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89. They will join four missile-arm versions in the fleet, and there is an op tion to buy three more.
Algeria: The first Soviet Kilo-ma^ submarine to be delivered to the Alger'a Navy left the Baltic on 15 Septembe 1987; a second unit is expected. Who
ted
the
ship programs since the Combattante fast attack craft program ended in
1UJI uuuvn Viun piugiuiu f
Presumably, with the ouster ot fornl Tunisian President Bourguiba, the na can dispose of the elderly frigate Pre dent Bourguiba, a former U. S. ra picket destroyer (DER). Apparently- ^ old ship was kept around to please the ^ ^ man. The only continuing program class of ten 28-knot customs boats built in Tunisia with South Korean ! nical assistance. „
Libya: In March 1986, the Liby Navy suffered in combat with U. S. b* .|( task groups. Libya lost the Soviet- 0 ^ Nanuchka-II-class Tariq Ibn Ziyad arl
By Michael Vlahos
Navies from the Magreb to Malabar have reached a watershed. Not one of their admiralties, with the exception of India, is conducting a real fleet expansion program. Major ship contracts with the West have essentially dried up, and a general period of realism has set in. The navies of small states in the region have acquired most of the combatants they actually needed in the past decade; more vessels simply cannot be assimilated. Of the larger regional powers, Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan have fallen on financial hard times, Iraq is under siege, and Iran is isolated by its war-making.
Before a renewed round of fleet-building, these states need to reassess their naval needs and abilities. Many have modem fleets that cannot be operated or, if they can put to sea, cannot conduct effective combat operations. Many shore
While missile and mine damage to ships in the Persian Gulf forced Western navies to reassess their escorting capabilities, Iran and Iraq discovered that such tactics merely expend valuable resources without affecting their war’s outcome.
establishments cannot even put their ships in operational condition. It is one thing to buy ships; it is another to be able to use them and to keep them ready for use. The critical items on the agenda of all navies in this Third World arena should be; maintenance, shiphandling, at-sea logistics, and operational art. They spent the last decade shopping for ships; the next decade should emphasize training and infrastructure.
In 1987, the world focused on naval actions in the Persian Gulf and on the Iran-Iraq War. The on-going crises highlighted two operational issues—air defense and mine warfare—and a broader question of naval strategy: the effective use of maritime power. The Iraqi attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) exacerbated claims of ship vulnerability to sea- skimmers, although the record for low- payload missiles such as the Exocet against large ships such as tankers remains dismal. The promiscuous use of mines as a politically protected form of indirect war has underscored future, more subtle demands on Western naval forces in Third World conflicts: their capacity to conduct flawless naval escort and patrol. In addition, the naval and air forces of Iran and Iraq were asked to perform as “decisive,” if indirect, weapons—one for political leverage and one for economic strangulation. However, their respective limited capabilities had limited impact; their use has been a risky diversion of resources, not a war-winner.
The Barbary Coast Morocco: The first of two 55-meter patrol vessels ordered in 1985 from Frederikshavn Shipyard (renamed Dan- yard in 1987) in Denmark was launched in July 1987. The three austere Lazaga- class patrol boats ordered from Spain’s Bazan in 1985 will be delivered in 1988- the second Kilo arrives, the two ren Romeos probably will go home to 1 Soviet Union. A 54-meter patrol boa^ reportedly of Bulgarian design alj launched in November 1984, f>na _ began trials in mid-1987, though fittlljj|. out was still incomplete at Mers-el-K® in 1986. The last batch of three Broo Marine 37.5-meter patrol boats is sl under construction at Mers-el-Kebir. Tunisia: Tunisia has begun no maJ
1984-
> being n teeb'
•ther
also
damaged. In 1987, Libya’s losses more severe, although sustained on . other “sea”: the Sahara. Chad haule an estimated $1-2 billion worth of ^ ya’s Soviet-built combat equipment a it stopped Libya’s invasion. Unders ably, there have been no signs ot naval acquisitions. -et.
Libya did receive its second So built Koni-class frigate, the Al o dabia, on 23 October 1987. Other P ^ grams continue desultorily. The Type-400 guided-missile patrol reportedly ordered from Kraljevica ^ yard in Yugoslavia at the end of 19° apparently still under construction.
The Levant . jng
Egypt: Egypt groans under a crusn js $40 billion debt, of which $10 bill ^ owed on military purchases, 'nC .Ufe|y $4.5 billion to the United States. Me^|S servicing the U. S. portion nearly e9 -q total U. S. economic aid—$600 to ^ million. Most of the borrowed m°
TUNIS!,
MOROCCO
1•Lebanon
2 Israel
3 Jordan
4 Kuwait
5 Bahrain 6-Qatar
NORTH
YEMEN
SOUTH
YEMEN
Arabian
Sea
P3ANGL/ Bay of Bengal
;desh
7 United Arab Emirates
>RI
ANKA
as Used to purchase “transcendental” 12n °rCe neec*s: a ^3.5 billion order for plv ^~'6 fighters and $700 million for ty e ^'2C early warning aircraft; the rest fefl t0 t*1e army- The navy’s share will lh Ct lts 'ow mission-priority as long as nav ^eace Pact w*th Israel holds. The y will have to work with what it has— anJhas not.
slo cont'nues t0 work—albeit Centl ' on outfitting a number of re-
'vith V
pl^a'n decidedly second-line. For exam- a ’ °f the total submarine force of ten fourC^jc'ass diesel submarines, only the
'v‘th a it.
t'v° boa
y acquired hulls (most from China) Modern equipment. Older ships will
Chinese-built boats will be fitted terria linger Librascope fire-control sys- ■ The equipment arrived in 1986, and
Th,
"ito
33
ats started their refits in June 1986. uPgrade, however, may slide well each full refit will take nearly
esse.
aionth
to complete. This program is
navntlal if Egypt is to have a working t'Urr,at U^' Only one or tw° Romeos are TChntlv operational.
rri0t| e fianghu-class frigates will also be n°Un rn'2eci- A competition was an- WhiCLe^.'n '986 for the Jianghu update, Hal W’^ reP'ace almost the entire origi- menrm'bal su'te wifh Western equip-
|had,
n° contract selection has been
('Vitj-Contenders include; Selenia-Elsag CSp 'ncantieri), Contraves, Thompson
tW'n^ Ateliers & Chantiers de la Bre- ple will be upgraded with two tri-
Qf an(I British Aerospace. b°ats Egypt’s eight Hainan-class patrol
ASw'^0 tube mounts for Stingray f,re.c *0rPedoes and a Singer Librascope 3o+_°nlr°l package to work them. The turnl?°nth upgrade is an experiment to batan(CaP’ but essentially useless, com- fig^i' lnto economical and effective teruj^S ships. if it works (on Egyptian six b0.’ 11 may *3e extended to the other
Aging
(1985) plans to acquire six more
missile patrol boats still have not progressed. Contenders for this program could be: Vosper Thornycroft, offering a repeat Ramadan class; Bazan Shipyards, with the Cormoran; and Tacoma Boatyard, Washington, with the 61- meter, 400-ton PSSM-200 design.
Israel: The cancellation of the Lavi fighter aircraft in 1987 was a great blow to Israel. The Lavi had become a symbol of Israel’s stature and future autonomy, and its killing only re-emphasized Israel’s strategic dependence on the United States. Nevertheless, there was celebration in the Israeli Navy: perhaps some of the billions saved could be channeled to needed navy programs.
Not necessarily, according to Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin. “Not all the money made available due to scrapping of the Lavi programme will be directed towards the development of new combat means ... a portion of it will be invested in closing the financial gaps from past years and in strengthening the existing forces.” The Lavi was strangling Israel’s combat readiness. The jet fighter had already put 15% of Israel’s combat aircraft into storage and grounded 20% of the Israeli Air Force’s pilots. Yet, how much of the total cost of 90 Lavis—$5.1 billion—will go to ships or submarines?
The navy’s needs are expensive and intended to enhance Israel’s maritime power materially. New submarines will do more than replace the three small 1KL/ Vickers Type-206 boats, built ten years ago. They will provide a quantum leap in capability, permitting Israel to strike its enemies thousands of miles away. Larger surface combatants would enable Israel to escort merchant ships across the Mediterranean. The total re-equipment program requires an estimated 5-8% of the defense budget. If it is not forthcoming, Navy Commander in Chief Major-General Av- raham Ben-Shushan has warned that Israel must face the “physical extinction of
the Israeli Navy.”
Political and financial entanglements have held up the submarine program, but some red tape recently may have been cut. Reportedly, Israel already approached Ingalls and Todd in the United States for contract proposals. The opening bids of both Todd and Ingalls imply that the first boat could be completed in a German yard as early as 1992, with two Israeli-assembled units to follow in 1993 and 1994. These will be sophisticated combatants—for example, contractor proposals include EDO-1100 flank hydrophone arrays able to track as many as 15 targets, but cost will still be a problem. The total cost of the three submarines and the first four of a parallel corvette program has been put at $ 1.4 billion by Ingalls and Todd, or $90 million and 7% higher than Israeli and U. S. government calculations.
The Israeli Navy would also like to start on the eight long-awaited Sa’ar-V missile corvettes as soon as possible. At about 1,150 tons and 76.2 meters overall, they would be the largest combatants ever built in Israel, though at least the first unit may be built in the United States. They would have a range of 3,500 miles at 17 knots, and would carry Harpoon and Gabriel antiship missiles, Barak vertical- launch surface-to-air missiles, and the Dolphin HH-65A helicopter now used on Sa’ar-IV boats. The only surface craft under construction are six 47-ton Dvora- class coastal patrol craft, slightly improved with greater endurance. Delivery of an expected third and final Romat- class, 500-ton missile boat has not been confirmed.
Israel is still well armed at sea against a Syrian threat unlikely to be reinforced in the near-future by Soviet Nanuchkas or Tarantuls. Big diesel-electric submarines and corvettes are meant for other enemies. Is the money really there to extend the sea theater?
Swedish- and U. S.-built speedboats, the Iranian Pasdaran's preferred weapon against Persian Gulf shipping, accounted for 48 of 76 Iranian attacks on ships in 1987. At least one Swedish-built boat was sunk by a U. S. Army helo in October.
Syria: Syria appears to have acquired a third Soviet Romeo-type submarine at the end of 1986. A third boat is certainly in keeping with Soviet sales or lending patterns to Third World clients. Syrian naval acquisitions are not sustaining the threat picture that the Israeli Navy may need to get its big new subs and corvettes.
The Arabian Gulf
Iran: The tanker war really turned ugly in 1987. Iraqi attacks on international shipping increased by 15% compared to 1986, and the number of ships attacked by Iran increased by 70%. Then there was the small matter of Iranian mines in international waters.
Iran uses its fleet more actively than does Iraq, which relies on its air force to push its naval objectives. The combatants employed by Iran, however, are unconventional. Iran generally has not attacked ships with its major units (except during October 1986—March 1987). The brunt of its naval war has fallen on converted speedboats and former commercial ships, including two Dutch-built medium land
ing ships acquired in 1985 and three 2,014-gross-registered-ton landing ships acquired from Inchon Engineering and Shipbuilding in South Korea. One of two recently received British-built tank landing ships has been used as a forward helicopter base for missile attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf.
Another civilian conversion, the Iran Ajr, was caught laying mines in international waters and scuttled by U. S. forces on 25 September 1987. This ship was part of a class of five Japanese-built commercial landing craft, two of which were sunk in 1980 after the class had been pressed into military service.
Speedboats, the preferred instrument of the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards, have caused the most trouble. Many of these fast and vicious attack boats were built for Iran by Sweden; others are of U. S. origin—a legacy of the former shah. A total of 51 of these aluminum, 12.8-meter craft were ordered from Boghammar Marine, with 40 delivered by mid-1987. The Pasdaran likes to use machine guns and RPG-7 rocket anti-tank grenades for their attacks. Speedboats accounted for 48 of 76 Iranian attacks against shipping in 1987. These attacks can wreach havoc, even if they are generally incapable of sinking a supertanker. For example, the Liberian tanker Peconic, on charter to Texaco, was hit 18 times in one attack. At least
“Boghammer Boat” was sunk by a - Army AH-6 helicopter on 8 Octobe 1987. s,
The Pasdaran had been using at le.‘ five oil drilling platforms and small 1 lands as bases for their speedboats fora)s Abu Musa, Al-Farisiyah, a platform ne Halul Island, and Sirri and Larak island ■ On 19 October, U. S. naval forces “ stroyed two of these Iranian-held offsn0 platforms used for observation and c° ducting attack missions.
The Iraqi attempt to strangle Iran <
eco-
n's
nomically has failed so far. The termin' continue to load tankers, and in 1988 V will be able to pump its war oil throng11
pipeline that avoids the Gulf and
ira <f
aircraft altogether. Tankers have rep1
edly survived Iraq's Exocets. More
ica1'
tha11
160 ships have been Exocet targets, few ships hit by the missile’s 165-D gram warhead have been lost, and 0 four of the big tankers (more n> 100,000 tons) seeking Iranian oil haV been damaged beyond repair. (0
Iraq may be spending more trying attenuate Iranian oil than Iran will eV . tually lose. At about $1.3 million a , Exocet damage can often be repaired : a fraction of the cost of the attack 1111
sion. For example, the Japanese
8, hit on 8 October by .two Exocets, repaired for $100,000. That month, ’r
was still exporting about two million
one rels per day. A more intractable pi"01
ble1”
f
^ *ran has been the world oil glut, com- ^ned with an increasingly effective, oil ''orchestrated embargo on Western laying habits. In the final months of the *ran was forced to sell very low on creS*3°f market. Ultimately, a major in- Ii„aSe 'n sa'es [°r barter] to the Soviet
may be Iran’s only chance to re-
^ajor
War
ln the presence of U. S. destroyers is
‘On- Ut,, ^rahta: The next Saudi ship a„ rjZa'—six submarines—has been -n_ awaited by European shipbuild
eagerly
ers. y, .
Ion„ ney will have to wait a while
re^6 dangerously declining petroleum
$h^nCe *984, Iraq has attacked 272 in the Arabian Gulf [as of mid- Ign^her 1987], mounting 77 attacks in Sc • Iran, which attacked less than a °f ships both in 1984 and 1985, at- 0ked 45 in 1986 and 78 in 1987. On 15
,ankember 1987’ the l02’00°-ton Greek er Ariadne was attacked by speeds and an Iranian frigate. Injecting ?r surface combatants into the tanker
Crgg*i -
lng an explosive mix for the future. ini/3**1 The Iraqi fleet, built and build- si^ ln Ita|y’ *s essentially complete, but frj Ws no sign of moving. The Lupo-class Piet *eS ^‘ll'n and Tmi Qar were com- 4/ y d *n 1985, and the Al Qadissiya and Al| ar>nouk were delivered early in 1987. I, I are securely moored at La Spezia, an(j ' The fleet support tanker Agnadeen a 000-ton floating drydock are both p^1* at Alexandria, Egypt. Given the WqmUS statc °f Iraq’s war finances, it Sejnd n°t be surprising if Saddam Hus- f|ceventually elected to sell this unused ba|i .to a needy Third World navy that is
IriiYln® at the high price of European ‘sates.
bSaudi
U1fiCr Mr
the i Wlse*y^ Saudi authorities delayed ligbtec*sion. The Gulf war has high- cjaj]ed more urgent naval needs, espe- lan"V m'ne warfare and maritime surveil- is no need to spend $4 [(°n rashly on fancy submersibles. late 'S 'mPortant for the Saudis to assimi- cjaiirecent combatant acquisitions, espe- PacU ^r'§ate anc* replenishment ship age delivered by France. The
Saudis’ four frigates, two support ships, four missile corvettes, and nine missile patrol boats have entered service since 1981. It will be difficult enough for Saudi Arabia to keep the fleet it has operational in a war theater.
The Saudis have a limited mine warfare capability: four U. S.-built MSC- 326-class coastal minesweepers. They might benefit from the acquisition of several MSH-type minehunters, especially for mine neutralization at oil terminals and in supertanker channels. In December 1987, there were reports that the Saudi Navy had invited bids from Britain, Italy, and the Tripartite consortium for eight “off the shelf” minehunters.
Maritime air surveillance is urgently needed. A multinational force of 10-12 P-3C Orion aircraft is being actively discussed by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The program would be led by Saudi Arabia, which would buy six P-3Cs, and would include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Such a force would extend the Gulf air picture—now covered by five Saudi E-3 airborne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft and eight KE-3 tankers—to include the sea.
There is an alternative to the Saudis’ plan to buy a package of brand-new submarines. Though less attractive to European builders, it might be more sensible for Saudi Arabia to follow the example of Algeria or Syria and buy a couple of reconditioned boats to get started. Britain’s Seaforth Group offered the Saudis a fully reconditioned Oberon (they call it the Mk.6), which might cost half of the price of a new boat. These are not merely refitted old boats, so they would not necessarily suffer more maintenance problems than would new-construction boats.
Maintenance issues weigh heavily, understandably, with the Saudi Navy. In a strategic context in which the kingdom would benefit more from air defense destroyers and minehunters, a more modest, digestible sub program might be in order.
Oman: The Province-class missile patrol boat, ordered in 1986 from Vosper Thornycroft, is still expected late in 1988 or early 1989. The most intriguing addition to the Omani fleet is the 10,900- gross-registered-ton auxiliary Ghubat Al Salamah, delivered by Bremer-Vulkan in May 1987. Diesel-powered, she has the appearance of a passenger-cargo ship, with side-positioned, vehicle-loading ports and a helicopter deck and hangar big enough for at least two Sea Kings.
Kuwait: Its sea approaches strewn with mines, Kuwait needs to acquire some mine warfare capability. Thus, the Dutch Government authorized the potential sale of Tripartite minehunters on 15 July 1987. Kuwait could buy the ships off-the-shelf, and the Netherlands could lay down a couple more to replace sold units. This kind of sale, already done for Greece, could emerge at the completion of the two-ship Dutch minehunting task group tour in the Gulf.
Bahrain: The first of two Type-62-001 helicopter-equipped missile corvettes, built by Liirssen, entered service in December 1987. These 62.95-meter cor-
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refurbished, yet again with French Twenty Mk-42B Sea King helicopi have been ordered from Britain. ; these apparently will be fully convert1 ^ to commando use. This kind of divis j- of labor would allow the unfettered use the Viraat as a Sea Harrier carrier.
an1
her air group could comprise as many
With
ne"'
aircraft. P'1 ran-
class destroyers. Four Kashins have rived in India, two more are building
id
iuire
iost
After
that, India should continue to acq ^ fleet escorts from the Soviet Union. ^ . likely the Sovremennyy design, de* ^ by the Indians for its great firep0"^ which is useful for supporting assa tendings. . , ny
The Indian Navy feels that it is .
~w
escorts. Following completion of
lit'
son
suites will be built around an indig^^ product of which the Indians are v
The first of two 62.95-meter Liirssen Type-62-001 missile corvettes entered Bahraini service in December 1987. These helo-equipped ships will lead Bahrain’s four 45-meter Liirssen missile boats.
vettes are intended to serve as leaders for four 45-meter Liirssen missile boats.
United Arab Emirates: Two 62-meter Liirssen missile boats were ordered in 1987. They differ from the Bahraini boats in that eight surface-to-surface missiles, the Goalkeeper gatling gun, and modified Crotale surface-to-air missile system were specified instead of a helo deck and 40-mm. antiaircraft guns. The Baglietto patrol boat program continues, with one completed in July, one in September, and two more on order.
The Indian Ocean:
Pakistan: If Pakistan scaled back its fleet plans in 1986, it seemed intent on a resurgence in 1987. In 1986, Pakistan’s plans to buy another British County-class destroyer fell through, as did a deal with Vosper Thornycroft for three modified Type-21 frigates.
In 1987, however, it appeared that British shipbuilders would sell some of their cherished new designs to an old British Empire buyer. Three Type-23 frigates were reportedly ordered on 22 March 1987, one or two to be built by Yarrow (including the Argyll off-the- stocks), and one or two to be built at Karachi Dockyard. This order, however, was snagged by mid-April, with British Ministry of Defence teams flying to Pakistan to try to free financing snags. The Type-23 may be a bit cheaper than its predecessor, the Type-22, but it is hardly a bargain.
It was reported that HMS Fife was offered in May 1987 as a sweetener for the Type-23 sale, but Chile got her. Pakistan simply cannot afford to buy new ships, but it wants and needs to replace its six antique ex-U. S. Gearing (DD-710)-c!ass destroyers.
Pakistan may realize this desire if Iraq holds a naval garage sale. Crushed by its war debt and saddled with a fleet it cannot even bring home, Iraq might smile at the prospect of a quick cash sale to Pakistan. Pakistan could dump all of its aging ex-British and U. S. hulls, and start with a clean slate—and for less than the price of a trio of expensive British frigates.
The future acquisition of E-2C Hawk- eye early warning aircraft would have real naval applications. It would, however, be difficult to suggest that they might serve a general AWACS mission. The cost of a navy-only E-2C buy could not be justified. The Sub-Harpoon missile has been deployed on Pakistani Daphne-class submarines, although not yet on the Agostas. A fourth Breguet BR1150 Atlantic maritime patrol plane was ordered in 1987, after a deal for used Australian P-3s fell through.
In an intriguing extra-regional foray, a combined Turkish-Pakistani naval exercise—the first of its kind—was held in the Aegean in 1987. Two Pakistani destroyers, the Taimur and Alamgir, and a submarine, the Hashmat, deployed.
India: With two aircraft carriers, however aged, the navy can begin to craft a larger concept of fleet employment, one that will enhance India’s broader regional goals. Although the 1987-88 naval budget grew only slightly from the 1986— 87 budget (6.4 billion rupees to 6.5 billion), the navy’s expansion program continues at a steady pace. The three significant areas of fleet development are: carriers, submarines, and amphibious lift.
The Viraal, the former British light fleet carrier Hermes, bought in April 1986, was refitted in Britain and handed over there on 12 May. She sailed for India in July, and arrived late in August.
Carriers will form the centerpiece of Indian naval strategy. This means a fleet built around new carriers. A decision must be made within the next five years to replace the aged Vikrant. There is no more talk that India would like to purchase the newly completed HMS Ark Royal or copy the Royal Navy’s Invincible design. Instead, it has been announced that a new all-indigenous ship will be built in India. Admiral R.H. Tah- liani. Chief of the Indian Naval Staff, officially confirmed in August that design work had been under way for two years.
The ship will probably be no larger than
the 28,000-ton Viraat, will take ten years
to build, and will cost 7-8 billion rupees-
• the
This is a reasonable schedule, given 1 evolution of Indian combatant shipbun ing capabilities. A design that might ap peal to the Indian Navy is the U. S. sea control ship, an existing example which is the Spanish Principe de Aslu rias. It has been rumored that India11 naval officers searching for a desig baseline for a new carrier have actual J approached Ingalls Shipbuilding in 1 United States. v
Although India has two carriers, t - are vastly different ships. The 19,00(H‘^ Vikrant is now weight-critical, and is small and overloaded to accept a s jump forward. Accordingly, the ship111. emerge from her latest refit as a sped' ized antisubmarine warfare (ASW) c° , mando carrier. For this role, the old A fixed-wing aircraft would be retained a
ble id
30 of the V/STOL fighter-bombers, this in mind, Indian orders for the
Mk-5 Harrier may reach 20 ing the navy close to 50 V/STOL aircl
Although there are no announced p to acquire airborne early warning (A*11 ^ Sea Kings, India will have a fair h1'1^, based maritime surveillance capability • 1988. The navy will receive two re bished Soviet Bear-F Tu-142Ms 1 year, with perhaps more to follow.
The core of the navy’s carrier ha group escort will be Soviet-built Kas
an1
several more probably will follow.
capable of supplying its own ASW
expanded British Leander-class, °r dian Godavari-class, program, India ^ parently will continue with a c*a'si’. ,ni eight enlarged frigates, still derived >r the Leander hull. These new 5,000 ^ ships will carry two Sea Kings, surK^.6 to-surface missiles, and possibly a dual-purpose gun mount. Their - s
civil-tribal strife. Five 39.8-meter
proud. However, when Rajiv Gandhi visited the United States in October 1987, he asked for the U. S towed linear passive sonar array used by U. S. destroyers and frigates. The U. S. has not responded.
The Indian submarine force, like the surface fleet, is striving for autonomy from Western and Soviet sources. The program to build German 1KL boats in India is progressing very slowly, apparently in part the result of design shortcomings, although the German-built pair in the program had no reported major problems. The first Mazagon Dockyard boat may be ready for trials in September 1990. If possible, India may try to improve the IKL boat and make it the basis for their future diesel-electric force. However, at the same time, the navy continues to procure Soviet Kilos. The first was delivered in August 1986 and the second in 1987. The program will extend to at least five boats.
India received its first nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) in January 1988; it is a “loader”—an older Soviet boat for familiarization. A series of new Victor-
India recently received its second Soviet-built Kilo-class submarine (the first, the Sindhugosh, below), and two of six coast guard patrol boats, the Tara Bai (right) and Ahalya Bai, built in Singapore.
Ills apparently will follow. In fact, a Victor-Ill was recently completed, long after the end of the Victor production for the Soviet Navy. Indian press reports suggest that a six-boat SSN squadron is planned.
Eventually, the Kilos could replace Indian Foxtrots for training, the IKL design could be developed for antisubmarine use, and a small squadron of nuclear boats would give India a very long range submarine punch.
India’s long-term plans envisage an all-services corps lift capability, including airlift and sealift. To this end, India purchased the plans for the British Sir
Lancelot-class tank landing ship, and modified the design to suit its needs. The result is the 5,000-ton Magar, commissioned late in 1987. A class of eight could result. This would permit a two-tank- brigade lift, sufficient to support overall Indian plans. The ability to lift heavy army units would give India the capacity to respond to threats against Indian island possessions: the Andamans, Nicobars, and Laccadive island chains. India must be thinking ahead to potential conflicts with other regional powers, such as Indonesia, which lies only 90 miles from the naval base on Great Nicobar. A security pact with the Maidive Islands was signed in 1987, further extending India’s strategic obligations, and Mauritius received a promise from India to supply patrol craft.
A class of 12 locally-designed naval corvettes is planned. The first four will have an ASW orientation, and the second batch will be general-purpose. The 90- meter Khukri-class ships will be 1,200 tons, make 27 knots, and will have one Soviet 76-mm. gun, four 30-mm. guns, and a helo deck with no hanger. The fns was launched in late 1986. The Sovtf Nanuchka, not surprisingly, is as unpop ular in India as it is everywhere else. 11 Tarantul now seems to be the Indian m1* sile corvette program of the future; are being built in the Soviet Union. T rest are to be built in India, and one mig^. expect at least two more squadrons eight.
The fourth unit of the Vikram-C coast guard patrol ships, the Vanina- . completed in January 1987; the fifth a last, the Vasira, was launched on 31 J . uary 1987. A new, larger design of S° Korean origin is to follow. Two ^ meter, 200-ton Lurssen patrol b°ats . _ dered in May 1986 from Singapore S 'P. building and Engineering, the Tara and Ahalya Bai, were delivered in n and July 1987, respectively. Four m0 are to be built at India’s Garden ReaL Dockyard under license. . s
The massive peacekeeping °Pcratl. against Tamil insurgents in Sri Lan involving 40,000 Indian troops, >s s ^ tained by sea. To strengthen its sea *ir1^ India is improving its access to Sri La through the Pamban Channel.
Sri Lanka: Local sea patrol and *n diction are the foremost maritime c ^ lenges facing this island state rent