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AIWS Development Continues
Tli »
e U. S. Navy has awarded development contracts (Am*16 ac*vance(l interdiction weapon system 19QO )' Scheduled for introduction in the mid- Us> the AIWS is a multipurpose family of weap- ns for short- to medium-range standoff missions.
^he Soviets Reposition Their Military
feast
The Soviets
continue to deprecate their military systems publicly, at
Haijfan sta,enients released in the West. In an unofficial conference stiff*111 ^une> a Soviet spokesman stated that the Soviet Navy had stirfaCe a Var>cty of embarrassments, such as the failure of an encrypted had to Jt0 air ^ata link ln the carrier Baku (ultra-high-frequency radio were • e used instead), the unsuitability of some radars for the guns they and alntendecl to control (presumably a reference to close-in weapons), her r- jruiser s need to carry hundreds of civilian specialists to maintain spokear Astern (presumably a reference to a Kirov-class ship). The Action'31' conc*u^ec* that the Soviet Navy, which consumes a large At p11 va*uahle resources, would suffer heavy cuts in the near term, three 3nS 'n ^une’ the Soviets were careful to state that there were only DefCn^r°.t')tyf,es °f the new Hokum ground-attack helicopter (the U. S. of tjlese. epartment had reported it close to service entry) and that some Prot„. aircraft’s subsystems were not yet available, at least not for the fj ^Pe displayed.
' • scientists permitted to tour the Soviet laser test site at Sary
Shi
Weren.Were shown evidence that no antimissile laser was present. They POtye0Wed to conclude that the Soviets had never operated high- "Star w *as,ers (°f the type being developed in the United States for the the eo • ars ' Program), and also to observe the dismal state of much of in the laser test area. They were not, however, allowed to ons K. much larger area devoted to more conventional antimissile weap- inteiii °f ^ 11 aPPear that those present were conversant with the U. S.
The qCe on ^ov*et antimissile programs.
Where .L°Vlets a'so have permitted visits to the secret city of Kyshtym, ramSh |flr Plutonium is produced. Again, visitors were made aware of earlier u, 6 conditions, and of the contrast between Soviet reality and
-er .
0ngestem perceptions.
'ftght be forgiven for seeing three motives in such disclosures.
First, the Soviets badly want to relax international tensions, at least in part so that they can obtain large-scale financial assistance from the West. There is, incidentally, some evidence that at least some of this assistance goes to meet Soviet hard-currency obligations to subversive or terrorist organizations operating in the West. However, much of the hard currency is undoubtedly to be used to buy consumer goods, and thus to stave off internal problems. A Soviet military clearly incapable of offensive action (because its equipment does not work) is no great threat. Similarly, to the extent that the Soviet military is toothless, technology transfer from the West is no great danger.
Second, the Soviets are seeking massive arms reductions in the West, therefore reductions in the perceived threat are essential. So is greater openness, which the Soviets are offering particularly to those Western scientists who in the past have opposed Western spending on weapons. For example, such scientists were permitted on board the cruiser Slava to take radiation readings in support of a Soviet proposal that nuclear sea- launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) be limited. The scientists hoped to show that nuclear SLCMs could be detected, hence counted, without intrusive inspections on board ships. This is not exactly a new idea: during the 1973 Middle East War U. S. observers were able to tell that Soviet ships sent into the Mediterranean lacked nuclear weapons, whereas ships withdrawn from that sea were nuclear armed. The U. S. Navy gains considerably if the Soviets, not knowing which ships carry strategic cruise missiles, have to track all of them. It is by no means clear that the loss of this enormous tactical advantage is worthwhile.
Third, and perhaps most important, the Soviets hope to discredit Western estimates of their military power, and thus cause unilateral Western disarmament. The Hokum announcement and the trip to Sary Shagan are direct attacks on DoD descriptions of Soviet equipment, and at least the latter was so reported. The press did report that U. S. interest in Soviet laser weaponry is concentrated on Dushanbe, which the scientists did not visit, but that mention was overshadowed by one U. S. scientist’s comment that the overestimation of Sary Shagan had been worth $10 billion to the U. S. Strategic Defense Initiative.
This theme, of gross and cynical U. S. overestimations of Soviet capability, is not a new one, and it is likely to be seen again and again. It is certainly true that Western intelligence has often tended to arrive at a worst-case picture of Soviet capabilities. However, in many cases the issue is how well individual units of a massive force work at present. If the units work at maximum theoretical potential, the total force is overwhelmingly powerful. If they currently have many failings, then it is true that the force cannot develop its potential—at present. However, many of those failings are by no means impossible to correct. Indeed, the reconstruction of Soviet society advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev ought to correct precisely the sort of failings that in the past have so reduced the power of large Soviet forces.
For example, there have been suggestions in the Soviet press that the July accident to the Echo Il-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea was caused, in part, by personnel incompetence owing to overemphasis on political indoctrination at the expense of more practical training. It is impossible to say whether this is true, but clearly such a statement supports the sort of perestroika that Mr. Gorbachev advocates. It also can be used to support a movement by, say. the Soviet military and the KGB to squeeze the Community Party (and Mr. Gorbachev) out, in the name of greater military and economic efficiency. This year the main Soviet journal on military history (which carries enormous prestige in the Soviet military) published the three-part article “The Army and Culture,” which reportedly pressed for a disciplined and largely nonpolitical state, harking back in a sense to the days of the tsars. That, too, is a reaction to increasing Soviet press coverage of military inadequacy.
In the past, a weak Soviet Union has been willing to overstate its capabilities; after all, the Potemkin Village—i.e., fake—was a Russian (tsarist) invention. The assumption was that the West was on the point of attacking, and that overstatement served as a valuable deterrent. One
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ets .r^retat*on °f the phenomenon of perestroika would be that the Sovi Theeamed l^at cou*^ not match the Western buildup of the 1980s prev' are’ t*lere^ore’ hacking off. Even so, it is remarkable that, where seeirJ0Us Soviet overstatements are now recognized as such, Westerner thi„ t0 ta^e Soviet poor-mouthing at face value. Perhaps there is such a* a Potemkin Ruin. sVst 6 m°St 'nterest’ng question is to what extent within the Sovie with m ;h£ t^ePrecation (and the openness) extends. Such deprecatior and m t"le ^ov'et Union would tend to reduce the prestige of the militar> depI.W°U'c* *’e difficult for the leadership to reverse. However, if the catlon is for foreigners only, then it may be a reversible ploy | Stand-off Missile Is One Step Closer SLAM, the new standoff land-attack missile, flew its first simulated mission at Point Mugu on 24 June. The SLAM (AGM-84D) is a modified Harpoon with a Maverick imaging infrared seeker, a Walleye data link, and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver. Using GPS, the missile can be programmed to fly toward a preselected target. A guiding aircraft uses the image produced by the missile seeker to acquire the target and designates the portion of the target into which the missile is to fly. Once it has locked on the target, the missile guides itself to the kill. One advantage of the GPS installation is that the data link is required for |
Japan Receives MCM Helo SIKORSKY Japan’s first Sikorsky S-80M-1 mine countermeaSUres helicopter is flying at Nagoya. Japan has Purchased 12 S-80s and plans to station them at ''akuni Air Base. The aircraft are similar to U. S. avy MH-53Es but use Japanese avionics and are n°t equipped with refueling probes. | only a relatively short time, so that it is difficult either to intercept or to jam. The most important earlier standoff missile project, the Condor (AGM-53), was cancelled in the late 1970s largely because of the enormous cost of its antijam data link. In the June test, an A-6E Intruder launched the missile, but the pilot of an F/A-18 Hornet controlled it. In theory, the data link permits the controlling aircraft to remain well beyond the range of any surface-to-air missiles defending the target. The test was the first of ten; it was a preplanned strike against a simulated tactical missile communications site on San Nicolas Island. McDonnell Douglas delivered the first production SLAM to the Navy in November 1988. The SH-60F Joins the Fleet The Navy has formally accepted its first SH-60F carrier ASW defense helicopter. The SH-60F is externally similar to the standard SH-60B LAMPS-III carried by many cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, but it employs a medium-frequency (hence medium-range) active dipping sonar (an AQS-13) rather than the largely passive sonobuoys of the LAMPS. The active sonar is essential for ASW operations near the carrier (in the inner ASW zone) because the noise of the carrier herself tends |
Jhe Upholder Experiences Problems marine"' the first of a new class of British diesel-electric sub- si°nedS encountered problems during her sea trials and will be commis- at ongseveral months behind schedule. British newspapers reported that c°ntrol ^°mt S^e *ost Power anc* plunged several hundred feet before Corre t CK°Uld regained- The accident was presumably a minor (and hunone’ but the builder, Vickers, must be concerned that it will The^/SU^mar'nd s alrea<dy-damaged export prospects. nuclear P^°^er was conceived as a lower-cost supplement to Britain’s react0 ^tac^ submarines, i.e., in many ways a nuclear craft without a (havin0 f^t'tish justified reversion to diesel submarine construction Stound’ <?0mP'etecl the last of an earlier class in 1967) largely on the Grp»„i aat SU£b submarines could act as listening platforms in the gand-Iceland-UK Gap. to rev "ects f°r export seem to have played a major part in the decision nearlyCrt l° d'ese* Power. For years the Royal Navy has not provided chojcee/'ou^^ orders to maintain a large British naval industry, leaving a yarcjs ®tween increased exports and the slow death of many existing ization h ^ards *ost money under government ownership, and privatize^ aS mat*e tbe yards more anxious to compete. However, privat- Warsiy WaS carr'eil out against a background of a declining international eniar'^, market. The Upholder design was modified (and somewhat Ausir. r ln hopes of capturing one of the new available prizes—the The lan submarinc order. a<e Was every hope that the Royal Australian Navy, which had Ho\vev°*'erated British submarines in the past, would buy the new class. choos' 6r’ '^'‘-bers was dropped from competition, the Australians finally therea Swedish design over a West German design. At the time, in the r,ere claims that bad publicity surrounding the Vickers submarine this naval press had turned Australian attitudes, and indeed that in» , lci‘y bad been planted by one or the other of the builders remain- The he COntest- Navye ^holder has one other major potential buyer—the Canadian Subrna ' aen ^ustraha chose, Canada had a parallel project for a diesel Cancell 'T’ ^Ut *bat project in turn was cancelled in favor of the now- subnv, C nuclear submarine. Now Canada may turn back to a diesel marine. | to mask submarine-generated sounds. Active sonar is also valued in the inner zone because it makes for quick detection of contacts. Passive detection and localization take time, but time is available in outer zone prosecutions. Once a submarine enters the inner zone, she is nearly within torpedo attack range, and detection and prosecution must be relatively quick. That is practicable in the inner zone because zone dimensions are well matched to the inherently limited range of the dipping sonar. In the outer zone, it would take an impractically large number of dipping sonars to cover the wide area involved— hence the present reliance on passive systems, both shipboard (e.g., towed arrays) and helicopter-borne. As Soviet submarines become quieter, passive sonar may become less effective, and all ASW helicopters, including LAMPS, may require active sensors. The Naval Air Systems Command is evaluating a variety of low-frequency helicopter sonars and presumably the type chosen may replace the current AQS-13 in the SH-60F. Because low frequency (plus high power) can confer great range, the same sonar may well appear in later or rebuilt LAMPS. For the present, the SH-60F is replacing the SH-3 Sea King, which entered service in the early 1960s. The new helicopter offers longer mission endurance, much better maintainability and reliability, an improved sonar, a better autopilot, and improved autohover capability. The SH-60F carries three homing torpedoes; the SH-60B has two. Two other versions of the same basic helicopter are in maritime service, the HH-60H combat support helicopter for the Navy and the HH-60J medium-range recovery helicopter for the Coast Guard. The combat support helicopter is intended for strike rescue and special operations; 18 are on order, to be operated by Naval Reserve squadrons at Norfolk and Point Mugu. The first were delivered this spring. The Coast Guard has ordered 24 medium-range recovery helos and has a requirement for 32, all for search/rescue and drug interdiction. The HH-60J replaces the HH-3F version of the old Sea King. The Navy requires 175 SH-60Fs, of which 25 have been ordered. Approval for full lot production (18 per lot) was granted in May 1988. As of mid-1989, however, production for fiscal year 1990 has been deferred to fiscal year 1991, largely to cut the defense budget. Reportedly the cut was also justified by deficiencies in the current model of the AQS-13 sonar, which must be rectified before large numbers of helicopters are delivered. |
Pr°c<*din<« / ....... _ |
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