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°rd of the Californian”
(f>
pfe John C. Carrothers,
°ceedings)
^Carroll E. B. Peeke—From my own study of e Titanic disaster, it seems that Mr. Car-
pp. 58-71, March 1968
roth,
ers strengthens the contention that the -if not Captain Lord—was ex-
a^ifornian
^hiely negligent on that night of 15 April -■ For example, he states, “The point is a‘ the Californian could not possibly have tehed the Titanic's side before the ship q k.” I must question this statement. Mr. brothers admits that the distance between ^oint “b” on the plot (p. 66) the position of Californian, and point “C,” where the
•Jterczc struck the iceberg, was 19.75 miles. e Californian was a 13-knot ship. If she had rtl'd promptly, she well might have reached . e Titanic before she went down at approximately 2:20 a.m.
q danger from ice to the Californian? The
1 arPathia was 58 miles from the Titanic. But tier
ati:
captain put on full steam, disregarding
•15
Scr of ice, and reached the Titanic at about
a.m. in time to rescue several hundred
rsons.
awakened, it is quite possible the Californian might well have reached the Titanic before she went under.
Mr. Carrothers cites testimony tending to show the rockets were fired from a distance closer than 30 miles away, rather than the 8-to-l 0-mile distance claimed by Lord Mersey at the British Inquiry. But what does that mean? We know that the Californian was slightly less than 20 miles away. We know of no other ship firing rockets that night. Therefore, the rockets seen by the Californian must have been fired by the Titanic, and the introduction of the 30-mile distance only tends to further becloud the issue.
Mr. Carrothers injects another note of mystery, when he says, “when the first lifeboats were launched [from the Titanic] more than an hour after the collision, they were instructed to row over to the Carpathia about five miles away; deliver the passengers, and return to the Titanic for more survivors.” This is certainly not in keeping with the record. The Titanic struck the iceberg at approximately 11:45 p.m. If the first lifeboats were launched about an hour later, this would
T'he ttian
Titanic fired eight rockets. The Cali-
‘hi
saw eight rockets. What were they
lriking on the Californian, that it was Chinese ^';Vv Years or the Fourth of July that some s, ’P Was sending up rockets? Mr. Carrothers ^ ‘es, “Jr is aiso feit that natural curiosity ^°uld have caused him [the Californian's ,^'c[nd officer] to awaken the Marconi opera- Ij f' ’ If this had been done, he might have ‘he “PDQ” (the international distress pjptel of those days). Had this been done 0rriptly, and had Captain Lord been
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
lead o',1 1885
in
have been about 1 a.m. And the Carpathia was much further away than five miles at that time, since she did not reach the disaster area until about 3:15 a.m., at least two hours later and almost an hour after the Titanic had gone under.
In spite of the charges of a “frame” against Captain Lord, the findings of the British Court of Inquiry resulted in a recommendation that has safeguarded travelers by sea since the Titanic disaster. This recommendation provided that no passenger vessel may leave a British port without sufficient boats to hold all passengers and crew and allow a margin for emergency.
★ ★ ★
John P. Eaton—It is commendable that the publication of the article, “Lord of the Californian,” coincides with renewed efforts in England to clear the name of Captain Stanley Lord. On 5 March 1968, the Mercantile Marine Service Association presented a petition toward this end to Anthony Crossland, president of the British Government’s Board of Trade, asking for a rehearing on the Lord case.
It is hoped that the British Board of Trade will heed the new petition and grant a reopening of the Lord case, during which evidence can be presented and evaluated in the light of fact. Thus, the emotional desire of the 1912-1913 investigations to “fix the blame” for the Titanic disaster will be abnegated; and it is hoped that a new and more objective reappraisal of the facts will show Captain Lord to have been blameless in the affair.
In March 1963, the Merchant Mar*1’1 Masters’ Union in London exonerated C<T tain Lord of blame and fastened it ins the Samson, a Norwegian trawler. Built as an Arctic seal hunting vessel and tra<F ’ she was in the vicinity of the Titanic on night of 14 April 1912. Her master, Ffonjl Naess, in a sworn statement made before death, stated that he saw the rockets fire from the Titanic and thought that, because ^ had been sighted by American vessels in a I
hunting” area, the rockets were signals from |
Americans to heave to and be searched- simply darkened his ship and sailed a"'3' and the Californian took the blame. , . .
The Samson was purchased in 1925 ■ :
Admiral R. E. Byrd. Renamed the City °J| York, she carried the Admiral and his party the first Antarctic expedition. Exhibited i°r ■ year at the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair, was retired until World War II, when she used as an all-sail vessel running betw<j , Nova Scotia and the West Indies. She enC^_ | her life as a lumber schooner in the Bost ^ Nova Scotia trade and was dismantled 1 1952 at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia. An excele I model of the ship can be seen at Mystic z port, Mystic, Connecticut.
★ ★ ★
Captain Roy C. Smith, III, U. S. I
Reserve (Retired) Director, Naval History Display Center—Five years ago Mr. ^ ° ;
rothers’ article, “The Titanic Disaster,’ c°'
mC tbat Captain Lord of the Californian Ren °een clu'te justly condemned for negli- vj Ce °n that fatal night. Now he has con- °the C me 3S well as hiu'self and, I hope, and that his earlier conclusions were wrong 'da grave injustice to Captain Lord. fry 'V° days after I read “Lord of the Cali- fee • tde Naval Historical Display Center dent a PaiTaphlet5 “The Californian Inci- ^ ’. from the Mercantile Marine Service
Sec ^ lal;ion in Britain, containing the text of a of Q d Pet'tion for rehearing and clearance i^j aPtain Lord’s good name. This was subin to tbe President of the Board of Trade foruary 1968.
-S Mr. Carrothers said,
earlier
Mr. Beesley was not called as a wit- at either the U. S. or British investigation ’ and tbe significance of his book was not Wasr^c'ated until December 1962, when he cast- '>e*ng interviewed for a British Broad- V Corporation radio feature, “Trial by Brit'-'^y the Other Ship,” based on the Beesj investigation. In February 1962, Mr. $ta ' *cy made a statutory declaration that the Qnetits in his book were those he would a w ^lven as testimony had he been called as b,.[j ncss at either investigation. However, it, ' Vlng that the case stood firmly on its own Out |S from existing testimony (as brought e,iil ^ ^r- Carrothers) and not wishing to dij arrass the then 87-year-old Mr. Beesley, by ,,not include his statements in its petition for aC Mercantile Marine Service Association •j?shearing in 1965.
e new petition, based on Mr. Beesley’s
the Association’s J$0.‘v‘ Petition was denied in 1965 by the semd Trade on the grounds that it preset j” n° new and important evidence to off- 1'[lee findings of the original investigation, i,, Cllrrent petition does contain “new and inJ ,rtant” evidence that has a very interest- & background.
eng11 July of 1912, Mr. Lawrence Beesley, I.(iSstbe survivors, published a book The i'n/ °^t!le Titanic, based on notes he made lish U|d‘ately afrer the event. He clearly estab- r0ck diat the last of the Titanic's distress r0ci^ts Was fired well before unidentified ff0i(<ts Were sighted by the Californian and also, n^t'! tbe 1 Panic's heading and, that she could f0rr).lave sighted or been sighted by the Cali- tUn/l^i Under the existing situation. Unfor- aesi tions.
eye-witness account, does therefore present “new and important” information and one sincerely hopes that it will be granted. If so, Captain Lord’s name will surely be cleared, at least for posterity.
"To Build a Bigger Ditch”
(iSee August C. Miller, Jr., pp. 26-34, September 1967 and W. R. Mathews, p. 102, January 1968 Proceedings)
Richard B. O’Keeffe—There is no question (and your editor’s note points this out) that Dr. Miller’s advocacy and analysis have been overtaken by the event of the treaty announcement of 27 June 1967, issued jointly by the Presidents of the United States and of Panama.
It is not unfair to assert that Dr. Miller’s article requires more than mere updating, more than reference to the peculiar protocolary delay of the U. S. Department of State. Until recently, inquiries about the three treaties were answered by the Department’s assertion that these documents were being translated into Spanish.
First, in regard to the need for a sea-level canal, Dr. Miller has not pointed out that these same large freighters and tankers which cannot transit the Panama Canal, cannot (while fully laden) transit the Suez sea-level canal; nor can these ships enter many of the world’s important harbors. The owners of these ships obviously have concluded that their operation is practical and economical despite these restrictions. It is scarcely any objective of our Republic to run “greyhounds after the mechanical hare” in the matter of accommodating Japanese and other shipbuilders.
In any case, the article fails to note the impressively endorsed alternative solution to our Isthmian canal problems, the Terminal Lakes project. It is unfortunate that Dr. Miller should prepare what purports to be an article on Isthmian canal possibilities without properly referring to this important alternative to the old sea-level idea. This omission is more grievous since a major advantage of Terminal Lakes over a sea-level canal is political, i.e., there is no necessity for the United States to negotiate new treaties in order to improve its existing canal. As a political scientist, he is surely aware of this contrast.
The Panama Canal Zone and the Panama
many of its aspects. The performance unit on scene in the contact area remains key factor in the ASW battle, and hoW that unit performs depends largely on the perience and training of its personnel. ^ the VP force proved beyond reasonable do11^, years ago that increased crew stability leae
have
ere'’
level readineS*j|
biy
concept which, broadly stated, calls f°r ‘ squadrons to be equally (and presum3
achieve measurable improvement in the o
all readiness of our VP force by intelhg1
:efl
tei11'
Canal, territorial possession and property of the United States, has now cost this nation almost $2 billion in acquisition, construction, and maintenance thus far, plus more than that sum in the inescapable costs of defending our possession.
Professor Miller’s reference to the Colombian hydroelectric-seaway plan is, I assume, to the Choco Project, [see pages 135-137, July issue], prepared for the Republic of Colombia by the Hudson Institute in the fall of 1966. Two observations should be made here: The Choco Project is a Terminal Lakes design canal, suggesting that the idea of the operational or economic inferiority of a lake- lock canal is “not necessarily so.” Vannevar Bush, General Thomas F. Farrell, and many other experts have argued cogently that against atomic weaponry, neither a sea-level nor a terminal lake canal is secure. The Choco canal, as outlined by Robert Panero in the official report, would be totally inadequate for present-day interoceanic commerce (cf. Dr. Miller’s suggestion that the Choco canal be used while the Panama Canal is brought down to sea level). The authors of the Choco Project go to considerable pains to deny any intention of competing with or of replacing the existing Panama Canal.
What was the result of the 1955 yielding to Panamanian importunings? Within nine years, as Professor Miller pointed out, the United States had denounced (in effect) the 1955 Treaty, and American Isthmian policy seemed to be set firmly on a course of appeasing the insatiable. Dr. Donald Dozer and Vice Admiral T. G. W. Settle sum up the grave situation in Panama with:
We now have a fine canal. We know it will work. We know how to operate it. We know how to enlarge it from time to time as necessity requires. We have a treaty with Panama which enables us to operate it and control it, though this treaty is now being abrogated by executive fiat. We are losing control of the Panama Canal through a policy of retreat and through our obsession with the construction of a canal of sea-level design, which weakens our bargaining position. If we cannot control the Canal which we now own, we may be forced entirely out of the canal business in Central America. If this happens, who will control this priceless interoceanic utility? Who will operate it to serve the needs of world commerce?
"The Canadian Cyclic System”
(See Seymour Dombroff, pp. 64-68, January Proceedings)
Commander H. D. Wilbur, U. S. NaV) ^ Captain DombrofPs article should be c°'’ sidered carefully by everyone in the A business, and especially by those of us in lJ,_ trol aviation. The VP force has made sign1 cant strides in ASW capability in recent yea^, primarily through the “bootstrap” techmfi^ of making better use of existing equip111 ^ through intensified training of personnel development of better tactics. Although 11111 progress has been made in the areas of °a handling and analysis, improved sens0 ’ and more economical employment of f°r ASW is more of an art than it is a scien°e
of ‘hf th« vvell e*'
to improved ASW performance. But we not been very successful in achieving stability. We adhere to a
completely) ASW-ready at all times. Norl11^ personnel rotation continues throughout ^ year, with each squadron getting its shar(W new people and losing its share of old-t1111 on a regular basis. Lack of regard for depl°^. ment schedules, operational commitments; availability of training services results quent disruption of trained crews. There 15 limit to what the squadron commaO01^ officer can do to rectify this situation. Care ^ planning based on projected rotation clatU^ key people certainly can help, but we still counter some helter-skelter training to unanticipated gaps. J
It appears that our Canadian allies h3 found a much better way to manage tn ^ forces. I believe it is within our abilitieS
wd adoption of the Canadian Cyclic Sys ^ Moreover, the resulting improved stabihb 3 the lives of officers and men might havf, salutary effect on personnel retention 1
0l,ldn’t a stable team progress in its ASW or
control skills to truly competent levels?
* What if a duty section were composed of trained, experienced men?
the executive officer and his
^ could keep the service records perfect, 'ion 0rreSP°ndence lawless, and the organiza-
1 administratively 4.0.
di
for
°ne cycle? Wouldn’t that environment
Jttst-b,
training exercises invariably have their
'hated
by transfers, to realize that the prob
r °u^ go even farther towards attacking the °f the difficulty, which is excessive per- S°nnel turnover.
-ieutenant Larry R. Seaquist, U. S. Navy ^ o reading the article by Captain Dom- “i I experienced the same feeling of antici- , . 0rV Excitement that I can recall, when as a r,, cl> I poured over the toy section of a ^ r,strnas catalog, thinking “what if. . . .” ^ Crc are the “what if’s” that immediately of .'C t0 my mind as I consider the possibilities a stabilized ship’s company as demon- ated by the Canadian Cyclic System:
\v * ^hat if a destroyer’s weapons teams t always breaking in that new man?
fire
w“rel>, • .
o^'ldn’t the ship be in far better hands than "'here the burden upon the command . officer was to accomplish some basic in , ninS in damage control and watch stand- fi°r an ever-changing, ever-green section? in * ^hat if the ship’s office were not receiv- and transferring men daily? Perhaps with- a 'he demands on him to check people in , °ut, issue orders, and beat the bushes for
3b-"*
* What if a sailor were assigned to one Vlsion on one ship with one set of shipmates
cean . ■
j V let him grow into a billet, mature, and [jj e °P authentic pride in his own work and sfiip’s reputation?
^.The big “what if” is this: What if a ship aCtVln? through her 36-month cycle could t^lly improve steadily and continually sat. 3rd maximum readiness? Is it really neces- y to have to struggle so fiercely to maintain ^ the minimum levels of proficiency? Mainly there are hurdles in the way of °nl ^ Vv‘de stabilized crewing. But one has t^.t0 look around any pier where ships re- 0,. rJ'ng from refresher training, deployments,
eginning-to-work-together crews deci- lems of continuing with this constant flux of new people through a command are great also.
The constant and demanding task of training ourselves is necessary to reach our proper goal: a high and improving ability to use our weapons systems. That’s not easy. Modern naval warfare’s skills are complex and its techniques require skilled teams. Our ships do not now reflect, in high readiness levels, the efforts we expend in training. In fact, it is a common experience for a ship to devote her entire postrefresher training cycle to regaining or retaining the proficiencies that were advertised by the Fleet Training Group at the time to be “basic.”
I suggest that the increased efficiency of our ships to be gained by stabilizing .their crews for up to 36 months to allow the more complete development of their readiness is well worth the trouble. Our traditional naval standards require that we get the most out of the resources at hand. Crew stabilization looks like a good way to improve our use of the Navy’s number one resource: people.
"Modern Destroyer Bridge Design”
(See R. L. Scott, pp. 44-50, March 1968 Proceedings)
Sublieutenant T. B. H. Kuiper, Canadian Forces Reserve (Retired)—I would make the following recommendations in addition to, or in lieu of, those made by Commander Scott. The CIC is too vulnerable, and needs to be placed deep in the ship. A suitable location would be just above the waterline with nonessential buffer compartments, such as living spaces and workshops, on either side. The CIC, along with other combat centers and radio rooms, should be located in an airtight, self-sustaining “citadel.” This provides it with protection from nuclear fallout and other airborne killing agents. It also provides a greater degree of protection from more conventional weaponry. This arrangement is incorporated in all Canadian destroyers, and no Canadian destroyer captain would have it otherwise.
A feature that should also be incorporated is a remote conning position adjacent to the CIC (operations room in Canadian terminology). This would feature all the ship control facilities, but would depend on closed-circuit
"American Harbor Defenses: The Final Era”
{See D. P. Kirchner and E. R. Lewis, pp- January 1968, and p. 106, May 1968, Proceedings)
William M. Powers, PHC, U. S. Nav’>""j Remnants of harbor defenses at the mouth 0 Manila Bay in the Philippines as shown iu 11 Pictorial still exist. None of them, of cou^'' are manned or operative. Many of the larg‘d batteries at Corregidor, including Batted Way, Hearn, and Crockett still stand as thc'
did at the end of their
ag0'
television for visual information. This gives the captain the greater freedom that Commander Scott’s system provides. The pilothouse should be eliminated. There is no reason, technological or otherwise, why the OOD (officer of the watch in Canada) cannot steer as well as conn. The ship control room would, in most respects, be similar to the one Commander Scott proposes, but would include the additional features of a control wheel and throttles. These controls would be similar in design to those used on aircraft.
A partial version of this system was tested some years ago in a Canadian destroyer. The reaction of personnel associated with the test was quite favorable.. It was found that the OOW could direct the ship far more efficiently, particularly when executing such difficult maneuvers as following in the wake of an evasive ship.
The original Canadian version had the ship control room occupied by the OOW and a helmsman. I would propose instead two officers, as Commander Scott does. They would be, in function as well as relation to each other, rather similar to the pilots of a bomber. The main exception would be that the captain would retain ultimate control. He would either direct the ship orally, or take the conn himself at the operations room remote station. In the event of a total breakdown, the OOW would conn the ship by oral commands to the engine room and steering compartment until the captain himself arrived at the bridge.
d mu enu ui meir epic siege, 26 years “o Six miles away at Fort Drum (El Fraile), ‘j1, 14-inch guns installed after World War I |,C rusting in the tropical sun. At two other p°s1' tions in Manila Bay, at Fort Hughes °n Caballo Island and Fort Frank on CaraW0 Island, mouldering remnants of the gl11’. which fortified these sites can still be found W the occasional intrepid tourist. .
To the north, at Subic Bay, two lO-inclj guns which once were the main armament0 Fort Wint on Grande Island were dismantle by the Navy and are being shipped to Wast1' ington State to be renovated and placed °' display. In the last five years, Washing10"’ Oregon, and the Smithsonian Institution ha'‘ expressed interest in these guns. The SnU1" sonian stated they would have installed & weapons at Fort Washington, Maryland) short distance from the nation’s capital- ^ j cording to a Smithsonian survey, the gun® Fort Wint are the last of their type. Curiou®1)’
Huge old guns still stand at the mouth of Manila Bay in the Philippines. On Corregidor, left, is shown one of the 12- inch, Model 1890, M-l mortars of Battery Way. In the center, one of the 33-ton, 10-inch gun barrels is being dismantled on Grande Island, Fort Wint. And, next is one of two 12-inch disappearing guns of Battery Crockett.
William M. Powers, PHC, USN
p - . .
0rt Washington site, now being turned >de 9n anned forces museum, once mounted frntlCal weapons as those being removed 0tTl Fort Wint.
The
°atte;
condition of the different guns and t|1.'ierV sites varies, but, considering the fact l^7none have had any maintenance since Vat.’ theY are in a remarkable state of preser- H’a'011' of the guns are deteriorating in the an<^ humid climate. Some areas of the sh urete battery sites, weakened by Japanese 0jn ^re and the passage of time, are begin- Pr uto crumble. Of all the sites, Fort Wint was Far ^ast affected by enemy action. .fc-Wy untouched by Japanese artillery fire, fJ;.' ^Uery is virtually unscarred when com- ^ to positions on Corregidor and Fort
visf Philippine Constabulary truck takes
U,°rs to the various batteries, as well as ^alinta
^r)Jv|ahnta Tunnel, General Douglas Mac-
ffl _
ttrs headquarters during the early days C War- Evidence of serious structural fail- f shows even in Malinta Tunnel. Debris
of
the i
otn
Fat
tW‘ tainor cave-ins lies in the main shaft
jk . P*erces Malinta Hill, and much of the the ln? appears termite-infested. Even now, p)(^c ate lateral shafts in the Malinta com- Containing supplies intact from World C^v,r lf> which are unreachable because of trap'*i?S an<^ still existent Japanese “booby-
t- ‘
°rt Drum, while not on any regular tourist still can be visited by small boat. The
to
Ute
pounding this installation took, as evidenced by its shell-scarred exterior, must have been incredible. Large chunks of concrete are missing in places, and the entire islet is pockmarked from shells of all calibers.
Fort Wint’s two 10-inchers deserve special mention because of the condition in which a Navy engineering team found them when they commenced dismantling them for shipment to the United States. Although rust covered all areas of the weapons exposed to the elements, many parts still worked fairly easily, and bearings which hadn’t had oil on them for years still turned. The pieces, now dismantled, are being packed for shipment at Subic Bay for their trip to Washington state. Because this state was the first to ask for the pieces, they were granted possession of them and are paying the costs of removal and shipment. Fort Wint’s guns will eventually be displayed at a Washington state park.
Book Reviews of "Incredible Victory” and ''Rendezvous at Midway”
(See pp. 122-125, December 1967, and pp. 97-98, April 1968 Proceedings)
Rear Admirals H. E. Strange and John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The review of these two books by Assistant Professor Clark Reynolds of the Naval Academy has sent these two Midway veterans to General Quarters. When the professor is actually reviewing, he is in safe waters. But when he freely passes out
The basic weakness in Lord’s work lS failure to distinguish between document^ facts and the nostalgic remembrances of111 getting old. If Professor Reynolds expect
als°
I
iff
Mr. Fisher quotes Captain Karl Dalld°_ who states “that the weather was not e* tremely bad.” Perhaps on the surface of 1 sea his observation might be correct. ever, conditions aloft could have been fo1 different. The loss of the USS Akron took l^Jl
during a “line squall.” Let us assume
necessarily be correct.
While with LZ (Luftshiffban-ZepP1- .,
no11
w
issued to him and he in turn assigned theUf LZ. The USS Akron was not his first airship j sign; a complete hull design can be f°ul’f, among patents issued to him. In this P^, ticular patent, the keel was extended to f°
his own judgments, not only on the events but the men of Midway, these two old fogies cheerfully train their verbal smoothbores on him.
The endearing quality of Walter Lord’s book, which one of us reviewed for another periodical, is his humble admiration for the men of whom he wrote, but whom he refused to judge. Professor Reynolds might well reread the book with this in mind. Moreover, historians should not make such categorical statements as he did about Admiral Fletcher. He should know the dangers of making contemporary historical judgments, for he himself mentioned the pitfalls that trapped interviewers of the Strategic Bombing Survey, as well as S. E. Morison.
But it is his back-of-the-hand treatment of Captain Buckmaster that has mostly sparked our reply. One of us was in the Yorktowri’s ship’s company with duty on the staff; the other watched that ship with admiration and affection during the four months that the Astoria was in her “body-guard.” Captain Buckmaster, with a reputation for being one of the best shiphandlers in the Navy, had three outstanding executive officers, Arthur W. Radford, Joseph J. “Jocko” Clark, and Dixie Kiefer. Only Clark had friction with the ship’s company and air group, which Buck- master was able to smooth over. This kept things interesting for a ship underway almost continuously for two years.
Perhaps the Yorktown at Midway was abandoned too soon, but at that stage of the war we were learning to fight as we went along. Those of us with damage control responsibilities thought carriers were as tender as top- heavy cruisers and destroyers and, when the list kept increasing, that the Yorktown would soon roll over. It was from the Yorktown’s tough experience that we discovered carriers seemed to reach a new stability around 10 to 15 degrees. Subsequent photographs of damaged flattops testify to this. Moreover, there were then no directives for a salvage party to remain with the ship when the majority of the crew abandoned. These were the lessons of the Yorktown loss; her sacrifice saved other ships.
Some of Reynolds’ praises are no more watertight than his censures. And he evidently did not know about the long, involved questionnaire that Lord sent to Midway vets and
which many of us did not bother to anS'vf'’ Lord is a professional writer and one of11 transgressions of this trade is to stress the ro of participants who are willing with their ne" and to ignore those who are not.
ie»
become a first rate naval historian, he should learn to discriminate between stories” and reality.
"The Design of the Great Airships”
(See William L. Fischer, pp. 126—128, February * Proceedings)
Dean H. Hamilton—The USS Shenatd was literally “torn apart” when she was fl°" into the turbulence of a summer storm fr° -
tb3‘
temperatures were considerably lower ( perhaps the rain was near the freezing Po1' ( and turned to ice when it touched the Inn1 the airship. Perhaps there was a rapid bum t of ice. The airship did not have an anti-icl,1j or de-icing system, so it may have been f°rCt down by the weight of ice accumulation.
Helium has some deficiency as a lifting"*11 and it may be that a helium airship may ascend when the gas cells are fully infi3^’ f Quite possibly a water recovery system 1 ballast may not be needed. The USS ShiN doah was modified in order to use helium- * extensive hearing was held in order to dete mine why the USS Shenandoah was lost. 60* siderable testimony was given; however, analysis is always subject to review and form ( determinations. First judgments may 110
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Dr. Arnstein patented many features fount1 the design of LZ air ships. U. S. patents
^lr. Fischer’s discussion of engines, he es flatly, “Specifications for the Allison
stat,
Cities
"'Quid
engin,
Writ,
th,
tlnie the USS Macon was being completed. e Problem of the soot and corrosion of the ha Cr recovery condenser panels might easily 1 c been solved by switching from a petro- ''' base engine fuel to an “aromatic” fuel
^ad,
^ixt
------------- i
,^ae future. The rigid airship looks like the jj. Possibility for nuclear-powered flight. ,r||cturally visualize an airship with a nu- ar reactor providing heat for thermal lift, Ration of electricity for general purposes Uectric propulsion.
ieari-
an ■ln^ ed§es l^ie fin; making the assembly ■ntcgrai part of the hull.
were wrong.” The Allison engine Probably have been a very suitable e for rigid airship propulsion. As the er understands, the engine was in test at e from benzol. Proper setting of engine IJSetUre control would solve the soot problem, Pr k ^ aromat'c fuel would solve the corrosion be, Crn' U the engines of the airships had Pe[n ^as°flne fueled, the GZ (Goodyear-Zep- ln) Water recovery system would have been ^eflent.
tjj eather seemed to have gotten the best of (|^. S. Navy’s rigid airship program. Many f) ln§s were accomplished in order to have a t0 f 7 aircraft carrier. Forget the past and look
t
doUCturaUy visualize an airship with a nu-
Set>,
and
ajr 'cbard K. Smith*—The case of hydrogen 4b l^S versus helium airships, per se, is ^$Urd "pjjg slightly superior lifting quality 4ir ;vro§en was well understood by American tj aiP engineers in general, the Navy in party .ar- They also understood its hazard so Ijy *-hat they deliberately chose the lesser HQ’ lhe much greater cost, and the safety of st/1 ^arnmable helium. The Germans under- rj-this, too, especially after the flaming /y;aster to the British R. 107 in 1930. The flat*'°n^urg was accordingly designed to be in- Hj with helium, and would have been if » United States had not refused to export the Lto Germany.
,\^ 0 one really knows the details of the , '°n’s loss, because of the small number of lvors. Fischer’s insistence that there was
* o
Af ee Richard K. Smith, The Airships Akron and °n> Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1965.
no line squall the night of the Akron disaster contradicts subsequent analyses by the U. S. Weather Bureau, Irving P. Krick, and Theodore von Karman, among others.
If there was a “magic ingredient” in the success of the Zeppelin airships, it is owed to the sagacity of Dr. Hugo Eckener, who worked out the painfully careful training and operating procedures for the airships and their crews.
★ ★ ★
FAHEY'S EIGHTH EDITION
THE SHIPS
AND
AIRCRAFT
OF THE
U S. FLEET
Compiled and Edited by James C. Fahey
An up-to-date listing by name and type of over 2,000 ships and 120 aircraft and missiles. Over 400 illustrations. 64 pages. Paperbound. List Price $3.50 Member’s Price $2.80 A U. S. Naval Institute Publication
A. D. Topping, Vice President, Wingfoot Lighter-Than-Air Society—Mr. Fischer plumps for hydrogen first by imagining an artificial contest in which no helium airships competed and then argues that hydrogen airships beat helium airships 115:0.' If such a contest were to mean anything, the percentage of successes would surely be a better measure. He is wrong in saying, “No helium airship ever crossed an ocean nonstop.” In March 1957, the Navy £PG-2 “Snowbird” not only flew the Atlantic nonstop, but made the
round trip nonstop, which no hydrogen airship ever did. The 1,000,000-cu. ft. £PG-2 was much smaller than the airships Mr. Fischer had in mind, and since the ability of an airship to perform such a feat increases with size, it is absurd to conclude that helium-filled airships cannot compete with hydrogen airships.
Mr. Fischer’s ideas about the Shenandoah and the Akron are not correct and can be ascertained by referring to three recent studies: U.S.S. Shenandoah, by C. L. Keller (West Roxbury, Mass.: World War I Aero Publishers, 1965); The Airships Akron and Macon, by Richard K. Smith; and Theodore von Kar- man’s autobiography The Wind and Beyond (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967).
Mr. Fischer attempts to concoct some sort of rivalry between Dr. Duerr and Dr. Arn- stein, always to the denigration of Dr. Arn- stein. LZ (Luftschiffbau-Zeppelin), says Fischer, “was the most successful operator of airships in the world and Duerr, who had designed all LZ ships since 1905, was therefore an unsurpassed airship designer.” This does not, of course, follow at all. Just as the best of designs may be wrecked by an unskilled or reckless operator, a mediocre design can be saved by skill and care in operation. Perhaps a clearer perspective will be gained if it is recalled that Count Zeppelin brought Dr. Arnstein to LZ in 1915 (not 1914 as Fischer states) to solve the problem of ring failures the Zeppelins were experiencing.
Arnstein had designed a bridge at Langwies in Switzerland that is still standing and recog
nized as a remarkable feat of bridge eng'inC<:(. ing, but he was not simply a “bridge builder> as Fischer puts it. Rather he was a structi'r‘j engineer of unusually fine education and a ready high reputation whose experience
\vas
by no means confined to bridges. Duerr, t0° though structural analysis was not his was a capable engineer; and the two men each other in mutual regard. Duerr’s respc for Arnstein is evidenced by Arnstein’s Pr° motion to the high rank of “prokurist
.» in
charge of all engineering departments
before
he left LZ in 1924, and by the retention
,f
time
Arnstein as a consultant by LZ after that up to about 1937. Arnstein for his part 'v ^ corned advice from Duerr based on his 1,1 paralleled experience. It was no accident t when Goodyear-Zeppelin was founded aS ^ joint subsidiary of LZ and Goodyear Tire Rubber Company, the agreement called exchange of all drawings and informal' generated by either company (LZ or GZ) 1 mutual benefit. LZ had no criticism of 1 Akron-Macon design drawings, and, in 'a ^ when Eckener and Duerr came to the Un|te States for the launching of the Akron in m ’ they had nothing but high praise for her
Mr. Fischer’s hindsight, in short, is far
fro"1
20/20. There is no reason to suppose that && one could have designed a better airship meet the specifications for the Akron, given 1 state of aerodynamic knowledge in 1930; al1
the explanations he offers for the accidents
the Shenandoah, Akron, and Macon are net historically nor scientifically sound.
th"r
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An Illuminating Incident
On a black night high above the Gulf Coast, the instructor pilot of a lone T-28 trainer was peering ahead to avoid running into isolated summer thunderstorms. In the after cockpit, with the instrument hood blocking his outside view, a young cadet was flying the aircraft on instruments. As they approached Pensacola, the plane plunged without warning into an unseen cloud bank.
“We’re in the soup! Come out of the ‘bag,’ Mr. Plummer,” called the instructor, wanting his student to experience flying in actual instrument conditions.
The cadet snapped back the instrument hood. Suddenly, the pitch-black night exploded in a blinding, searing bolt of blue-white lightning. Then blackness again. As the spots began to fade from the eyes of the half-blinded instructor, he heard a weak voice inquire over the intercom:
“Sir, can I go back under the ‘bag’?”
--------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant Joseph Feldman, U. S. Naval Reserve
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)