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Between the aged Sea Knight and the delayed Osprey is the Super Stallion—ready and able to support the Marine Corps mission.
As the Marine Corps weathers extended delays in replacing its medium-lift CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter with the V-22 Osprey tiltro- tor, it finds itself—oddly enough—in a good position to shoulder the burden of that delay.
Originally the Osprey was scheduled to have operational squadrons in the fleet by 1992, but because of delays, budget battles, and cutbacks, it will not enter service in appreciable numbers until after the year 2000.
Meanwhile, the CH-46 airframes have had their service life extended and are becoming less capable as their total numbers dwindle through attrition. In response, the Marine Corps has begun to rely more on the CH-53E and CH-53D (and now in the reserves, the RH-53D) to fill the gaps in lift requirements. As the appearance of the Osprey continues to be delayed, the CH-53E Super Stallion will carry more and more of the load of the Marines’ continued global commitments.
The primary mission of the CH-53E—heavy lift of cargo and supplies—is crucial in an amphibious ship-to-shore movement of combat power. The quicker a commander can move his forces during the early phases of a landing, the better the chances for success in seizing enemy-held terrain. This is also important in the rapid movement of a ground assault, as in the ground war of Desert Storm. Ammunition and fuel brought to forward-area arming and refueling points by CH-53s for Marine AH-1W Cobras helped keep the enemy on the defensive.
Because the Super Stallion has been designed for hauling cargo and supplies, it has been somewhat underused in troop transport—the primary mission of the CH-46. The Super Stallion, however, will be a highly capable troopcarrying platform until the Osprey arrives. During the 1991 non-combatant evacuation from the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, for instance, two Super Stallions carrying 30 Marines and SEALS each took off from am
phibious task force ships, flew 500 miles over the Indian Ocean at night (refueling in flight with a Marine KC-I30 tanker), landed in the embassy compound, and evacuated U.S. civilians from the middle of a civil war—a feat that could not have been accomplished over that distance by any other Marine helicopter.
The significant increase in capability that a CH-53E offers should prompt a departure from the traditional aviation combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Instead of forming a composite squadron around a 1.5-hour-endurance CH-46 squadron, MEU commanders could increase capability and flexibility and speed up the ship-to-shore movement of Marines and cargo by incorporating the Super Stallion. It would only require a change from the established way of doing business.
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During Desert Shield, for example, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade practiced many brigade-sized amphibious assaults in Oman in preparation for a possible invasion of Kuwait. These became massive operations involving nearly 30 ships and scores of helicopters. A typical scenario would have three battalions assaulting, with two battalions moving by surface and one by helicopter. The heliborne battalion, comprised of approximately 600 Marines and 24 all-terrain vehicles (HumVees), would be moved by 20 CH-46s and six CH-53Es from two amphibious assault ships. In classic MEU-style employment, only on a bigger scale, the movement would begin with
the CH-53Es taking off 90 minutes before the last CH-46 and orbiting the ship in holding patterns, to accommodate the CH-46’s frequent refueling cycle. As close as 25 miles from ship to shore, the CH-46s were limited to one round trip before having to refuel. The first division of five CH-46s would take off with their troops, orbit until the second division had launched, and then return to the deck to refuel for the journey ashore. Meanwhile, the 53Es would come in, pick up the HumVees after the CH-46s were off the deck, and then have to cycle in between waves of CH-46s taking up the few deck spots with their constant need to refuel throughout the whole evolution. With a 25-minute round-trip time and the 20 minutes required to refuel a flight of five 46s (each carrying 12 Marines), the whole evolution requires over two hours under ideal conditions.
If we change the aircraft mix and eliminate all 20 46s and increase the six 53s to eight, we find that each 53E is easily capable of carrying 24 Marines as well as the 7,500-pound HumVee underneath. In three waves of eight aircraft (without having to refuel), the whole battalion is ashore with all its HumVees, and if the ground commander wants the first wave to be troops only, then the last wave could carry two HumVees apiece. The 53s would have nearly three hours of fuel left, giving the ground commander the flexibility to resupply, relocate.
withdraw, or perform the whole mission from a much greater range. This entire movement would be completed with fewer than one-third the total aircraft—in less time and with more flexibility. What is needed is not a new breed of technology but a willingness to discard outdated ways of doing business and to give the ground commander the support he deserves.
The AV-8B Harrier and the concept of operating vertical short take-off/landing aircraft in an expeditionary environment would depend heavily on the lifting ability of the Super Stallion for support. Operating from the USS Nassau (LHA-2) during Desert Storm, the AV-8B required
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a massive logistical effort by CH-53Es to bring ordnance from the holds of the other ships in the amphibious task force. Once ashore, the Harrier also requires fuel, parts, and other support to keep it flying. Supporting the Harrier and its remote basing capability is key to the success of Marine expeditionary operations and can only be done effectively by a helicopter with the lift capacity of the I Super Stallion.
The ability of the H-53 to move large amounts of cargo, people, and supplies over long distances has been capitalized upon many times in recent years: evacuation of Liberia, evacuation of Somalia, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, hurricane relief in Bangladesh, Mount Pinatubo and the associated evacuations, and Operations Provide Comfort and Provide Hope. During recent unrest in Haiti, CH-53Es and CH-53Ds were positioned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for potential evacuations or operations in Haiti. Super Stallions can reach Cuba non-stop from their base in North Carolina, with aerial refueling. HMH-362 recently deployed CH- 53Ds aboard an aircraft carrier as part of a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Today, a Marine
y\ expeditionary unit sits off the east coast of Africa, ready to respond to anything from Bosnia to Iraq or Somalia. CH-53Es are relied upon daily to shoulder the Corps’ logistical requirements. Even though the Osprey is being delayed, the worldwide commitments of Marines are not. Fortunately, the Super Stallion is available to support Marines on the ground and at sea in their operational commitments.
The only comparable heavy-lift helicopter in production or on the drawing boards in the western world is the r Army’s CH-47 Chinook, which (except for the special- operations MH-47) is incapable of aerial refueling and is kl scheduled to be in service until 2025. The Marine Corps should seriously reconsider any plans to reduce the number of CH-53Es programmed in the years ahead. Because the Osprey has yet to prove itself in the fleet, such a re- , duction would be unwise.
The Super Stallion is critical to the Marine Corps’ abil
ity to conduct: vertical assault, AV-8B operational support, tactical refueling, heavy resupply, long-range combat search and rescue and aircraft recovery, engineer support, airborne antisurface warfare shipping supply and equipment dissemination, and movement of air-defense assets. A renewed look at the CH-53E is warranted, because the Marine Corps cannot conduct its modern amphibious operations without it. The equipment and supply requirements for ship-to-shore movement and support of subsequent operations ashore has increased over the last 25 years, with the amount of troops changing very little. Eventually, all the remaining CH-53D squadrons (including the reserves) should be replaced with CH-53Es—even if it means a smaller total of V-22s.
Even when the Osprey does arrive, the CH-53E will carry the lion’s share of logistical support. The Osprey will have a modest cargo capability (estimates vary, but the high end, around 15,000 pounds, would be 20,000 pounds short of the CH-53E’s capability) and carrying external loads would only undercut its greatest asset: its speed.
If the Marine Corps does not intend to replace the CH-53Ds with Super Stallions, then it should implement a serious service life extension program for the available CH-53Ds (and Reserve RH-53Ds)—including upgraded avionics, engines, and rotor blades, and making all airframes capable of aerial refueling—that would help fill the gaps left by the CH-46 until the Osprey arrives in force, because CH-53Ds are the last ones scheduled to be replaced by the V-22.
The CH-53E Super Stallion has proved its worth in U.S. Marine Corps global operations, and has picked up the slack left by the CH-46. A change in our tactical mind set can maximize the potential of the Super Stallion and enhance the assault support for our Marines.
Captain Mullen is a Marine Corps helicopter pilot and a civilian professional photographer.
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Proceedings/July 1994