied: “There would be a strong implication of a slow-do'''11 in the program even though, technically’ we would not let the production contract f°r the first five DX’s until August 1969 which’ of course, is in fiscal 1970.
“As for the design, we know the character' istics of what we want in considerable deta1 —there’s no problem there.
“Furthermore, if no DX production funds are approved in the current budget, a strong eDment of uncertainty will be introduced— industry will be inclined to wait because of a eehng that the program does not have sufficient congressional support.
“And it would almost certainly be more difficult to get all the money denied us in seal 1969, plus that which we plan to request in fiscal 1970—all in the same year.” Weschler pointed out that two other major >avy ship programs which envisioned “total Package” procurement and series production had
shi
N;
°ver,
■ ersial Admiral should concentrate on builds submarines instead of “engaging in per- °nal criticism.”
serious trouble in Congress.
The FDL (Fast Deployment Logistics) lP Program was up twice and was shot down ^ice,” he said. “The LHA (a multipurpose Amphibious ship) was up last year but was cferred. We have high hopes for it this year, however.”
From other sources, it was learned that the avY and Defense Department have given on the FDL for this year, although the °use has not yet formally killed it.
83 Navy Seeks Faster Submarines
I he New York Times, 12 July 1968 by Edwin • Dale, Jr.) Secretary of Defense Clark M. 'fiord announced today that the Navy w°uld proceed to build one of the two adVanced types of nuclear submarines long |lrSed by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover c°rnbat a growing Soviet submarine threat. fe Authorization, disclosed at a news con- rence, was for a “super high speed” sub- ^Arine. Clifford said a so called “quiet” ^marine, driven by electric power, was still "adcr consideration. All work on develop- j^ent of that submarine was stopped last k aA although a preliminary contract had
congressional armed services committees ,ave backed Admiral Rickover in urging evelopment of both types, t-lifford, without naming Admiral Rick- indicated he thought that the contro-
Admiral Rickover, in testimony released last week, had criticized “endless studies” at the Department of Defense for holding up submarine development. He named Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engineering, and Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Director of Systems Analysis.
Clifford indicated today that the two men favored more speed over less noise in the new generation of submarines. He said he had decided July 1 to proceed with a “super high speed” design. “As time has gone on,” he said, “we have learned that speed has become important, so that more attention is being given to that factor now.”
Clifford did not disclose any cost estimates, but congressional testimony has indicated a cost for the high-speed vessel of about $185 million.
He declined to say how much faster it would be than existing nuclear submarines.
The submarine program as a whole covers 69 nuclear attack vessels, of which 34 have been built.
Clifford emphasized that defense against the Soviet submarine capability was not limited to submarines, but also included destroyers, planes and mines.
H Small Boats Widen Mekong Patrols
(The New York Times, 30 July 1968 by Douglas Robinson) The U. S. Navy said today that its small patrol boats were operating 24 hours a day on the waterways of the upper Mekong Delta all the way to the Cambodian border.
The patrols, designed to check the infiltration of enemy soldiers and supplies into South Vietnam, are being carried out on the upper reaches of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers. It is the first time that such patrols have been used on a full-time basis in the isolated stretches of the rivers. The 31-foot fiber glass boats are accompanied by helicopters.
The extended river and air patrols are part of a new strategy aimed at stopping enemy forces before they can get into position to strike at cities and military bases. The increased patrols on the upper Mekong River
have been made possible by the arrival in the waterways of a mobile base that is capable of providing river patrol boats with a month’s supplies. The base, constructed in six sections, is made up of landing docks, sleeping quarters, a repair shop, a galley, and a sick bay. It can be moved easily through shallow water.
Before the introduction of the mobile base, the river patrol beats ranged infrequently into the northern delta waters from bases at Sadec and Vinhlong, 50 to 60 miles downriver.
Last month the boats were put on a continual patrol on the Saigon River and its tributaries as another means of protecting the city from threatened assault.
The Navy, in announcing the latest move, said that its patrol boats now covered the length of the delta waterways from the Cambodian border to the South China Sea.
s New Pilots Get 'Seasoning’ in Vietnam
(Washington Post, 22 July 1968) Some Navy pilots finish combat training with missions in Vietnam, Senate testimony released yesterday showed.
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, admitted that some carrier-based pilots got their final “seasoning” over “less vulnerable areas” of Vietnam.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee May 17, Moorer said age and heavy combat damage were keeping Navy planes in the overhaul for longer periods of time, which in turn slowed the delivery of the planes to squadrons undergoing combat
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training. Moorer said that no squadron commander would send a pilot on a mission into a “high risk area” if the pilot were not fully qualified.
If a squadron “had a portion of the pilots that are not qualified, and they have an operation in a high risk area, this of course means that the burden is heavier on those that are qualified,” Moorer said.
Moorer told the Committee that the United States and its allies have the same number as the Communist bloc nations of tactical aircraft. But, he said, the Soviet Union had 2 wider variety of planes.
Moorer urged that the U. S. tactical fleet be updated to keep pace with the Soviets- He said the United States has reached the point where “older Navy” tactical aircraft have been removed from storage and returned to service to fill shortages and supplement our training command.
Other U. S. Services
s Army ROTC Gets More Academic
{Journal of the Armed Forces, 29 June 1968) Change in traditional army ROTC program will be tested this fall at 11 colleges and universities. New curriculum will allow students to concentrate solely on academic subjects the first two years, in contrast to current “standard” curriculum filled entirely by military subjects, or more-widely-used modified curriculum substituting some academic subjects for military subjects.
s PRIME Is a New DOD Budget System
{Washington Star, 3 July 1968 by Orr Kelly) A major new budget system will go into effect in the Defense Department of the armed forces today. Congress gave its approval to the ne'>v' system—called PRIME-69—yesterday. Ironically, approval came four days after the Whhe House announced the pending resignation of Assistant Defense Secretary Robert N Anthony, who, as the Department’s controller, has been working for three years to get the new system put into effect.
As Anthony describes it, PRIME-69 vv'i^ permit the Department, for the first time since the Mexican War 130 years ago, to haVe a clear picture of where the defense doflar comes from, where it goes and what it buys-
Anthony expected to put the new system "n° operation a year ago. But at the last 1T|inute, Congress refused to go along.
The major purpose of the new system is to match the items in the budget to the programs °n which the money is being spent. When the system is fully in effect, it will thus be possible pr a manager—the commander of an Air 0rce installation, for example—to tell almost Exactly how much it is costing to run the
lnstallation.
Under the old system, managers got many 'ngs “free” so they had no realistic idea of
total cost of carrying out their mission.
J'ginally, Anthony had hoped that both internal Defense Department budget and
toad ais
yv
the
^hen the new program was being tested \vt,Cral y’ears ago, the manager of a Navy shop, j. 0 had thought his costs were $7,000 a year, towered his actual costs were more than hjOOO a year.
Anthony and members of his staff have 1 nt much of their time in recent months "lng to explain to managers that the new y tom will not merely snow them under with °re paperwork but will, for the first time, *to it possible for them to get a real under,, nding of the financial reports flowing across their desks.
'T’i
outIle nCW system "'ill be required through- q toost of the services, but not in Vietnam. ^P^toanders there may use the system if they
budget submitted to Congress could be tp. e to conform to the new system. He felt j(pls w°uld give members of Congress a clearer Sp^a °f where the defense dollar was being
^ ut that phase of the program has been CQ°PPed at least as far as the 1969 budget is tot Cernedj and the system will be used only rnally. This means that Defense Depart- (, nt budget information will have to be fQ toslated” whenever anyone wants it in the rto of the budget sent to Congress.
rchant Marine
tj-. Tankers Are Threat to Canal’s Future
to th ^eWs American, 8 August 1968) A boom tQe building of giant tankers is threatening f^^ke the Suez Canal obsolete, at least so as die transport of oil is concerned.
Oil accounted for about three-fourths of all the cargo going through the canal before it was closed at the start of the six-day war between Israel and the Arab states in June 1967. There is no immediate prospect of its reopening.
The fading of the canal’s importance would have serious consequences for Egypt, which once depended on it as a major source of revenue.
The first of the series of six 276,000-ton tankers has been launched and is due for delivery late this summer according to a survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The study was made for the 22 member nations.
“These are ships which can use the cape routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America at lower costs than the largest vessels which can transit the canal fully loaded,” the OCED said.
“The Suez Canal would have to be considerably deepened and enlarged before this advantage would be cancelled out.”
The project for a new pipeline from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean would also lessen the usefulness of the canal.
There had been a trend to bigger tankers even before the closing of the canal. But the big surge came last year, when 40.1 million tons of tanker capacity was ordered from shipbuilders, compared with 24.9 million tons the year before. Tankers of 200,000 tons and over accounted for over 60 percent of the new construction. At the end of the year, of the 294 vessels on order, 115 were tankers of more than 200,000 tons.
New ships for carrying dry cargo also tend
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The world’s merchant shipping marked its biggest increase in history between mid-1966 and mid-1967, rising 10.9 million tons to a total of 178.7 million—a little more than 6 per cent. Japan, with 2.1 million additional tons and Norway with 1.9 million, showed the most notable increases. Japan is now building nearly half the world’s new tonnage, while five years ago it was building only about one- fourth.
OECD found that the total amount of seaborne trade was still rising a bit faster than the available shipping—by about 7 per cent. But the curve is leveling out: the growth in cargoes was 9 per cent in 1965 and 12 per cent in 1964.
0 New Sea Lanes for San Francisco
(iSafety At Sea International, May/June 1968) The U. S. Coast Guard announce the approval of a sea lanes system for San Francisco designed to reduce the chance of ship collision in the approaches to San Francisco Bay. To start in June, the San Francisco plan is similar to ones already established for New York and the Delaware Bay. Much like a divided highway for road traffic, these sea lanes are two one-way lanes separated by a “buffer zone.” 0 ABS Rules Show New Trends
(iSafety At Sea International, May/June 1968) The 1968 edition of the Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels has recently been published by the American Bureau of Ship-
ping. The Rules are revised and published annually and are indispensable to the ship' builder, naval architect, and marine engi' neer.
Combining British and metric units, the 1968 Rules incorporate several major changes and additions. Principal among these is an ) addition to the hull rules which makes pr°' vision for the application of higher strength materials. This has been done to keep 111 step with the present trend towards much greater use of high strength steel in ship' building. ^
0 Seaman Data System Could Aid Hiri°S |
(The Baltimore Sun, 9 July 1968 by Hele" Delich Bentley) The computer may rcplace the age-old seamen’s “Z” card as the new ag*j proposes to change the methods of hiring a!l° releasing seamen.
Today the Department of Transportation asked Congress to enact legislation whid would allow the Coast Guard, one of *ts agencies, to simplify procedures by whic merchant seamen are hired, employed, a" discharged aboard American-flag vessel'
As proposed by Alan S. Boyd, Secretary 0 Transportation, the bill would enable the Coast Guard to computerize the volumin°llS service records it maintains on mercharlt seamen—saving shipping lines and the G°v ernment several million dollars a year.
Secretary Boyd stated that the lavvS enacted between 1872 and 1940—are °llt dated and do not lend themselves to modcr1’ techniques for the maintenance of records-
“The primary data source of inforinatia*' on American maritime manpower is 1 information gathered through the C°a Guard’s issuance of identification docume"tS to seamen,” Mr. Boyd stated. “Accurate data capable of rapid retrieval and evaluati0'1 is vital both to national defense a planning for a healthy peacetime marine. j-
“Signing on” and “signing off” a creW 0 seamen is a cumbersome process which ofteI requires several hours to complete, it " ^ noted because the giant forms are filled 0 , by hand. The Shipping Articles, only ooe the forms, is a 12-part document, 14 iuc_ wide and 28 inches long. The Shipp'11” Articles, which serve as a contract between
search and Development Navy Satellite to Set Time Standard
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Purpose. The satellite emits signals at precise, known intervals. A particular
ship s master and her crew, spell out in Painstaking detail the daily rations which each seaman can demand.
Examples cited by the Coast Guard are: lree-fourths of an ounce of “coffee (green erry)” every day; half-a-pint of molasses on ' Undays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays; a pound p ,saE pork on Mondays, Wednesdays and ridays; half-a-pint of vinegar on Tuesdays and Saturdays.
Also the antedated articles specify that Crew members can bring “no dangerous Weapons or grog” aboard ship and that they ■11Ust be given a “daily issue of lime and lemon ■iUlce and sugar, or other antiscorbutics.” mtective features of the existing laws are g ained in the proposed legislation, Mr. °yd said, but outdated requirements and e'Consuming procedures would be elimi- Uated thereby.
He
a
A’ayal Research Review, July 1968) The ational Bureau of Standards, the Naval p servatory, and the Naval Research 3 °Eatory will conduct tests using NRL’s ^Perimental navigation satellite, Timation, ^^synchronize time standards for the United .■ ates- Precise determination of time is essen- a for navigation.
ha and NBS rad^° stations regularly nsmit time signals governed by ultra pjccise time standards. All standards for the Uted States are synchronized through a Eedure known as time transfer.
\vR Urrently> dtne ts transferred via airplanes frIC l fly amazingly accurate time pieces 0t^tri fhe Naval Observatory to sites where ■ er standards are located. This procedure Sr^able but costly.
trlrnation has been proposed as a time - nsfer vehicle. Its high speed, high alti- til:. very
sta^ Can exPected to reach the site of a staard at a precise moment. An inaccurate r; *~ard would indicate that the signal ar- ^d before or after that moment. cjt Naval Research Laboratory scientist the following example to illustrate the
time transfer procedure using Timation: A particular signal is expected to reach the site of a standard at exactly noon. If the standard reads one second after noon when the signal arrives, that standard is known to be in error by a second.
In actual operation, present day standards have not deviated by more than a few thousandths of a second for several years. Timation’s signals can be used to detect variations much smaller than this. The signals are spaced sufficiently to avoid confusion.
The experimental Timation satellite was built by NRL personnel and placed in orbit on 31 May 1967 to verify principles of a new satellite navigation technique with which a ship or airplane can instantaneously obtain a highly accurate fix of its position. The satellite weighs 85 pounds and is powered by solar cells. The Naval Air Systems Command sponsors the project.
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Write for Further Information and Brochure s 'Fast Fix’ Runways in 30 Minutes
{Journal of the Armed Forces, 29 June 1968) “Fast Fix” cement which hardens in 30 minutes or less is being used in Southeast Asia to fill mortar and rocket damaged runways, the Air Force had disclosed.
Developed for the Air Force Systems Command’s Aero Propulsion Laboratory, Wright- Patterson AFB, Ohio, by the Western Company, Richardson, Texas, the cement is being tested at Air Force and Navy bases under operational conditions, officials said.
The Air Force said that earlier tests at Eglin AFB, Florida, and at the Navy’s SeaBee base at Port Hueneme, California, demonstrated that the quick-setting cement possesses the strength of concrete that has dried up for 28 days—in one test, a simulated fighter aircraft with a load of approximately 58,000 pounds was successfully supported only 30 minutes after the cement hardened.
During the Eglin tests, simulated 750- pound craters were filled to within a foot of the top with sandy debris, with the last foot of the 14-foot deep crater filled with a uniform aggregate. The “Fast Fix” cement was poured at 1,000 gallons per minute over the aggregate and spread down through it to form a quicksetting concrete.
The tests at Port Hueneme used conventional, transit truck concrete mixers to develop a mixture approximately 35 per cent water content by weight. The mixture proved “excellent” for repair of mortar and rocket crater damage, officials said.
Foreign
s French to Build Soviet Ships
(Moscow Izvestiya, 11 May 1968) Sudoimp0^ has signed a contract with the French fir,rl Chantiers de l’Atlantique for the supply 111 1971 of two refrigerated transport vessels ol 12,500 d.w. tons. A contract for the delivery in 1970-1971 of 10 refrigerated vessels 0 8,600 d.w. tons has been signed with the firms Ateliers et Chantiers de Bretagne, Ateliers et Chantiers de Dunkerque, and others. Soviet machinery will be built into these vessels.
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