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Combat aircraft offered for sale worldwide by the former Soviet Union offer operators some distinct advantages, but potential pitfalls associated with these aircraft must be fully understood.
I first was able to get close to Russian combat aircraft on a cold January afternoon in 1990 when I flew a MiG-29 Fulcrum from Kubinka air base near Moscow.
The following September, I flew in the front seat of a Su-27 at Farnborough, England; Viktor Pougachev was in the back seat on that flight.
These are rugged aircraft, meant to be operated from austere airfields and maintained by small crews. The same philosophy prevails in the cockpits of the two aircraft; although both were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s—about the same time as the F/A-18 Hornet—the cockpit design dates to
the 1950s and is akin to that of the F-4 Phantom.
While the overall design of two fighters exemplified the Russian goal of building superior numbers of aircraft with relatively short service lives, the basic reason was that the Russians lacked the computer technology necessary to integrate avionics and systems integration—as was being done in the West at the time. As a result, neither aircraft had the hands-on-throttle-and-stick and cathode-ray tube technology of their Western contemporaries, although they did incorporate advances in infrared search-and-track technology and helmet-mounted sights.
Their outstanding performance and handling characteristics, however, clearly put them in the same league as the newer generation of U.S. and European fighters. The Russians achieved this combat ability with excellent aerodynamics and
strong engine performance without the aid of fly-by-wire technology. Performing hard turns in the MiG-29 or the Cobra maneuver—a 90° pitch-up to get the nose on target—in the Su-27 convinced me that either aircraft in the hands of a good pilot would be a match for current Western fighters during a close-in fight.
A lot has happened since 1990, and the Russians now are competing with the U.S. and Europe for fighter sales throughout the world. Both Mikoyan and Sukhoi have updated their fighters with cathode-ray tube displays, enhanced aerodynamic features, and other modern technology- The Malaysians recently ordered MiG-29s, but did not opt for the ex- , port version with the newer features- jj
The Russians also are endeavor- ! ing to improve their reputation for I building aircraft whose engines have | short service lives and for failing to :
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such as Australia, and the scaled-down/phased-out technologies sold to the rest of the world. In spite of this requirement to export, however, few systems were developed entirely for the Third World market.
In the absence of the Cold War, the lesser-included- case assumption no longer pertains. In the United States, the new strategic focus has resulted in a sharp questioning of the utility of new weapons and systems in local conflicts. The even sharper questions of budget constraints have forced both a slowdown in the introduction and development of new systems and an increase in the reliance on overseas sales to sustain defense industries. Budgetary constraints are more emphatic still in the successor states to the Soviet Union, and the newly independent governments have demonstrated a willingness to sell even the most advanced technologies for hard currency.
In Western Europe, the change is less dramatic. European states always have had to sustain relatively small indigenous arms industries. What has now complicated their sales problem is the sharp decline in the internal defense market as a result of force drawdowns. Given the already marginal economies of scale in many of their industries, the drawdowns have deepened the need for export sales and, more importantly, reinforced a willingness to design and build systems exclusively for Third World markets, as well as to assist Third World producers with local production under license.
Taken together, these developments not only invalidate li previous assumptions as to which producers and system* il developments need to be monitored and evaluated by U-S- ti intelligence agencies, but they also point toward an it*' V creased proliferation of more sophisticated weapons and 1 technologies to regional powers and an increasing divef' d sity of arms in regional inventories.
The second major assumption underlying Cold Waf o threat assessments was economic. Because the SovR1 t Union and its allies constituted an economy of formid3' f ble scale, and because they had demonstrated a willing' t ness to choose guns over butter in what was effectively3 f wartime economy, we could assume that the pace of de' velopment of Soviet military technologies would be die' c tated primarily by engineering and research constraint* s rather than by the availability of resources. This assumP' 1 tion permitted Western intelligence to extrapolate cuf' a rent weapons and technologies along relatively well d£' j 1 fined straight-line paths, with only a technologic3* r breakthrough likely to invalidate predictions.
This assumption, too, has been overtaken by events^ 1 as the current desperate Russian search for hard-cuf' 1 rency arms customers underlines. In fact, the constrain1* 1 imposed by economics are twofold, affecting both the pr°' ducer and the consumer. From the producer’s perspective ' when the drawdown in the defense budgets of all of tl>e 1 major powers and the resulting uniform increase in fe' s
A lot has happened since the author strapped into this MiG-29 at Kubinka air base outside Moscow in 1990—and the Russians now are marketing the aircraft aggressively worldwide.
provide maintenance and support for their aircraft. While they have yet to achieve Western standards for extended engine-overhaul times and long service lives, Russian engine manufacturers are attempting to improve their overall performance. The same can be said for doing a better job in maintaining their aircraft.
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The incentive for the Russians to correct their past liabilities and market their strengths to sell aircraft is enormous. Both Mikoyan and Sukhoi are struggling to keep their aircraft lines open and retain a cadre of skilled technicians and engineers, which means that they are willing to negotiate aircraft prices not easily matched by Western builders.
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liance on overseas arms markets are taken into account, it becomes apparent that economics will be a major factor in determining which weapons and systems are developed and how fast. In fact, only the United States is likely to be able to sustain a high-technology arms industry based solely on domestic sales.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the new importance of overseas markets portends a reversal of the Cold War practice of building for a domestic market and downgrading for export. In Europe, especially, future practice may entail building for export and upgrading for one’s own armed forces.
From the perspective of the consumer, the limited size of defense budgets and the rising cost of high-technology systems will limit the size of the market and thus lower the level of unit cost that is acceptable. This means that a successful Third World arms-marketing strategy is likely to focus on sales of low- and mid-range military technologies, rather than exclusively high-end systems.
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Finally, the Cold War assumption that weapons and systems developed by either side would be used with maximum effectiveness rested on the paradigm of a large-scale, 'veil-trained, professional military equipped with relatively homogeneous weapons and systems. Both Eastern and Western militaries demonstrated that they could integrate the wide variety of systems developed, provide a satisfactory level of maintenance to ensure their opera
tional readiness, and then make effective tactical use of the systems in implementing a coherent national military strategy.
These assumptions never have been valid with regard to the Third World. Despite the best efforts of Third World military planners, their military forces contain an often bewildering variety of systems from different producers— who, for the most part, never intended the systems to be used together. Such unorthodox mixing of systems has the potential to produce an occasional synergy, but more often it is a headache that would challenge any professional Western military logistician.
Next, we must add to this the problem of maintenance. For most Third World states, this is a threefold dilemma. The more sophisticated the system, the higher the complexity and cost of its maintenance. The higher the complexity, the more difficult it becomes to accomplish maintenance in-country with existing personnel and resources. The greater the requirement for outside maintenance, the greater the vulnerability of the new systems to the vagaries of politics and foreign-exchange economics and the less usable the system is likely to be in supporting national objectives. For most regional militaries, this means that real operational capability is much less than that indicated by mere order-of-battle estimates or the capabilities of any individual system. In terms of materiel readiness, the date a system is delivered by the producer probably is the only
47
Proceedings / February 1994