This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
***fc,v
By William H. Garzke, Jr. and Robert O. Dulin, Jr
ferns
Was it two crucial hits by the British battleship Prince of Wales on 23 May 1941, an attack three days later by 15 Swordfish bombers, or the hits she took during a 92-minute battle with the British battleships Rodney and King George V and the heavy cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire? Or, did the Germans scuttle their prize battleship that morning of 27 May? The evidence here—an epilogue to our “50 Years Ago” Bismarck story on pages 20-21 of the May issue—suggests that the answer is “Yes.”
On 8 June 1989 Dr. Robert Ballard, using some of the technology that helped him locate and explore the superliner Titanic, discovered the wreck of the German battleship Bismarck in some 15,317 feet of seawater on the side of a sea mount. She was upright with her hull buried in some 10 meters of sediment, at about the level of her normal waterline.
Although the Bismarck is in better archeological condition than the Titanic, her wreck exhibits some of the serious damage that she sustained during her final engagement with Royal Navy battleships and heavy cruisers on 27 May 1941. The exploration of the Bismarck revealed some spectacular details of battle damage heretofore unknown. Testimony from two of the 115 survivors—Seaman Josef Statz, from the Bismarck’s Damage Control Central, who escaped up through the communications tube to the forward conning tower, and Baron von Mullenheim Rech- berg, who escaped from the aft gunfire control station—
a'ded in this analysis.
Close examination of the video and still imagery obtained by the Ballard expedition has revealed numerous shell and fragment hits. Although the imagery does not cover all of the wreck, and coverage of the ship’s vertical surfaces is limited, the extensive damage observed is consistent with our estimates of from 300 to 400 hits from the 2,876 shells fired from 133-mm., 152-mm., 356-mm., and 406-mm. guns. The imagery also allowed us to trace the escape routes of the two notable survivors.
We had problems in assessing battle damage and recognizing ship features on the Bismarck wreck because of the nature of the imagery. Because of the characteristics of the “sled” being streamed from thousands of meters above the seabed, almost all of the photography was taken from directly above the ship, and at very close ranges. Typically, a field of view would be only 5-15 meters wide. Near the end of his mission. Dr. Ballard and his col
leagues were a bit more daring in their approaches to the ship with their photographic sled. Since this was tethered to the Star Hercules and was nonbuoyant, there were considerable vertical excursions owing to wave action and ship motions. The seas were very rough during the photo excursion periods. Videotape yielded oblique views of some vertical surfaces, such as the forward conning tower and segments of the side armor belt.
The lack of comprehensive views of the ship (impossible in this region of perpetual darkness) and the lack of imagery showing vertical surfaces were most frustrating in the evaluation. Shadow effects and confusing perspectives—caused by the fact that the light sources on the sled were at a distance from the still and video cameras— complicated the process. At times, therefore, observers could not be sure if they were observing true battle damage or just shadows cast by the lights. Identification was difficult from close range, and from some of the new, unusual perspectives. For example, the areas around the funnel and the base of the fore bridge tower, exposed for the first time since the battered Bismarck capsized and sank to the seabed, caused considerable confusion. Battle damage aggravated the problem. Some equipment was so badly battered that it was difficult to recognize.
Unlike the exploration of the Titanic wreck, all photography of the Bismarck was taken from a remote control sled directed from the mother ship. With the Titanic, Dr. Ballard used the deep-diving submarine Alvin, which enabled him and Dr. Eleazar Uchupi of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute to plan a direct photo survey of the wreck. The Bismarck expedition did not employ the same techniques, and some areas of the wreck were not explored as closely as others. Nevertheless, the photographic evidence has altered as well as clarified many of the conceptions of what took place on the morning of Tuesday, 27 May 1941.
Torpedo Hit from the Victorious Swordfish Aircraft— One of the few views of the hull side, by a fortunate coincidence, is directly in way of the area on the starboard side just aft of the fore bridge tower (command tower), which was affected by this 24 May 1941 torpedo hit. Although the area struck by the torpedo is buried in the mud, one of the heavy main side-belt armor plates was found to have been displaced inboard a few centimeters relative to the adjacent plate. This damage was very similar to that observed at Pearl Harbor to the USS West Virginia (BB-48) on 7 December 1941.
The report to (German) Naval Group Command West by Seaman Herbert Manthey, who observed the damage on Sunday, 25 May 1941, is extremely interesting in view of the Ballard photographic evidence. He stated that “the torpedo detonated on the ship’s side and merely left scratches on the paintwork.” Such a dramatic statement is understandable, if exaggerated, in that the damage probably appeared minor, as observed from on board the Bismarck. Our discussions with Josef Statz revealed that Manthey repeated a slogan that the crew of the Bismarck had devised alter this torpedo hit. They felt the Bismarck to be unsinkable! This report by Manthey was provided at a naval conference with Adolf Hitler on 27 June 1941.
.A Battle Damage Tally,
missing. Part of the starboard chain remains, and is tucked into an oblong hole in the main deck, forward of the starboard anchor windlass. This hole is
Gunfire damage inflicted on the Bismarck by the battleships King George V and Rodney and heavy cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire on 27 May 1941 was massive, and most of it was concentrated in the area of the forward superstructure:
- The bow anchor and mooring casting, with the spare anchor and jackstaff, were all missing. A large, jagged hole was left in the stem.
- Both anchors and chain were
approximately two to three meters long and 500 mm. wide.
The teak deck around the hole is missing and charred. We believe this hit came between 0945 and 1000, when the Rodney was on the Bismarck’s starboard quarter. Such a hit may have started a fire below, in the berthing spaces. ► A shell (possibly 14-inch, according to the King George V gunnery report) hit near the top of the barbette of turret Bruno and tore away a large piece of 340-mm. armor. Below this point is a large hole where the main deck plating was ripped away from the barbette. We cannot confirm whether the two areas of damage are related.
Seaman Josef Statz has informed us that he was able to look into turret Bruno, for that turret’s rear wall had been blown away- It was also pitched forward on its barbette.
► The after port side of the forward conning tower was hit repeatedly, based on an oblique video view. As many as 25 shell and fragment holes are apparent in the field of vision. Before King George V ceased fire around 1014, a volley from her 14-inch guns punched a large hole into the Bismarck’s 350mm. armor plate on the port side. The number of penetrating hits, as opposed to surface- marring fragment splashes on
QUEST GROUP & MADISON PRESS
The photographic evidence is persuasive that this torpedo struck a plate of the 320-mm. main side belt, driving the plate inboard and opening a gap of a few centimeters between the damaged plate and adjoining armor. We observed the top edge of this displaced armor plate, which pivoted inboard under the stresses caused by the torpedo detonation. Undoubtedly, there was some damage to the backing (or teak) structure caused by the movement of the armor. Although the 50-mm. teak wood backing structure would have absorbed much of the armor’s displacement, the shell and its support structure would have sustained damage in bounding the torpedo impact.
Torpedo Hit in Stern by Ark Royal Swordfish Aircraft— The effects of the torpedo hit in the stem that doomed the Bismarck were very apparent—effects of the torpedo hits farther forward (Compartment VII) and below the mud level were not visible. The torpedo that hit the stem caused spectacular damage. We believe the torpedo hit the port rudder on the shell plating above it. The impact point of this torpedo (near frame 10) was near the aft armored bulkhead of the steering gear room. Much of the energy from the torpedo s explosion was vented into the ship- which would account for the absence of the pronounced plume typical of a torpedo striking the side of a ship. The explosion ripped a large hole in the stem structure beneath the steering gear room. The combination of the ruptured hull structure and damage to the rudder and the rudder stock disabled the port and starboard rudders. Such damage, we believe, could not have been even temporarily repaired with the shops and material on board the Bismarck, even had the seas been calmer.
We believe that either part of the Bismarck’s stem collapsed onto her rudders, or the shell and/or port rudder was tom in such a manner that it was impossible to steer the ship by either manual or mechanical means. The torpedo detonated near the aft end of the steering gear complex, at a 150-mm.-thick armored transverse bulkhead. The lower decks and adjacent shell plating were badly damaged, leaving the undamaged remaining shell plating and upper decks to support the stem, thus severely weak-
’he armor, cannot be conclu- S|vely determined, owing to shadow effects and the oblique angles of view. Statz, who v>ewed this damage from both ’he outside and inside, indicates
’hat the port side of the conning tower looked like “swiss cheese. ’ ’ Penetration of this 350-mm. armor was absolutely possible at ’he gun ranges of the Rodney and King George V in this battle, especially during the later stages ^hen the Bismarck was, for all •ntents and purposes, defenseless. * The forward superstructure was ravaged by shell hits from ’he main and secondary batteries °f the two British battleships, which tore away superstructure Plating and stiffeners, as well as ’he louvers for the forward hoiler intakes. Several of the latter were found in the debris field. These hits undermined the support for the fore bridge tower (command tower), which collapsed and broke away from the hull at the level of the lower bridge deck (U.S. Navy-02 Level) when the ship capsized.
► The 105-mm. gun mounts on the port side forward were heavily damaged and unrecognizable. All that remains from the second 105-mm. mount on the port side is a plate from its undercarriage. Statz confirmed this from his
own observations on board the Bismarck that morning.
► The forward 150-mm. turret on the port side was wrecked by British shellfire and was covered by debris from the forward superstructure before the Bismarck capsized. The after section of the 80-mm. armored roof is missing, presumably caused by an ammunition explosion within the turret. The right side 80mm. armor plate has been riddled by shell hits and fragments. With a large hole in the side armor and the after roof missing, the turret’s interior is visible. This turret is trained well aft, with its guns pointing toward the Bismarck's port quarter. Based upon survivor testi
mony, there was a severe fire in this turret’s magazine and Statz was personally ordered by his superior, Gerhard Sagner, to flood its magazines, which would have contributed significantly to the port list. The side of this turret is much darker than the surrounding structure, perhaps indicating that a severe
ening the structure. The ship motions combined with the heavy seas and shell damage from 16-inch shells from HMS Rodney gradually weakened the intact structure and a weld just aft of the transverse armored bulkhead at Frame 10.
We cannot conclusively determine exactly when the battered stem end fell away from the Bismarck—it had almost certainly failed structurally during the capsizing process. Prior to capsizing, the stem no longer contributed buoyancy to the battleship. We do know from the testimony of Statz that the stern was in place on the Bismarck as the prevailing seas carried him past her around 1030. Therefore, it is likely that the separation occurred near the Water surface as the hull began its plunge to the seabed.
This structural fatigue-type failure in the stern was the result of poor welding, a structural continuity problem—a design mistake manifest in not extending the longitudinal bulkheads bounding the steering gear room aft into the stern-end stmeture—and shell damage to the plating just aft of the transverse armored bulkhead to the steering compartments. In fairness, it must be noted that welding was a new technology in ship construction in the 1930s and that other German and foreign warships also experienced cracks in welded joints after sustaining damage. The Gneisenau experienced a severe failure of welded structure in her bow when she was torpedoed in June 1940 by HMS Trident. Her crew welded bars across the break to prevent the bow from separating from the ship. German authorities noted these weld failures and traced them to unrealistic quotas being imposed upon welders in the shipyards by the German Navy, anxious for the ships to be delivered.
We observed remarkable evidence of a failure in the welded seam at the Bismarck's stern along the side shell and main deck of the main hull and in a large piece of plate from the port side shell just aft of the steering gear room that was found in the debris field. We were able to identify this plate absolutely by a row of portholes and a straight edge, evidence of structural failure in the weld joint. One jagged end had a large hole that we believe resulted from a
hangar overhead during the capsizing.
- There was a large hole near the amidships catapult on the port side. This was probably caused by a 356-mm. shell that hit in compartment X in the canteen (just below the main deck and aft of the stack). This shell (or shells) killed more than 100 men, including Commander Hans Oels, the executive officer. The last torpedo hit from the Dorsetshire struck the superstructure of the listing and sinking ship.
- All of the 105-mm. and 37mm. gun mounts showed evidence of damage. Some 105mm. mounts were missing one or both barrels, and two mounts were virtually obliterated. The 37-mm. gun mounts near the bridge were severely damaged
vicinity of the port forward 150-mm. turret. We believe several shells (356- or 406-mm.) struck aft of this turret and penetrated the ship. Splinters from the shell bursts could have caused the ignition of ammunition in the 150-mm. magazine. Statz has independently confirmed this analysis.
► There were several shell holes in the aft aircraft hangar and considerable damage to the boat stowage and searchlight platforms over it. The forward bulkhead and doors to the hangar were undamaged, but we believe that anyone seeking shelter within this space probably was killed or injured by shells exploding within. The mainmast, damaged by shell splinters and located over the hangar, was severed near its base at the
fire raged outside the gunhouse as well. The deck, however, is covered with silt, and it will be difficult to determine just how much of the wood deck was destroyed. According to British gunnery reports, there was a large fire in this area.
- All the barrels of the 150mm. turrets were intact, although those of the after starboard turret appeared to be damaged. The most serious damage to an individual turret was sustained by the one on the port side forward.
- The base of the funnel and upper portions of the forward superstructure were damaged severely. This resulted in their separation from the main hull upon impact with the water surface during capsizing. No traces of either the funnel or the upper forward superstructure were found in the debris field. They could be buried in the sediments from the landslide caused on the seamount by the impact of the turrets and main hull. The forward antiaircraft control positions were totally destroyed, with a large hole in the base of the one to starboard.
- The side armor belts (splinter and main) showed evidence of penetration, particularly in the
16-inch shell hit. Torpedo and shellfire damage, prevailing sea conditions, inadequate welding technology, and poor structural details brought about this fracture. Correspondence with Wilhelm Schmidt—who was the leader of the damage control team aft—and testimony from British observers on board the Rodney made us aware of the severe damage to the stem end.
There is a remarkable similarity between the Bismarck damage and a similar torpedo hit on the stem of the Prinz Eugen on 23 February 1942. A torpedo struck this German heavy cruiser at Frame 6 1/2 (the aft armored bulkhead of her steering gear room). The after portion of the stern collapsed but was supported at the bottom by the rudder. Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, who directed the repairs of this heavy cruiser in Norway, wrote to us that this incident and an earlier one in the armored ship Luetzow—whose stem also collapsed from a torpedo hit—indicated a structural flaw in the stem design of German armored ships, heavy cruisers, battleships, and battlecruisers. Subsequently, improvements were made to the stem structures of the
Admiral Hipper, Luetzow, Tirpitz, Admiral Sheer, and Scharnhorst during 1940-1943.
Shell Damage—Dr. Ballard’s cameras were unable to photograph the damage caused by HMS Prince of Wales. The hit in the vicinity of the forward conning tower (compartment XIV) on the port side was one with an underwater trajectory. The shell entered the Bismarck in the soft shell plating below the main side belt but had sufficient momentum to carry it through more structure before hitting and then exploding against the 45-mm. torpedo bulkhead. Mud covers the entry hole. The other 14-inch shell struck the 60-mm. splinter belt midway between the forward turrets and the anchors, but just above the waterline. A hole from 1.3 to 1.6 meters in diameter was drilled through this belt, but the shell emerged on the starboard side without exploding in the ship. Statz has confirmed that much of the two major watertight compartments (XX and XXI) were flooded with a mix of oil and seawater. The ship took a list of 9° to port and 3° by the bow, which were corrected by flooding voids aft on the port side.
ail(l swept overboard during the BUnnery action. Statz, in his br'ef time on the bridge, remarked that he distinctly remem- ®ers their absence.
- Evidence exists of a 356-mm. shell hit on the faceplate of turret Caesar while it was trained toward the port bow. There is a Jussive “splash” of fragment holes in the aufbaudeck (the E-S. Navy’s 01 level) in a semiocular pattern, where the face Plate of this turret would have heen positioned.
- The barbette of turret Dora took three shell hits. We believe these to have been caused by the Rodney. Two of these were pen- orations that could have started the fire in the magazine of turret h*ora, as reported by Wilhelm Schmidt. The hit on the forward Port quarter demolished a segment of the 340-mm. barbette an<J ripped a large hole in the O'ain deck. The severity of dam- a§e indicates that Herbert Man- they must have left the Bismarck before 0920—the time at which the abandon ship order was B'ven. Shortly thereafter, there "'ere several hits in the deck area between turrets Caesar and hk'ra. It is doubtful that any Carley floats, such as Manthey Used, could have survived the
massive damage now apparent in this area. We believe Manthey and his comrades escaped from the Bismarck shortly after turrets Caesar and Dora fell silent. Any
attempt to approach these turrets while they were firing would have been extremely dangerous.
► Only a few shell or splinter holes in the Main Deck are in evidence, but some of these could have been covered by sediment now on the wreck. The teak deck is remarkably intact in those areas unaffected by battle damage. Unlike the pine deck of the Titanic, teak is resistant to wood-boring organisms. The wood deck around turret Anton, the aft port quadrant of turret Bruno, and the forward port quadrant of turret Dora all sustained extensive fire damage.
The main deck of the wreck is not littered with debris, as had been the situation before the ship capsized and sank, spilling the debris into the sea.
- The deck plating on the lower bridge deck, outside the forward conning tower, had two large gashes on the port side, and the bulwark on the port side was pushed in. We believe that two large shells caused this damage to the deck plate, and so weakened it that when the bulwark made contact with the water surface during capsizing, the impact collapsed the bulwark in toward the conning tower surface. Lighting and shadow effects made analysis of this area difficult. Statz is convinced that these two hits killed the ship’s command and everyone on the open bridge.
- The remains of what we believe is the port aircraft boat crane now rests in the barbette of turret Caesar. The violent inrush of water during the sinking process and the partial buoyancy of the crane’s boom could have caused this. Statz has told us that the starboard aircraft boat crane had been destroyed before he left the ship around 1025.
—Garzke and Dulin
Scuttling—Dr. Ballard’s discovery of the Bismarck, to his surprise, has intensified an old debate over who sank the ship. Based upon the condition of the hull (especially *n comparison to the after portion of the Titanic hull), the testimony of Josef Statz, Baron Wilhelm Schmidt, and Gerhard Junack, and our examination of the damaged stability analysis of the Bismarck, there is no question that scuttling charges caused the ship to sink at 1040.
There is no question that the Bismarck was severely damaged at the conclusion of the gunnery battle. Statz, "'ho was the only survivor from Damage Control Central, has given a detailed summary of compartment flooding, Which reinforces our conclusions that scuttling charges Were limited to the engine rooms and auxiliary machinery spaces. Pumps that had been removing water from flooded spaces were reversed.
Statz has provided detailed descriptions of his escape from Damage Control Central to the point on the main deck where he entered the sea. He recalled looking at the flooding status board in Damage Control Central and told us that, “there were a number of compartments already flooded on the starboard side to counter the list and trim from earlier actions, but now the board was lit with additional lights indicating that many additional compartments were flooding, particularly on the port side.” The port side is where the British battleships concentrated most of their fire.
We have frequently been asked whether the Germans or the British sank the Bismarck. Our answer to this question is always “Yes.” We do not doubt that the ship was scuttled by her crew, but the Bismarck was a defeated and sinking ship. The scuttling charges, which Statz has freely admitted and confirmed, merely accelerated her inevitable demise.
Our analyses of the loss of a number of capital ships during World War II makes one thing clear—massive torpedo hits will certainly sink major ships, but not nearly as quickly as the Bismarck appeared to succumb to the three torpedo hits from the Dorsetshire.
Damage to turrets—None of the main turrets of the
With the help of the authors, artist Thomas G. Webb depicts port-side and overhead views of the Bismarck here as she might have looked as HMS Dorsetshire approached to fire her final torpedoes. Damage to the superstructure is the result of some 300-400 shells striking the ship.
sunken Bismarck were in their barbettes. All of them had spilled out of the ship during the capsizing process and are buried deep in the debris field of the Bismarck wreck. Dr. Ballard’s team located only one turret, upside-down, buried deep in the sediment. This was identified by its turret machinery flat. The four turrets hit the side of a seamount before the hull and other wreckage followed. The turrets’ impact started a large landslide that carried the Bismarck hull some distance down the seamount’s slope when it settled a few minutes later.
We do know that turret Bruno had sustained severe damage from shell hits and an internal explosion. Early in the action on 27 May, a 16-inch shell struck the port beam segment of this turret’s 340-mm. barbette armor and cut a V-shaped notch some 10-15 centimeters deep in the upper edge. This notch was through the armor and would have permitted splinters from the exploding shell to ignite cartridges on the loading platform of the turret. Based upon turret deflagrations in the battlecruiser Gneisenau and the battleship Tirpitz, it is quite conceivable that turret Bruno was uplifted from its roller path and once the pressure
subsided, came crashing down on its barbette.
Statz was able to see this turret before he left the bridge and found it pitched forward. He also noticed that the rear armor of this turret was missing and he could look into the turret, which was trained 45° to port with one gun pointed skyward at an angle far in excess of its maximum elevating capabilities. The other barrel was near its maximum elevation of 30°. Based upon the action report of the King George V, one of her last 14-inch shells struck this turret at a range of some 8,000 meters. Turret Anton was trained to port and aft with its guns at maximum depression. This barbette shows no damage from shell penetrations.
Our research has shown that turret Caesar had been trained to a position just forward of the port beam and its guns jammed at maximum elevation from a 356-mm. hit on its face plate. Baron von Mullenheim Rechberg noticed this turret’s position during his escape from his aft conning station. The barbette armor shows no signs of shell penetrations, and the ventilation trunks on the aft port segment are remarkably intact.
Turret Dora had three holes in its barbette of 340-mm.
Evidence uncovered by the Ballard Expedition indicates that the break in the stern was caused by a failure in the weld all the way around the ship. This was a major contributing factor to the Bismarck's sinking.
armor and one of its barrels had sustained an internal ex-
- plosion that ripped it open, much as one would peel a
r banana. It is possible that a British shell had damaged this
- barrel, and a 380-mm. shell was jammed in its passage up
1 the barrel, and subsequently detonated. The surface ot
- barbette Dora was blackened by fires in the wood decking
i >n areas where the barbette had been penetrated by 406! mm. shells from the Rodney. All of the main turrets were
t out of action by 0931; it appears that turret Caesar was the
1 last to fire a 380-mm. shell at the British battleships.
- Escape Route of Josef Statz—Using the video photography of Dr. Ballard, we were able to trace the escape route
i of Statz from the starboard bridge wing, adjacent to the
- forward conning tower, to the idle 150-mm. turret on the
t port side amidships. He unknowingly chose a very peril-
1 ous escape route, for he had to pass some of the most
; spectacular damage that the Bismarck sustained.
Statz’s descriptions of the damage to the conning tower t were confirmed by photo and video imagery. The conning tower was completely destroyed inside from shells explod, ing within. He narrowly escaped death, because his ascent
to this position from his battle station had been delayed ten minutes by his search for an alternate route of escape.
After the British battleships temporarily ceased fire around 0950, he emerged from the communications (or cable) to be within the conning tower, with two other comrades. They crawled forward and were able to exit the conning tower through a small opening between the deck and the vertical armor surface. This opening was hard to distinguish in the photography because of the shadow effects. Shortly after the three men emerged on the open bridge, the British battleships resumed firing, forcing them to seek cover on the starboard bridge wing. Statz’s two comrades, however, were killed by 8-inch shell splinters from the Dorsetshire, while he sustained an 8-inch- long wound to his shoulder. He commented to us that this cruiser’s shell fire in those moments on the bridge was very effective—and horrifying.
In the meantime, the Rodney and King George V were making their last pass along the Bismarck's port side and firing at point-blank range. Their gunfire was tearing the ship apart. About this time, Lieutenant Friedrich Cardinal
ft
On a highly detailed model of the Bismarck at right, crew member Josef Stafz outlined the route by which he and Lieutenant Friedrich Cardinal made their escape from the burning and sinking ship. By the time they reached the 150-mm. turret (4), it was partially submerged. Pictured here with other survivors, Statz is in the front row, far right.
appeared, and soon he and Statz would begin to plan their escape from the bridge.
The last salvo from the King George V came at 1014, and we believe it hit the forward superstructure and the conning tower. This salvo may have punched out a large opening around a door in the conning tower’s side, weakened by numerous shell holes. The scene Statz surveyed shortly thereafter in the area of the forward conning tower was a gruesome one. Although the roof of the conning tower position was intact, the gunfire control director had been wrecked and carried away, and the conning tower interior was black. Wreckage was everywhere.
To port, the 350-mm.-thick armor plates had a number of holes that permitted enough light to seep in for him to view the interior. The intermediate deck in the conning tower was completely destroyed, and the deck was covered with a fine red dust. All instruments in the space were just piles of rubble, with a large mound of debris just aft of the hatch were he emerged. There was a massive crack in the 60-mm. armor deck of the conning tower. The force of the shell hits had also created an opening in the forward side between the deck and the vertical wall large enough for him to crawl through.
When Statz and Cardinal began their escape, they made their way around to the badly damaged port side, where the upper bridge deck had been splintered by two shell hits. Footing here was particularly difficult because of the ship’s list, trim, and motions. Looking down, they could see large pieces of plating and stiffeners tom from the forward superstructure lying on the main deck below, some of it covering the forward 150-mm. turret. Among this debris were louvers for the forward boiler room. Access down the port side was difficult because of missing
inclined ladders (which had been shot away), large holes in the decks, and jagged debris jutting from the side of the superstructure. Statz and Cardinal had chosen this route because it appeared safer than the one to starboard. The Dorsetshire did not halt her gunfire until 1019.
When Statz reached the aufbaudeck, he could barely recognize features he had once known well. The funnel had been badly damaged and was full of holes, especially near its base, with intakes and uptakes barely visible in the smoke and haze. There was a large hole in the aufbaudeck that was still smoking from fires burning within and around the hole. The wood deck in this area was severely damaged by fire. The hole was so large that he decided to exit the ship from the middle 150-mm. turret on the port side, despite the list to port and the waves surging into the ship. The guns of this turret were pointing outboard, and this aided his escape.
Escape of Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg—Unlike Statz, the Baron chose a less damage-hindered route. As he left his aft gunfire control station, he could see the damage over the aircraft hangar. The searchlights and two 37-mm. machine gun mounts were gone, and smoking debris remained. The boats had disappeared and their cradles were twisted wrecks. The aft starboard 105-mm. gun mount had its two barrels pointing almost vertically. The Baron was able to make his way down to the main deck, even though the access ladders had sustained some minor damage. Once on the main deck, the wood planking appeared generally intact, but there were holes visible from shell hits or splinters. The aft end was covered with water, and it is possible the stem had already begun to break away. The Baron and his party escaped from the starboard side—the lee side—away from the prevailing wind.
Conclusions—A comparison of the Titanic and Bismarck wrecks reveals that despite the Bismarck's, sustained exposure to the sea environment, she had suffered a surprisingly gradual corrosion of the hull. Many advances had been made in materials and paints since the Titanic sank in 1912, and these enabled the Bismarck to resist corrosive forces quite well. A few rusticles have formed
°n the armor surfaces (barbettes and main side belt), however> and we anticipate that, over time, these will grow to Itle Point where disintegration of the wreck will begin. A rernurkable feature of the Bismarck wreck is the condition
the teak decks in areas undamaged by shell fire. This is tlle result of the wreck’s great depth and the fact that teak ls more resistant to wood-boring organisms than other of wood.
Eh'- Ballard’s discovery of the Bismarck was, by his °Wn description, a scientific achievement. He came to dis- c°ver and to demonstrate his deep-sea-exploration tech- tyque in the interests of science. He regards the wreck as property of the German people and does not intend to relum to the scene unless scientific interest demands it. He a*So has no intention of recovering artifacts from the Wreck or debris field, for he believes such recoveries to be aesccrations of gravesites.
, The discovery of the wreck of the Bismarck has conclu- ®jvely ended any controversy about who sank her. The British caused severe damage to the ship above the water- 'ne, particularly high in the superstructure. The battleship Was unquestionably sinking gradually because of uncon- holled progressive flooding, exacerbated by the flooding °f magazines to put out fires caused by shell hits. The ^ennan use of scuttling charges rapidly diminished the reserve buoyancy, causing the ship to skin at 1040.
In viewing the shell damage to the Bismarck, we were amazed that so many of her crew were able to escape into sea. Unfortunately, only a fraction of these men could °e saved.
The photographic evidence concludes that the Bismarck’s port side was much more severely damaged than the starboard side, a result of the fact that the Rodney and King George V spent most of their time shelling her port s'de during the gunnery action on 27 May 1941. The cruis- efs Dorsetshire and Norfolk spent all of their time on the starboard side.
Throughout the final gunnery engagement, the Bismarck had no steering and was at the mercy of the oncoming sea, which caused her to broach and pitch violently at times. The gunnery problem facing Commander Adalbert Schneider was a difficult one, and it is a credit to his skill that he was able to straddle the Rodney before his gunfire control director battle station was destroyed.
The Bismarck was a beautiful ship, well-designed and well-fought during her brief combat career. She now rests on the seabed, upright and proud, a memorial to the valor of the Germany and British sailors who wrote an indelible chapter in the history of the war at sea, a half-century ago.
Mr. Garzke is the staff naval architect at Gibbs and Cox, Inc., Washington, D.C. He was a research assistant at Webb Institute of Naval Architecture and has taught naval architecture at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.
Mr. Dulin is senior program manager for the Basic Technology Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia. He spent 12 years in the Navy after graduating from the Naval Academy in 1961—two years at the Naval Ship Repair Facility at Subic Bay, Philippines, and four years in the office of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in New York.
Garzke and Dulin are the authors of the three-part Battleships series of books currently being reprinted by the Naval Institute Press and were technical advisers to Robert D. Ballard for his The Discovery of the Bismarck (Toronto: Madison Press Books, 1990).
Both Mr. Garzke and Mr. Dulin express their appreciation to Dr. Robert Ballard, Burkard Baron von Mulllenheint-Rechberg, Mr. Josef Statz, and retired Royal Navy officers from the Prince of Wales, Captain Colin McMullen, Commander A. G. Skipwith, and Vice Admiral D. B. N. Wildish for their assistance.
_______________________ ___ A Good Man Is Hard to Find_____________
Seaman Gabelli had been on board the submarine for two years and had served passably, if not conspicuously, in every department. Each time that an advancement examination cycle came around, however, he decided that he wanted to try a different rating and declined to take the exam. Since his performance was always satisfactory, he was allowed to move to a new department.
Following one such move, a discussion took place among the officers concerning Gabelli. It was noted that he was qualified as a diesel engine throttleman, battery charging electrician, torpedoroom watchstander, sonar watchstander, and even as a cook. While he did none of these things well, he at least did them to the minimum standards. Summing up the discussion, the Executive Officer said, “Okay, Gabelli is a jack of all trades and master of none—but what are we going to do with him?”
At that point, one of the officers suggested, “We could always send him to OCS.”
Commander Edward Ransom, U.S. Navy (Retired)