By the standards of today’s world, Sweden is a small state. The Swedish population (7.7 million), about the same as the city of New York, is spread over an area approximately as large as the state of California. The influence of Sweden in international politics—- in the United Nations, at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and elsewhere—is far greater than that of most states of comparable size. It is usually assumed that there is a relationship between the political influence of a nation in international affairs and the military power of that nation. This raises the question: If threatened by armed attack, can Sweden defend herself? In a more general sense, can any small nation maintain an adequate defense in today’s world?
A good deal has been written in the American and foreign press about the Swedish defense establishment. Factories, we have been told, have been installed underground. Warship pens have been constructed out of solid rock. Ultra-modern, supersonic fighter aircraft, designed and engineered to the standards of Swedish excellence, are rolling off the production lines. Our purpose here is not to examine the details of the Swedish defense establishment, but to assess the Swedish defensive posture. The emphasis will be on the strategic and political factors that influence Sweden’s ability to defend herself in the event of armed attack.
Sweden’s basic policies have been defined by the Swedish Defense Staff as follows:
During the last 150 years Sweden has been preserved from war. Today, as in the past, the desire to maintain peace and freedom constitutes the basis for Sweden’s foreign policy. The Swedish Government believes that the best way to attain this aim is to stay out of the alliances of the Great Powers. At the same time, it is obvious that an independent policy of this kind requires strong armed forces to preserve the independence of the country, as long as there is no evident relief of the tension between the Great Powers and of international disarmament. Sweden’s foreign and defense policies, which are supported by the nation as a whole, serve the same peace-preserving purpose. By these policies, Sweden wants also to contribute to peace and stability in Scandinavia.
The role Sweden has assumed in implementing this “alliance-free” policy requires a strong, self-contained defense establishment and active participation in peace-preserving organizations, principally the United Nations.
Sweden’s present policy seeks to project the successful maintenance of neutrality during World War I and World War II into the future. Because this policy is so firmly rooted in the past, valuable hints for predicting future developments may be obtained by a cursory examination of Swedish history.
Sweden not only stayed out of both World Wars, she also succeeded in maintaining peaceful relations with the rest of the world for more than 150 years. The last armed conflict in which Sweden fought as a participant occurred in the early 1800s.
During World War I, Sweden declared her “strict” neutrality, as did Norway and Denmark. Neutrality was maintained in these states despite strong external and internal pressures which favored both sides. Sweden suffered many deprivations, and at times the population was close to starvation. Perhaps the most valuable lesson Sweden learned from her rigid World War I stance was that a certain degree of flexibility might be of value in implementing a policy of neutrality.
Sweden succeeded in staying out of World War II by convincing both the Allies and the Axis that she had the capacity to maintain her neutrality. The belligerents were led to believe that Sweden could and would defend herself against attack. This attitude was in contrast to the positions taken by Norway and Denmark, both of which proclaimed neutrality, but were powerless to enforce it.
The Swedish destroyer Uppland docks in a camouflaged, underground naval base and shipyard in the Stockholm archipelago.
From the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Swedish policy was to avoid being dragged into the conflict. This required a certain amount of “elasticity” in dealing with the belligerents. From 25 June 1940, when the Battle of Norway was concluded with the withdrawal of British troops, until the end of the war, Sweden was surrounded by German forces.
During the period 1941-1945, Swedish leaders walked a political tightrope in the international arena, but they never lost the confidence of the Swedish public at the polls. During the early months of the war, both the Germans and the British demanded that Sweden adjust her trade with them. Sweden resisted economic subjugation and traded with both sides during most of the war. At one time, Sweden was supplying approximately two-thirds of the German requirements for iron ore (approximately 11 million tons per year). The British demanded that the amount of ore delivered to the Germans be drastically reduced; the Swedes resisted this demand and refused to permit an Allied force to transit Sweden en route to Finland during the Winter War (November 1939 to March 1940); the Swedes interpreted this demand as a thinly disguised attempt of the Allies to gain control over their iron ore mines. With the German occupation of Norway and Denmark, and with a joint German-Finnish campaign against the Russians, the Swedes faced the strongest pressure of the war. They made concessions to the Germans by permitting the transport of military personnel and equipment across Swedish territory. In receiving such concessions, the Germans were led to believe that armed force was unnecessary to control Sweden, surrounded as it was on all sides by the Nazis. As the fortunes of war changed, Sweden gradually altered its relations with Germany. Trade was first reduced and then largely cut off. By the time the war ended, Swedish relations with the Allies were sufficiently harmonious to accord Sweden a status in the immediate postwar world not unlike that of Norway and Denmark.
Sweden’s defensive posture today must be evaluated in terms of the strategies being followed by the Big Powers. Consistent with the technical advances that have been made during the last 15 years in the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, there has been a shift in strategies.
It is abundantly clear that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can achieve its objectives in a war on the highest level involving the annihilation of the principal population centers of East and West. Yet, such a war could be started in error. And, because this mortal danger of error persists, the “no cities” strategy, which calls for a reduction of the risks of error by all available means, has been widely discussed in Swedish planning circles. These means include locating nuclear bases in areas remote from population centers, installing the weapons themselves in well-protected installations to reduce the need for immediate counter-attack, and creating a strong civil defense.
The situation today can be summarized as follows: both the United States and the Soviet Union are heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons. Many of the U. S. weapons are in hardened sites, some of which are located near population centers. Since the completion of the initial ICBM-arining phase, both the United States and the Soviet Union are demonstrating a greater awareness of the responsibilities of the nuclear age. The nuclear sabers have not been rattled since the Cuban missile confrontation in the fall of 1962.
Two events have had a significant influence on Swedish defense planning during the last decade. One of these events was the arrest, on 20 June 1963 by Swedish security police, of Colonel Stig Wennerstroin, a Swedish Air Force officer who had held important military attaché posts abroad and who was at the time serving as chief advisor to the Swedish Foreign Office on disarmament matters. The second major event of the decade was the debate in the Swedish parliament and press concerning the procurement of nuclear weapons for the Swedish armed forces.
During his career as a Soviet agent, Colonel Wennerstrom was in a position to do a great deal of damage both to Sweden and to the NATO countries. He made microfilm copies of numerous classified documents pertaining to Swedish and NATO defenses and turned them over to the Russians. The worldwide attention that this international espionage case attracted makes it easy to overestimate the damage Wennerstrom did to Swedish defense. It is now believed that the damage was serious, but not catastrophic. The argument has also been advanced that the revelations by Wennerstrom may have created a greater respect among the Russians for Swedish defense capabilities than they otherwise might have had.
The debate in Sweden concerning nuclear weapons for the Swedish armed forces has been going on for almost ten years. This debate is a natural consequence of weapons development during the 1950s. In the mid- 1950s, planners began to talk about “tactical” nuclear weapons as opposed to “strategic” multimegaton nuclear weapons. It appeared to some military professionals that a clear distinction could be made between tactical and strategic weapons and that use of the former for defensive or even for offensive purposes would not necessarily lead to use of the latter.
In 1957, the Swedish Supreme Commander requested approval of a development program that would provide the Swedish armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons. Today, ten years later, a decision on the Supreme Commander’s request has again been postponed. Despite recent political setbacks, the Social Democratic Party still has a majority of seats in the Swedish Parliament and consequently controls the Swedish government as it has done for many decades. A congress of the Social Democratic Party was held during the period from 6 to 12 June 1964. At this congress, it was decided that no decision would be reached on the question of tactical nuclear weapons at least until the next party congress scheduled for 1968. Meanwhile, Sweden continues to produce materials that could be used for nuclear weapons.
The Swedes, then, have the technical and economic capabilities to design, develop, and manufacture nuclear weapons. The ruling political party has not authorized a program for weapons development. Such an authorization could not possibly come before 1968. Due to a number of factors that will be touched on subsequently, there are those in Sweden who believe that the decision will be postponed indefinitely and that Sweden will not have tactical nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
It should be emphasized that the request of the Swedish Supreme Commander was for permission to acquire tactical weapons only. There has never been any question about strategic weapons. In the international political arena, Sweden is doing everything possible to hinder the spread of nuclear weapons. In line with this policy, Sweden has renounced the use of strategic weapons and has limited its preliminary planning to weapons of a defensive nature. The situation is such that Sweden will not, under any circumstances, consider the creation of a Swedish force de frappe similar to the one now being developed by France.
Let us now reconsider the factors we examined briefly in the historical overview.
Military Strength. If we consider only conventional weaponry, Swedish military strength vis a vis the Western and Central European powers has remained relatively constant since the period 1942 to 1945. But, when nuclear weapons are considered, it is evident that Sweden’s military power is very much reduced compared to that of the Great Powers. The acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons would increase Sweden’s military potential. It is unlikely, however, that anything short of a force de frappe would restore Sweden’s overall military power to its relative position of the period 1942 to 1945.
Physical Assets. Sweden has no natural resources or raw materials that are greatly prized by either the United States or the Soviet Union. This contrasts sharply with its position during World War II when Swedish iron ore was vital to the needs of the German war machine.
Geography. Sweden’s geographical position is on NATO’s northern flank. While this flank is not of paramount importance, its strategic significance should not be underestimated. Sweden’s geographic position vis a vis the Great Powers remains relatively unchanged since World War II.
The Economy. Sweden’s economic development in the postwar era has been rapid and is based on a firm foundation. Strategic goods are stockpiled. The agricultural situation continues to be favorable. From an economic standpoint, Sweden is at least as strong as she was during World War II.
The External Image. The image of Sweden in the world as a model democracy has been enhanced by her active participation in the work of the United Nations. Swedish military and civilian personnel have participated in U.N. peacekeeping actions in the Congo, the Gaza Strip, Korea, Lebanon, Palestine, and Kashmir. Sweden’s allegiance to the United Nations is strong because it believes that the United Nations represents the best method available for controlling irresponsible actions by large and small states. Hence, Sweden’s image to the world is far better than it was prior to World War II.
Internal Support. The Swedish people are proud that their small nation continues to play a significant role in international politics. There is, however, a lack of unity concerning how Sweden can best defend itself. The Conservative Party and the military are strongly in favor of tactical nuclear weapons for the armed forces. The Communist Party (a tiny fraction of the electorate) and the left- wing of the Social Democratic Party are strongly against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. A pacifist movement has gained some support, although it is still very small. The major question regarding internal support for government policies is a simple one: Would Sweden fight if confronted with armed aggression? This question obviously is the most important factor in an evaluation of Sweden’s—or for that matter, any nation’s— defense capabilities.
The Will to Fight.
On this question, the Swedish Defense Staff has made the following comment:
The defense has to be so strong that the costs to defeat Sweden are out of proportion as compared to the strategic advantages which an aggressor might attain. It is equally important that the Great Powers should have confidence in Sweden’s will and capability to defend herself. If Sweden were attacked or exposed to hard political pressure by an adversary and if any of the Great Powers should have doubts about Sweden’s will to fight, this Great Power might be tempted to take the first step itself and, by attacking Sweden, try to prevent the adversary from obtaining bases on Swedish territory. . . . No part of the country must be surrendered without stubborn resistance.
The answer to the question—would the Swedes fight?—can perhaps be phrased in terms of the size of the aggression. If confronted by military force of a size that the Swedes could consider “reasonable,” there is every expectation Sweden would attempt to defend itself. On the other hand, if confronted with overwhelming force, including a nuclear threat, there is serious doubt that Sweden would fight.
These conclusions require careful substantiation. While the evidence is not without ambiguities, certain trends may be deduced from a careful examination of the contemporary Swedish scene.
In supporting the conclusion concerning confrontation by “reasonable” force, the total defense of Sweden can perhaps be taken at face value. This total defense has four components. The Armed Forces are complemented by Civil Defense, Economic Defense, and Psychological Defense. Each of these components has an assigned role to play in the event of attack. Equipped with conventional weapons of high quality, the Armed Forces are responsible for the military role. Civil Defense is entrusted with the responsibility of evacuating the greater part of the population from urban centers and protecting the rest of the population in deep shelters constructed to withstand nuclear attack. The Economic Defense is responsible for organizing the economic resource of the country for a wartime situation; this includes stockpiling critical materials and ensuring adequate food production. The Psychological Defense is entrusted with maintaining and strengthening the “Swedish defense spirit.”
A detailed examination of each component of the total defense reveals an impressive defense establishment. It is particularly imposing when one considers that it has been created by a state with a population of only 7.7 million. It is undoubtedly the most impressive defense establishment of any of the uncommitted, small states. If confronted by attacking forces of “reasonable” proportion, there is no evidence that the total defense of Sweden would not be implemented. This is substantiated by the public opinion polls which were taken by the Swedish Institute for Opinion Research (SIFO) in 1957 and 1964. Of those who responded to the question, “Suppose that Sweden were to be attacked; are you of the opinion that we ought to give armed resistance to this attack even if the outcome for Sweden is uncertain?” the following percentages were recorded:
Answer |
1957 |
1964 |
Yes |
84 |
72 |
No |
9 |
7 |
Don’t know, Doubtful |
7 |
21 |
In 1964, then, approximately three-quarters of the Swedish population favored armed resistance to aggression “even if the outcome ... is uncertain.” This supports the conclusion that the total defense of Sweden would be implemented if the country were to be attacked by an aggressor with forces that are “reasonable,” that is, of comparable magnitude to the forces of Sweden’s total defense.
On the other hand, if confronted by an attacking force with overwhelming power at its disposal that threatens the destruction of major cities, there is grave doubt that the total defense of Sweden would be implemented. Witness the responses to: “Suppose that the aggressor threatens to use atomic weapons; are you of the opinion that we ought to give armed resistance to this attack even if the outcome for Sweden is uncertain?”
Answer |
1957 |
1964 |
Yes |
60 |
28 |
No |
26 |
27 |
Don’t know, |
|
|
Doubtful |
14 |
45 |
Recognizing the limitations of public opinion polls, it appears that, in 1964, less than one-third of the Swedish population felt that the total defense of Sweden should be implemented in the event of an attack by an aggressor threatening the use of overwhelming force.
In a third series of public opinion polls, the question, “Which alternative do you consider best for a country like Sweden: to have certain types of atomic weapons for defensive purposes or to refuse to equip the defense forces with such weapons?” was asked:
Response |
1957 |
1964 |
Have atomic weapons |
40 |
27 |
|
||
Deny atomic weapons |
36 |
54 |
Doubtful |
24 |
19 |
Thus, in 1964, more than half the Swedish people opposed the acquisition of atomic weapons by the Swedish armed forces.
What factors may have influenced the results of the public opinion polls cited above? First, Sweden is a rich country; the standard of living is among the highest in the world. The Swedish people have become accustomed during the last decades to the advantages of an ultramodern, comfortable way of life and all of the luxuries that are commonplace with a high standard of living.
Second, the country has never been occupied in recent history. The Swedish people do not have an understanding of what an enemy occupation (e.g., German occupation of Norway and Denmark during World War II) really means.
Third, there are no Swedes alive today who have had extensive combat experience, except for the survivors of the 8,000 Swedish volunteers who participated in the Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40.
Fourth, the Swedish people have deep humanitarian interests. They are concerned by man’s inhumanity to man. They are solidly behind the efforts of the Swedish government to foster through the United Nations a greater spirit of international understanding and cooperation. Within Sweden, social reforms are far advanced; the police are unarmed; the penal system is lenient; the death sentence has long been abolished.
Fifth, the internal political situation is the controlling influence on the defensive posture. At the present time, it appears unlikely that the government could accede to the Supreme Commander’s request for nuclear weapons without losing power, even if the government should be so inclined. The Social Democratic Party that presently controls the government includes an important faction that is strongly opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the present time, the Swedish government is more concerned with internal problems (e.g., inflation and unfavorable balance of payments) than with the external political situation. For this reason, it is unlikely that there will be any policy changes affecting the defense posture until after 1968, if then.
In 1965, the semi-official Central Federation of People and Defense published a pamphlet entitled Can the Small State Defend. Itself? by Colonel Karl Erik Holm. Colonel Holm is in charge of that section of the Swedish Defense Staff responsible for strategic studies and analyses. In this pamphlet, he noted:
So long as we maintain our present foreign policy (“alliance-free” in peace, neutral in war) and so long as our defense establishment is not equipped with weapons of a definitely offensive character, there will be no reason for characterizing a strong defense as provocative . . . The aggressor’s principal opponent in a conflict situation will feel compelled to come to our help . . . Our defense must therefore be so strong that a Great Power, if we are attacked, would consider it worthwhile to come to our assistance. This means among other things that we must be able to manage for ourselves until help arrives and has time to take effect. The first requirement for a small state to receive assistance from the outside—and this applies not only to the “alliance-free” small states but also to those allied by treaty to the Great Powers—is that it be able to handle the “first round” itself.
What we . . . know is that mistrust between the Great Powers is so great that both would take timely steps to prevent the other from a quick grab of Sweden.
This aspect of Swedish strategy appears to be somewhat perilous, but it may be the only possibility in view of the present internal and external political situation. As Colonel Holm points out, changes in the present situation in Northern Europe could rapidly increase the risks to Sweden. What seems to be particularly perilous in this strategy is that Sweden is relying on the Great Power umbrella by assuming that one or the other of the Great Powers will come to its aid if attacked. Let us consider this problem in more detail in a hypothetical situation.
The basic elements of Sweden’s hoped-for optimum balance of national strength for defense are evident in modern naval units in protected berths, in the mobility of its land forces, and in the quality of air force aircraft such as the excellent SAAB-3 5 fighter.
Assume that Great Power A is the aggressor. Aggression against Sweden would be most likely to take place if two conditions were fulfilled: Sweden has something (e.g., a supply of a critical raw material or a base for strategic operations) that Great Power A needs badly enough to risk escalation, and the attention of Great Power B is concentrated on events elsewhere so that she would be unlikely to come to Sweden’s aid.
It is emphasized that neither of these conditions now exist, but the strategic situation —was not Sweden’s iron ore of critical value to Germany during World War II? did not the Soviets suppress the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 while the attention of the West was focused on Suez?—could change rapidly in the future.
Today, the time available for decisions is much less than it was during World War II. From the outbreak of World War II in August 1939 to its conclusion in May 1945, the Swedes had more than five-and-a-half years to work out their strategy. If Great Power A were resolved on a course of aggression against Sweden, the ultimatum would be a logical prelude to such aggression. Suppose that Great Power A informed the Swedish government of the landing in three hours’ time at specified places on Swedish territory of advanced units of A’s military forces. Suppose further that the ultimatum contained the threat that if any resistance were encountered, strategic nuclear weapons would be launched immediately on the five largest Swedish cities: Stockholm, Goteborg, Malmo, Norrkoping, and Halsingborg.
While such an ultimatum would only be delivered if there were to be a drastic change in the strategic world situation from that existing today, it is conceivable that the Swedes might be caught off-guard (such as the Poles were caught off-guard in August 1939). It is even conceivable that in such a drastically changed world situation the Swedes would not mobilize their armed forces because such a mobilization might be construed by the Great Powers as a provocative move.
Faced by an ultimatum in this hypothetical situation, what would the Swedish government do? Would appeals to world opinion and the United Nations help? Would an appeal to Great Power B be effective? Would the possession of tactical nuclear weapons be of any value? It is, of course, impossible to give definitive answers to any of these questions. But the time factor would work against the Swedish leaders. In less than three hours, they would have to reach their decision. This would be particularly difficult as they have not had the experience of a “hot line,” boiler-shop operation such as that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the leaders of the Great Powers made a number of life-or-death decisions within the span of a few hours. This hypothetical example has been introduced to illustrate the complexity of the problems facing the Swedish defense planners. Perhaps the most valuable deduction that can be made from the hypothetical example is that Great Power B can be expected to come to the rescue “only if it is to B’s advantage to do so.”
Consider now the various alternatives in descending order of military strength available to Sweden in the implementation of its defense. The following alternatives are considered to be technically and economically feasible for Sweden. Let us, then, examine the alternative, its champion(s), the estimated percentage of gross national product it will require and, finally, attempt to predict its possible implementation.
We have already stated that Sweden will not create a force de frappe, but if one were to be forged, it probably would include weapons systems that are primarily intended for tactical defense, but which would also offer limited offensive capabilities. In the immediate future, the delivery system could be supersonic aircraft now in service in the Swedish Air Force or on the drawing boards. In the more distant future (five to ten years), medium- range rockets could be used for delivery. With strategic nuclear weapons in her arsenal, Sweden would be in a strong defensive position. But such an alternative is presently inconceivable; at variance, as it is, with Sweden’s foreign policy; counter, as it is, to the humanitarian interests of the Swedish people.
Although it is extremely attractive to the military, the Swedish Supreme Commander’s request to equip the armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons to be used strictly for defensive purposes seems doomed. There is a fundamental opposition to nuclear weapons by a large proportion of the Swedish people.
ALTERNATIVE |
ADVOCATED BY |
% OF GNP |
PREDICTION |
Force de frappe |
No one |
10 |
No possibility |
Tactical nuclear weapons |
Supreme Commander and Conservatives |
7 |
Very small possibility |
Higher level of conventional armament than at present |
Supreme Commander and Conservatives |
6 |
Fair possibility |
Continue conventional armament at present level |
Part of Social Democratic Party and center parties |
5 |
Most probable |
Lower level of conventional armament than at present |
Part of Social Democratic Party |
3.5 |
Fair possibility |
Unilateral disarmament |
Pacifists |
0 |
Very small possibility |
As a substitute for tactical nuclear weapons, the Supreme Commander is advocating that the level of military preparedness be slightly increased over the present level during the next five years. Counterbalancing this proposal, a faction of the ruling Social Democratic Party advocates a reduction of the current military expenditures to a level approximating the present expenditures by Norway and Denmark (3 to 4 per cent of their GNP, exclusive of NATO assistance). The decision concerning somewhat higher or lower levels of preparedness with conventional armament will be influenced by the internal political situation and by economic considerations. At this time, it appears likely that the present level of preparedness, which involves an expenditure of approximately 5 per cent of Sweden’s GNP, will be continued.
The last alternative—unilateral disarmament—offers no defense at all. It is unlikely that Sweden will opt for this alternative. Multilateral disarmament is a distinct possibility, however. At the present time, Sweden is participating as actively as possible in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. If a partial or total world disarmament should take place, it is probable that Sweden would lead the way. However, since world disarmament appears improbable at this time, we have not considered a corresponding alternative for Sweden. If it were to be included in the table on the opposite page, it would lie between the lower level of conventional armament and unilateral disarmament.
It is perhaps well to conclude by quoting part of the final paragraph of a booklet by G. Dryssen and G. Rapp, published in 1961, and entitled Objectives and Means for Swedish Military Defense:
Even a small state like Sweden with its limited resources can create a defense which, through its strength, would require the aggressor to use such a high level of attack that he abstains from the aggression . . .
At the present time, Sweden has made the “level of attack” as high as it can be made with the conventional weapons at its disposal. But there are several higher steps available to the nuclear-armed aggressor. What will happen if the strategic situation in the world changes so that a potential aggressor considers stepping up to one of these higher steps on the escalator? Only the future can answer that question.