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Whether a future conflict involves U. S. forces on a Third World island or on Europe’s Central Front, there will be no way to separate land and maritime theaters. Land commanders must learn to integrate naval forces—such as the battleship Iowa firing her 16-inch guns and the Aegis cruiser Ticonderoga in this NATO Baltic exercise—to support their operations.
Much of recent U. S. military history is marked by the separation of land and naval forces. During World War II, General Douglas Mac Arthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz followed separate westward courses across the Pacific. And in the Vietnam War, blue- water naval forces were in a chain of command that stretched to Hawaii, rather than terminating in-country.
Our next major conflict will not allow separate land and sea campaigns. Our likely opponents will be big, fast, and synchronized; the war violent and total. To have any chance of winning, we must know how to apply naval power to land campaigns effectively.
Naval officers naturally are focused on naval battles and campaigns. They spend comparatively little time on the problems of applying naval power to continental campaigns. When they do tackle these issues, it is almost exclusively at the tactical level. Similarly, few Army officers have even a superficial understanding of how naval
i ®
forces (the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps) can be use influence directly the outcome of a continental campa'y The emerging “age of jointness” and the atten „ changes in the services’ professional military educa programs eventually should correct part of the prob1£ But “eventually” may be too late. It is essential that^( move now toward better service integration for a nun1 j) of reasons. First, the emphasis on jointness means u have to get smarter about how the other services Second, there is not one major theater on the gl°^j which naval forces, or army and air forces, will not p'‘;^ significant role. Third, most officers eventually serve j joint staffs such as that of the U. S. European Corniy . where major naval forces are part of the permanent I ^ structure or to which naval forces would be rapidly ^ signed in a crisis. Finally, there are a multitude of ^(i that can be accomplished by naval forces, each ofvV' ai can directly support ground operations or land theate
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■ ' | Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the 1930s. Strategic Level of War: U. S. strategic objectives are derived from the National Command Authorities (NCA). Through the process embedded in the joint strategic planning system (JSPS), these objectives are reflected in the planning guidance given to the commanders in chief (CinCs) of the unified and specified commands. This planning guidance is provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and sets in motion the deliberate planning |
; ■ | process. In a crisis, the NCA can pass strategic guidance directly to the appropriate CinCs, normally through the Chairman of the JCS. Achieving assigned strategic objectives is the responsibility of the CinC. He does this within his assigned theater of war or, in some cases, theater of operations. Though no doctrine distinguishes between the two, the distinction is worth noting.2 A theater of war is the geographic area within which a unified or combined commander is responsible for achieving his assigned strategic objectives. This theater of war might correspond with the area of responsibility assigned to a unified command by the unified command plan, but this is not an absolute requirement. A theater of operations is a major subordinate theater—within a theater of war, within which large formations would be operating along separate lines, or within a distinct geographic area. For example, on the European continent a war would be fought by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEur), who would have as his theater of war the entire European NATO area extending from the north cape of Norway to Turkey’s eastern border. One of his theaters of operations would be the central European area extending from Jutland to the borders of Austria and Switzerland. He |
\ n . f.„ ’Perational level of war. This article addresses this S| Point. ^[Theater Organization during the past decade, much has been written about Maritime strategy, the amphibious strategy, and the military strategy. Following an almost paralle L1 ’ there has emerged within the U. S. Army a similar of literature (but little doctrine) about theater organics'0ri< the operational level of war, operational art, anc v5| Paign planning. However, little has been done to de- C)pe°P an understanding of the relationships between nava Options and land campaigns. The Joint Chiefs of Stafl 1^, * Joint Doctrinal Development Process now has the U. S. Army to write the capstone doctrine for H^?'nt operations—“JCS Pub.3, Operations.” This can- for6 accomplished without addressing the issue of naval jt6s supporting land campaigns, generally is accepted that there are three levels ol h^s^"Strategic, operational, and tactical.1 However, ii Cn,y been within the last decade that the operational (j J °f war and operational art have entered the lexicon ol Of t,' military terminology, with the Army in the vanguarc lev , Movement. The Soviets have dealt with these three s of war and operational art since the time of Marsha V, | also has additional theaters of operations in the northern and southern regions of his theater of war. The theater-of-war commander normally operates at the strategic and operational levels of war. The theater-of- operations commander normally functions at the operational level of war. Tactical Level of War: This level requires little explanation because it is generally the most familiar. It focuses on fighting battles and engagements, and the tactics, techniques, and technologies used to fight at that level. Operational Level of War: The operational level of war links the strategic and tactical levels. Operational-level warfare has the characteristics of both art and science— science because it can be learned, and art because even the skillful practitioner must study and practice it continuously. Little official terminology or doctrine exists to describe the operational level of war. However, a former U. S. Army War College faculty member has said: “Regardless of size [of the units employed], if military force is being used to achieve a strategic objective, then it is being employed at the operational level.”3 Clearly, this definition can be broadly interpreted. Are not an attack submarine working against an enemy submarine and an attacking armored brigade both being used to help achieve strategic and operational objectives? Probably, but it is almost universally agreed that brigades and single-ship units operate <i1 |
by Tomahawk missiles, then AAW is much less impc ^ to the success of the power-projection function. On
almost exclusively at the tactical level. So to establish the context for applying naval power to land theaters at the operational level of war we must recognize that we are operating at this level.
Operational-level operations have characteristics that differentiate them from tactical operations:
► They cover a broad geographic area in both depth and breadth, i.e., hundreds or even thousands of kilometers.
► They extend over a long span of time—weeks or even months—and are normally part of a larger, multiphased campaign.
► They aim to achieve the strategic objectives assigned by the NCA through the unified commander.
A number of other factors generally indicate that you are functioning at the operational level of war:
► Campaign plans or broad-gauged letters of instruction are used to convey the commander’s vision, interpretations, and phasing of the operation or campaign.4
► The focus is to concentrate large forces, at the right time and place, before the battle.
► Plans are made to exploit tactical successes rapidly using large formation maneuvers, operational (deep) fires, or both.
► Logistical issues dominate operational feasibility.
► Deception plans are developed to attempt to cause the enemy to deploy his operational reserves ineffectively.
Although this list is not all-inclusive, it helps us recognize that we are dealing with the level of war where operational planning links strategic objectives and the military measures used to achieve them. Generally, this occurs at the unified and combined command levels within theaters of war and theaters of operations.
Though we will focus on the application of naval power to assist a CinC in attaining operational and, thereby, strategic success in a land theater, remember that the line separating land and maritime theaters is fast becoming blurred. Quantum leaps in the ranges, accuracy, and lethality of weapons and forces coming from the sea, coupled with increasing support of maritime operations from land-based systems, has made this inevitable.
Basic Naval Functions
U. S. maritime forces engage in warfare by conducting operations in three broad functional areas: sea control, power projection, and sealift. All closely related, they can occur concurrently and contribute directly to land, air, and sea campaigns of all services, as well as those of our allies. The Navy’s ability to perform the two war-fighting functions, sea control and power projection, is an absolute requirement if we are to be able to use the seas to support warfare in land theaters.
Many who are unfamiliar with naval operations view the problem of an overseas conflict, in a maritime context, as one of simply keeping the convoys moving. However, the relationship between sea control and power projection to a successful sealift operation is direct, complex, time- sensitive, and crucial to the success of any large-scale land conflict. Carrier-based aviation and Marine Corps amphibious forces in the power projection role can be crucial
to ensuring control and continued safe use of the high sea' and contiguous land areas.
Fundamental Naval Warfare Tasks ___ ^
Closely related to the three broad functions are six damental naval warfare tasks: antiair warfare (AAW)11v tisubmarine warfare (ASW); antisurface ship wan (ASUW); strike warfare (STW); amphibious wan (PHIB); and mine warfare (MIN). Table 1 depicts close relationship between the basic functions and the damental naval tasks. The specific nature of each of th relationships, however, is subjective and mission-dePe(() dent. For example, AAW can be critically important^, power projection if you are conducting strike opera11 ^ with carrier air. But if the strike operation is a deep dll\
other hand, AAW might be crucial to achieving the de?.|j of sea control necessary to position the platforms that launch the Tomahawks. It is also evident from the ^ column in Table 1 that there are few naval tasks that not influence the land battle. jc-
Although we might expect to see the relationships picted in Table 1 because we are dealing with naval tj* tions and tasks, the same paradigm can be used to s'^j the relationships between the fundamental naval tasks land operations. . to
Table 2 depicts the naval tasks and their relationship the major functional areas of land-force operations. of these functional areas have been taken from FM 1 ^ Operations, the current U. S. Army doctrine for lan ^ erations.5 These functional areas have been further vided into those which normally take place in fighting j rear, close, and deep battles, as depicted in the u• 5 Army’s concept for air-land battle. A general category -j also been added to better depict those functions pert0 across the full spectrum of ground operations. ^5. Table 2 also reflects a number of subjective judgme
Table 2 Land Warfare and Naval Tasks
() _ a]ways directly affects land warfare function
Fundamental Naval Tasks
/if,
0__ Can direc,|y a^ect *ancl warfare function
as can be performed to affect land warfare ^ l0n or usually has only limited effect 0 relationship exists between task and land ***»'* function
|Harbor/Base Seizure | 3 | 3 | o | 3 | 3 | • |
1 Harbor Security | 3 |
| o |
| O | • |
l Fire SuDDort | 3 |
| o | • | 3 |
|
jLOC Security | 3 | • | 3 |
| 3 | o |
Airspace Coordination | O |
|
| o | 3 |
|
[Surveillance/Tot Acquisition | 3 |
|
|
|
|
|
l-SEAD | 3 |
|
| • |
|
|
_Airspace Coordination | O |
|
| 3 | 3 |
|
Fire Support | O |
|
| • | • |
|
.Electronic Warfare | o |
|
| O | O |
|
.Security Operations | 3 | O | 3 | • | • | 3 |
Ground Maneuver |
|
|
|
| • |
|
_A*r Superiority | • |
|
| 3 | 3 |
|
Close Air Support/BAI |
|
|
| • | • |
|
.Special Operations |
|
|
|
| O |
|
^eep Fires | 3 |
|
| • | • |
|
Offensive Counterair | • |
|
| • | • |
|
^erveillance/Tet Acquisition | 3 |
|
| O |
|
|
Special Operations |
|
|
|
| o |
|
Maneuver | • |
| • | • | • |
|
^pstainment | 3 | • | O | o | o | O |
deception | O |
| o | 3 | 3 |
|
Table 3 Operational Support of Land Warfare
Tasks | Means |
• Choke Point Control | —Amphibious Forces —Carrier-based Aviation —Mines —Submarines |
• Seizure of Kev Terrain | —Amphibious Forces |
—Airspace Control | —Maritime Prepositioned Forces |
—Advanced Bases | —Carrier-based Aviation |
—1 larhors/Harbor Defense | —Mines |
• Deep Strike | —Tomahawk Missiles —Carrier-based Aviation —Marine Land-based Aviation |
• Counter-maneuver Operations | —Surface Action Groups |
—Screening | —Carrier-based Aviation |
—Barriers | —Mines |
— Blockades | —Submarines |
re]a(.even given this limitation, a number of interesting fare'°nships are revealed. For example, amphibious war- tj0 ?°es not ^ave t0 used t0 effect tactical or opera- val deception, because an amphibious assault is by its aHi\nature a pure power-projection operation. But since %at' *0Us Petrine also provides for amphibious demon- as , l0ns and supporting landings, it can also be depicted pe‘ng able to directly affect the deception function. Th °r ^AW, the focus is enemy aircraft and missiles.
the relationships between the naval A AW task is j, ar|d functions are less apparent. On the other hand, it to a5 function of the strike and amphibious warfare tasks "'arfa^ly suPPort 'and °Perati°ns’ and much of strike
the sustaining function by shortening lines of communication and providing more secure sustenance bases. Seizure of key terrain takes on increased importance when it facilitates the control of critical choke points and denies the enemy freedom to reinforce, deploy his forces, or threaten friendly flanks.
The Army continues to grope for a solution to the “deep fires’’ problem. One major challenge is providing fires of sufficient range, volume, and accuracy to disrupt the arrival, for example, of Soviet second-echelon front forces into the Central Front theater of operations in sufficient strength and in time to influence the outcome of the war. This issue takes on a new perspective when we consider the use of the conventional Tomaha' k land-attack missile (TLAM-C), with its 600+-nautical-mile range, 1,000- pound warhead, and devastating accuracy.6 Carrier aviation, though more effective in the immediate littoral areas, could also play an effective role if selectively employed for deep strikes.
Operational Applications
Te consists of aircraft operations.
° e ^ shows with more specificity those naval mission OavS|frat directly affect land operations, and some of the hs.a forces and systems that can be used to execute these ^Qst ta^*e clearly shows that the naval forces that Phib- °^en have a direct effect on land warfare are am- tlW?US fofces’ carrier-based aviation, land-attack cruise lesgs, maritime prepositioned-ship forces, and, to a ^degree, surface action groups. Not as evident are the
lh,
sons 'ese
why the land commander should want to have
?ureetasks performed by naval forces. Advanced base sei- Pos;t1S 0ne example. The advanced bases provide forward °ns from which to project power. They also support
For better or worse, when one discusses large-scale land warfare with many Army officers, they think reflexively in terms of NATO or, more specifically, NATO’s Central Front. This is good for our purposes because a future European conflict will offer ample opportunity to employ naval forces at the operational level of war and may provide our toughest test. Understanding how naval forces can support this effort may help us pass that test.
Assuming that the major conflict will occur in the Central Front, there are a number of key maritime choke points that must be controlled by maritime forces, or the Central Front battle likely will be lost.
► Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) Gap: To lose control of the GIN Gap would allow Soviet submarines to threaten the entire Atlantic, interrupting reinforcement shipping and thus affecting the Central Front battle in the long term.
► Danish Straits: The Danish Straits must be controlled to bottle the Soviet Baltic Fleet. But even if the Soviets are able to flush their fleet under the guise of an exercise,
base[1]
strike aircraft could significantly reduce the \VarS , Pact’s ability to bring second-echelon forces for"' f However, even these seemingly logical application*
naval power introduce a host of related issues for the p'jT
ner to consider. For example, to employ the TLA
sat*1
NATO must control this critical area to prevent the Warsaw Pact forces from using Jutland to flank its Central Front forces and to prevent reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces by superferries running from Kalipeda in the Soviet Union to Rugen, East Germany.7 A combination of amphibious, surface, and aviation forces could be used for this task.
► Dardanelles-Bosporus: This choke point seals off the Black Sea Fleet and prevents reinforcement of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Greek and Turkish Thrace also provides NATO forces access to the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact east-west lines of operation.
►Gibraltar and the Suez Canal; Though initially not as critical as the other choke points, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal control the access of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron to both the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
Choke-point warfare must be of concern to SACEur and his theater-of-operations commanders. Usually, however, this and other naval considerations are considered “Navy problems.” The fact that two of the principal NATO commanders, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLant) and SACEur, have no common commander (both answer to the NATO Military Committee) exacerbates the problem.
Effective use of Tomahawk missiles against high-value,
effectively for deep fires, naval forces may have to si harm’s way i.e., too close to enemy land-based sys^^ . Accurate risk assessment will be crucial. Perhaps su rine-launched variants of the missile can be used. Ag .
111*
deep targets for TLAM-C strikes carefully. Given battleship carries only 32 missiles and a Spruance ( 963)-class destroyer only 37, and since there are 1 ^ sands of legitimate deep-fires targets, the targeters on land commander’s staff must select the deep strike ta » to be assigned to naval systems with great care. ^ The seizure of key terrain, almost by definition.^, have a pivotal effect on a conflict. In the European text, this would clearly be at the operational level ot (0 Jutland is but one example of such key terrain, crucja a both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. If, as many preolC
the risk is great. The ground commander has to select
Warsaw Pact attack across the north German plain n with initial success, then it is clear the Warsaw Pact ^ control Jutland. Not to do so would expose their
northern operational flank. Moreover, exercises - t ducted by Pact forces clearly indicate that they place - emphasis on controlling this piece of terrain. y
The NATO allies, on the other hand, should v*evVpad land as an opportunity to control or reverse Warsaw ^ successes on the Central Front. Jutland is crucial to r*
for exactly the same reasons it is crucial to the
War*3'
be'1
es- The nature of the geography makes the use of am-
y Planned amphibious operations to seize key terrain enveIop or turn enemy forces can have an immediate fl'j'Pact on a theater-of-war or theater-of-operations con* at the operational level of war. General Douglas Mac- P Ur demonstrated this skillfully at Inchon in 1950. i 'Hally; counter-maneuver operations such as screen- can ^atT'ers’ blockades, or other containment operations ters a'S° ^ave imme<Jiate operational benefits to land thea-
Se:
Cts
ing
^st as General George Patton used U. S. Army Air -s to screen his southern flank as he raced across ce and into Germany in 1944, land theater command
essariiy
on how to use forces of the other services to sup-
Port
Th
best ® conventional wisdom seems to conclude that, at c^ACEur’s forces will have a difficult time winning a to Slllct 'n Europe. Why not use some of our naval power $ea PP°rt the land battle? In fact, does winning the war at
cC”
erences in the nature of the operations of the respective
ititees' ^owever, given the growing gap between our vital to pfests and treaty obligations worldwide and our ability °tect those interests, it seems clear that closer coordi- ck n can only serve to reduce this gap. But a number of
Pr'|ress.
Se ’ 0Ur dual-track thinking in terms of distinct marled atl(J 'and theaters must change. The ranges, lethality,
!*act, that is, security of the northern operational flank.
and’s geographic limitations—littoral areas, canals,
a relatively small peninsular nature—will limit the
mber of forces that the Warsaw Pact can maneuver on
^ Peninsula. In effect, this will offer NATO an opportu-
J.y to control Jutland, with all the benefits that this implies - s10Us forces, supported by the U. S. Navy, ideally ed to the task. In fact, in the past nine years a number b amphibious exercises have been conducted on Jutland y- S. Marine Corps amphibious forces.
^ Mediterranean also offers ample opportunity for Ure or control of key terrain that, again, threatens the fl||jrsaw Pact’s flanks or lines of communication. Care-
w
jntpa.
Can use naval forces to screen their littoral flanks dur- ob operational-level maneuver. This may seem like an C()m°US aPP*‘cati°n °f maritime forces. However, naval 1^ Zanders naturally focus on winning the war at sea and Commanders on winning on the ground, but not nec- ,heir efforts.
Course [2] 1
give students a solid appreciation of the nature, problems of employment, and true capabilities of all services’ forces. The congressionally-mandated joint specialty officer programs may be a positive move in this direction.
Third, the land commander must be able to integrate naval forces and capabilities into his planning intelligently. To do this his staff must contain enough qualified, properly educated, and experienced officers who understand the nature of maritime operations.
Fourth, we must develop the appropriate command, control, and communications, and the procedures to control naval forces in the land environment. We can no longer afford to develop unique procedures for each situation. Perhaps the joint doctrinal development process being led by the joint staff will provide such a capability. Today, for example, it would require a Herculean effort for a theater-of-operations CinC to target, coordinate, control, and prompt the Navy to launch a Tomahawk missile against a deep land target in a timely manner.
Finally, we must train as we will fight if we want to take advantage of maritime forces in continental theaters. U. S. Marines do conduct amphibious operations in Jutland and other NATO areas and some exercises employ naval aviation against land targets. Certainly, the Navy should not focus only on land operations, but it has a long way to go before devoting the exercise time necessary to address the issues identified in this article.
Naval forces offer a tremendous potential for enhancing the operational theater commander’s ability to win the campaign ashore. This potential can be achieved without reducing the ability of naval forces to attain their primary aim—winning the war at sea. But to do it we have to change the way we think, use officers who understand the issues, plan intelligently, and exercise the way we intend, or will be forced, to fight.
'Definitions for the three levels of war were recently approved by the JCS and will be published in the next change to JCS Pub. 1.
2FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations (coordinating draft), 30 September 1987, contains proposed U. S. Army doctrine for theater organization. However, publication is being held in abeyance pending publication of JCS Pub. 3, Operations, the joint capstone doctrine for operations.
3John F. Meehan, III, “The Operational Trilogy,” Parameters, Autumn 1986, P- 9.
Campaign plans and letters of instruction for large-scale operations can be remarkable in their simplicity. “Downfall,” General MacArthur’s campaign plan for seizing the Japanese home islands—a plan that was to employ the majority of U. S. forces in the Pacific, was only 13 pages long, with an additional eight pages of maps and charts.
5Headquarters, U. S. Army. FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C., May 1986, p. 40.
6See Maj. Roy A. Griggs, USAF, “Maritime Strategy on NATO’s Central Front,” Military Review, April 1988, pp. 54-65, for a more in-depth discussion of employing TLAM-C in a land theater.
7See VAdm. Helmut Kampe, German Navy (Ret.), “Amphibious Objective: Baltic Approaches,” Proceedings, March 1988, pp. 113-117, for a detailed discussion of the strategic importance of the Baltic Approaches or Danish Straits.
Colonel Jaroch is Director of Contingency Planning, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, U. S. Army War College. He recently completed a tour as a battalion commander and the G-3 of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Hawaii. He was a Senior Fellow at the Strategic Concepts Development Center, where he participated in work for the Secretary of Defense dealing with matters of high-level defense and national security policy.
[1]l>eorrC^Uce(j “pure” maritime and land theaters to almost aticl m103* concePts- E is impossible to separate the two, forCese separation associated strictly with the types of $ employed (naval or ground) is artificial, at best. Seni0r°n(E our educational institutions, particularly at the service college and intermediate school levels, must
aven matter if we lose the war on land? There are no inte>answers to these questions. It may be that a more pirated employment of land and naval forces has been ti0n^nted by a combination of factors, such as institute k'ases, poor cross-service education, and inherent
°fCi
c'Ses must be made before there is any meaningful
havCcuracy of both sea-based and land-based systems