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their & escalat01^
Sometimes a great power must use its power . . .
One of these days the Iranians are going to get lucky. Before they do, let’s adopt an offensive strategy.
The Navy currently has in the Persian Gulf area some 40 of its finest ships, 100-plus aircraft, and a large number of highly trained sailors and naval officers. They are there to support a “vital national interest” first declared by President Jimmy Carter in 1978. Operating at great risk under arduous conditions, they are pursuing extremely complicated objectives. But the U. S. strategy in the Gulf is both defensive and dangerous.
The current escorting of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers places U. S. naval forces in the highest continuous period of risk since the convoying operations of World War II. There are boundless opportunities for “instant actions,” and the threat comes from the subsurface (mines), the surface (a host of Iranian small craft and a few naval vessels), and the air (aircraft and missiles). With Iraqi air forces regularly striking large maritime targets and numerous other national forces operating in the area, there is the additional threat of a sudden accidental attack from someone other than the Iranians. The chance that someone in the Gulf will accidentally strike either friendly or unfriendly forces grows geometrically with every hour of operations.
The United States and those allied with its Gulf policies are attempting to accomplish something laden with Clausewitz’s “friction”—the friction that “makes the apparently easy so difficult.” It is unlikely that either our political leaders or the public understand what a difficult task our forces have in the Gulf. Simply being at sea is demanding, physically and mentally, under even the most benign conditions. Our Navy is currently engaged in extended operations just short of all-out war. The demands on men and their equipment are extraordinary.
Viewed from afar, untrained Iranian forces operating old and poorly maintained equipment do not appear to be a great threat. In virtually any imaginable encounter, the “correlation of forces” is heavily in our favor. Yet the opportunity for “friction” and—another Clausewitzian concept—-“chance” to suddenly dominate the arena grows dramatically with each aircraft sortie, each convoy mission, each Iranian attack, no matter how ill-conceived, equipped, and executed.
Policy, argues Clausewitz, must determine and control strategy. Otherwise, the use of force can escalate into mindless violence. Our declared policy in the Gulf is a traditional maritime one—to maintain freedom of the seas for the safe transit of ships in international waters. We are attempting to accomplish this reasonable objective in a hostile environment using a traditional naval strategy—convoying. This traditional strategy has a costly history. It is a defensive strategy that cedes the initiative to the enemy, allowing him to choose the time, place, and method of attack. Our national policy demands that we pursue this low-level defensive strategy while also pursuing diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Gulf crisis and bring the seven-year-old Iran-Iraq War to a reasonable conclusion (meaning no overwhelming Iranian victory). And we have to do this without totally alienating future Iranian governments or driving the Iranians into the Soviet camp. These are extremely difficult objectives to achieve.
I propose major changes to our current military strategy. If carefully executed, the new strategy will still support our national objectives and greatly reduce the chances that we will lose U. S. ships and men in the Gulf. The government should conduct the proposed strategy step by step, and accompany it with diplomatic and public relations initiatives to ensure that all participants understand it. This includes consulting privately with our allies to prevent unnecessary criticisms and surprises. The strategy involves four steps: ► Step 1. Through diplomatic pressure (and threat of force, if necessary) get
Iraq to cease its attacks on Iranian veS' sels, islands, oil-loading points, and other maritime targets.
► Step 2. Declare and enforce a mantime quarantine of all Iranian vessels and aircraft—naval, civil, small craft, and merchant ships.
► Step 3. Demand that Iran dismantle the Silkworm and other missiles post' tioned within striking distance of the Gulf. Be prepared to use force if the Iranians fail to meet reasonable deadlines for dismantlement.
► Step 4. Stop, board, and search all vessels entering, leaving, and operating in the Gulf. Impound or confiscate all vessels and cargoes contributing to the war effort.
How would the United States justify such a strategy? The United Nations charter permits the use of “appropnate force in response to aggression.” Minelaying in international waters, small boat attacks on unarmed tanked’ and the firing of Silkworm missiles clearly are hostile acts.
This strategy has several advantage It would allow U. S. naval forces to take the initiative rather than continually reacting. Under a quarantine, °ur forces could view all contacts as targe until proved otherwise; the reverse |S currently true. The strategy would reduce the number of air and surface contacts our forces must track, thus greatly lessening the “friction” in the Gulf. Finally, evenhandedly restricting Iran and Iraq would enable the Unite States and its allies to justify tions as peacekeeping and de-
Among the strategy’s disadvantage*, is that we would find it hard to “se to our allies—particularly the British’ who traditionally view convoying an other defensive actions as more appr° priate than offensive tactics. The French would probably approve if U. S. officials explained the strategy carefully. .
Initially, we would have to take nificant hostile action. U. S. forces would probably have to drive the Ira' nian small boat armada from the seas and destroy their operating bases. Th would not be particularly difficult n»
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82
Proceedings/ February
tarily, but it would certainly attract Verse public opinion. The sooner we 0 lt> the sooner the fury will subside, "tost analysts think Iraq is losing the
l^en-year war on the ground, and the (a^ls would no doubt object vigorously . u- S. restrictions on what they con- 1 er to be legitimate targets—
Pecially since it is only through those ^§ets that they can currently hurt Iran. e probably cannot justify our position them; sometimes a great power must jt^e 'ts power. The United States and QS a'hes are clearly able to deny the air la ^ers'an Gulf. as well as the n(l surrounding it, to all the countries
A compelling and honest memoir as well as a profound human document of a terrible and heroic time. Hynes can write; his story is fascinating, imaginative, and unforgettable
-James Dickey, author of Deliverance
•h the
^topping and searching all vessels in ® ^hlf could cause embarassments p Would certainly generate adverse he opinion, since a variety of nas allegedly supply weapons and aterial to either or both belligerents. r a time, however, vessels carrying in^bat cargo" would likely stop try- rar 1° enter the Gulf. Arms traffickers • c y persist when it is clear no profit
S bailable.
^hts is an offensive strategy, but of-
region.
^c‘als should plan and execute it care Q^y- It should not begin with an all
full
th ^SSault on everything that moves in Clar^uff' Rather, it should be a “de- pl ea strategy,” with step-by-step im- (_ia|ricnt>rig procedures that U. S. offi- clearly explain to all participants. liirt'S^°uld use f°rce with restraint, hi 'tln§ ourselves initially to warnings, Cq 'sPeed passes, illumination by fire ty r°l radars, and similar measures. If hiinmUSt escalate, we should use the lmurn amount of force the job re
quires
sled.
§ehami
^Ve don’t have to kill fleas with
mers.
Th
Gulf6 8rea'est danger in the Persian mt (- ■ lied
atlIT'a defensive, high-risk position to Itlensive one is clearly a big step. [pati°u*d require considerable diplo- ljes effort, cooperation from our al-
Bm a major public opinion drive. 1 the
today rests with the U. S. and al- °rees operating there. Changing
reality is that the longer we
c°ntin . y
rnorenUe W'lb our present strategy, the ship.6 *’kely we are to lose American sh0PS, ar,d sailors. Prudence—which grea be the primary concern of a ativ P0wer—dictates we take the initi- Ve 111 the Gulf.
C°Or(jjn ^'’zgerald is currently the Chief Naval f0tn,erlnator' Live Oak (SHAPE), Belgium. He havji u, ,aught strategy and policy courses at the be he]. |*r College, Newport. Rhode Island, where Str^tg 1 C thePhcn B. Luce Chair of Maritime
eed'ngs / February 1988
literary figure
II aviators, this war memoir i being called a classic even before its publication. The author, a former Marine Corps bomber pilot who flew some 150 combat missions in the Pacific, tells the story of his training and fighting - and of the growing up that went with it - in a lucid, deceptively simple style that ranks with the best literature to come out of the war. Samuel Hynes eloquently describes his rites of passage from untrained cadet to war-weary aviator, from youthful innocence to manhood. World War II veterans will relive many of their own memories through Hynes; other readers will come to better understand that age and those dramatic experiences.
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