This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
In 1954 the Hartwell Report, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense, recommended the development of a state-of-the-art early warning system for the U.S. Navy. This recommendation was based on the knowledge that low-frequency sound waves trapped in the deep sound channel of the ocean could be detected at extremely long ranges. This knowledge, coupled with the fact that the Soviet submarine force was rapidly becoming a serious threat, gave rise to Project Jezebel and—eventually—the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS).
The system was based on an elaborate system of fixed acoustic arrays in strategic locations around North America and other forward locations that were connected by submarine cable to Naval Facilities (NavFacs) in such places as: Bermuda; Argentia, Newfoundland; Shelburne, Nova Scotia; Dam Neck, Virginia; and Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. These facilities housed the equipment that processed, displayed, and analyzed the raw acoustical data collected by the arrays. The system provided the U.S. Navy with the unique ability to detect, classify, position, track, and attack Soviet attack and ballistic-missile submarines, and gave it the upper hand in the antisubmarine battles of the Cold War.
The strategic importance of SOSUS was not lost on Canada, as a close ally of the United States that shared its interest in the defense of North America. From the beginning the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was involved in the program, assisting the U.S. Navy in manning the SOSUS network. Because of the shroud of secrecy that cloaked SOSUS for many years, Canada’s involvement in the project—and the role its military personnel played—is little known.
Canada first became involved when one of the early NavFacs was opened in Shelburne, Nova Scotia. Intially operated mainly by U.S. personnel, Shelburne soon was turned over to the RCN, which in turn provided most of the personnel to operate the facility. When the RCN, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force were unified into the Canadian Armed Forces (CF) in 1968, the facility was redesignated Canadian Forces Station Shelburne, but remained under the operational command of Commander Undersea Surveillance, based in Norfolk, Virginia.
In 1972, Canada expanded its role in SOSUS and provided a small detachment to assist in operations at the U.S. NavFac at Argentia, Newfoundland. By the early 1980s, the detachment had grown from 20 to roughly 90 personnel and had become an integral part of operations and life at Argentia.
In the mid-1970s, SOSUS itself underwent a major upgrade. Technical advances in computers, communications, and processing equipment, plus the ad-
Using technology originally designed to track Soviet submarines, the Canadian Offshore Surveillance Center provides maritime information to various departments of the Canadian government.
dition of the Surveillance Towed Array Subsystem (SURTASS, a mobile long- aperture hydrophone array), transformed SOSUS from a strategic early warning system to one with definite tactical abilities. The integration of fixed arrays and mobile towed arrays created the system known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS).
As the IUSS expanded, so too did Canada’s involvement. Canadian personnel—mainly of the oceanographic operator trade, the equivalent to the U.S. Navy’s ocean systems technician analyst rate—took on a greater role. Positions were created for additional CF personnel at the Naval Ocean Processing Facility, Dam Neck, Virginia; at NavFac Bermuda; at Headquarters, Commander Undersea Surveillance Atlantic in Norfolk; and at Headquarters, Commander Undersea Surveillance Pacific, Ford Island, Hawaii. A Canadian detachment was formed at NavFac Whidbey Island, Washington. Through the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s, Canada’s commitment to the IUSS remained strong.
With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, 40 years of chilly East-West relations finally ended. Although it remained a significant force, the Soviet submarine fleet drastically changed its deployment patterns; it now seems satisfied to operate relatively closer to home and in smaller numbers. This thaw in relations—and the related change in Soviet submarine deployments—marked the end of an era for the IUSS and demanded the definition of a new direction for both the U.S. and Canadian navies.
The proliferation of submarine technology around the world and growing number of regional conflicts spawned a different approach to the future use of naval forces. In the U.S. Navy White Paper “. . . From the Sea,” a greater emphasis was placed on littoral operations. Those involved with the IUSS also realized this shift away from blue-water operations and paid more attention to detecting noise sources at closer ranges. From its beginning, a large portion of the IUSS’s effort was devoted to filtering out unwanted non-submarine information which masked the presence of actual targets. Given the very “noisy” operating environment that the IUSS analysts were used to dealing with—especially the Grand Banks—this was no easy task, but major successes were achieved. With the new emphasis on littoral warfare, a major change had to be undertaken to investigate non-submarine information, which now was of great interest.
The turnaround in the focus of the IUSS was complicated by other factors, however. Hard fiscal realities forced the U.S. and Canadian governments to rethink their spending priorities, especially in the area of defense. Shrinking defense budgets forced naval planners to look for ways to reduce expenditures significantly while retaining capabilities. The U.S. Navy quickly identified one asset which, because of the end of the Cold War, was considered to be underused and overfunded: the IUSS.
The system, worth an estimated $16 billion, quickly became a prime target for cost-cutters. Naval Facilities were closed and consolidated. Most SURTASS vessels were taken out of service, and operations and maintenance budgets were slashed. The remarkable undersea surveillance capabilities of the IUSS seemed in danger of being lost for good.
As a maritime nation with the longest coastline in the world and bordering three oceans, Canada had a keen interest in retaining a strong maritime surveillance capability. Therefore, when the U.S. Navy announced that it would close its NavFac in Argentia, Newfoundland—a site that could provide Canada with vital information on maritime activities in its wa-
70
Proceedings / March 1995
ters off the east coast of North America— Canada saw an opportunity to increase its undersea surveillance capabilities.
Funding was quickly approved to construct a new facility at Canada’s naval base in Halifax, Nova Scotia, that would become the new analysis center for all acoustical information gathered in Ar- gentia. The U.S. Navy agreed to the plan, and construction quickly commenced. Officially opened in August 1994, the Canadian Offshore Surveillance Center was fully operational by early 1995.
This new facility is only the beginning of a very bright future for Canada in the area of undersea surveillance. It will give Canada a unique ability to monitor its own waters closely and to provide additional information to mobile forces— not only of the Canadian Navy but also of other government departments and agencies.
With recognized capabilities not only in the detection of submarines but also of surface ships, aircraft, marine mammals, and seismic events, the IUSS is an invaluable asset. Its capability to conduct operations in the littoral areas ties closely with the new directions stated in “. . . From the Sea.” Major improvements to the command, control, and communications functions of the IUSS Nav- Facs have given them a greater ability to operate on a more integral basis with mobile forces. When coupled with the recognized surveillance capabilities of the IUSS and the mobility of aircraft and ships, this will give Canada and the United States an advantage never before realized in littoral operations.
The utility of IUSS to current naval operations could be shown clearly a hypothetical exercise in the Grand Banks off the coast of Newfoundland. The shallow waters and heavy fishing and merchant traffic in the area would provide an excellent environment for any force commander to test his abilities to operate in any littoral region of the world. This area also would be ideal for proving the integration of IUSS into tactical fleet operations.
Apart from military applications, the recently heightened interest of Canada and other nations in preventing overfishing on the Grand Banks and elsewhere off Canada’s East Coast has provided the IUSS, and especially Canada, new targets to track. Recent operations between Canadian maritime forces conducting fisheries patrols on the Grand Banks and the IUSS have had good results in identifying vessels suspected of violating fisheries regulations. The surveillance capabilities of IUSS were used to locate, identify, and track suspect vessels. This information then was relayed to a Canadian warship in the area, which moved to prosecute the target. Such coordination can be achieved with aircraft as well—providing expanded surveillance coverage, especially in littoral regions.
The IUSS tracking process can be used not only against fishing vessels but also for other targets of interest, such as potential drug traffickers and ships suspected of breaking environmental regulations. Information gathered on ships of interest can be passed quickly to other agencies that would take further enforcement action—e.g., the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of the Environment, or the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
The IUSS also has recently proved itself to scientists, especially those involved in the study of marine mammals. Information available on the migratory patterns, populations, and long-range communication abilities of many species of whales—including the blue, humpback, minke, and finback—has been greatly advanced by the IUSS in recent years.
Information previously unavailable to researchers—because of its secretive nature—is being released for study. Dr. Chris Clark of Cornell University, a long time marine-mammal researcher, has worked closely with the IUSS since it started its whale project in 1993. He has stated that the data collected so far is extraordinary; by using the IUSS, more information on whales has been gathered in the past two years than ever before. Other scientific uses for the IUSS include ocean-current tracking, acoustic telemetry, acoustic tomography (global warming), and the monitoring of ocean seismic events, as is being done by Dr. Clyde Nishimura of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory’s marine physics branch.
The IUSS, an investment paid for during the Cold War, is a highly capable system that will continue its service to both military and civilian agencies well into the next century. For its part, Canada will continue to participate in the system and expand its role as an aid to the enforcement of Canadian sovereignty and laws. The Canadian Offshore Surveillance Center will become one of the primary assets of Canada in matters of maritime surveillance—today, in the Atlantic, and, in the near future, it is hoped, into the Arctic and Pacific Oceans as well.
Lieutenant Bickford joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1986. As a maritime surface-subsurface- classified officer, he has served in several ships—including HMCS Terra Nova during the Persian Gulf War—and as the Canadian Offshore Surveillance Center liaison officer at U.S. Naval Facility Argen- tia, Newfoundland. Since August 1994, he has been antisubmarine-warfare director in HMCS Nipigon.
Peruvian Sailors Fight Ashore
By Rear Admiral Fernando Casaretto Alvarado, Peruvian Navy
The Peruvian Navy serves in the front lines not only at sea, but also ashore—a mission it has had for more than ten years.
More than 22 million persons populate Peru’s coastal, mountain, and jungle regions—a mosaic of variegated geography in South America’s third largest country. The nation, rich in ethnic cultures—each jealously guarding its own customs—has been difficult to govern. Almost 30% of the population lives around the capital city of Lima, which has helped create not only centralism, but also, particularly since 1980, the phenomenon of terrorist subversion that the nation has been fighting for the last 14 years.
The Peruvian Navy is basically a seagoing and riverine force, but does operate on lakes such as Titicaca, on the border with Bolivia. Peruvian gunboats routinely navigate the swift-running rivers on the eastern slopes of the Andes, and a hospital ship operates along the rivers of the frontier.
The Departments of Loreto, Ucayali, and Madre de Dios form the frontier between Peru and Brazil. Task Force 100 has its headquarters in the Department of Ucayali; it also operates in the Department of Huanuco’s Province of Puerto Inca, and the Department of Loreto’s Province of Ucayali. The area has seen much of the fighting against subversion fomented by the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Movimiento Rev- oluciondrio Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement—MRTA).
Fighting initially in the south-central Andes in the Department of Ayacucho, the birthplace of the Shining Path movement, and later in the high jungle of Ayacucho, the navy at present is engaged in the jungle itself in Ucayali. Loreto, and Huanuco.
71
Proceedings / March 1995