In today's world, security is the common ground-the engine spurring international cooperation. The high seas have become an increasingly important venue for expressing nations' shared interests in improving both regional and global security. The following examples illustrate the nature of 21st-century security and the prominent role of maritime forces:
* Proliferation security Initiative. Launched in May 2003 by the Bush administration, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) seeks to coordinate the efforts of participating countries to prevent shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and associated materials. A set of interdiction principles forms the basis of the initiative. It is designed to undertake activities consistent with international law and the national laws of the participating states and complements existing nonproliferation regimes. In this spirit, it enhances enforcement, preventing illegal transfers in participating states' territories, airspace, and territorial seas.
During a meeting of the PSI in March 2004—with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States attending—participants backed a U.S. call to extend their efforts to include denying the facilitators of WMD trade as well.1 At the time, six PSI exercises had taken place, with more scheduled in the coming months. Underscoring the naval context of these developments, the U.S. Naval War College hosted operational experts from 17 countries at a PSI maritime interdiction game in late September 2004 to help develop the operational expertise, decision making, and coordination necessary to effectively interdict maritime shipments of WMD.2
The PSI has been successful because it draws its strength and legitimacy from the common security interests of its participants. Recent outreach activities have resulted in more than 60 countries expressing general support for the interdiction principles.3 Often coordinated bilaterally, nations will contribute in pace with their abilities, with naval forces playing a prominent role.
* Our Evolving Global Posture. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined DoD's continuing transformational efforts before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 September 2004. Central to the efforts he described "is transforming our military into a more agile, more efficient force that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric challenges of this new and uncertain time." Four major tenets anchor this new global posture: (1) our forces are located where they are both welcome and needed; (2) the expectations of the hosting locations (and the agreements implementing them) support the flexible use and movement of our forces; (3) we maximize the employability and flexibility of our troops by positioning them where they can be brought to bear timely and efficiently; and (4) we capitalize on technological advances to bring the best capabilities to bear, not simply rely on mass and presence. This is to be achieved through a redistribution of our overseas troops, to include consolidating (though still retaining) our main operating bases in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Korea, while increasing the worldwide use of forward operating sites employing prepositioned equipment and rotational forces. These moves are informed by the need to establish cooperative global security relationships to counter a more amorphous, worldwide threat. The mutual interests of all concerned dictate flexibility and agility-inherent characteristics of maritime forces.4
* "Sea Power 21" and Sea Basing. Sea Basing, a pillar in the Navy's "Sea Power 21," is the foundation supporting both Sea Strike and Sea Shield-the offensive and defensive constructs, respectively, of the vision. Consistent with DoD's transforming global posture, Sea Basing recognizes the importance of agility and flexibility given today's security threats and the need to project both power and support ashore from a mobile at-sea location. Sea Basing will provide joint force commanders with distributed and netted "sovereign platforms" able to assemble effects, rather than just mass forces. The concept includes the coordinated employment of carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, submarines, combat logistics force ships, maritime prepositioning force platforms, and ultimately, high-speed support vessels.5
The added benefit of Sea Basing is its complementary and adaptable nature—a ready entry point for maritime collaboration facilitating coalition operations to meet regional security needs. The Sea Base encourages international security cooperation in a maritime context, an option often viewed more favorably by allies than land-based contributions and commitments.
* Contributions in the War on Terror. By the State Department's count, since 2001 some 69 countries have provided assistance to this common effort.6 Contributions have ranged from diplomatic support, assistance with logistics, access to seaports, and basing and overflight to troops and equipment on the ground, specialized teams, and naval assets providing support to both maritime and leadership interdiction operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coordination also has been evident. A significant portion of these opportunities for cooperation are maritime related.
* Black Sea Force. With little fanfare, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia gathered in Istanbul on 2 April 2001 to sign the Black-SeaFor agreement. The goals of this new organization are search-and-rescue operations, clearing sea mines, joint actions for protecting the Black Sea environment, and organizing goodwill visits.7 Comprised of naval units from the participating countries and with leadership rotating annually, the Black-SeaFor will function as an on-call force to enhance regional stability, interoperability, and friendship-clearly, a maritime organization born from mutually shared regional interests.
* South East Asian Cooperation. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have agreed to conduct coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca and Singapore Straits in response to the growing threat of piracy in these waters-clear measures that bolster the growing counterterrorism efforts in the region while quelling criminal activity.8 These developments are in step with growing regional consensus on the need for increased security cooperation. U.S. coordination with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) resulted in the 1 August 2002 U.S./ASEAN Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism, establishing the groundwork for wide-ranging cooperative activity.9 Given this framework, reinforced by common security views, multilateral activity—to include maritime cooperation—is on the rise. These improved regional relationships also will prove their worth during times of national emergency—as is the case in the current tsunami devastation.
Terrorists and those devoted to imposing their radical agendas would have us believe we are powerless to stop them—that international security mechanisms are too slow, too cumbersome, politically motivated, and subject to diversion by special interests. They are wrong. In the end, we will find a way, because we must. And maritime forces will continue to provide the needed flexibility, agility, autonomy, and reach that increasingly are being brought to bear as nations see their common security interests intersect.
1 "Proliferation security Initiative: Chairman's State- 3 ment at the Fifth Meeting," U.S. Department of State Web site, Bureau of Public Affairs.
2 "DoD Hosts First Proliferation security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Game," news release, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), No. 980-04, 1 October 2004. www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041001-1344.html.
3 "Proliferation Security Initiative," para. 5.
4 "Global Posture, Testimony as prepared for delivery by secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004," U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), www.dod.mil/speeches/ 2004/sp20040923secdef 0783.html.
5 VAdrn. Charles W. Moore, USN, and LGen. Edward Hanlon, USMC, "Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2003.
6 "International Contributions to the War against Terrorism," Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, 14 June 2002.
7 "A New Organization Is Born" Turkish Daily News, 27 March 2001 (Web page: Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group [Blackseafor]),
8 "Maritime Cooperation in Safety and Security AMVER Awards Ceremony," speech by U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, 22 September 2004 (From U.S. Embassy Singapore Web site, Meet the Ambassador, Speeches), Office of Public Affairs, U.S. embassy, Singapore.
9 James A. Kelly, Assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 11 December 2002 Remarks to the Woodrow Wilson Center (Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov).
Commander Girrier was commanding officer of the Guardian (MCM-5) and Roosevelt (DDG-80). He has completed assignments at Surface Warfare Officer School, the Joint Staff, staff of the secretary of the Navy, and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He is coauthor of Division Officer Guide, 11th ed. (2004, Naval Institute Press) and most recently served as Deputy Director, Navy Staff.