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Wtipig independently targeted reentry Sovlc es (MIRVs), while only 352 of the
The °r s*10rt"ran§e missiles on board.
the^ Versus'submarine missiles gives Sea .aPProximately 1,660 warheads at atari °°k’n§ at *be current Soviet sub-
b:
lr'ne-to-
q ^en before General Secretary Mikhail sigF acBev antl President Ronald Reagan the intermediate nuclear force Co ) treaty on 8 December 1987, arms tontf0* exPerts 'n Moscow and Washing- trWere at work on a strategic arms araty~~labeled START, for strategic s reductions talks. The INF agree- r;0n.t addresses U. S., West German, and djrV,ei.*andbased missiles and has little Vie^Ct imPact on the Soviet or U. S. na- eve'r strategic arms reduction, how- heets kave a maj°r impact on both Tk
suh 6 V" Navy’s 38 strategic missile tjjgH^rtes (SSBNs) carry some 70% of C| nah°n’s ballistic missile reentry vehi- trtis i S) anc* aimost 40% of its ballistic havSl 6S' Soviet Navy’s 61 SSBNs c]ee,°nly 32% of the Soviet reentry vehi- 1 s. ut about 40% of the missiles. Table leSi°WS tke current Soviet and U. S. stra- RyC suhmarine inventories. The Soviet 0 j,are significantly larger than those in |au ' submarines. All U. S. submarine- p0c”ed ballistic missiles (SLBMs)— - Cl4°n C-3 and Trident C-4—have
Socles i
■soviet .. , -
1 submarine missiles are MIRVed.
ttlen(e Critical factors in a START agree- gic be the total numbers of strate- retairneentry vehicles that each side will atta , anb the issue of strategic (land- a|30 1 eruise missiles. The most talked- tjnj Possibility is that both the Soviet Pjt)j°etywhich has almost 10,000) and the 7,0on ^tates (which has just under si]ew°uld reduce their strategic mis- tionrCCntry vehicles. A widely cited op- \yar,ls kor each side to cut MIRV missile hea(£ads down to 5,000 and “war- 1,0qq0n bombers down to perhaps la’unoh„Jhis formula counts each air- ainj e<3 eruise missile as one warhead si]e acb bomb load and short-range mis- B°rnbs °ne’ re8ardless of the number of
e current Soviet 2:1 mix of land- missile mix, by the early 1990s the Soviets could have this MIRV loadout at sea in just eight Typhoon-class SSBNs. However, if the Soviets did not complete additional Typhoon SSBNs, and instead provided the remainder of the MIRVs in the Delta IV-class submarines, which are also under construction, their SSBN force could be stabilized at four Typhoons (800 MIRVs) and 13 Delta IVs (832 MIRVs)— a total of 17 submarines. A new Soviet SSBN design is being built at the Severodvinsk shipyard in the Arctic, but few details of this submarine have been made public and the number of missile tubes is not known.
The United States would probably base half of its 5,000 MIRVs on land and half in submarines. The 2,500 SLBM warheads could be loaded in 13 of the Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarines. The U. S. options are more limited than are the Soviet Union’s. The United States has already commissioned eight of the 24- tube Ohio-class submarines and is building another seven. The older, 16-tube Poseidon/Trident C-4 submarines cannot be retained past about 1997, when the last reach 30 years of service life.
Although the United States recently tested a Trident D-5 (II) missile with ten MIRVs, U. S. and Soviet specialists have agreed to credit the missile with only eight warheads. If credited with ten MIRVs per missile, however, the United States would meet a 2,500-warhead level with only ten submarines.
The cruise missile issue is more complex. Both sides have committed to establishing a numerical ceiling on sea- launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) outside of the overall strategic limits, i.e., the 5,000-MIRV limit.
Historically the Soviets have deployed relatively large submarine-launched
Submarines
Table 1 Strategic Submarine Forces
Number Missiles Reentry vehicles1
Soviet Union Typhoon | 4 | 80 SS-N-20 | 10 MIRV (6 to 9 MIRV) |
Delta IV | 3 | 48 SS-N-23 | 4 MIRV (10 MIRV) |
Delta III | 14 | 224 SS-N-18 | 7 MIRV |
Delta II | 4 | 64 SS-N-8 | single |
Delta I | 18 | 216 SS-N-8 | single |
Yankee II | 1 | 16 SS-N-17 | single |
Yankee I | 17 | 272 SS-N-6 | single (1 or 2 MRV) |
Hotel III2 | 1 | 6 SS-N-8 | single |
Totals | 62 | 926 |
|
United States Ohio | 8 | 192 Trident C-4 | 8 MIRV |
Lafayette | 12 | 192 Trident C-4 | 8 MIRV |
Lafayette | 16 | 256 Poseidon C-3 | 10 MIRV3 |
Totals | 36 | 640 |
|
'The number of reentry vehicles is based on the U. S.-Soviet accord announced in December 1987. The previously announced number is shown in parenthesis (see, for example, Caspar Weinberger, Soviet Military Power!\9%1, p. 33).
:The single nuclear-propelled Hotel retained in the SSBN role and carrying six SS-N-8 missiles is a pre-1966 submarine and is not counted in SALT limitations; its later missiles are counted. No missiles carried in diesel-electric Golf-class SSBs are counted under the SALT agreement.
’Public material indicates the Poseidon C-3 can carry as many as 14 MIRVs.
117
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missiles/MIRVs are based at sea, a c0® ventional or limited nuclear conflict A conventional naval forces attack1 r SSBNs—as proposed, for example’ former Chief of Naval Operations Ad^ ral James Watkins—could result in .£ loss of a greater fraction of U. S. strat®r forces than Soviet.2
ary” areas; fewer SSBNs to defend free more Soviet attack submarines other roles. And because fewer So
The arms control issues are comp
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cruise missiles, with the early SS-N-3 Shaddock series being developed for the strategic, land-attack role. The SS-N-3 and it successor, the SS-N-12, remain in service in Soviet diesel-electric and nuclear missile submarines. While Western intelligence sources generally estimate these to be antiship missiles, some or all of the 208 missiles in Echo II-class nuclear submarines and even the 60 in Ju- liett-class diesel boats could be land- attack weapons carrying a large nuclear warhead.1
The SS-N-3s/12s are surface-launched missiles and hence less likely to be used in a strategic role. The large SS-N-24 land-attack cruise missile, which is launched from a submerged submarine, is now being tested. One former Yankee- class SSBN has been converted to a test platform for the SS-N-24, and a new cruise missile submarine to carry that weapon is under construction.
Verification of these Soviet weapons would be relatively simple because of the requirement for specialized cruise missile submarines. But verification of the U. S. Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) and the Soviet SS-N-21 is a more complex issue.
These weapons have a 21-inch (533mm.) diameter, permitting them to be carried in all types of submarines and launched through standard torpedo tubes. Thus, any nuclear (SSN) or diesel (SS) attack submarine could be used as a cruise missile carrier. Since these submarines could be loaded with such weapons under cover or at night, accurate counting and other aspects of verification would require having observers on piers where the submarines tie up. Even the recent offer by Secretary Gorbachev to share his country’s technology for detecting nuclear weapons within a submarine may not be adequate because the technology probably cannot distinguish between types of nuclear weapons. The Soviets use nuclear torpedoes, and both navies use nuclear antisubmarine missiles in subs.
This quandary has no simple solutions. As shown in the recent INF agreement, U.S. intelligence estimates were inaccurate with respect to numbers of Soviet missiles and to the status of the SSC-4 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). The SSC-4 is the ground-launched version of the submarine SS-N-21 missile and air-launched AS-15. The U. S. intelligence community estimated the SSC-4 would not be deployed until 1988 or 1989; in December 1987, the Soviets revealed that they had 84 of the missiles “in storage” with six launchers at a site near Jelgava, south of Riga, the capital of
Soviet Latvia. The Soviets said that th® missiles were “tested but not deployed- The number of missiles and location it'd1' cate that the missiles are ready for ‘ d®' ployment,” in some respects a euph®' mism for the availability of ^ 1,800-mile missile. (The SS-N-21 mis sile became operational in 1986 and thL AS-15 in 1984.)
Another complicating factor with r®' spect to cruise missiles is that the U- 5 Tomahawk missile is carried in surfa®e ships as well as in submarines. (The S° viet SS-N-21 is not known to be cam1 in surface warships.) .
While the implications of a limitati011 on strategic cruise missiles are not cl®ar' the imposition of restrictions on subfl)® rine-launched ballistic missiles has maJ implications for the U. S. and SoVi® fleets. As noted above, 10 to 13 of 1 1 24-tubc Trident submarines would cam what would probably be the entire U- sea-based strategic cruise missile qu°*a' as 8 to 17 Soviet SSBNs could do for u*® country. ...
While a future START agreement 'vl probably reduce SSBN forces, there af® no proposals to effect a related reducti in antisubmarine forces. While both • United States and Soviet Union rnain13'^ large antisubmarine forces, a sev® SSBN reduction could give the So^1® Union an advantage. For example, We em naval leaders assume that the Sovm will use large numbers of their atm submarines to protect SSBNs in “san®1 „ ile®
and will undoubtedly have consider3 impact on the U. S. and Soviet na^1®^ Additional Soviet attack submarines ‘ sea, resulting from being freed from P tecting SSBNs or from accelerated struction in building docks that Pre.je ously produced ballistic misS j- submarines, will probably be a fact^e life. At the same time, any such inc*jee in Soviet antisubmarine forces may 1 the U. S. Navy to change its concept protecting its missile submarines.
'The equivalent U. S. cruise missiles of the f|, series were discarded in 1964 when the SLBM system became available.
2See "Maritime Strategy" supplement to the Institute Proceedings (January 1986), p- l3-
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Proceedings
February 1