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By Lieutenant Colonel Keith M. Fender, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant (junior grade) Mike P. Gaffney, U.S. Navy
“The Russians aren’t coming! The Russians aren’t coming!” This cry has rung out with greater and greater frequency lately in the halls and counting r°oms of the Pentagon. Reac- hons have varied between glee and fear, depending on which s'de of the defense buildup fence 0r>e sits. To restate the obvious, |he events occurring in Eastern Europe are radically restructur- lng the world as we know it.
. The changes initiated by So- 'det President Mikhail Gorbachev are just short of revolu- h°n. The quandary facing the defense establishment is deciding how to react. Is Gorbachev for
real? Or is the possibility of a resurgent Russian bear still an ever-present nightmare? It is not Necessary to guess what to do,
0r guidance is easily accessible.
On 9 February 1790 the Honorable Edmund Burke spoke to arliament concerning the future o the English Defence Budget.
Urke, long famed for his liberal plews, was later seen by the rench as a visionary political lr>ker, having correctly pre- lcted the moral decay and deI ruct'on brought on by the revo- Nhon in his Reflections on the Solution in France. England , °w faced the prospect of a cretlch threat that had suc- rnbed to the ravages of revolu- n: Burke’s comments during a ^rliamentary debate on the Plc hear consideration. He ‘sed many important points evant to the current U.S. dense debate. Following is a ^mmary of his speech, derived fy°ni The Works of the Right Viable Edmund Burke, Re- Lim ^dd'on’ Vol. Ill (Boston: Thtlt’ Bfown & Co., 1865).
Port ®Llest‘on: h is of great im- fij atlce to maintain public con- ence in the decisions of the government when setting the defense budget in time of peace. The declared purpose of the majority of English forces is to preserve the balance of power in Europe. The propriety of the annual defense budget’s being larger or smaller depended, therefore, upon the true state of that balance. If the increase demanded of Parliament by the ministers of the government agreed with the manifest appearance of that balance, confidence in the government would be very proper. If, instead, the increase is not at all supported by any such appearance, great suspicion of the ministries might be entertained on that subject.
The Threat: The only real threat to the balance of power is the French. That France will remain an enemy is beyond question.
By the mere circumstance of vicinity it always must be an object of our vigilance. There is a natural and inevitable antagonism between a continental power like the French, whose concerns are dominated by land forces, and a maritime power on the periphery of the continent, whose concern with the continent is free access and stability in order to trade.
The nature of evil is totally changed in France; but there is still an evil there. While the disease is altered, the roots of it lie with Louis XIV, who established a greater and better disciplined military force than had ever been seen in Europe and with perfect despotism. It was in government nothing better than a painted and gilded tyranny.
It could be stated that the French decline was fast, and the recovery could be just as fast, but it lacks credibility. While it is true that one may fall with an accelerating velocity; to put that weight back up is hard and is opposed to the laws of physical and political gravitation, thus the same speed is unrealistic. The French have done our business [of destruction] in a way in which we would never have done it. (In February 1792 Prime Minister William Pitt declared in Parliament that “never had fifteen years of peace seemed more likely.”1)
The Strategy: Since they have ceased to be a power in Europe and will take a long time to restore themselves to an active existence, England's primary duty is to be observant and to regulate her preparation by the symptoms of their recovery. In monitoring the symptoms of her recovery, one should watch her strength, not her form of government, because republics as well as monarchies are susceptible to the usual causes of war: ambition, jealousy, and anger. If the French continued in this [revolution) and we continue increasing our expenses now, we would surely be weaker when it was time for us to arm.
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The History: The revolution began in 1789 as a result of King Louis XIV’s economic mismanagement. The cost of involvement in a foreign war (the American Revolution) was entirely financed by loans; public confidence in the monarchy was low,2 and this was further exacerbated by food shortages and runaway inflation. There was nothing to spare for consumer goods even though imports were undeniably cheaper and of higher quality; the goods clearly aggravated an already serious industrial depression.3
From this dismal foundation, the French swiftly came back. During 1792-94 the French successfully defended against a coalition of European monarchs attempting to restore the monarchy. Seven years after the revolution the French began an offensive campaign in Italy. By 1799, ten years after the revolution, there were whispers in Paris about invading England. In 1804 Napoleon coronated himself emperor for life.4 The year 1804 marked the end of William Pitt’s “15 years of peace.”
If the engine of war—the military infrastructure and support base—is not destroyed and the causes of war—ambition, jealousy, anger, and military adventurism—are not changed, war results as soon as the new political system can create a focus. The hostile environment of the neighboring monarchies created a focus for the French levee en masse. This environment forced the French to keep their industrial base mobilized. Although the French Revolution ended the military threat to England, it took Napoleon four years to rebuild the military, and only ten years to rebuild to a full military force capable of threatening the British Empire.5 England’s defense bill larmy estimates] declined and rose accordingly through that period.
The Present: These thoughts on France in 1790 are just as applicable to the Warsaw Pact today.
Burke’s speech reads much like today’s editorials if, each time they appear, you replace France with Warsaw Pact and monarchy with communism. The common ground between then and now is that the political and economic systems did not meet the needs of the people and failed.
If the dictates of history and weapons make war inevitable, one should not squander resources on the present defense establishment at the expense of economic strength and to the detriment of the military force that will be needed. The hostile environment of the neighboring monarchies created a focus for the French. Even when a country is shaken to the roots by revolution, if the people and weapons are not destroyed, the capability to wage war can be quickly rebuilt. Political capability leads to threat of war.
Similarly, in considering the threat of the Warsaw Pact nations, we must remember that unless their productive and technical capacity is reduced, the capability for rebuilding will always exist. We must, then, as the British did in the 1800s, watch our primary threat closely. As the immediate danger from standing forces subsides, our standing force expenditures should decline. At the same time, we should be wary of providing a motivation for rearming. It would, in fact, behoove us to create an environment that will lead to the dismantling of as much of their arms and military industrial and technical base as possible and redirect their national interests inward. Unless fundamental changes are made, renewed conflict seems inevitable.
As we create our strategy, we need to ensure that our available resources are not wasted but, instead, are committed to giving the greatest leverage in line with the increased warning time for rearming.6 This rationale leads our investment to be in basic science and technology, rein
forced at the expense of particular systems. By vigorously emphasizing research and development and limiting production to prototyping and operational testing, we can husband our strengths and increase our domestic technical and industrial capacity, freeing our economy for competition in the world market. We could, then, field systems whenever the present threat justifies the commitment and where we would gain the greatest leverage, while maintaining the capability for wartime surge requirements.
Insight to the crumbling Soviet system and U.S. response can be gained from the study of history. With the loss of Eastern European military capability and the linkage to Western economies, Eastern Europe will not threaten U.S. military or economic interests. However, the Soviet military potential remains intact and their ambition to be a world power remains. If history is an indicator, renewed U.S. conflict with the Soviet Union is inevitable, and this country’s resources should be conserved to deter military conflict.
‘William Doyal, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 200.
2Ibid., p. 67.
3Ibid., p. 87.
Thomas E. Griess, The West Point Military History Series, The Wars of Napoleon (Wayne- NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1985).
5George Fasel, Modern Europe in the Making (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1974). Of note is that it took four years after the Khomeini revolution to rebuild the Iranian Army under threat of invasion by Iraq. It took Germany 15 years to rebuild after 1918.
6This applies to warning of conflict, as opposed to shorter warning of attack and is focused on a survivable nonnuclear assumption-
Proceedings / April
Lieutenant (junior grade) Gaffney gradu ated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1987 as a Rhodes scholar and is completing graduate studies at Oxford.
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Lieutenant Colonel Fender is a Strategic Planner with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. has been involved in integration of Acquisition program reviews on the OSD and HQ Army staff as well as in many assignments in Armor and Aviation units