Transformation is about creating an adaptive national security apparatus that can deal with changing circumstances and emerging threats. Organizational changes—like creation of the new Department of Homeland Security—will help, but the real challenge is to capture hearts and minds.
Several years ago, a few military writers and observers began to promote the idea that warfare was entering a time of startling change—a revolution in military affairs. Warnings went out that the U.S. military must change or die as adversaries looked for weaknesses in the world's most powerful and successful military. It was not until President George W. Bush embraced the need for transforming the military, however, that most of the national security community began to take notice.
Two years into this administration, it has begun to have some success. It is also becoming clearer, however, that transformation must encompass more than just the Department of Defense. True transformation is, in many ways, a political struggle that must be waged not just in the halls of the Pentagon, but also in the halls of Congress and the West Wing. It is a debate not just for the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also for think tanks and the press. It is not just about what we buy and how we buy it but about creating a new, engaged, and empowered national security workforce with a culture that embraces innovation and change.
Definition
Some skeptics of transformation try to define it as a battle over competing technologies, pitting advocates of one weapon system against defenders of another. Some try to portray it as an attempt to predict the future. Still others try to limit transformation to a cost-savings crusade, squeezing a few extra dollars out of the defense budget.
Transformation is none of those things. It is not just some tactic to achieve cost savings or greater efficiency. It is not primarily about weapons, platforms, or projects.
Some procurement decisions may, of course, be significant as indicators of progress. For example, the Army's Crusader weapon system was canceled, in part, because it was too heavy, but in larger measure because it did not fit the way the military is going to fight in the future. Other recent procurement decisions document less positive trends. Last year's budget request for fighter aircraft was increased at a rate almost three times faster than that of unmanned aerial vehicles, which have shown great capability and potential in how the military will fight in the future.
But true transformation is less about hardware and more about creating a culture fueled by a vision and strategy, adaptive organizations, people, doctrine, and processes. Transformation requires continuous examination of assumptions so that the national security apparatus can deal with the world as it is, with real, moving problems.
Trends
Understanding that transformation is a process, not a destination, there still are some overarching trends that can help shape the debate and results. First is the increasing importance of information. As retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, DoD Director of Force Transformation, explains, "the nation is entering an era where advantages are conferred on the small, the fast, and the many. These capabilities will be paid for by the ponderous and the massive." To illustrate, he cites an Air Force example of a target that once required 1,000 bombs to destroy now being taken out by a single munition because of advances in information technology and processes.
Similarly, the nation's and DoD's dependence on information should change how we use information, protect information systems, and deny relevant information to our adversaries. Related to this shift is the increasing importance of space to military operations, as well as to the lives of everyday citizens. We rely on space systems for everything from targeting precision munitions to banking.
An unwelcome but certain trend is the spread of weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption. Our homeland will continue to be threatened by possible chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks from terrorists or axis of evil states.
Finally, with more transient and temporary international alliances, it is increasingly possible that in the event of hostilities, the military may not have use of foreign bases and facilities from which to conduct operations.
In a broad context, these trends together imply the "death of distance," not only in communications but also in national security. As a result of the attacks of 11 September, Americans feel—for the first time in a very long time, perhaps ever—that they are a target of the enemy. They feel they are on the front lines, and in a way, they are. Americans are ready to be led to greater safety, and they expect their government to do so.
Culture of Innovation
With all that has been written and said about transformation, what remains to be discussed is precisely what is necessary to achieve it. The crucial element is captured best in the phrase "culture of innovation."
In his book Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen writes, "It is, indeed, in his ability to adapt ... that a war statesman finds his largest test." This applies to an organization or an entire government, as well as to individuals.
Current leaders recognize the importance of adaptability. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld included fostering a "military culture that rewards innovation and risktaking" in a preliminary list of priorities for the year. In written testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Tom Ridge noted that leaders of the new Department of Homeland Security must "create a new institutional culture, motivate and reward an outstanding workforce; and respond quickly to changing circumstances, emerging threats, and emergency situations."
A culture of innovation requires us to reexamine everything. It cannot operate as a project with a definite ending; it must go on and on. And to be cultural, it must infiltrate into the marrow of the organization.
Looking at cultural change in corporations, Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan discuss a "cultural lock-in" that results from "the gradual stiffening of the invisible architecture of the corporation," and note that it "dampens the ... ability to innovate and ... signals the corporation's inexorable decline."3 For the national security community, avoiding this cultural lock-in and fostering innovation may be the most important ingredients of transformation. Some of the steps toward this are obvious. It is difficult to create a culture of innovation when a procurement system can take 20 years to field a product. It is difficult to create a culture of innovation when communications are hampered by incompatible, slow, unsecured information and computer systems. It is difficult to create a culture of innovation under arcane rules, regulations, and personnel systems.
Organizational Changes
President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that although the right organizational structure would not guarantee success, the wrong structure could guarantee failure.
Major changes in the organizational structure of the national security apparatus have occurred over the past year. Clearly, the role of the military in domestic security—posse comitatus, use of the National Guard and Reserve, the importance of intelligence, and DoD's relationship with the Department of Homeland Security—is an emergent issue for the Secretary of Defense, as evidenced by the newly created positions of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Steve Cambone nominated); Commander, Northern Command (Air Force General Ralph Eberhart); Director, Office of Force Transformation (Art Cebrowski); and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security (Paul McHale nominated).
The intelligence community, faced with its own challenges, including years of inadequate funding in human intelligence and lack of vision in technology application, will continue to struggle with operating in this fluid environment. How well it changes to be more responsive to its customers, define priorities, and create actionable, timely, relevant information for tactical and strategic use will depend on how well it can organize out of current stovepipes and prepare its workforce. The FBI, too, has been forced to change its focus from prosecuting criminals to preventing crimes and acts of terrorism.
The recent legislation that stood up the Department of Homeland Security is the most significant change to the organization of the federal government since the 1947 creation of DoD. The new department has a rare opportunity to shed any less desirable aspects of the 44 organizations that will be combined under its umbrella, but it faces significant leadership challenges in merging and managing diverse cultures. Personnel reforms in the Homeland Security Department Act will help, but ultimately, each employee must take responsibility for helping create one integrated organization committed to its mission of making this country safer.
On the road to transformation, the administration has fought and won some significant political battles to change some outmoded organizational structures. However, the real political struggle is just beginning. The next challenge is to capture and change the hearts and minds of national security personnel, both military and civilian, to create a culture of innovation.
Four Steps to Creating a Culture of Innovation
Progressive personnel policies, innovative technologies, experimentation, and professional education will help individuals adapt to the information-age cultures needed to cope with an increasingly complex world. Implementing these four steps, while difficult and time consuming, will be essential to create a culture of innovation to help transform our national security.
Personnel Policies. Air Force Colonel John Boyd put it best when he said, "Machines don't fight wars, people do, and they use their minds." Indeed, culture comes from people, their relationships, their way of doing things, their hopes and fears. Creating a culture of innovation means embracing diversity and leveraging the vast demographic changes taking place in our society. Top quality personnel, as well as the ability to recruit and retain people with new skills and new attitudes, are critical.
For the military, DoD should ask if it really is necessary to rotate every officer every 18-24 months. Admiral Hyman Rickover devoted more than 30 years to creating, building, and maintaining the nuclear Navy. Congress helped keep Admiral William Moffett in place long enough to see carrier-based aviation come to fruition. It is difficult to hold individuals accountable for changes or decisions if they are not in place to shepherd them through the system. DoD should identify positions that could be key to transformation for extended tour lengths, including the Commander of the Joint Forces Command.
Innovators within the military community also must be nurtured and protected. If they are stifled, we will be stuck in the rut of bureaucracies' self-interest forever. Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway said, "My greatest contribution as Chief of Staff was to nourish the mavericks." Part of protecting innovators is allowing for risk taking, embracing failure, and doing away with a zero-defect mentality that has plagued promotion boards.
DoD also should consider changes to its "up or out" policy, where good performers are forced to leave the service if they are not promoted at certain longevity points in their careers. Some officers and enlisted personnel are highly skilled in technical specialties, and while not all of them should become admirals or generals, the services have invested a great deal of money in their training and education. A core group of top performers in highdemand career fields should be retained and paid commensurate with their skills and ability to contribute.
Guidance to promotion boards should be reviewed to reflect the skills that will be required to fight future wars. If DoD promotes to the top ranks only people who fly planes or drive ships, they are sending a strong message on what skills are and are not valued. The military is becoming increasingly dependent on technology specialists, but it has been slow to reevaluate career paths and create advancement opportunities for these specialities. This is particularly true in space, intelligence, cryptology, and information operations.
DoD should review of the types of jobs and skills that will be required for the future. Although the services have embraced network-centric warfare, which is highly dependent on managing and using information, only 8.8% of enlisted personnel and 5% of the officer corps are designated communications or intelligence specialists. The Air Force admits it has plenty of people, but not with the right skills for the way it has to fight today, much less into the future. Similarly, jointness should begin at the earliest stages in the careers of officers and enlisted members. As recent operations have borne out, joint operations begin at the tactical level of warfare, led by junior officers and mid-grade enlisted personnel.
Funding Innovative Technologies. Promoting a culture of innovation will require a reliable stream of dollars for research and development, despite more immediate pressures for money for readiness. DoD should prioritize funding for some key lower risk technologies, as well as be willing to fund a few big bets that could change the nature of warfare dramatically, to keep the United States well ahead of its adversaries.
Some technologies that have been suggested for investment are hypersonics, advanced space technology such as microsatellites, advanced sensors, robotics, unmanned vehicles, directed-energy weapons, and advanced fuel systems. In a period of innovation, it may make sense to conduct more prototyping and wait for some technologies to mature before committing to large-scale procurement.
Experimentation. In a study of aircraft carrier development, it was found that "innovation is dependent less on 'vision' than on having means (organizations and procedures) for turning ideas into programs and then realistically testing the products of those programs." Experimentation provides the mechanism to do just that. It must have steady funding of its own and be distinguished from technology demonstration, training, or exercises. True experimentation cannot be scripted, and it may involve new equipment, organizational structures, tactics, or all three.
Each service should be allowed to conduct experiments, but the focus should be on joint experimentation at the operational and tactical levels of warfare because the military must train the way it is going to fight. Finally, the results must have a way to influence the requirements, acquisition, and procurement systems, as well as policies, doctrine, and training.
Education. The need for rigorous and continuous professional education in the military has been well documented but not well implemented. In the book Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, the editors conclude:
Professional military education was clearly a major player in the process of innovation in the interwar period; it will probably be even more important in the future. Only that willingness to think through the business of war will allow leaders to see the potential of long-term innovations.
Williamson Murray, U.S. Army Military History Institute professor, notes, "Mental preparation will be more important than all the technological wizardry U.S. forces can bring to bear in combat."
Yet, debate and the free exchange of ideas is difficult when an organization is successful. Winning militaries feel far less pressure for self-examination—why fix what's not broken?—and, as a result, can be less open to creativity.
In addition, in a world of information overload, it is important to be able to think critically. With more information at our fingertips, sorting it out is more difficult and more critical. Dr. Henry Kissinger writes,
The computer has, to a considerable extent, solved the problem of acquiring, preserving, and retrieving knowledge. But it also shrinks perspective. Because knowledge is so accessible and communication so instantaneous, there is a lack of training in its significance.
Today, professional military education is viewed as a ticket to be punched on the way to the next operational assignment. All the services should renew their commitment to joint military education and to make curricula more relevant to today's environment for uniformed and civilian personnel. We must be career-long learners.
Role of Congress
In any political discussion of transformation, the role of Congress cannot be overlooked. Its control of the purse strings, as well as its oversight functions in a context where elected officials try to look out for bases and defense projects in their own districts, makes advocacy for transformation difficult. There is no traditional constituency for exchange of ideas, no budget line for transformation; and there is no overarching expensive program to promote it.
At its best, congressional leadership has prodded the military forward. It was Congress that pushed for a coherent defense establishment after World War II. In 1986, it developed and enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Act that forced the military to become more joint. In the confirmation process, Congress has protected, promoted, and kept in place innovators such as Admirals Moffett and Rickover. It was Congress, as well, that initially pushed for a Department of Homeland Security. These types of initiatives and reforms must continue.
At the same time, Congress must focus more on oversight and less on micromanagement, giving federal organizations the flexibility to manage but holding individuals accountable for their actions. This will be more work but will result in better management within the federal government. Congress also should examine its own organizational structure and processes, as well as promote increased education for members and staff.
Reforming the House Armed Services Committee to reflect emerging threats and more coherent oversight of major weapon systems is a good first step to more effective oversight of DoD. With the creation of a Homeland Security Department, the Speaker of the House has created a new select committee to oversee the transition and propose any changes that are needed in the law.
Those members and staff who have national security duties also have a special responsibility to further their own professional knowledge and understanding of the communities they oversee. Members should seek expanded educational opportunities, participation in war games, and focused travel to learn about specific command missions and challenges.
In many respects, transformation has been a political battle between the old way of doing business and the new. The administration has worked with Congress to make some organizational changes in the national security structure. The next step—changing the culture, attitudes, and attributes of the national security workforce—will be far more difficult. We will be successful only if we have the right organization and the right leaders to foster a culture of innovation that can operate and adapt to an ever changing information-age environment. The safety of our citizens, and ultimately, the fate of our nation depend on it.
Congressman Thornberry (R-TX) serves on the Armed Services Committee, the Budget Committee, and the Select Committee on Homeland Security. He is co-chair of the Defense Study Group, a bipartisan group of around 90 House members who meet monthly to discuss issues affecting our nation’s security.