The Unification Act of 1947 increased interservice rivalries profoundly. The most powerful military machine in the world was being dismantled slowly in response to economic requirements set by the administration of President Harry S Truman. The most notorious of these animosities centered on the role aircraft carriers and intercontinental strategic bombers would play in delivering nuclear weapons. The future revealed the weakness of that conclusion, but not before cancellation of the new supercarrier, the United States.
That carrier and the B-36 bomber both were approved and funded; their mutual coexistence was not an issue until the services made it one. Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg brought parochial concerns over whether the United States would duplicate the B-36's nuclear mission to the attention of newly appointed Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. The first Secretary of Defense, James V Forrestal, had questioned Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington's motivations long before the debate began, and he had prevented any action from being taken against either weapon system.' Secretary Johnson, concerned more with political budgetry than with national defense, proved all too willing to listen to Symington's arguments, because they supported the "interests of the administration and his own political future."
In the following months, the fabled "Revolt of the Admirals" brought the B-36 under scrutiny. The Air Force refused challenges to use Navy jet fighters in trials. The MiG-15-which outperformed the B-36 and marked the bomber's obsolescence-arrived shortly after the B-36 was selected as the nation's primary nuclear deterrent. Its performance caused retired General George C. Kenney to recommend that it be used as a tanker or for antisubmarine warfare-not as an intercontinental bomber.
As the debates subsided, the services began preparing for the next war. Shortly after establishment of the Air Force, Lieutenant General E. R. Quesada wrote of the lessons learned in World War II. One mistake he felt the German Luftwaffe had made was its failure to recognize the need for air superiority before pursuing a major land campaign. He also set the stage for the Air Force's argument regarding interdiction. A tactical air force, he wrote, is not concerned primarily "with direct support of the Army. . . . Destruction by air of enemy logistical centers and lines of communication materially aids the ground advance." General Quesada proclaimed that the Tactical Air Command "accepted the concept" of the World War II air-land team only as "a point of departure for future cogitation and thought." Only "if the surface forces become engaged" would tactical and strategic forces be committed "in an all-out effort to effect a decision." His concept, if "effectively pursued," would require little "direct support in the zone of contact." General Quesada recognized that tactical air power must nevertheless "be prepared and equipped to provide maximum assistance" to the ground forces.' Unfortunately, for the next two years the Air Force faced funding decisions that precluded such preparation.
Army leaders had begun to express concern over close air support, and their criticisms brought a quick response from the Air Command and Staff College. It attempted to assure critics that the Air Force "has at the present time trained tactical air units, capable of expansion necessary to meet the requirements of any joint air-surface operation." The critics, "not realizing that our surface forces are small and require only a modicum of air support," were berated for speculating that the Air Force should maintain a similar number of tactical air-support units as were employed the Marine Corps. Promises of the availability of "modern, high-performance ground support aircraft" were made to counter the "concern over the capabilities of jet-type aircraft to perform the ground support mission." Claims of the "latest jet fighter-bombers" outperforming all missions of the P-47s and P-S Is during World War II, while "producing more accurate results," were supposed proof that the "Air Force is more than prepared to uphold its share in any immediate joint air-surface operation." These claims also were tested less than a year later. The most important one proved to be the most contested: "The Air Force can enlarge its tactical air units in ample time to adequately support any expanded surface force."
In June 1950, Army Major John M. Barnum, in apparent response to General Quesada, took issue with the Air Force's sincerity, citing a 1942 quote from General Hap Arnold, ordering his director of air support to take "the necessary steps to impress upon all concerned not only the necessity for absolute teamwork between the Air Support and Ground elements, but also the very thorough step by step training necessary in all of the Air Support elements in order to develop the technique and procedure so essential to bring such teamwork about. . . . This is something that I have been pounding on now for over a year-apparently with little success."
Seven years later, Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley was fighting for the same cause by "wringing from the Air Force an agreement to give greater emphasis to tactical air power in future Air Force planning." He was fighting an uphill battle against the type of corporate thought that Secretary Symington stressed: "The strategic bombing elements of the Air Force are primarily designed to destroy-at the very outset of hostilities the enemy's means of making and supporting an attack against this nation and its allies."
An April 1950 press release reinforced this mentality, announcing improved ranges for the F-84E through the addition of external fuel tanks. This was "of tremendous strategic importance," allowing the fighter to "approach strategic points, such as the Baku oil fields of Russia."
The Air Force had decided its mission was strategic, and it assumed this mission would preclude land armies from meeting again in modern warfare. This was in conflict with a 1947 Secretary of Defense agreement that defined Air Force obligations: "To furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army. . . ."
The Secretary of the Air Force maintained that this obligation was being fulfilled, claiming that more than 80% of his forces consisted of groups equipped primarily for nonstrategic bombardment. He glossed over the fact that the Air Force had only one group organized specifically for supporting ground operations. It was Barnum, the Army artillery major, who pointed out that the remainder of the air assets would be dual-role fighters whose primary mission-the only mission for which they truly were suited-would be air interception. The major accurately predicted what would happen by the end of that month; many of the World War II fighters still in reserve would instead be used in the next conflict. He also was correct in asserting that the Air Force would continue its investment in high-speed fighter jets for close air support. But if the new jet aircraft posed new weapon delivery problems, it was the Air Force's role to "develop adequate tactics and provide suitable training to match the airplane."
By June 1950, the Air Force had only once demonstrated the concept of using a modern jet fighter-bomber for ground support. Eglin Air Force Base demonstrations in the fall of 1949 recorded both B-45 light bombers and F-84 fighter-bombers as delivering their ordnance "far wide of the designated targets." These apparently were the tests that the Air Command and Staff College's Colonel Howard Sutterlin referred to in his description of the "latest jet fighter-bombers . . . producing more accurate results" than their World War II predecessors.
In spring 1950, the Far Eastern Air Forces were responsible for the air defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam and the Philippines. Squadrons converted from F-51 to F-80 aircraft. The version of the F-80 sent to Japan was not ground-attack capable, and the pilots did not practice that mission. "The standard fighter planes, all of them jets, were not designed for troop support jobs. The airmen just weren't trained and equipped for a major job in giving troop support." The need for close air support training became apparent in the ensuing weeks.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Major Barnum's plea was its timing. North Korean forces invaded the South on 25 June, and Air Force assets in theater responded quickly and heroically. Unfortunately, insufficient assets were available. "Victory in the air-defeat on the ground. Despite the total air supremacy, the enemy ground forces advanced. Finally, it was ground troops supported by . . . sea forces that turned back the aggression from the north."
The media caught on quickly: "The Air Force neglect of its `tactical' mission of supporting troops soon became apparent." The short range of Air Force fighters decreased their time over targets when staging from distant Japan. The low fuel capacity of the F-80 and its inability to carry ordnance for close air support required the carrier Boxer (CV 21) to set a trans-Pacific speed record to deliver propeller-driven F-51 Mustangs to Japan. These reserve fighters joined the few F-51 Is that had been awaiting shipment back to the United States.
With no trained ground-support officers in the theater, the Army and Air Force did a commendable job of establishing close air support early in the war. According to Barnum, however, "The existing complicated system for processing ground unit requests for air support fails to meet the ground force requirements for speed and simplicity. . . ." The press quoted a cavalry officer as saying, "One of the bitterest complaints seems to be the inadequate Air Force support and the bad coordinating medium between air and land forces."
Marine Corps tactics and procedures did not recognize the Air Force's insistence on its air arm remaining a separate and equal entity. "The Marines have developed and trained their pilots for close ground support of their frontline troops; the air subordinates itself to the ground commander and the entire objective of the close-support air operation is to aid the ground forces in attack or defense."
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander, had directed that all close air support requests be channeled through the Fifth Air Force. The situation grew so drastic that ground force commanders began pleading directly to Admiral C. Turner Joy's Task Force 77. "The tactical air squadrons of the Navy and Marine squadrons would have to provide the major part of the troop air support, even as they did at the beginning of the last war. The too few aircraft carriers were serving in their traditional role of roving airfields, often within sight of the Korean coast, launching strike after strike against enemy lines . . . carrier based planes were delivering staggering blows in close support of the troops."
Although neither a supercarrier nor the B-36 made an appearance in Korea, the few remaining carriers did. When forward-deployed Air Force assets went to Japan during the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, U.S. and British carriers were the sole remaining tactical aviation assets left in the immediate area. Support of the United Nations forces on the ground depended heavily on the carrier forces until well after the Inchon landings.
Suffering great losses when its ADls, F4Us, and F9Fs were pitted against the superior MiG-15, naval aviation nevertheless continued to support the beleaguered ground forces until their costly victories allowed the return of the Air Force. This spirit contrasted sharply with that described by one individual, who declared that Air Force pilots deserved better aircraft for air-to-air combat, at the expense of ground support. "Such fighting spirit cannot long survive if we deal these pilots a `second-rate hand' in their flying equipment."
Air Force bombers also encountered problems with enemy opposition. With fighter escort unavailable from the Air Force itself, the World War II-era strategic and tactical bombers in Japan abandoned daylight operations because of heavy losses. This was despite the "air superiority gained in the first few days of the campaign by the F-80s." The B-36, with its much-needed firepower, never exercised its global reach in support of the ground war in Korea. Even improved B-29 Superfortresses, known as B-50s, were kept from the theater; one B-50 squadron was forced to relinquish its bombers and exchange them for old B-29s. One crew member lamented: "We got the feeling that the USAF just didn't want to waste its firstline equipment over Korea." Two years later, with naval air assets in less demand for close air support, carrier fighters escorted B-29s into target areas out of range of landbased fighters.
Were any lessons learned? Less than a year after hostilities erupted, the Air University remained sanctimonious, making references to Army officers as "the man in the street," who have a "more restricted outlook on the battle . . . the master battle plan is no concern of his." Colonel R. C. Weller of the Air War College decreed that, "In short, the air war will get ever further from the ground war, but as long as the air war must be won first, the ground war must wait." Not everyone was in agreement. Air Force Chief of Staff
General Vandenberg, in a reversal of his 1949 stance on the viability of the B-36, had said: "It is not the Air Force's job to win a war alone. Land, sea, and air may all make a vital contribution to a campaign." New Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter was quick to "answer in terms of air power, and to talk about what the Navy and the Marine air did as well as what the Air Force did."
In sharp contrast to previous official Air Force posturing, Finletter's reply to media questions actually denied that the Air Force ever contested the viability of carriers.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense a few months before had acknowledged that, "mistakes have been made," and that these problems, "can not [sic] be corrected until more effective planes are available to equip our combat groups." That did not mean, however, that the Air Force would commit to procuring aircraft to support the Army better in the near future. Brigadier General Homer Sanders wrote: "We cannot afford Stuka-type aircraft useful only in the very limited task of close air support but totally worthless without absolute air supremacy."
Noting that "it was fashionable at the beginning of the action in Korea to belittle the efforts of the Air Force," The Air University Quarterly Review defended the Air Force contribution. Creating references to the "limitations of carrier operations," Dr. Robert Futrell ignored the role naval aviation played in the air war over Korea. His naval commentary instead began with the Air Force's control system that showed only its weaknesses "when Navy carriers moved into South Korean waters to augment the Fifth Air Force close-support effort."
The successful Marine Corps method used many more aircraft per ground unit than the Air Force method, which proved less popular with the troops. Futrell determined, conversely: "All combat experience had shown the gross waste in committing air units specifically to the support of particular ground units . . . a surprising number of Army commanders seemed unwilling to unlearn these lessons."
To the contrary, one "mud Marine" commented that: "There is nothing in the record of Korean combat to indicate that the ground troops complained that they were getting too much Marine and Navy close air support."
Futrell's version of carrier operations, which asserts that carriers supposedly were unable to launch aircraft in the manner "required for orderly close support," fails to bolster Air Force credibility. No mention was made of carrier assets providing B-29 escort when the latest Air Force fighters were unable to accompany the bombers deep into Korea. General Vandenberg also disagreed with Futrell, saying instead: "Korea has provided an ideal area for employment of carrier-based aircraft in tactical operations."
Futrell was premature in his analysis, deducing that carrier "advocates failed to appreciate the unusual circumstances of the situation" that allowed the carriers to operate in waters near hostile shores. Carrier presence off the coasts of China (1954, 1958), Egypt (1956), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1961, 1962) Vietnam (1964-73), Iran ( 1979), Libya ( 1986), and more recently Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Taiwan, and Kosovo, indicate that these "circumstances" are in fact commonplace.'
In his defense of the F-80 and the emergency use of the F-51, Futrell points out that all of the F-80's shortcomings eventually were overcome. It is true that the F-80 interceptor Was modified to carry air-to-surface ordnance and that long runways were constructed on the Korean peninsula. External fuel tanks were field-fabricated, which "brought the F-80's range close to that of the F-51." (Often overlooked, however, were the resultant "numerous wing failures" that this field modification caused.)
Futrell and the Air Force did not address the lack of preparedness for the Secretary of Defense-directed ground-support mission. The few aircraft marginally qualified to fulfill the Air Force obligation to the Army either were being retired or were in the experimental stages of developing a secondary mission.
Use of the F-51 continued throughout the war, even after the F-84 finally arrived in theater. The jet pilots who suddenly found themselves back in the older Mustangs "had seen vivid demonstrations of why the F-51 was not a ground-support fighter in the last war, and weren't exactly intrigued by the thought of playing guinea pig to prove the same thing over again." Futrell went as far as to claim "the F-51 had demonstrated in World War II that it was well suited for the type of low-level missions which were common in the Korean War."
Those pilots might have preferred the F-47 Thunderbolt, which had proved superior for ground attack in World War II Europe. In a move that foretold the scheduled demise of the A-10 Thunderbolt II prior to Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force had decided to retire the F-47 fleet in the late 1940s, while maintaining the more popular F-51 in active inventories. Like the modern-day F-16, the F-51 was a capable platform, but it was much more vulnerable to ground fire than the F-47.
Despite pleas from those on the ground and carrier aviation's response, the Air Force continued to advocate the virtues of interdiction over close air support. "The Air Force, free from what it had regarded as uninformed meddling, dated effective interdiction in Korea from August 3, the day of its liberation from the GHQ Target Group." General Sanders was convinced of its value in "that the task of interdiction was successfully performed is attested to by North Korean prisoners." (Sanders did not mention that the prisoners feared "the blue planes" above all other Allied aircraft.)
Colonel R. C. Weller wrote that "interdiction, although far more significant to the outcome of battle, is far less popular than close support." Another colonel boasted: "Some pilots flew entire tours of interdiction and armed reconnaissance without a single front-line coordinated strike."
At least one military leader digested what really happened in 1950 Korea. When acting as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been influential in his opposition to the United States. After his election to the presidency, however, Eisenhower apparently developed an appreciation of the carrier capabilities that were supporting the ground armies in Korea. As a result of the carriers' performance in the Korean War, the Forrestal (CVA-59) class was approved and funded, despite cancellation of the United States class.
Whether in spite of or in support of his "Massive Retaliation" strategy, Eisenhower saw six Forrestal-class carriers built and the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and Enterprise (CVN-65) classes approved under his administration.
Years later, Futrell wrote his definitive history, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. In fairness, this book was commissioned by the Air Force, and it presents that service's view. Futrell repeated most of the arguments he made back in 1951. He chose not to revisit his claim of the F-51's survivability in the low-level environment, but the modern version has the Far Eastern Air Force claiming that "both F-51's and F-82's were exceptionally well suited for the long-range, low-level missions required in Korea."
While acknowledging that processing B-29s out of storage met bomber requirements, the book makes no mention of B-50 squadrons leaving superior aircraft at home and being forced to use deficient replacements.sb Chapters deal with close air support and interdiction, the former mentioning that naval aircraft "did not work out very well for several reasons." Ironically, even though incorrect, one reason given is the inability of the carriers to launch strikes from distances closer to the targets.
As for interdiction, the Navy refused to participate, according to Futrell. "Fortunately for the success of Interdiction Campaign No. 1 . . . the B-29 crews of the FEAT Bomber Command soon demonstrated that they alone could adequately handle the systematic destruction of North Korea's transportation routes."5
The Air Command and Staff College still disseminates its version of this story. Generally, it denies that close air support was inadequate in 1950 and that interdiction was a more important mission to an Army that did not know any better. Despite the pleas of today's Army to the contrary, the Air University maintains that close air support remains an Air Force priority, while educating the "man in the street" of the importance of interdiction.
Army aviation has been reading the writing on the wall since 1947; its attack helicopters provide firepower to support the soldiers on the ground. What they lack is mobility and ordnance tonnage that can be provided only by "fast movers," which do not require logistical support from the land army. If speed, payload, and supply issues could be resolved internally, the Army conceivably could relieve the Air Force of its close air support duties.
Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the A-10 was to be replaced by the more glamorous F-16. The brilliant performance of the A-10 in close air support over Kuwait and Iraq, however, has kept it flying to this day, if in reduced numbers. As A-10 squadrons fade away, the F-16 is assuming a larger role in close air support.
The F-16 has proved itself as an effective complement to the F-15E and the interdiction mission. Regardless of the party line, those aircraft, as they now fly their interdiction missions, cannot provide effective close air support. When the F/A-18 evaluated unrealistic, high-altitude close air support prior to the Gulf War, the tactic was abandoned as ineffective. The A-10 and the F/A-18 employed low-level close air support with the predictable result of accurate weapon delivery and occasional aircraft damage, often in the form of destroyed engines from shoulder-launched missiles. The two-engine design of these aircraft allowed them to escape and return to flight status.
The single-engine design of both the F-16 and the Joint Strike Fighter will prove a handicap, precluding effective low-level close air support in the future; this limitation will drive them into the upper atmosphere, as is practiced today. The F-15E, like the B-36, will prove too valuable for close air support. From miles above the earth, they will carry out the interdiction mission admirably.
The close air support mission, however, will fail miserably from there. No sensor will replace the naked eye and the pilot judgment so critical to close air support. This mission always has been and will always be about supporting soldiers and Marines in close proximity to the enemy. Discriminating between the good guys and the bad guys is tough enough on the ground; it is extremely difficult while looking through a canopy at 500 knots and 200 feet.
Flight operations over Kosovo have taught the public the mistaken lesson that technology allows our military to fight wars without casualties. Political considerations forced Allied aircraft to operate at high altitudes over Kosovo, which hindered interdiction and resulted in accidental damage. Had the close air support mission been attempted with those restrictions, the "collateral" damages would have been far worse than what was reported. Only our declaration of victory postponed this tragedy.
It will again fall to others to provide close air support. The option of retrieving the A-10 from storage, like the F-51 and B-29 of 1950, will not exist. Fortunately for the foot soldier and Marine, this is a mission that the Navy and Marine Corps continue to believe in and train for. The value of interdiction over close air support is academic; most important are the needs of the 18 year-olds in their foxholes, as Major Barnum wrote 50 years ago.