Agree or disagree with the concept, but the reality is that naval reservists must be full and equal partners with the regulars. Just as the frontline carrier John F. Kennedy has become a Naval Reserve Force ship available for surge and crisis deployments, naval reservists will provide continuous support to the fleet during peacetime.
In 1938, Navy regulars wanted reservists to wear undulating rank stripes on their uniforms so they could be set apart from their regular brethren. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Bureau of Personnel of the time), Admiral Chester Nimitz, objected. He felt that reservists and regulars should wear identical uniforms. Otherwise, it would mark the reservists as different and somehow inferior, when in fact they would have essentially the same authority and the same responsibilities, they were coming to fight and die, just as the regulars. As Admiral Nimitz said, “Difference in uniform implied a lack of unity that did not, or should not exist.”
In the fall of 1993, Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton characterized the sea service reserve components as full and equal partners in the total force. His remarks have since been amplified by the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda has declared that “The number one job of the Naval Reserve is to do the Navy’s work today.” Adding momentum, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces urged an increased reliance upon the reserves, noting that they should “. . . contribute as much as practical to executing the national strategy.” Not since Admiral Nimitz has senior Navy leadership spoken about the Naval Reserve with such clarity.
The Naval Reserve has been evolving since its inception in 1915, struggling to define its mission and to gain full acceptance from its regular counterpart. There has been resistance—especially from those who view an increased use of reservists as a threat to established force structure. Recent historical events, such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm and “rightsizing,” however, combined with fewer defense dollars and more military deployments, have aided and accelerated this evolution toward full partnership.
It has become increasingly clear that even greater change is needed to exploit the efficiencies and economies of the Naval Reserve, which today is composed primarily of prior-service personnel who also possess valuable experience and training and who represent a significant investment by our nation’s taxpayers. In addition to their military experience, reservists have talents often in short supply in active components, such as: medical and dental specialists; architects; environmental and construction experts; management consultants; and computer programmers. All are available at a fraction of their civilian contract cost, and their full employment capitalizes on the prior-service investment.
Admiral Boorda’s words highlight the financial bottom line of the future: without global conflict, the size of the military and its supporting budgets will not increase dramatically. We must make do with what we have now. To do so effectively means removing all impediments to the full use of our reserve components. We must scrap the old model that relegated the Naval Reserve to preparing for mobilization in response to global Soviet attack—the fabled “M-Day.”
This Cold War paradigm governed force structure and employment of reserve components through every conflict since World War II. Since then, however, there have been only two significant reserve recalls—for the Korean War and Desert Shield/Storm. In fact, 45 years had passed between those two major recalls. Despite billions of dollars invested in the Naval Reserve, it remained a force trained and waiting for the call-up that never came. Its employment was hindered by narrow interpretation of Title 10, Section 262 (now Section 10102) U.S. Code.
The traditional view is that individual billets and units of the Naval Reserve are mobilization assets suitable only for mobilization training, and can neither be created nor funded unless they are identified within a mobilization requirement. This means that reservists cannot “do the Navy’s work today,” unless that work enhances mobilization readiness. Further, monies appropriated for the Naval Reserve can be used only to fund training.
As a result, the Navy has been—and still is—unable to tailor its reserve billet structure to meet all of today’s contingency support requirements. During the Navy’s attempts to mobilize reservists in support of war against Iraq, the Chief of Naval Personnel, then-Vice Admiral Boorda, discovered that existing reserve mobilization plans made no provision to identify and access reservists for anything less than a global war. Imaginative ad hoc processes were brought into play, and the Navy quickly patched together a recall effort which, although not perfect, covered most requirements. It was obvious, however, that the Naval Reserve was not structured to be accessed efficiently to meet the demands of a regional conflict.
Coincidentally, while the United States was gearing up for the Gulf War, Under Secretary of the Navy Dan Howard told the Navy’s National Naval Reserve Policy Board (NNRPB) that the Navy was prepared to reduce radically, if not eliminate totally, the Naval Reserve. As he put it, “The CinCs don’t feel like they’re getting their money’s worth from the reservists, and they’re tired of paying the bill.” He noted that there hadn’t been a reserve call-up since the Korean War, and that represented nearly 40 years of paying for something that provided no return on investment.
Secretary Howard’s words energized the Board, and with the encouragement of Deputy Assistant Secretary (Reserve Affairs) Donald Morency, the NNRPB made a radical proposal, recommending a policy to maximize the use of reservists across the full range of operations and support, from peace to global war. The Board undertook a comprehensive study of the function and accessibility of the Naval Reserve. The result was a philosophical revolution which proposed contemporary assistance to Navy fleet and support activities as a legitimate function of the Naval Reserve and a justification for force structure. The “New Model for the Naval Reserve” proposed to legitimize three distinct and equally valuable categories of reserve support:
- Wartime complement manning (traditional)
- Contingency forces for crisis situations (voluntary and 673[b] recall)
- Continuous contributory support to the fleet during peacetime
After a cooperative effort, the Navy Judge Advocate General and the National Naval Reserve Policy Board agreed that the language of 10 USC 262—especially the phrase, “at such other times as the national security requires”—was flexible enough to support a more expansive interpretation, and that no new legislation was required to implement change. However, because of concerns centered on congressional reaction, the same lawyers were not ready to embrace the implementation of this interpretation. Therefore, although continuous contributory support as a primary mission and stand-alone billet validator for the reserve was not supported by the resulting Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SecNavInst 1001.20), it was the first official recognition of this function as a legitimate and valuable activity. In addition, it permitted the Navy to consider peacetime support as a factor in the billet validation process. Even in its watered-down form, it was a true paradigm shift, and reflected one of the Navy’s most important course changes since the Cold War.
Under the Chief of Naval Operations, then Admiral Frank Kelso, and the Director of the Naval Reserve, Rear Admiral Thomas Hall, a number of significant firsts were initiated, including the inauguration of the Innovative Naval Reserve Concepts process and later the Total Force War Game. These initiatives brought together senior reserve and regular programmers and staff to identify and prioritize new reserve requirements in support of the Defense Planning Guidance. Reserve participation in all major war games was established as a matter of routine. The strategic planning process was evolving into a total Navy process, and the accession of reservists for a variety of contingencies actually was being exercised.
All of these changes, and more, were woven into Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OpNavInst) 1001.2A, which implemented the policies established by SecNavInst 1001.20. Peacetime contributory support was fully legitimized. This landmark instruction also included the concept of defining the amount of support individuals and units may provide the regular forces in terms of their placement in the Time Phased Force Deployment Plan. Depending on their response time, they were either “crisis response immediate” or “crisis response delayed.” This became known as “flexible readiness,” which recognized that different individuals and units had different readiness requirements, based on their unique missions. Thus, units and individuals were permitted to perform work while maintaining a level of readiness compatible with their timely response to call-up or other accession means.
“Flexible readiness” already is providing the active component with greater accessibility to its reserve shore assets (medical, dental, supply, SeaBees, etc.), by giving them the discretion to establish its training and contributory support policies.
These advances were picked up and developed by the Navy in the recent Naval Reserve Roles and Missions Study. This in turn was followed by the Secretary of the Navy’s Peacetime Contributory Support Study, which created a comprehensive process to identify, fund, and track contemporary active-component support requirements.
The result of this continuing evolution is that the Naval Reserve now provides vital mission capability and/or peacetime contributory support to the active component on a daily basis. More than 1,327,000 workdays and $192 million of peacetime contributory support were provided by the Naval Reserve in fiscal year 1994, and the future holds an even greater promise of support. In addition, a comprehensive Peacetime Contributory Support Plan was instituted, with milestones and goals incorporated, to ensure that the maximum amount of available time of reservists is dedicated to supporting the Navy. Figure 1 illustrates a few of the Naval Reserve’s contributions.
There are exciting new missions under way for the Naval Reserve. The first operational reserve aircraft carrier is the John F. Kennedy (CV-67). Her primary mission, like any other Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ship, is to be a reserve and fleet training asset, available for surge and crisis requirements. A Naval Reserve air wing (CVW-20) will be operating in the fleet, and new Naval Reserve C-130 aircraft are providing additional air logistics support capability. The C-130s are flying all around the world, including a detachment in support of U.S. troops to Bosnia. The transfer of two LSTs to the Naval Reserve Force, and retention of five LKAs and two more LSTs in ready operational status will enhance amphibious lift significantly. Further, Naval Reserve Force frigates are conducting worldwide deployments alongside active components, reducing operating tempo (OpTempo) and personnel tempo (PersTemp) pressures on the regular forces. Reserve participation in the mine warfare area continues to expand with the assignment of the Inchon (LPH-12), 4 of 14 new Avenger (MCM-l)-class mine counter measures ships, and 11 of 12 new Osprey (MHC-51)-class mine hunter ships to the Naval Reserve Force.
There are five primary influencing factors in expanding the use of reserve forces: accessibility; equipment; unit and personnel readiness; funding; and, the commitment from the regular Navy to support the use.
- Accessibility: Desert Storm firmly established that accessibility is no longer an issue; reservists definitely will come when called. There is no indication that the Navy is overtaxing its reservists. Employers remain steady in their support of their employees who are reservists, and new legislative initiatives in Congress are designed to mitigate the impact on both, including mobilization insurance and tax incentives.
- Equipment: For the Naval Reserve to respond adequately to crisis or contingency and to be equipment ready, the Department of the Navy must continue to fulfill its promise of horizontal integration of contemporary equipment. Some Naval Reserve units are still equipped with outdated and/or incompatible equipment, however. This means that reservists training with such equipment will be unable to integrate and operate with our fleets effectively in time of crisis.
- Readiness: As part of “flexible readiness,” the Navy accepts that time traditionally reserved for training (drills, active duty for training, additional duty for training and individual duty for training [Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) funding]) can be used to “. . . do the Navy’s work today.” The challenge is to balance mission readiness and the ability to respond with the doing of such work.
> Funding: The Navy budget process continues to seek the proper balance of priorities between the funding of active and reserve components to enable the efficiencies and economies present in the Naval Reserve to be fully exploited. The Naval Reserve’s record of returning the Navy’s investment, combined with the support of the Fleet CinCs, has resulted in the Navy’s commitment to fund adequately Naval Reserve end strength. The Navy will fund between 96,000 and 98,000 reservists, although it has identified fleet requirements for more than 120,000 reservists. This will dramatically expand the Naval Reserve’s ability to provide contemporary support. Nevertheless, until this promise is kept, the Naval Reserve will remain seriously under-funded and unable to provide the support the Fleet CinCs require in order to meet operational objectives.
- Commitment: The active component must commit to a continuous process of mission and capabilities evaluation, and be willing to use the reservists wherever they add value. During Desert Storm, there were regrettable incidents where reservists were not used—even when they were clearly needed. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Reserve, and the Navy Secretariat need to continue efforts to move the Navy beyond this kind of dangerous parochialism.
Addressing the Cold War mobilization paradigm, the Chief of Naval Personnel is exploring changes in reserve manpower analysis and validation methodology to meet CinC requirements in peace, crisis, or conflict. The Navy is taking the lead in this vital area and the other services are watching our progress with great interest. This effort enhances the Navy’s ability to identify and validate reserve billets needed to support directly the Navy’s “Forward . . . from the Sea” strategy. Although global mobilization is no longer probable, we must still be prepared to respond to a wide variety of threats and contingencies. Through the use of war games and other requirements determinators, we can identify the specific billets to facilitate our response.
In order to fully refine this paradigm shift, the Navy needs to revisit its understanding of “contingency.” In planning its own force structure, the regular Navy component does not think solely in terms of responses to armed conflicts. It justifies its billets to support a wide range of requirements—on shore or at sea, in peace or in combat—which cover the full range of its operations. Using the same template for the reserve components as the active component will simplify the process and promote compatibility.
A command’s requirement to redesign its computer programs, or its need for increased administrative support, may be as much a “contingency” as the necessity to respond to a regional threat. A requirement to augment a naval station’s security forces may also be a “contingency” which requires a response. Using reservists to train on and be prepared to activate our hospital ships may satisfy a contingency as well. Contingencies can take many shapes, and the Navy should have the ability to access the skills of all the people available to it to meet them.
The Navy is presently examining staff requirements for reserve support, to determine whether those requirements are better met through the use of traditional reserve units or individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs). The Fleet CinCs have been queried about their preferences. Expanding the use of IMAs, particularly in the areas of staff and specialized contributory support requirements, may be a better way to preserve corporate experience and meet the customer’s needs. We are also exploring the desirability of shifting management determinations concerning active duty, active duty for training, active duty for special work, training relevance, functional skill utilization. and staff personnel for coordination to the Fleet CinCs. To facilitate global mobilization, these functions are presently concentrated in the Commanders of Naval Air and Surface Reserve Forces respectively.
As part of this shift of management function, senior reserve leaders are studying ways to facilitate the most efficient employment of reservists. Working with all levels of the active component command structure, the Navy is already in the process of establishing new reserve units, IMA billets, and assigning selected reserve flag officers and full-time support personnel. This deployment of reserve management expertise and support should mitigate the problems of coordination and communication which frustrate efforts to get the “right reservist, right place, right time, every time” as Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force, Rear Admiral Francis H. Harness says.
The theme that runs through all these initiatives is maximum and efficient use of all Navy personnel, regular or reserve, and complements the National Performance Review and the President’s efforts to reinvent government. The key to success in this dramatic rudder change is twofold. First is education. Navy leadership must be committed to putting the word out about the reservists and their daily contributions to the fleet: how they operate, integrate, and facilitate within the sea services. Further, it must be included in every major policy statement, such as the “Forward . . . from the Sea”, and in the Navy’s Program Planning Guidance, and at every step of professional military education. And the Naval Doctrine Command should weave the role of the Naval Reserve through every publication.
Second is the inclusion of the Naval Reserve in all aspects of strategic planning. Not a single policy affecting the structure, welfare, or implementation of the Total Force should be put in place without the full and active participation of the reservists. An appropriate place and voice must be provided at the table for this vitally important 21% of the U.S. Navy.
In the spirit of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, it is time to remove the remaining visual discriminators which exist between regulars and reservists, such as different colored identification cards and the “R” in “USNR." These devices serve no necessary administrative function, promote elitism, and mark the reservists as somehow different and inferior to the regulars . . . and, to paraphrase Admiral Nimitz, these differences imply a lack of unity that does not, or should not exist.
If we are to properly honor the memory and sacrifice of the thousands of reservists who have perished in combat since inception of the Naval Reserve, if we are to remain true to our vision of a single Navy community, we must remove these final barriers to full partnership. Only then can the total force meet the challenges facing, in the words of Secretary Dalton, the “Navy after next” and, as Admiral Boorda says, . . do the Navy’s work today.”
Mr. Sanders is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Reserve Affairs. He is a Captain in the Naval Reserve.