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launched SA-N-9 Gophers were not canted in any way, hovve The Admiral Kharlamov, completed in 1989, is inten
Below Decks on Russian Warships
Given a rarely extended opportunity to visit below decks on the Russian S/ava-class cruiser Marshal Ustinov [ex-Admiral Lobov] and the Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Kharlamov in Boston harbor, I saw a command-and-control organization quite different from that of the U.S. Navy.
The Marshal Ustinov, completed in 1986, has four separate mechanisms for targeting her over-the-horizon SS-N-12 Sandbox missiles: a Bell Crown standard data link alongside her foremast; a Punch Bowl satellite link to passive ocean-reconnaissance satellites (the active- radar reconnaissance satellite program is dead); a radar- equipped Ka-25 Hormone helicopter in a hangar aft; and
SS-N-12s on the Marshal Ustinov (right); SS-N-12 target assignment console (bottom left); SS-N-12 control console (middle); radar/weapon status board (bottom right).
Rum Tub electronic support measures (ESM) equipment.
Antiship ESM might seem useless beyond the horizon, but many signals trapped in ducts near the sea surface can travel surprising distances. In the North Atlantic, ducting is frequent but very intermittent; ESM works only if the set can pick up fleeting traces of signals. That is apparently the case with Rum Tub, which is also the major ESM set triggering Side Globe directional noise jammers. Other ships, such as the Kiev and
Kirov classes, use Rum Tub only for targeting, and other: tennas (Bell Bash-Bell Thump) to direct the jammers.
The Admiral Kharlamov carries the next-generation Wif Glass ESM set for over-the-horizon targeting. Her SS-N-14 m1 siles have a secondary antiship capability and she can data-lb with other ships to triangulate targets, much as U.S. ships f# with the Classic Outboard HF/DF system are designed to wo;1
The Russian vertical launch missile system is quite differ^ from those common in the West. There is only a single door a® the magazine below rotates to place a missile under it for firi®
Because a missile blast mii set the others in the magaZ® alight, the missiles are cok launched, meaning that they 1 nite after getting airbor®1 (Western systems, with missile per cell, use launches.) The Russians the® fore cant their missile tub slightly outboard, so that i®1' siles that fail to ignite duds 'vl not fall back onto the sh>t Many years ago, U.S. desi?1 ers did much the same thi®; The Admiral Kharlamov’s
primarily for ASW, with a main battery of eight SS-N-14 U’1, siles forward and a pair of ASW helicopters aft. The reader'' note that the hinges on the upper and lower SS-N-14 tubes “ fer. The missile was designed to carry either a torpedo or u 1,1 clear depth bomb. The special hinges on the lower tubes ‘ reportedly connected to a nuclear release mechanism, which
Second Captain consoles in the Admiral Kharlamov’s battle information post; there is a repeater on the bridge.
quite warm, and although doors into
the
P mputs such as damage control data (transmitted from a sep- damage control center) and weapons readiness data in ad-
l0n to the usual data from the ship’s sensors and messages via data link. Also, quite unlike its Western counterparts, it
tain
A/,
PPWial Ustinov—used by the commanding officer. The Mar... Ustinov also has a large console for SS-N-12 weapon as-
>me
y'N‘l4s-
sj(!<J«e; the Admiral Kharlamov did not, but did have a televi- monitor, which presumably had the same function.
tacks them only when the appropriate release code is received. Given the agreement with the United States to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from the sea, these tubes are probably now empty.
The Admiral Kharlamov has smoke floats in deck release positions fore and afti they are probably intended to frustrate electro-optically or laser-guided weapons— the ship also has the new Spetra-F laser detector. The older Marshal Ustinov ftas neither detectors nor smoke floats, ar|d lacks the newer ship’s fixed chaff launchers.
Both ships are air-conditioned, at least amidships near the command spaces. For many years the Russian Navy and its So- v,et predecessor have used “citadels” to Protect against fallout and chemical attack, he citadel is sealed, and positive air presSUre >n it prevents gas or particles from emering. This sort of arrangement requires lhat the ship be operable entirely from
Within enclosed spaces. Although the day
rvas superstructure were often opened, the Marshal Ustinov had 'ery effective air-conditioning. The Admiral Kharlamov's seemed ess effective.
The two ships have similar command arrangements that are aPParently typical of modem Russian surface combatants. The Pt'naary combat system computer, referred to as the “Second aPtain,” is connected to a variety of multi-function displays: °n the bridge, in the ship’s combat information center (CIC), vvhich the Russians call a battle information post, and in a separate Weapons control space.
Unlike a Western combat data computer, such as the Navy ^taical data system,the Russian’s Second Captain receives own-
arate <Jiti sent
PUKJuces a ranked list of tactical options. It can, moreover, fight e ship if necessary, using scripts in its memory—hence its 0rnewhat sardonic name. This provides yet another important Pti°n: a group commander (or the commander’s combat com- Ptaer) can controi a subordinate ship via a data link feeding that 'P s Second Captain system. This option was dearly visible ^ board the missile boat Hiddqnsee, where the SS-N-2 missile console had a data-link setting. The boat was too small to e a system of its own, but its architecture had to fit the same
hlerarchy.
Each ship’s bridge is divided fore and aft by an athwartships ain, shielding surface-search radar scopes and Second Cap- consoles—one in the Admiral Kharlamov and two in the
nent; the Admiral Kharlamov lacked any equivalent for her (j .A U14s. The Marshal Ustinov had a large periscope on the
The bridge consoles are standard multifunction units; the Marshal Ustinov has 20 scattered about her bridge and weapons control station. The ship’s battle information post was located several decks below and abaft the bridge, buried in the hull for protection.
The Admiral Kharlamov’s battle information post, in contrast, was just aft of the bridge, perhaps half a deck down, and thus still in the superstructure. More generally, the cruiser was much more heavily built. Presumably that reflects a formal distinction between destroyer and cruiser standards of construction, which would be comparable to that in many other navies. The cruiser’s wardroom extended all the way across the ship; the destroyer’s was far more cramped.
The battle information post functions partly as an alternative bridge and partly as a weapon assignment station. As in the U.S. Navy, the Russian Navy would much prefer this protected area for the CO’s post in combat, but many COs much prefer the bridge. An open passage links the battle information post with the weapons control station from which the weapons are actually fired. In the Marshal Ustinov, it accommodated a classical vertical manual plot, a relatively large space that also contained two Second Captain terminals (equivalent to those on the bridge), another SS-N-12 assignment console, and an SS-N-12 control console—the only one on the ship.
In the Admiral Kharlamov, the battle information post accommodated a pair of Second Captain consoles (one could be used for ASW and the other for AAW, or one could be used for both); the secondary bridge also included a steering stand and engine-order telegraph.
The SS-N-12 console arrangement is similar to that on the Hiddensee, which has an SS-N-2 console just abaft her bridge and another below that is adjacent to her other weapons controls. It seems likely that one of the two Second Captains on the bridge of the cruiser is dedicated to the long-range surface picture, for SS-N-12 engagement; the other would be for the air and possibly the ASW picture. Apparently, it is standard practice to place weapon assignment consoles for the big surface-to- surface weapons only on the bridge and in the battle information post. Descriptions of the weapons control station Sovremennyy-class destroyers indicate that the consoles for SS- N-22 Sunburn missile control are not located there. Note that the SS-N-14 of the Udaloy is not included in this category, even though it has a secondary antiship role.
I was struck by how empty the battle information post seemed—there are no banks of radar monitors, no multiple trackers or track supervisors. In the West, the trackers and supervisors are in the combat information center so that the officer making tactical decisions has some idea of the source and accuracy of the data on which the tactical picture is based. This concept was illustrated dramatically on board the USS Vincennes (CG- 49) when Captain Will Rogers was desperately trying to identify an approaching aircraft—which turned out to be an Iranian
Airbus. Some accounts of Russian practice suggest that tracks are automatically labeled with identifiers—sometimes with icons—on the basis of identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) and ESM data.
On Russian warships, it seems most likely that the battle information post Second Captain is fed by a single dedicated radar, e.g., the Top Pair on the Marshal Ustinov, so there are few if any track ambiguities to resolve. There is probably a separate radar operation space, but the Russians, like their Western counterparts, probably now use radars that automatically detect and track targets. Tracks are
identified by IFF and by intercepted radar emissions (ESM), presumably in a separate space well separated from the battle information post. The Second Captain’s tactical advice is based partly on these identifications; it carries data on foreign weapons and platforms in its memory. That capability is now only beginning to appear in Western combat direction systems, which probably use more powerful computers.
The Marshal Ustinov's second, shorter-range Top Steer radar is connected directly to the weapon control station, which makes it equivalent to the target indication radars of Royal Navy and other foreign ships. In the U.S. Navy, three-dimensional radars such as SPS-39/52 once had much this function but most have been integrated with the ship’s long-range radar through a track-keeping system like the SYS-2.
On the Admiral Kharlamov, the three-dimensional, back-to- back Top Plate (Fregat) main-mast radar probably feeds the ship’s Second Captain. The foremast two-dimensional Strut Curve radar probably feeds the weapons control station. The first ships of this class had Strut Curves on both masts; others had Top Plate amidships but nothing forward. Presumably, that was acceptable because the defensive weapon, SA-N-9, had its own independent radar system on its Cross Swords director. A two-dimensional radar was necessary for helicopter control, and one was eventually fitted.
Of all modern Russian major surface combatants, only the Sovremennyy-class destroyers lack paired air search radars. It seems likely that they are unique in integrating the Second Captain with the weapons control station. Because it lacks human filters, the Second Captain might prove ill-suited to the sort of very dense and ambiguous air picture Western navies often envisage. No combination of IFF and ESM would definitely have identified the oncoming Iranian Airbus, for example, or, for that matter, any of the cloud of small private aircraft so often seen close offshore in the West.
Similar distractions profs bly will be present duriP combat. Decoys might appe* as legitimate air targets, a though the Russians fire the decoys using the Second Caf tain system and it p<\ sumably could decide :-r~— ignore their rad=\pr jjj tracks. f?r >9
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in signal structure !™l 19 (and possibly deriv^m 19 from) the U.S./NATl^g 19 Link 11. Data link us% |9 however, is striking^ jjj different. The Marshakc 19 Ustinov is not fitted %Cc a group command shiPp 19 She almost certain'Fs tr sends her radar data a flagship (an Admiri'>— Ushakov [formed! ar >9
AVrovJ-class cruise1.
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and receives firing 01
ders in return, particularly for SS-N-12s. Thus she needs no 03^ supervisors to coordinate own-ship data with data received h) 19 link. In contrast, the Admiral Kharlamov is fitted as an AS''oct group command ship. Adjacent to her battle information p°' is a separate space containing two terminals (their keyboard covered for protection, since she is not now performing this fuOc|(J^ tion) and a data-link terminal. This combination, which mig'1’' be called a “Second Commodore,” collates information receipt, by data link for group command. The group can include aircf^L such a Bear Fs as well as surface units. The antisurface W^pb j9 fare (ASUW) collation center and computer on the AdmWleb |? Ushakov might be called a “Second Admiral”; the ASW equf]^ alent is on board a Kiev-class aviation cruiser and was planner ]9 for the aircraft carrier Admiral Flota Sovietskogo Soy^'l^ Kuznetsov (ex-Tbilisi, ex-Leonid Brezhnev, ex-Riga). jjar }9
In the Marshal Ustinov, the SA-N-6 control space is imn'et; !9 diately adjacent to the battle information post. It contains thfd sets of weapon assignment/control consoles, one for each APr
SA-N-6 vertical launchers on the Marshal Ustinov (top); one of three SA-N-6 engagement consoles (left); one of three SA-N-6 engagement status boards (right).
get the ship can engage simultaneously. Above each set
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consoles is a status board, showing the readiness of radars a'11 missiles. Alongside is a communications board showing the sta Pr 19 tus of each engagement. All these boards use analog rat^ V 19 than digital technology: lamps light up behind symbols scribe‘ b[
- — * - - ------------------------------------------------------------------
on plastic. Other weapons also are controlled from here. The e> ay |(J
ecutive officer appears to have firing authority. He walks throng ky |? the weapons control station, visiting different areas to fight d': ferent stages of the battle in turn. In the past, Westerners alloWe‘ to visit Russian CICs often saw only a weapons control stati1 and concluded that the Russians lacked anything comparable a Western CIC; they missed the battle information post that co" L trols these stations. It was not possible to visit the Admiral KM1 ju| lamov’s weapons control station, but a look through the pasStL V from her battle information post confirmed that it was simil^ tjj laid out, with a similar function. ,
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