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The U.S. armed forces have made great strides in joint operations. The Persian Gulf Link-11 net and its use by forces to achieve greater connectivity is an excellent example. The theater-wide link is the primary communications node for many of the decision makers in the Gulf region.
The Tactical Data Information Link (TADIL)-A/B net involves U.S. Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps units plus Royal Saudi Air Force and Navy, and Bahrain Defense Forces. Rear Admiral Raynor A. K. Taylor, U.S. Navy, for-
Jointness and interoperability were key principles as the United States began to build defenses in the region. When Operation Southern Watch began in August 1992, Joint Task Force- Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) became the Force Track Coordinator of the TADIL-A/B net, and its picture became the prime focus of the net. The task force command center (call sign K-MART) at Riyadh Air Force Base and the European Landing Force Detachment 1 (call sign RHINO) at Dhahran Air Force Base passed TADIL information to the Royal Saudi Air Force units.
The current structure of the Persian Gulf Link (see Figure 1)—a combination of TADIL-A and TADIL-B nets— is a good example of the way the services can work together.
Exploiting assets from all the users, the TADIL-A/B net keeps Central Command’s component commanders—Navy, Army, and Air Force—plus JTF-SWA informed of the real-time status of all units in the theater. It is constantly tested in this harsh and challenging environment.
It has its problems, which can usually be divided into two categories: technical and those resulting from a lack of understanding among the users. They have worked together to resolve the problems but, although most of the Desert Storm issues have been resolved, a myriad of others have arisen from attempts to refine the process. Chief among the technical issues are:
► Track classification
► Net control station (NCS) selection >• Multiple tracks
► Communications connectivity >• Net discipline
Only constant attention to detail by all the players can solve them. Monthly meetings help, and the Navy has simplified operations by publishing a standing Operational Tasking Link using permanent participating units instead of line numbers. This facilitates entry into the Link by as many players as possible. Normally the Link-11 net has a number of participants, including the U.S. Air Force and Navy, Royal Saudi Air Force,
-------- TADIL-A HF or UHF, 1-2 Freqs, combos may be 1/2 HFs or 1 UHF
.................. TADIL-B Land line or TACSAT
H-UIHIIIII TADIL-C UHF only
............. PADIL Patriot land line link
xxxaoooooooa IJMS (Intermediate Joint Msg Sys) USAF unique, precursor to JTIDS
U.S. Army Patriot missile batteries have become vital parts of any U.S. antitactical ballistic missile defense. Their command posts must have access to the latest data.
mer Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, called it “Truly the best example of joint operations in the AOR [area of responsibility] that is in existence today.” It is a recent development. During Operation Desert Storm, there were at least three separate Link-11 nets throughout the AOR: one in the Red Sea; one—or sometimes more—in the Persian Gulf; and a third serving the Saudi Peninsula. The first two nets were primarily naval, while the latter was a U.S. Air Force-Army TADIL- A/B net. There were gateways to facilitate intercommunications between these nets but their performance was substandard and inadequate for wartime contingencies. There was no theater-wide connectivity until after the Gulf War.
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Proceedings / January 1995
Why Can't We Talk?
The USS Mitsclier (DDG-57), shown on firing trials last August, carries a capability that her namesake could have used off Okinawa in 1945 when a kamikaze hit his flagship.
and British naval vessels with other units—Australian naval vessels and the U.S. Army, for example—occasionally conducting operations.
The operational tasking link format was taken from U.S.
Naval Warfare Publication 101-13, Supplement 6, which is the guide for all joint message formats. Reasonably coherent, it replaces the morass of documents that have been used by the various services.
Classification of track identification by participating units— especially the Air Force’s E-3B Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft—was a major issue. The E-3Bs originally classified all targets as friendly unless they originated over Iraq. This caused problems for the Navy because the classification precludes certain shipboard fire-control systems from engaging such a track automatically. It also conflicted substantially with the Navy’s concern—greater than that of the Air Force—for Iranian threats. To correct this perceived deficiency, the Navy circulated rough copies of a track identification matrix that was eventually accepted by all parties in December 1991.
Other initiatives by the Navy included use of the Link Monitor System (LMS)-11, referred to as the “Link Doctor,” throughout the Gulf and the eventual integration of the U.S.
Army’s Patriot missile system into the net.
A ship modification permits the use of the LMS-11 on virtually any Naval Tactical Data System-capable unit. Given their limited numbers the Navy tends to place them on major antiair warfare ships. Used primarily to monitor the signal-to-noise ratio of the system, in reality the LMS-11 is a sophisticated diagnostic tool that can be used to troubleshoot the analog portion of the system. In the Gulf, it is used to determine which platform is best suited for the role of the net control station. It also can analyze longterm trends—a capability that has been used to determine transmitter-receiver discrepancies in units throughout the region. The Air Force’s 552nd AW ACS squadron, for example, used them to tweak their aircraft radios.
The Army’s Patriot missile system, on the other hand, uses a phased-array radar with the potential to serve as another participating unit—if the connections through the Air Force’s AN/TYC-10 Message Processing Center in Dhahran can be arranged. This is significant because the intense summer heat affects the air mass overland to the extent that radar coverage from airborne units such as E-2Cs is limited. A TADIL-A link with the Patriot radars inland would improve coverage.
Beyond the technical problems, some participants lack an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Link— which is why they must become more intimately involved in crossdecking operations in the region. Many of the current problems with the Persian Gulf Link are directly attributable to this lack of knowledge. The U.S. Navy—the dominant player in the net—did send liaison officers, including carrier battle group representatives, to Riyadh to fly on board the AW ACS, but most were able to stay for only a limited time and thus could not talk with all the crews.
The situation improved in the summer of 1993 when the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) sent 50 crew members to Riyadh to fly with the 552nd and 40 Air Force and Army officers plus Link-11 operators went on board the Nimitz and the Lake Champlain (CG-57). These crossdecking efforts during WestPac ’93 were a major factor in improving link operations.
But ships and squadrons go home and new ones take their place. An Army-Navy team should be stationed permanently in Riyadh with the 552nd. The team should include E-2C crewmembers, a senior airborne intercept controller who has served as a track supervisor as well as an Army non-commissioned officer with extensive Patriot experience. The Navy created such positions during the Gulf War but has not filled them since early 1991. The naval representative at Manama, Bahrain, has a primary Link-11 billet—but he is normally tied to Bahrain and cannot visit Riyadh to brief new AW ACS crews and handle Navy Link-11 issues.
Even through the AWACS aircraft have been operating in the Gulf for almost 12 years, most of that time has been devoted to serving as a radar warning platform for the RSAF command center. The Persian Gulf Link-11 net is 90% Navy, and yet the AWACS crews do not have a full understanding of Navy procedures. Only with the massive influx of Navy ships and Army air defense artillery batteries during the Gulf War did the Air Force begin to develop procedures for a joint net.
More important, the liaison officers could manage the crossdecking effort—a never-ending requirement to get newly arrived players up to date. It can be done—we just have to decide to do it.
Lieutenant Armistead, a naval flight officer, is serving as the Antiair Warfare/Link- 11 Officer on the USS Nimitz (CVN-68). He has served in the fleet with VAW-125 and as an instructor with VAW-120. He served as the Naval Forces Central Command Link-11/Anliair Warfare Officer in Bahrain from July 1991 to January 1992.
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Proceedings / January 1995
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