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For more than ten years, from 1970 to 1983, Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer led the design, engineering, ship construction, training, and introduction of the Aegis Fleet system, earning the title, “The Father of Aegis.” Here, he talks with Richard Lawson for Proceedings in Hawaii, just prior to the commissioning of the Lake Erie (CG-70), about the future of Aegis and the Navy.
Proceedings: Is Aegis going to be the cornerstone of the fleet in the future?
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Meyer: There are two answers. In one dimension, it clearly is the cornerstone by default, because it will be on the ships that exist. But they really are ships for their time—I believe the cruisers are the ships of the future because they have proved their extraordinary versatility.
I have confidence in their capacity to adapt to the future, but, at the same time,
I keep warning everybody that we can’t sit still. [The]
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Lake Erie is a far different ship than [the] Ticonderoga (CG-47). There is almost a 20-year difference in the design of these ships. The World didn’t stand still during that time. More specifically, the need for change is driven by our opponents, not by ourselves. Fifteen years from now these ships will have to take on another character. If they don’t, someone will come after the ships in a dimension that they can’t handle. That’s the nature of war.
Proceedings: The Lake Erie is the second Aegis cruiser in Pearl Harbor, but the shipyard here is submarine oriented and may not have adequate facilities to maintain the cruisers. Where—other than Pearl Harbor— could the Aegis cruisers be maintained affordably and still remain in mid-Pacific?
Meyer: There just isn’t a good solution to that. I always have been a strong believer in the integration the Aegis project has done in establishing Aegis support groups. They are modest in size but are in every Aegis port to assist the staffs, the captain, and the officers. The same is true with the weapons-engineering stations in Port Huen- eme and Dahlgren. We set up this network and this integral force to ensure these ships are at their best without regard to where they are homeported. Of course, such an innovative and proved approach is under attack because there are individuals who believe it is too expensive.
Proceedings: Why is it under attack?
Meyer: For efficiency’s sake. We have senior officials in the Navy and the Defense Department who want us to get more efficient. “Gee, that’s nice to have, but, gosh, it costs so much.” Well, I don’t agree with that. If you surveyed every Aegis captain and executive officer, they all will give you a glowing testimonial to the thoroughness of these Aegis support groups. Why can’t our leaders hear that? What’s the problem here? Yet, we have officers who are opposed to it and are attempting to take it down.
Admiral Bill Retz, the commander of the surface forces here, told me the other day that the reason Aegis cruiser problems are so few while other ships have significant numbers of problems is that we take care of our own—and the Aegis support group is a big part of that. It really frosts me when people come around and want to do away with things like that. It’s as though if they can’t have it, then you can’t have it either. Their view is, “If we can get our hands on all the gold the Aegis people have, we can redistribute it and solve a lot of problems.” It’s a typical approach to solving a problem: disperse all the wealth and somehow everyone will be well off.
Proceedings: Is there also a movement to reduce training?
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Proceedings / February 1994
Meyer: Yes. And again it’s for efficiency’s sake. For example, some say, “Why don’t we just get down to one trial in construction?” The thought is that all the trials always go so well, so what’s the need? [The] Lake Erie is the 24th ship. She isn’t the first ship.
Well, [the] Lake Erie is the first ship to most of those Lake Erie sailors. The captain of [the] Lake Erie told me the average age of the men in the ship was 20.6 years. For many of those sailors it’s their first time at sea. And yet, they sailed that ship from Maine to Pearl Harbor, with a few stops in between, loaded weapons, conducted exercises, flew their helicopter, and shot their weapons without a single accident. Simply because trials go well is the wrong reason to stop them. On the contrary—invariably, that’s when you get into trouble.
I get very defensive and argumentative when people come along and decide we don’t need all these measures. They think we can save a lot of money. I don’t agree. What’s the price for not doing it? What’s the price of failure?
Proceedings: What other issues concern you about the future of Aegis?
Meyer: We generally do not have plans in this country to sustain our sea power. I’m sure the responsible officials would disagree with me, in that they all think they have a plan of some sort. But the facts speak, as well. There are only two cruisers on the building ways in this coun-
try, and there are no plans that I’m aware of ever to build another. In fact, I believe there are no plans to continue construction of any capital ships in this nation. And we are laying up our nuclear cruisers instead of modernizing them with Aegis.
There is a belief in some harbors that somehow we can freeze everything in time. If we need to, we will be able to whip out all the old crews or the old shipbuilding forces of the nation and start building again. I don’t believe
that can happen. Nor do I believe that we can stop tit the ships that are on the seas right now from growing old. 1 that sense, we keep fooling ourselves because of the bat bal tleship experience. The only thing that didn’t make tit gei battleship grow old was the 16-inch gun. Yet, there w* gn repeated controversy about the 16-inch gun’s accuracy. l0( don’t think it is unfair to ask, “Where are the battleship today?” They’re moored. *o
I see a fundamental requirement in this era not only11 sustain war-fighting capability but also to sustain our waf ftii ship-building capability. I have suggested to a number P le admirals and other industrial and government officials th- W; a cruiser every year or even every other year would su$ W tain this capability. If we let that capability disappear,ge will never reemerge. It was difficult enough to get cruis jaj ers built in two yards. Already the capability has been los1 Ce in one yard, Bath Iron Works, and it will be gone shortl! in the other yard, Ingalls Shipbuilding. th
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Proceedings: So, you don’t want to have to ask in the si] future, “Where are the cruisers?” Hi
Meyer: In the case of the cruisers, it will be too late ar The Aegis cruiser is both a big pouncer and missile guard
If I were running an amphibious force or ships of the train- I wouldn’t want to go anyplace without my missile guard- $ In the art of missile guarding, you don’t have much time ^ to stumble. Their readiness must be almost instant. While j. there may be some opportunity to go hustle up the bat- j. tleship, I don’t think you will have the opportunity to g° j \ hustle up the Aegis cruisers. You better have one wit!1 . you all the time and she had better be ready. \
Proceedings : If you did try hustling up the Aegis <
cruiser, wouldn ’t the technology be old? You'd have | to upgrade the technology completely to handle the I
new threats. ;
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Proceedings / February
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Interview
Meyer: That’s right. The technology would go right b) you. The reason you could still use the old technology the battleship is that particular problem didn’t change. I"
the case of the Aegis, the opponent changes continuously. The world doesn’t stand still. Why do you think we have ballistic missile threats now? Because cruise missiles can’t get through. This application of technology keeps progressing. Are the Aegis cruisers a threat to opponents today? Of course they are. But even though we’ve built these cruisers with such strong armor, someone is going to try to find a way to defeat them.
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Cruise missiles now are stealthier because regular missiles are a piece of cake for the Aegis. Why do opponents attempt to fly cruise missiles 10 to 15 feet off the water? Because they are trying to get under the Aegis. Why do attackers go very, very high? They are trying to get over the Aegis. Why are opponents building massive jammers? To try and neutralize the Aegis. Will they succeed? Dam right. Sooner or later, they will succeed.
Opponents just don’t sit still, not if they are going to threaten you. One good portrayal of that is found in any ad by Aerospatiale, where you see a whole array of missiles that company has designed and exported. There are maybe 12 or 15 on the chart. Those missiles get harder and harder to defeat.
Proceedings: Do you see the recent Tomahawk attack on Baghdad boosting the role of the Aegis ship both as a weapon of war and as a political tool for President Pill Clinton?
Meyer: The strike on Baghdad is a good example of the importance of a potent standing force. The Commander- in-Chief could make a decision within a very short time, and he had forces on the scene that were able to bring such a strike to bear and do it safely. I mean safely in the sense that our own forces were at modest risk with the Iraqis unable to counter the attack. But there isn’t any free lunch. You must always be prepared to be attacked. In my view, there is only one risk level in battle—and •hat’s high risk.
Proceedings: Haven't there been questions raised in the past regarding the use of Aegis cruisers in the littorals? Some of those questions were raised after the Vincennes (CG-49) shot down the Iranian Airbus.
Meyer: Yes. I remember the discussions about why we Put that ship in there in the first place. “Why ever did put her in such a position?” I recall similar discussions When [the] Ticonderoga sailed on her maiden voyage from shakedown and she immediately pulled into the gun line °ff Lebanon, where she used her 5-inch guns. Some people asked why we would risk a ship like that for 5-inch bombardment. My reaction is the opposite: Why would ^e not risk those ships? They are the ships with far and away the best defense we have. They are the hardest ships "'e have.
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I have no qualms whatsoever about risking an Aegis Cruiser in the littorals or even in confined waters. 1 believe she is more maneuverable, better armed, and more flexible than any other ship we have when it comes to adapting to the situation and surviving.
Proceedings : What were some of the lessons learned from the Vincennes incident?
boccedings / February 1994
Meyer: It’s always easy afterward to think up any number of explanations and pieces of logic to explain an accident or explain some disaster. Everybody is smart afterwards.
There wasn’t anything wrong with [the] Vincennes' design. But the officers and men were faced with a difficult situation, and they acted accordingly and in accordance with the doctrine in the ship. We can discuss at some length whether they misread the data or not. Of course, in hindsight, they misread the data. But whether they misread the data in real time is another issue. Does this mean that we should not take steps to do better prevention or to train our officers and crew better? Of course not. But neither do we have to be apologetic for it.
There’s no doubt in my mind that the enemy was completely out of line. I’ll never understand why such airplanes were operating in the war zone the way they were or why the alleged civilians were flying through a war zone just to go shopping on a Sunday afternoon.
We have heard people say the ships are too complex, people can’t master them, or they would be too trigger happy. I reject that. We have thousands upon thousands of hours in operation and hundreds and hundreds of officers and men to indicate that simply is not true.
I am convinced that the reason [the] Princeton (CG-59) survived the mine explosions was the extraordinary discipline the captain had imposed in his ship and the discipline in Aegis, which naturally flowed down into damage control and general behavior throughout the ship. A lesser ship may not have made it. After voyage repairs, she sailed home with her own battle group. 1 would not apologize for the design of [the] Princeton either. She gave a pretty impressive account of herself.
Should we be searching for ways to render those ships more resistant to hostile littoral environments? You bet your boots we should. I have pushed very hard for a long time—in fact from the first day I went to work on the Aegis design—for secondary batteries in the cruisers. Now, it would seem to me that secondary batteries are becoming mandatory, given the fact that we’ve landed these big, new, beautiful launchers. But with everyone having differing ideas about what should be put in those launchers, we have reduced the defensive role of these ships significantly. We’ve reduced it even as the threat target population has exploded, and it needs to be built back up. Should we better prepare these ships that deal in inland waters against small boats? You bet.
Proceedings: Is it possible the Vincennes crew wasn’t prepared—and that’s why they made the mistake identifying the target?
Meyer: 1 don’t know whether you could honestly say that. You can look later and say that we could have trained the captain better or that we should have done this or that better, but there is another important dimension. The captain and crew knew exactly what they were doing. They really weren’t confused. We would like to pretend that they were confused.
Proceedings: Isn’t that one of the popular conceptions? Meyer: Yes. But they were under attack. That was the na-
31
ture of their error. Their belief was that they really were under attack. They weren’t confused about it. The captain deliberately closed the firing key. The captain waited as long as he could to fire. They were confused only in the sense that when we watch a football game on television, we can sit there and yell at the quarterback, “Hey you stoop, don’t you see that man open over there?” Well, of course, he doesn’t see the man. In that sense, you may call it confusion. I don’t call it confused. They knew exactly what they were doing. It just turned out to be the wrong thing.
Were there ways and means to prevent [the] Vincennes' error? I don’t know. When you are living on the edge, you are always at risk—and the opponent will always take the risk. Aegis cruisers are built to operate on the edge, but you must be very, very careful in figuring out where the edge is.
Proceedings'. If the system had been in automatic, would it still have fired?
Meyer: I don’t know. I’ve heard speculation, but it depends on what the coefficients were. If the target met those coefficients, the system would have acted. If the target didn’t meet the coefficients, the system wouldn’t have acted. In the general design of the coefficients, the intent was that they would discover cruise missiles. You would set it in automatic to take on a cruise missile—a low missile coming hot at supersonic speed a few feet off the water and the target angle was zero. That was the general intent of that doctrine, but it doesn’t mean you can’t set other numbers.
I’m the one who worked on—conceptually—the three fundamental modes. In the manual or step mode, every step is taken manually as you prepare to fire. In the semiautomatic mode, you can set up the system so everything is done except for closing the key. Then there is the automatic mode. In this mode, you can set the range of parameters and once you unlock the firing circuits the system will close the key. There is a two-man rule in the system: two people have to take action to be able to fire. I think the design still is that the officer on the bridge and the captain down below in the combat information center have to act together to close the firing circuits.
Proceedings: When you said the defensive role of the Aegis ships had been reduced, what did you mean? Meyer: We’ve been taking Standard missiles out of these ships and filling the holes with Tomahawks and antisubmarine rockets. This means their defense load is going down. Those Standard missiles are supposed to defend other ships in the battle group or expeditionary forces, in addition to the cruiser. If she has to use them all to defend herself, there won’t be any left to defend the other ships.
I believe strongly in the dimension of defense. There can be no offense without defense. You will not be much of a Tomahawk shooter or threat in the world if you are not defended adequately yourself. This means the ships that bear Tomahawks must have superb self-defense and
mutual defense capabilities, if they are going to ha' j| any staying power. Con
Today, there are two elements that any naval force mus the be able to defend against if it is going to take the war i‘ f0r the enemy. One is cruise missiles. Hardly any of us pre beo dieted how epidemic cruise missiles would become. W w-^ have, in fact, been attacked by them, as have markin'1' i$ a forces and commercial forces. They’re plentiful, and then Cut( are many varieties. In the maritime environment, at tl» out edge of war, they are always a threat. f
The second element is ballistic missiles. There are’ n0 lot of them and we must get ready for them. If there i-‘ ba] one message to take home from Desert Storm, it is tha tre; the threat of ballistic-missile attack is now wit* inij
us. Great advances in naviga in , tion and precision timekeepin; tre; make that threat almost a cef tainty in any future skirmishes /‘r( When you talk about war i( f0c the littorals, some would ha'' \j, you believe that is a recent db cns covery. In fact, however, think prc ing naval officers always have believed that a majo1 If,
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Proceedings: How does the Navy better prepare the Aegis ships against attacks from small boats?
Meyer: We must beef up the armament of the ship5 We’ve been arguing now for a long time over whether need to put small-caliber guns in our ships. Thirty year- ago there was no argument, because we had them. We h^ h 20-millimeter guns. We had 40-millimeter guns. We ha“ ir< 5-inch guns. All in one destroyer. It is ridiculous to coi>" i\] tinue this inane discussion about whether ships that sa|] th into those kinds of waters need guns.
The latest solution is to equip Phalanx with a seconds'! mode, to defend against small boats. I question the wb" dom of that approach. Phalanx was built to kill missile We need that system badly for attacking cruise missile5' Once we start changing the focus of the Phalanx, I’1” not sure what that means for our ships. I don’t thi'1*' anyone can guarantee that we will be attacked only W boats or only by cruise missiles. We are more likely to h* attacked by both at the same time.
Proceedings: How will the ABM treaty affect the Navy's ballistic missile defense?
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There may be a long period of Pax Americana, but the way you have it is with a strong fleet.
role of the Navy was to be able to carry the battle to tbf enemy. But the ballistic missile is a new factor in this. 1' the battle is to be ashore as well as at sea, you must b able to put infantry and air forces ashore. And they, too, must be able to defend against cruise missiles and ba> listic missiles.
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Meyer: I don’t know what to think about the ABM trea'l anymore. It’s become highly technical. The Senate ha- called for a review of all current programs under the U"1' brella of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, to termine whether they remain in line with the ABM treaty' I know that many people, who have worked awful*-' hard, view the treaty as serious and significant. But I,I' not sure that many people in the world care very mu' for the treaty anymore.
ha' It is hard for me to imagine a treaty that would place J constraints on the operation of the Aegis cruisers. First, the United States has an extraordinarily credible record 'art for operating peacefully. Second, if the United States ; prc began to operate outside of a treaty context, I don’t know • who would be able to stop us. Third, I don’t believe there itin>] is any design conceived, planned, or waiting to be exe- then cuted that encompasses any more than is required to carry it tit, out the mission or task at hand.
As an engineer, I look at the treaty as a nuisance—but are ‘ no worse than that. It is hard for me to imagine how our :re ballistic-missile efforts would be out of whack with the tha treaty requirements. But the Navy should concentrate its witlj initial ballistic-missile efforts in the cruisers rather than /*ga’ in the destroyers. Certainly, that is one way to keep the pin! treaty issues focused on the cruisers, cef
she-1 Proceedings: What do you mean that the Navy should ar 1l[ focus its efforts on the cruisers?
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havf Meyer: The Navy would be best served by staying fo- dh'j cused on the proper role of the destroyer: to escort and link provide fleet defense for the ships with which she sails. If we keep 12 carriers, then we need only to worry about ensuring the destroyers have an adequate capability to defend those carriers. Then we need to be certain that the cruisers are getting the appropriate upgrades to defend naval forces on an area basis against ballistic missiles.
had Proceedings: I’ve heard you liken the Navy to a fire had station and a police station. Why is that?
:oir Meyer: I think the public better understands the Navy in sail those terms. Periodically, the public wonders whether it needs a police force or a fire house and wouldn’t it be a lar) I lot cheaper to get rid of them or at least scale them back, vis-! But that never happens. When a city block is on fire, a le$- fire department becomes mighty important. Until then, it les isn’t worth all that much. And, after the fire, it’s too late 1’n1 to go make a fire department.
inf So good firemen talk prevention and they talk about the b) ability to act. The same is true of a good police force, ib* When catastrophe strikes, invariably our reaction is: Where’s the police force? Why aren’t the police taking care of this?” The reason is that there usually are not enough police to handle a catastrophe.
Here in Waikiki, the people, the buildings, the beaches, at) and the streets are all presentable. That doesn’t happen ia- automatically. It starts with a police force that preserves m' law and order and takes care of people who jump out of &e' Une. And that’s exactly the way a Navy has to function, ity- You can talk to any policemen in any precinct and he liy i could tell you about places in the precinct that you never 111 beard of. And that’s true in the Navy. The Navy nomi- icl1 Hally goes where the trouble spots are. And maybe you can’t even spell the names or find them on a map. Do
Interview
I think that it would be a mistake to think of ballistic missiles as just an adjunct to the [antiair warfare] problem. Some people want to think that way. For example, you hear a lot of talk about one missile for all. Well, I’m lot opposed to that, but my 50 years of experience ips tells me that is hard to do—technically, fiscally, and -w,f operationally, eao
we have an interest in those places? That’s not for me to say on a personal basis, but 1 would make an observation: We have an interest in whatever the Commander-in-Chief thinks we should have an interest in and in what our society thinks we should have an interest in. Furthermore, almost all of that interest exists within the dimension of prevention.
My driver here in Hawaii, a 21-year-old petty officer third class, asked me what I thought he would see in his naval career. My prediction was that he would find himself in Macedonia. I asked him if he knew where Macedonia was located. He said he knew vaguely—that’s the way most people are. But the nation has a right to expect that it has leaders who know where Macedonia is and what Macedonia is all about as far as their own national security is concerned.
Proceedings: Why Macedonia?
Meyer: It’s at the crossroads—an Islamic and an Orthodox crossroads. If you look back through civilization, it has been an important region. 1 happen to believe that history repeats itself.
Proceedings: Are you talking of a possible repeat of a conflict similar to World War I?
Meyer: Yes. Only historians, working from hindsight, can understand and attempt to explain the full emergence of a war. In real time, things happen suddenly—just one more thing occurs that pushes everything over the brink. Everything may go along peacefully for a long time, then all of a sudden an archduke is shot or someone throws a rock through a store window and a riot breaks out. War is just one overblown riot.
Proceedings: What do you think of the efforts to make and keep peace?
Meyer: We all long for peace, and we all should strive to achieve and sustain peace, but the truth is that the record isn’t very good. There may be a long period of Pax Americana, but the way you have it—and I believe very strongly about this—is with a strong fleet. We can have a long period of Pax Americana the same way we had a long period of Pax Britannia: with strong operating forces. Can air forces and ground forces in garrison accomplish the same thing? I have trouble believing they could, because, again, the record is not there. Air power has not existed long enough—not even a hundred years—to establish a record for itself. And certainly, ground forces in garrison have never sustained peace.
We hear repeatedly that we must get the policemen out of garrison and out on the beat and out in the patrol car. That’s also true of our armed forces. Mobility is the key to effective forces, whose presence is a significant and important factor in stability. There’s a lot of comfort knowing you have a decent fire station. That’s true, as well, of a first-class police force. And—when you get down to basics—that’s also true of a navy.
Richard Lawson, who conducted this interview for Proceedings, is a free-lance writer living in Chicago. Previously, he was an associate editor with the Washington newsletter, “Inside the Navy.”
^ Proceedings / February 1994
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