On 9 February 2001, the nuclear fast-attack submarine USS Greeneville (SSN-772) conducted an "emergency main ballast tank blow" in the Pacific Ocean near Honolulu, Hawaii. The final step of the maneuver was initiated by the opening of valves that released air, pressurized to 4,500 psi, into the Greeneville's main ballast tanks. The high-pressure air displaced water from the main ballast tanks, creating buoyancy that caused the ship to rise rapidly to the surface—with no ability to stop on the way. At the surface, the Greeneville struck the Japanese fishing/training vessel Ehime Maru. As a result of the collision, the Ehime Maru sank and took nine people to their deaths.
At the time of the tragedy, Commander Scott D. Waddle commanded the Greeneville. Commander Waddle has since acknowledged responsibility for the tragedy, which many Americans find refreshing in light of other recent events in this nation's history.
The Navy's court of inquiry into the matter has ended, and apparently the official explanation of the underlying cause is that "haste" on board the Greeneville that day caused certain departures from classic submarine competence. Commander Waddle abandoned his supervisory role, and contact management, periscope use, and watch discipline were poor.
The Navy raises an important question by suggesting that mere haste could so seriously degrade the competence of an able submarine crew. Actually, submariners historically have displayed high degrees of competence under much more arduous burdens. There is, however, a more likely explanation.
The errors leading to the Ehime Maru tragedy may well be the avoidable result of a specific defect in the way the submarine force trains and promotes some officers. A review of Commander Waddle's career path suggests that there has been no end to, and perhaps there has even been an escalation of, a culture war that raged within the submarine force since before my time almost two decades ago. That clash is between those who believe that a submarine officer's operational competence is the foundation of his professional skill, and those who believe that the foundation is engineering competence.
The core of a U.S. Navy submarine officer's operational competence is experience as officer of the deck (OOD). The OOD is the captain's alter ego and is directly responsible to the captain for every operation from stem to stern—particularly the navigation of the ship. The OOD will maintain, for example, detailed knowledge regarding all identified contacts at any given time. The OOD will maintain regular communication with the captain regarding this "contact management"—especially in connection with contacts that are subjected to heightened scrutiny for specific reasons.
While non-OOD interactions between the junior officers and the captain of a submarine are formally handled through the chain of command that includes the executive officer and department heads as buffers between them, submarine officers receive much of their vitally important OOD training directly from their captains. This training may be a submarine captain's most important job, because the junior officers who stand watch as OOD are vital to the present and future operational competence of the submarine force.
According to his official biography, Commander Waddle's first "sea" tour was with the precommissioning unit (PCU) of the Alabama (SSBN-731), and his second was with the PCU of the Kentucky (SSBN-737). A PCU is a Navy command that becomes deeply involved in the construction and testing of a ship when she is still under the legal control of the shipbuilder. A submarine officer's service on a PCU is heavily focused on engineering, and it takes special opportunities and special effort for such an officer to develop his skills as OOD. Thus, while PCUs certainly present excellent opportunities for young officers to hone engineering skills, they hardly provide a suitable environment in which to train combat submariners.
Not only was Commander Waddle's development as an OOD apparently hampered by serving on PCUs for his first two sea tours, but also both the Alabama and Kentucky are fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) whose operations many submariners would say (privately, at least) are not suitable for preparing officers for command of fast-attack submarines (SSNs).
SSBNs have a unique mission that requires, above all, that they remain undetected. On an SSBN it is a good thing for an OOD to make contacts "go away." That is how SSBN OODs keep their missions intact, and themselves and their ships alive.
But the mission and mind-set on an SSN are different. On an SSN, contacts are not to be evaded, but instead are to be evaluated to determine whether they are to be tracked in detail—i.e., prosecuted. Fast-attack submariners see themselves as grabbing contacts, and not letting go until it suits them. Indeed, the aggressive prosecution of contacts is not only an SSN function in peacetime, but excellent training for SSN wartime operations when the very next step could be to pull the trigger.
The mission difference also gives SSN officers of the deck substantially more and better experience at periscope depth contact management than their SSBN counterparts. While an SSBN might operate at periscope depth as rarely as once per week (and only if there are no contacts in range), SSN operations generally involve numerous instances of periscope depth operations, daily, often with fairly close contacts.
Another meaningful difference between SSNs and SSBNs is reflected in operational schedules. Because of their missions and the two-crew concept, a crew on an SSBN can expect to have only a handful of transits in and out of port a year. The one crew of an SSN, on the other hand, can easily have as many transits in and out of port in a week. This gives SSN OODs much more experience at contact management, ship handling, navigation, and other important aspects of operational competence that a submarine captain must have as second nature.
Therefore, as a result of the missions and schedules, submarine officers on SSBNs have less opportunity to develop operational competence in comparison to their SSN brethren.
It was not until his third sea tour that Commander Waddle served on a fast attack submarine—as executive officer (X0) of the USS San Francisco (SSN-711). By that time, however, Commander Waddle presumably already had been qualified and experienced as OOD. On board the San Francisco he likely would only have stood watch as OOD in highly unusual situations, if at all. At any rate, an XO should be qualified to take command immediately, so an XO tour is too late for an officer to learn what first-tour SSN OODs know about SSN operations.
The Navy's conclusions reveal the lack of operational competence just as clearly as a review of Commander Waddle's career path. The Ehime Maru tragedy occurred as a result of that lack of operational competence—not because, as the Navy suggested, haste caused competent submariners to ignore what they knew. Commander Waddle obviously believed that he was acting competently; he apparently lacked sufficient experience as OOD to know otherwise.
Submarine officers should never spend both of their first sea tours on SSBNs or on PCUs, because to do so can deprive them of sufficient experience as OOD to develop the operational competence a submarine captain must have. There simply is no substitute for standing watches as OOD prosecuting contacts—many of them—for a submarine officer to develop the base level operational competence on which a submarine captain's judgment always will depend. If a submarine officer does not stand sufficient watches as OOD (preferably, in my view, on an SSN with a demanding commanding officer) to develop that foundation during his first and second sea tours, he probably never will. Once that chain of operational competence is broken, it is broken not only for that officer, but for future generations as well.
Obviously, the submarine force values both operational and engineering competence. But career patterns like Commander Waddle's show that an officer can rise to command of an SSN—the pinnacle of submarining—with a glaring gap in operational competence. Certainly, no officer would command a submarine if his lack of engineering competence were as patent.
It is a mistake for the nuclear submarine force to allow engineering competence to enjoy primacy over operational competence. The Ehime Maru tragedy might be part of the price of that mistake.
Mr. Wright graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979 and served on the fast attack submarine USS Ray (SSN-653) from April 1981 through July 1984 as communications officer, electronic material officer, reactor controls officer, chemistry and radiological controls officer, main propulsion assistant, sonar officer, and weapons officer. After leaving the Navy he practiced law for 15 years. Mr. Wright now is the chief executive officer of a small public utility in Georgia.