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1992 support the °f nat*onal military strategy elements rwani Presence and crisis response, been 6 anc* Marine Corps team has cial . eredt0 conduct a myriad of spe- °f „ ni's|s'°ns across the broad spectrum
short''1 1Ct s'nce *989—often on very n°tice. Evacuation operations such
___________ Picking the Latest ’Gator
By Captain John E. O Neil, Jr., U.S. Navy, and Commander James D. Hankins, Jr., U.S. Navy
"'he Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition has approved the Department of me Navy staff choice for the next-gener- ahon replacement amphibious ship. More han 13 design concepts were examined °ver four years, and three were closely reviewed; the Navy’s Warfare Requirements Board made the final selection— he LX90 (see Figure 1).
The new amphibious ship will be able o embark a minimum of 700 troops; j~'000 cubic feet of cargo; four CH-46E e icopter equivalents; and her docking We l can carry two LCACs. The design (I) a undergo a Defense Acquisition Board AB) Milestone I decision in late summer 1992.
This new ship class will complete the avy s initiative to provide an amphibious force that can land the surface assault aves of the embarked landing force Slng air cushion landing craft (LCACs). will provide a majority of the capabil- Jes °f the remaining 26 ships of the ustm (LPD-4), Charleston (LKA-113),
(LST°ra^e (LSD-36), and Newport j, .11T9) classes of amphibious ships at will be retiring at the end of their 35- year service lives.
When the last LST is lred, the U.S. amphibi- tiS force—for the first since early in World ar ^ will not have a l^at can beach itself v °ffload troops and >cles through or over ne s.hip’s bow.
^ Given obligatory force- reductions, the Department of the Navy is r -pressed as it strives
atemba'ntain an aPPr°Pr‘- ® balance of ships and
l9una_ft t0 support the
of
as Sharp Edge in Liberia and Eastern Exit in Somalia—both conducted during the Desert Shield buildup—and humanitarian assistance operations such as Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Sea Angel in Bangladesh after the Gulf War—are but the best-known examples. It is hard to imagine that our naval forces will stop conducting these traditional and vital missions in the next twenty years.
Designing a new class of ship evoked ideas, plans, and suggestions from many different organizations; since the LX is the only new ship-design game in town, everyone wanted to get into the act.
Specific amphibious warfare capabilities required for various levels of conflict were examined in detail by a flag and general officer-led Navy and Marine Corps panel that published its report in April 1991. The report—the Department of the Navy Integrated Amphibious Operations and U.S. Marine Corps Air Support Requirements Study—has been widely distributed throughout the sea services, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Senate Armed Services Committee staff.
Concerning future amphibious assault
operational requirements over the next 30 to 40 years, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined [that] a requirement for amphibious assault lift exists, since [it] directly supports our national military strategies of force projection and forward presence throughout the foreseeable future.” It must be noted that full-scale, direct attacks over a heavily defended beach are not envisioned.
Modern amphibious ships with their high-speed, night-fighting landing craft and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, truly offer the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) more flexibility in their choice of ship-to-shore options. Forces assigned in support of an amphibious mission—minesweepers, carrier battle groups, submarines, and allied assets—must expand their training with the amphibious forces to ensure success in a crisis.
The amphibious warfare force of the 21 st century—designed to lift the assault echelons of two and one-half Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs)—will consist of:
- Six Wasp (LHD-l)-class amphibious assault ships
- Five Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ships
- Eight Whidbey Island (LSD-4 l)-class dock landing ships
- Three Harpers Ferry (LSD-49)-class dock landing ships ► A yet-to-be-determined number of LX amphibious ships
While war plans require amphibious lift for the assault echelons of larger units—two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—this requirement remains unaffordable. thus the fiscally constrained 2.5
MEB assault-echelon lift goal remains the nation’s minimum requirement. If achieved, this goal will meet current requirements for forward deployed naval forces and still provide sufficient surge capability to lift the assault echelons of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
Amphibious ship design is driven not only by a gross lift requirement, but also by the numbers required to conduct a variety of naval missions ranging from peace to war. Amphibious ship require-
The LX88 (top-at 765 feet length overall) and the the LXC (lower-876 feet length overall) are good ships but cannot be bought in the numbers required.
ments for operational commitments (less a prolonged regional involvement), are a function of day-to-day forward presence and peacetime requirements combined with an amphibious brigade-level response capability. The 2.5 assault echelon (MEB) amphibious force will enable response to a crisis on a real-time basis, or the extension of the depth of the maritime battlefield onto land, using sustainable and credible landing forces capable of forcible entry.
The LX is designed to contribute its share of the total wartime amphibious-lift goal, as well as to support the forward- deployed presence mission. In today’s fiscal climate, optimization of available funds is paramount. Costs, viewed in Ship Construction, Navy (SCN) dollars, budget-year fiscal controls, and life-cycle estimates, are most important in selecting an affordable ship. Commanders-in-chief must be able to conduct the daily fleet operations that are essential to the maintenance of a visible presence in developing regions of importance to the
United States. The LX design took all these factors into account. Below are some of the operational highlights that forward-deployed amphibious ready groups provide:
- Substitutes for fewer overseas bases
- Assets for use in non-amphibious roles—This includes events such as the Alaska oil-spill cleanup, Persian Gulf tanker war support missions, special intelligence collection, disaster relief in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Bangladesh, noncombatant evacuation operations in
Liberia and Somalia, the drug war___ and
the list goes on. Supporting an average of three Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) at sea in three separate geographic locations around the world is important in providing a balanced fleet.
► Surge-response assets.
Designers considered all facets required to give the LX the operational flexibility we need. Here are some specific examples:
All the eggs in one basket. If a very large design were selected, loss of the ship would have a greater effect on a task force than the loss of a smaller design. This was demonstrated in the LX Milestone I cost and operational effectiveness (COEA) report.
Bigger is not necessarily better. An adequate number (depending on the size of the amphibious operation) of medium- size, wet-well hulls will sustain the surface ship-to-shore air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) transfer rate of troops, vehicles, and cargo. A rapid build-up of combat power ashore enables the landing force commander (CLF) to establish the beachhead, consolidate forces, and push inland to counter any enemy reinforcements. Adequate numbers of well decks and flight-deck spots allow efficient
LCAC and VTOL aircraft refueling and loading, thus maintaining rapid turnaround times to the beach. (See Figures 2 and 3.)
Additionally, the flight decks of the LX will be used as fueling and rearming points for the embarked AH-1W and UH- 1N helicopters. These small helicopters, vital to any air assault, can be staged on the LX to free the big-deck amphibious ships—the LHAs and LHDs —so they can concentrate on supporting the medium- and heavy-lift assault aircraft. The Cobras and the Hueys provide escorts for the assault force; command-and-control platforms; and close-in fire support. These missions mandate an “on-call” capability for rapid refueling and rearming, which calls for the design and construction of a replacement amphibious ship with a secondary aviation capability to provide maintenance, fuel, and ordnance to VTOL aircraft.
Amphibious big decks—the centerpiece. The programmed amphibious force—with the LX and the sixth LHD—will provide a minimum of 11 deployable amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with a surge capability to lift 2.5 MEB assault echelons. The centerpieces of these ARGs are the 11 “big- deck” LHAs and LHDs. The LX design will allow uniform ship pairings and force packaging when forming Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) with an LHA or LHD, LSD-41 or LSD-49, and the LX. The LX with its aviation capability will permit the dispersal of the attack and command-and-control helicopters to provide tactical VTOL support for any size MAGTF operation.
Ten pounds in a five-pound bag. The design effort avoided overburdening 8 ship that already must perform a multitude of evolutions that can swamp her facilities and crew. Some of these tasks in- } elude primary or secondary casualty receiving and treatment ship, tactical ait control center, primary control officer/ship, command ship, tactical logistics control, supporting arms coordination center, forward arming and refueling point, and boat haven—plus 20 j others which could overburden and increase risk to the mission.
Amphibious force employment options As a matter of routine, the deploy^ ARG/MEU(SOC)s have been required to separate or divide their capabilities ovef great distances to execute concurrent mi*' sion. A three-ship ARG/MEU(SOC) provides commanders a choice in platfoflO selection while retaining a majority of the ARG in the primary theater. MEB’s frequently are similarly tasked, e.g., the Liberia evacuation—ARG/MEU(SC>C) split; and the Eastern Exit Somalia evac-
uation—MEB split.
Longer, more frequent deployments.
electing a replacement ship of the appropriate size with the ship-to-shore and aviation capabilities described above, will tde Nayy t0 ^uy enough amP 'bious ships to meet current personnel- °perational tempo goals.
What is acceptable risk? A medium- j.lze replacement ship with the capabili- 'es described will provide commanders Wlth 11 amphibious ready groups at the ra.ost affordable cost and the least oper- ahonal risk.
Following are the key factors for seeding a medium-size LX rather than a ‘arger one:
Chief of Naval Operations Warfare
Requirements Board: This three-star level board selected the ship in part for the “operational flexibility” it provides. The board's selection was subsequently approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. >- Secretary of the Navy: The Secretary approved the findings of the 1991 Department of the Navy Integrated Amphibious Operations and U.S. Marine Corps Air Support Requirements Study. It calls for a three-ship ARG in the early 21st century consisting of one LHD or LHA, one LSD-41 or LSD-49, and one LPD-like ship—the LX.
► Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Speaking at a recent Center for Naval Analyses conference, the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the services should begin considering alternatives to large weapons platforms in the 21st century.
The design selected should offer a ship that matches lift capabilities with operational requirements and available funding. It should also be affordable in the numbers required, which dictates the lowest life-cycle costs. The amphibious force levels of the 21st century will indeed be lower than those in the fleet today. The LX-90 is the ship that can make a difference.
em^T*16 ent’re military educational from W, plan —and lessons learned
ation f°ud War ff—prompted the cre- Industriaithr ^ational War College, the (ICaft College of the Armed Forces
lege (AFSC)he A"ned Forces Staff Co>-
howev^°rlt! ^ar 11 faded int0 the Past'
joint matt the re9u*rernent to integrate Wstern hCrS mt0 tde md*tary educational vices h ecame *ess dear, and the ser-
Schooi°rnplayed j0'111 mauers in their
Nation i r!tU education was left with the effect m Defense University, which in
College63"' WUh thC Armed Forces Staff
f e Goldwater-Nichols Department of j i eFense Reorganization Act of 1986 IV*3 5 mente^ far-reaching changes. Title Wo°k t*1'S aCt’ wf)’cf| provided the ground- ioi ^°r dle Vacation and increased ti n. orientation of all the services, is par- ■cularly significant.
cisi 6t C*esP'te a plethora of studies, de- ntan°nS’ 3°d con8ressional oversight, rev' ^ aSPects °f f*16 current system need the'tr'e*11 ^6 316 ,TUSS'n§ forest for
itarv^ff t^le nee(^t0 prepare senior miltary ° Fcers t0 concluct integrated mili- f>rouohPerat-0ns *las appropriately been joinf 110 micromanagement of the the vS"VStCm ^as Placed great strain on °peraV^’ sornet'mes at the expense of Drn„atl0nal requirements, without im- 'ng combat readiness.
In tn 6 StUd^ of J°int matters is not new. (Jcsae *945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint cS?Ued a "General Plan for Postwar wjth th UCat'on the Armed Forces,” ti0n jnt^u3* °P 'nte?ratmg joint educa-
In 1975, the Defense Department’s committee on excellence in education reaffirmed the specific mission orientation of the intermediate and senior service schools, and recommended that the schools collectively develop a common core curriculum to meet the educational requirements of the officer corps. Little of substance resulted.
Nevertheless, both recent and historical military operations have clearly demonstrated that no service can function alone in combat, and that all services must understand integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces. This includes the development of national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command-and-control of combat forces under a unified command.
In May 1987, a Senior Military Schools Review Board was convened to answer questions posed by the Goldwa- ter-Nichols legislation. Chaired by General Russell E. Dougherty, U.S. Air Force (Retired), and comprised of active duty and retired senior military officers, the board’s findings were not extraordinary. While recommending that officers should be introduced to joint matters at the earliest practical level, they said that joint instruction need not be extensive below the intermediate level, and should not come at the expense of learning how to perform well in one’s own service.
Further, they thought that formal instruction in joint matters should be conducted at all senior and intermediate service schools, plus National Defense University schools, to qualify graduates for the joint specialty. The board concluded that the best way to groom senior officers to operate in a joint environment was to inculcate and enforce effective joint education in all the professional schools, in the belief that this would help to develop positive attitudes about joint matters and their effect on all aspects of military organization, equipment, training, and doctrine.
The goal of an unrestricted line naval officer is and always should be command. For those aspiring to flag rank, success in command is no longer- enough. Qualification as a joint specialty officer has now been added to an officer’s qualification card. This is a milestone that will not be argued, but the process for obtaining the joint specialty designator is too rigid, and it places undue hardship on an officer trying to remain competitive within his or her own warfare specialty.
To become a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), an officer must complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) by either of two principal methods.
Attendance at a service school—the Naval War College, for example—followed by attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College is one way. At the service school, the focus is on large-unit warfighting within the context of the operational art. In addition, students become familiar with the roles, missions and major organizations of the Army and the Air Force. The study is complemented by a review of the principal organizational units that comprise the Navy and Marine Corps.
Students at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia, examine joint operations from the stand-
Members of all the armed forces already attend service-sponsored schools—here, Army, Air Force, and Navy officers at the Naval War College. It is time to expand the joint curriculum at these intermediate- and senior-level courses.
point of the JCS, a unified commander, or a joint task force commander. The curriculum is designed to further develop joint attitudes and perspectives, increase the understanding of all service cultures, and concentrate on joint staff operations.
The requirements for JPME may also be completed by attending either the National War College or ICAF. At the National War College, the focus is on the development and implementation of national security policy and strategy, while ICAF focuses on the resource component of national power and its integration into national security strategy.
The final step in JSO qualifications requires an officer to serve in a joint billet designated by the Secretary of Defense, after which the officer must be granted the JSO designator by the Secretary. The process contains a dizzying array of waivers, clauses, stipulations, exemptions, and special cases that have become a nightmare in planning a career—especially given the personnel reductions currently being implemented.
Promotion to flag rank, for example, requires completion of a joint duty assignment, unless the officer selected has been granted a good-of-the-service waiver from the Secretary of Defense and the initial flag tour is in a joint duty assignment. A nuclear-power exemption is in effect until 1994, but an officer in this category cannot be promoted to Rear Admiral (Upper Half) until he has served in such an assignment. And while being a JSO is not required by law for flag rank, by 1994 50% of flag joint billets will be designated critical (requiring a JSO), thereby making completion of the JPME requirement for JSO designation virtually mandatory for future admirals.
If all this sounds confusing, don’t worry: you are not alone. The above examples only begin to outline the current policies. They were written to apply to all of the services, wherein lies the flaw. While the goal of developing joint specialists should remain the goal, the methodology must be flexible enough so that it may be implemented within the framework of the various services, rather than becoming the driving force behind the framework. Each service is unique, and diverse career paths have been effectively formulated and managed over the years to ensure staff and operational commitments are fulfilled. Even within the Department of the Navy, each community must accommodate a wide variety of career paths, and the dynamics of officer management have been developed to ensure that all commands in the Navy are manned at optimum levels with qualified personnel.
Several problems in the current system must be corrected to ensure proper personnel and joint management in the services, particularly in the Navy.
First, Title IV dictates that all JSOs and more than 50% of all other graduates of NDU schools will follow immediately into a joint duty assignment. The law is specific, with no provisions for waivers for the good of the service. Compounding this problem, communities that do not normally fill joint billets (Materiel Professionals, for example) are not credited in determining the services numbers when calculating the 50% joint follow-on requirement. There is no need for officers to be locked into joint assignments immediately after attending NDU schools. Ideally, such officers should be going to command billets to remain competitive within their community.
While service in a joint billet is given due consideration at promotion boards and when screening for command, the qualities that must be given significant weight are those developed within one’s own warfare community. This hardly says that joint duty assignments should be viewed as less important than operational assignments, but those given the opportunity to command must be of the highest quality and have proven themselves within their community. An NDU graduate should be able to assume command, if the opportunity is there, and not forced into a joint billet just to satisfy an arbitrary quota. In essence, current rules require personnel managers to place the cart before the horse. Unnecessary quotas and complex rules should not come into play when filling a billet, be it joint or otherwise.
The current throughput of Naval officers at the Armed Forces Staff College (Phase II, a 5- and 12 week-course at the intermediate and senior levels, respectively) is only 180 per year. This is not enough, but increasing the number of students at AFSC is neither cost effective nor wise from a personnel management perspective. Such a solution would further separate, rather than integrate, joint education and service education. To provide the largest number of highly qualified and motivated officers with joint PME from which to select officers for joint duty, the responsibility for joint education should be fully incorporated into the service schools, such as the Naval War College.
This is not a new idea. A January 1992 poll of detailers and placement officers at the Bureau of Naval Personnel revealed that an overwhelming number favored combining Phase I and Phase II at the various service colleges to reduce time, temporary additional duty costs, unnecessary family separations, and dramatically increase the number of officers who complete JPME, and thus need only a joint tour to complete JSO qualification.
The course of instruction at AFSC could be integrated into the current set- vice schools curricula. This would not have to be a radical change, given that 65% of the intermediate level course and 73% of the senior level course is already considered joint-oriented. The key aspects of joint warfare, service culture, attitude5 and perspectives taught at AFSC could be incorporated into current service school programs without great difficulty.
If this plan were implemented, the student and faculty service mix at these schools should remain at present levels. An adequate joint education is as much a product of environment as of curricU' lum. An appropriate mix of students and faculty from each of the services play5 t an important role in that education.The current mix of services provides suffi' cient representation from each service to facilitate student access to individual 1 service philosophies and doctrines, efl' suring joint matters can be adequately taught.
What is derived from professional mil' itary is never sufficient to qualify a pcf' son to perform well immediately in aspects of a job. Too much emphasi5 has been placed on using schools to pt°' vide adequate training for joint officer5,
I submit that a joint officer in the true5*
commanders and 35-45% of unrestricted
captains will be graduates of a pro
sense is developed on the job in a joint billet, which complements and adds to the education process.
The final problem is one of numbers. The Navy is well short of the CNO goal that 25-35% of unrestricted line lieutenant line fessional military educational program, ho improve these figures, officers whose assignments do not permit attending in residence at a service college may avail themselves the education offered by the Naval War College continuing education Program, which is available through correspondence courses, and, in selected locations near fleet and staff concentrations, nonresident seminars. Both programs reQuire approximately three years to com- Ptete. In the case of seminars, a three-year shore tour is unlikely for some warfare communities, such as nuclear-trained officers and mid-grade aviators. The correspondence course too provides such limitations, and completing the course work while on a sea tour is difficult.
Both programs should continue for those officers willing and motivated to undertake them, since by 1994 all joint billets designated as critical must be filled by a JSO. To meet this requirement, a third alternative should be considered: Establish a course that can be completed in two years. Many officers complete graduate studies for advanced degrees in two years by taking courses at night through programs at local universities while on shore duty.Thousands of eligible officers from all services stationed in Washington, D.C., could feasibly participate, providing an excellent mix of students to ensure the proper joint flavor.
Too many rules and regulations governing the system that prepares officers trained in joint matters may prove detrimental to the overall goal of integrating the profession of arms. Now that the importance of joint education and duty has been brought to the forefront, we must step back and view the system that has been created—or we may lose the forest.
Lieutenant DiCampli is a nuclear submariner currently managing the officer assignment information system in the Bureau of Naval Personnel after completing study for a Masters degree in Engineering Management at Catholic University, Washington, D.C. He has served on board the USS Von Steuben (SSBN-632).
__________________________ Cost-Effective Mine Warfare
By Carsten H. Fries and Electronics Technician Second Class Gerald M. Slusher, U.S. Naval Reserve
"Phe Craft of Opportunity Program , (COOP), which concerns itself with e Navy’s smallest surface mine-warfare bn,ts>'s a perfect example of a small— Ut effective—program that has been fj!Ven l°w priority as the service scram- es to protect big-ticket items.
ortunately, the House Armed Services oirimittee in early June added a provi- ■°n to the Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Au- orization Bill that would preserve the urn"ram, but it is too early to say if this "'appear in the final bill, in N ^ebate over balancing reductions aval forces against the strategic de- rean^s °f a rapidly changing world has ^ached a critical juncture. The argute6!" for the big programs often relies on tjQeir^orfftous sunk costs for justifica- o n: "his argument, however, fails to rec- nize the economic and military value Ver "^-profile programs that provide ar8e returns relative to the limited aoi'ars invested.
feted6 program, officially insti-
tn 1986, provides mine counter- areasures (MCM) capabilities for coastal Thg3! anc* Ports that lack such assets. Cowere originally organized in unit ^'ne Squadron-22 with eleven SS on the East Coast, and COOP Mine
On-,3 r°n_ * * w"h four units on the West
^°ast.
",itlf0St °Perational units are equipped troi k rc'urbished and converted yard pa-
^apted^ (uP) tha* haS been sPecia"y °f m' t0 tbe Prc,8rarn’s primary mission sUrvlne identification and hydrographic ey- These craft make up about 50%
Proceedi of the Navy’s mine-detection surface assets. Actual mine neutralization can be carried out if an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team is embarked.
Employment of these resources envisions short-duration and close inshore missions, which suit the YPs’ size, seakeeping qualities, and cruising radius of 665 miles. Maximum deployment time is generally less than a week. Full personnel strength in a unit allows for four crews at nine men per crew. With adequate support, this allows a trained unit to man four vessels for short-term deployment or two boats with reinforced crews for round-the-clock operations.
The COOP program is true to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s principle that the United States is a maritime power whose military and economic strength are directly tied to command of the seas. In the event of hostilities, COOP units will use their previously surveyed routes to guide commercial and military assets in and out of port. The program’s flexibility allows each unit to expand from one craft to four. In time of need, three additional vessels of suitable design would be attached and outfitted with off-the-shelf sonar, navigation, and radar equipment, increasing the coverage of any given area.
This multiple-crew capability has led to proposals to fly personnel and their equipment to overseas crises. Under this concept, local craft would be configured to perform the mission. It has a number of precedents: In both world wars commercial vessels were employed in U.S. coastal patrol and mine-hunting and sweeping operations. In Vietnam, landing craft converted to minesweepers and minesweeping boats were used in riverine waterways. All of these makeshift units performed admirably, though their effectiveness and survivability were usually dependent on air and naval superiority in the operational area. Personnel and existing craft also can be moved by heavy-lift ship to a threat area—as was done for Operation Desert Storm.
The COOP program started because of the lack of mine warfare assets in the Navy’s inventory. Along with the COOP units, most mine warfare forces are organized as components of the Naval Reserve—USS Aggressive (MSO-422)-class ocean minesweepers, which are to be decommissioned soon, and the new USS Osprey (MHC-5l)-class coastal mine- hunters that are arriving soon. Two mine counter-measures helicopter squadrons and diverse support units round out the picture. Active duty mine warfare encompasses three MSOs, which will be replaced by Avenger (MCM-l)-class mine counter-measures ships (MCM) shortly, mine counter-measures helicopter squadrons, and the use of newly commissioned surface craft during their first year of deployment. The COOP mission uses reserve personnel four weekends a month for duty in the major shipping routes leading to strategic harbors and rivers of the United States. The continuous updating of survey data pertaining to these routes by cost-effective reserve units serves as a force multiplier for the Navy’s mine warfare assets. Unencum-
bered by the mission given to COOP units, MSOs and MCMs are thus available for deployment elsewhere. If the need arises for MSO and MCM services in a COOP-supported area, their crews will be able to use the COOP unit’s most recent hydrographic survey.
The U.S. Navy’s most recent experience in Southwest Asia reacquainted military strategists with what a few relatively inexpensive mines—or just the perceived threat—can do to military and commer-
A Naval Reserve sailor lowers a sidescanning sonar over the side of the craft-of-opportunity program (COOP) trainer CT-11 (ex-YP-654).
cial shipping. The cyclical nature of history is quite apparent here: In World War II, the threat of mines at times severely restricted Allied and Axis maritime traffic. The case of the Kiel Canal, which allowed Germany direct access from the North Sea to the Baltic, was typical. In 1944, even though no shipping was lost, the threat of RAF-dropped mines all but halted traffic for months. Delayed shipping is often as good as lost shipping.
Operation Desert Storm has been cited as an example of the U.S. Navy s ability to survive without COOP—units were alerted for possible deployment but were ultimately passed over in favor of Coalition MCM assets. The Navy’s long-standing policy of relying on allies for many of its MCM needs seemed to be vindicated. In actuality, even when reinforced with additional MCM capability from the Coalition, there was still a shortage of MCM platforms for the duration of the conflict.
Granted, though the Iraqis possessed a plentiful supply of mines, these were hurriedly laid according to textbook Soviet doctrine, reducing significant portions of the minehunting process into a plotting-table exercise. Moreover, recent reports have indicated that many of the mines deployed were not operational.
Even so, the U.S. Navy lost the services of an Aegis missile cruiser and an amphibious assault ship because of mine damage. But the temporary loss of several hundred million dollars’ worth of hardware pales when one considers that an amphibious assault by two Marine brigades was precluded because of the time that would have been required to sweep the extensive mine fields off Kuwait.
Postponement or cancellation of a mission because of mines is nit new in the Navy’s experience. The Wonsan landing in 1950 during the Korean War required the frenzied activity of a multitude of U.S. and allied MCM assets. The assault was undertaken more than a week later than planned, at an added cost of two mine warfare platforms and two hundred lives lost, and several vessels damaged.)
COOP units could have provided additional mine warfare capabilities in the Persian Gulf, specifically in operational areas where the likelihood of finding mines was low, but where the need to confirm the absence of mines was high; COOP units could have relieved MSO/MCM assets for duty in sectors that had a higher probability of being mined.
Coalition mine-warfare vessels proved invaluable during Desert Storm, but they may not be available during crises in which the objectives of the United States do not converge with those of our European allies. The diminishing threat of a high-intensity conflict with the former Soviet Navy does not rule out the possibility of future conflicts comparable to the Gulf War. In fact, as the Commonwealth of Independent States liquidates its stocks of military equipment in pursuit of hard currency, the international arms bazaar may become flooded with an assortment of sea mines that presently make up the largest mine inventory on the globe.
Third World access to this ordnance is a given. More chilling is the potential for the mines—many of them technologically sophisticated—falling into the hands of terrorists. The impact of even one mine planted in a sea lane is obvious. Again, the mere threat of mined waters would be sufficient to bring seaborne commerce in the area to a halt.
All MCMs and MHCs were to be home-ported in Ingleside, Texas, on Corpus Christi Bay, while COOP units were to be home-ported at points between Maine and Galveston, Texas. In the event
of a threat, COOP assets would have carried the ball for the seven-to-ten-day response time required by the larger units.
Those who support the program are not blind to the argument that the COOP- based mission could be better performed in new, multimission hulls manned with active duty crews. In this era of shrinking defense expenditures, however, the problem is how to finance the better program. Though not the ideal solution, COOP is the best one available. The budgetary advantage inherent in using readily available hardware and reserve personnel are obvious.
The quality of the COOP sailor adds value to this equation. COOP duty requires long hours at sea under arduous conditions. The small crew size dictates that all hands participate in all evolutions regardless of rank or specialty. The actual performance of hydrographic survey is monotonous, detail-oriented work that can go on for hours without let-up. This 5 environment quickly eliminates those ! lacking in dedication and resolve, and has accordingly left the typical COOP unit with a cadre of highly motivated and self-disciplined team players.
As with the majority of Naval Reserve personnel, the typical COOP sailor is older and more mature than the typical active duty sailor. Other attributes include a higher level of education and specialty training, more Naval and technical experience, and the motivation of individuals whose present billeting is one of personal choice. These characteristics have proven instrumental in the success 01 COOP crews in accomplishing their eX" acting mission.
Theoretically, a fully manned and trained unit could log 164 days at sea annually, an excellent deployment schedule for any Navy ship. Furthermore, the COOP program incorporates an important peacetime mission that is slowly j being expanded to include locating submerged objects—sunken ships and downed aircraft.
As the discussion continues on whefe to cut the budget, the Navy should $$ \ special attention to the craft-of-opportunity concept. The program can be the basis for an expanded mine warfare program for this decade and beyond.
Carsten H. Fries is a production editor at Rand° House, Inc., and has been selected for the Naval serve Officer program. He has a Masters degree 1 American studies from the Ludwig-Maximilians versity in Munich, Germany. Gerald M. Slushed Naval Reservist since 1979, is the chief econoflU in the Atlantic County, New Jersey, Division of nomic Development. He is assigned to COOP Unit 2205 in Cape May, New Jersey, as the uni*' leading sonar operator.